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Abstract 
This study provides detailed evidence as to the current state of strategic control in 
European retail banking. In so doing, it also provides an unique insight into the rigour of 
the strategic management 0 fthe banks investigated. 
The increasing rapidity and magnitude of change experienced by today's society and its 
chaotic nature, results in many business organisations discovering their plans to be 
obsolete almost before they have finished creating them. Companies are faced therefore 
with the need for a systematic surveillance of the factors of change, both internal and 
external to the organisation, that will allow for a methodical monitoring of strategic 
progress and for a rapid evaluation of whether the strategies themselves require 
adjustment. Such is the process of strategic control. 
Strategic control is further defined from a comprehensive literature review of the subject 
area and its component parts are identified. A generic research model is conceptualised to 
facilitate the investigation of the range of factors that can influence strategic control 
practice. 
A sample of British, French and German retail banks is investigated in order to identify 
current strategic control practices. The principal research method used is in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with key retail banking executives. The findings based upon their 
commentary are reproduced in a narrative format. Leading strategic control experts are 
also interviewed 
The different approaches to strategic control amongst these seven leading European retail 
banks are compared and analysed in order to distinguish patterns of practice. The 
advantages and disadvantages of current practice are contrasted to recommended 
strategic control practice. 
The value of the generic research model for the investigation of strategic control practice 
is assessed and a rigorous, yet easily implemented range of strategic control tools are put 
forward as an improvement to the retail banks' current practices. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
"Two ships set sail in the self same breezes blow, but it is the 
set of the sail and not the gale that qids them where they go. ,,1 
European retail banks fmd themselves today in some unusual 'sailing' conditions . 
. __ These unusual conditions have been identified by many commentators (see for 
example: Anderton 1995 pp. 7-12; Palmer and Lucas in McGoldrick and Greenland 
1994 pp. 118-120; Howcroft and Lavis 1986 pp. 17-20), the key factors of which can 
be summarised as follows: 
• Deregulation Statutory changes have facilitated the opening up of the financial 
services sector to many new organisations. Many financial institutions also now 
have a broader spread of business operations than before. The retail branch 
network was yesterday's asset and, because of the arrival of new forms of 
competition, may become tomorrow's liability. 
• Globalisation Companies already think of the 'global market', but soon they will 
be faced with customers wanting to shop in the 'global village'. The 
internationalisation of the marketplace, stimulated by the advent of the Euro, the 
internet and cheaper telecommunications for example, will bring new challenges 
in terms of the supply and demand ofretail fmancial services. 
• Market focus An increasing customer sophistication is forcing the pace of 
change, with increasing demands for personalised, bespoke financial services. 
Retail b .ks have already shifted from process focused organisations to more of a 
customer focused operation, but banks will have to continue to keep adapting to 
meet the challenges of changing consumer requirements and the services offered 
by new market entrants. 
• Technology The impact of technology is forcing banks to be more explicit about 
their strategic decisions, such as to be market leaders or followers. The cost and 
speed of the introduction of 'new' technology will be increasingly dictated by 
I At the start of this study, I had the opportunity to conduct an interview with David Asch, Dean of the 
Open University Business School, who mentioned the above words to me and which remain for me a 
powerful analogy for the whole subject area of this thesis. The original words, slightly different to the 
above rendition, come from the first stanza of a poem by Ella Wheeler Wilcox (1916) entitled The 
Winds of Fate. 
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market competition as much as reflecting an internal choice and will have a direct 
impact upon organisational productivity and culture. 
• Management Managers need to incorporate specialised banking knowledge with . 
broader functional expertise to keep apace of the organisational and cultural 
changes brought about by an increasingly dynamic environment. 
This thesis does not attempt to provide any panacea for dealing with these forces of 
change, that must be left to the strategic decision makers within each retail bank, but 
instead investigates a generic framework to better manage the strategy once chosen. 
In so doing, this thesis agrees with Howcroft and Lavis (1986 pg. 3) that: 
"The application of a strategic methodology to retail banking as an interpretative 
and practical exercise is a vital element in structuring and focusing bank 
energies towards an increasingly complex and volatile business environment. " 
It is this pursuit of a rigorous strategic methodology, as will be discussed in further 
detail in the following chapter that leads to the need for strategic control. 
Strategic control as its name clearly indicates is about maintaining control over 
strategy. This looks at fIrst glance simple enough, but unfortunately it is not as simple 
as it appears. The root of the complexity is that strategy is about a future position and 
we can not guarantee that we can arrive at that future position or indeed what is going 
to happen en route to trying to attain it (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1994 pp. 9-47). 
Furthermore, how we;eal with the future strikes at the heart of how we deal with the 
present, requiring also an understanding of how we dealt with the past. This 
complexity leads to the inevitable conclusion that "strategy isn't easy" (Whittington 
1993 pg. 2), that strategic issues are "messy and complex" (Finlay 1994 pg.152) and 
the realisation that the control of strategy must be equally difficult. 
This study maintains that despite our inevitably incomplete knowledge about the 
future, it is preferable to have a strategy with which to face the future. Given this 
position and the fact that a strategy is to be defined, then this study also maintains that 
some form of 'control' over the pursuit of strategy should be exercised. Returning to 
the above nautical analogy, strategic control can be likened to good seamanship, 
where the sails need to be used to best effect, along with all the equipment on board, 
2 
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in order that the ship attempts to reach its port of destination. Likewise, the crew of 
the ship need to keep a careful watch, throughout the ship's journey, on what is 
happening both within the ship and with the weather outside. Indeed, by maintaining 
this watch, the crew can make changes to try to keep the ship on course, and similarly, 
if something unexpected arises, such as the arrival of pirates off the port bow, changes 
can be made to best cope with those eventualities, for example preparing for battle, 
changing course or ultimately climbing into the lifeboats! 
Business organisations today are faced with rapid change, both internal and external 
to the organisation, which forces managers to deviate from the best of plans. Business 
organisations in all modem day societies have some notion of the importance of 
maintaining a close eye on budgets and exercising some form of control over 
finances. Many people, particularly bankers, would even call this just plain common 
sense. The need to balance income with expenditure and to budget for the following 
year is usually perceived as good financial practice. Furthermore very few business 
managers would spend time producing a budgetary plan and then fail to monitor real 
progress with that planned. Strangely however, whilst fmancial plans are usually 
modified and updated, when it comes to strategy and strategic plans this logic appears 
to be often lost (Coad in Berry et al. 1995 pp. 119-138). At fIrst glance, it would 
appear that finance and an awareness of the profit and loss situation is more important 
to managers than the actual objectives of all the expenditure or profitability, i.e. the 
strategy pursued (Bungay & Goold 1991, Byars, Rue & lahra 1996 pg. 264). 
The' gic of this position however, must surely be flawed. The strategy must have 
changed and the organisation must be aware of the change, because it will be moving 
toward a different goal or trying a different route to attaining the original goal. It is 
merely the fact that the strategic plan has not been formalised into a document for 
distribution, but it will be known informally by members of the organisation. 
Strategic control, therefore, appears to be informal as well as formal. But what 
exactly are the components of strategic control? 
This study attempts to provide an answer to this difficult question. It does this by 
investigating strategic control practice within European retail banks. Europe is the 
birthplace of retail banking and today each country within Europe still has many 
different retail banks in existence. On the eve of the introduction of the European 
3 
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Single Currency it will be interesting to see which one will develop its core business 
away from its domestic market to become the first true European retail bank:. This 
opportunity for European retail banks is set within an even wider context of change, 
with it being genera\1y noted that the: 
"European banking and financial markets currently find themselves in a decade 
of fundamental change. Intensified competition, a new regulatory framework, the 
increasing role of technology and more sophisticated and mobile customers all 
place pressure on traditional credit institutions. " (European Commission 1996 
Section 23 pg. 9) 
The European Commission (1997 Section 24 pg. 1) noted further, that these 
"dramatic changes" have resulted in ''pressures for the adaptation of business 
strategies. " This thesis argues that as banks become increasingly strategic in their 
outlook they will need greater control over their strategy. 
A certain paradox has been noted by some observers (see for example: Horovitz 1980, 
Goold & Quinn 1990a; Asch 1992) that whilst strategic control writers have ca\1ed for 
greater use of strategic control, businesses are apparently not using any system or 
using an inadequate system of strategic control. This research investigates this 
paradox, it identifies the state of existing practices within European retail banks and 
compares and analyses their different approaches to strategic control. It also 
identifies a number of 'tools' that a\1ow for a rigorous and appropriate 'best' practice 
strategic control sys' m. 
Prior to any investigation of strategic control practice, however, an exploration of 
what is meant by the term strategic control is required. The literature pertaining to 
strategic control is therefore considered in Chapter 2, with a focus upon its origins in 
strategy and control theory. This literature review also a\1ows for the identification of 
the 'best' practice from the strategic control theory and sets the scene for identifying 
the 'determinant' or causal factors of strategic control. 
Chapter 3 identifies the research framework for the exploration of patterns of strategic 
control within European retail banks, making note of a number of national differences 
as identified by comparative management writers. A generic research model is 
4 
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introduced as the basis for the research framework, allowing for the specification of 
the research objectives. 
In Chapter 4, the practical detail of the research design is outlined. The precise 
research questions to be investigated are specified and the choice of research methods 
is justified. The rationale behind the selection of retail banks chosen for this 
investigation is discussed and details of the respondents participating in this research 
are given. 
The findings of the different retail banks investigated are detailed in a narrative 
format in Chapter 5. Each retail bank 'story' is outlined in a similar way, allowing for 
a comparison of'stories', and easy referral back to the generic research model. 
Chapter 6 draws together the conclusions of the study. The value of the generic 
research model is determined, as are the practical implications of this study for 
practitioners. The limitations of the research are noted and the potential areas for 
further research are highlighted. 
A graphical interpretation of the structure of this study is provided in Figure I below 
to help the navigation of the reader through the thesis. 
5 
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Figure 1: An Overview of the Thesis Structure 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
This Chapter explores the concept of strategic control as outlined in the existing body of 
literature. In order to gain a full understanding of strategic control, however, the terms 
'strategy' and 'control' need to be reviewed and defined. These terms will be discussed in 
sections one and two respectively. Once this background detail has been exposed, the 
third section of the literature review will deal specifically with the 'strategic control' 
literature with a view to highlighting the best state-of-the-art practice. Finally a fourth 
section will identifY and analyse the factors that influence and shape strategic control 
practice. 
Section 1: Strategy 
2.1.0 Origins of Strategy 
The term 'strategy' originates from the Greek word 'strategos' meaning "art of the 
General" (The Oxford English Dictionary 1989). This origin clearly links strategy to the' 
management of battle campaigns and the strategic manoeuvring of forces for better 
competitive position. It fixes strategy in the heart of military analogy and, although not 
completely pertinent in today's business world, it does provide some valuable bases of 
comparison, with, for example, companies competing within market places, carrying out 
strategic thrusts and formulating strategic plans. Indeed, managers often talk about 
'attacking' markets and 'defeating' rivals, etc., but the analogy must stop, however, when 
realism is introduced and the slaughtering of one's competitors is compared to the realities 
of outselling them and the confines ofpennissible market practices. 
Strategy in everyday English is used to mean the 'overall plan of campaign'. However, 
despite the fact that the subject of strategy appears to have found its way into business 
7 
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related literature in the 1960s (see for example: Andrews 1987- in its latest edition; Ansoff 
1965; and Chandler 1962), agreement on the exact definition in current management 
literature is still elusive and seemingly inconsistent today. Consultants and theorists, 
actively pursuing and at times competing for a business advisory role, appear to find the 
agreement on the exact definition of this much debated subject difficult to come to 
(Mintzberg 1990). 
This said, strategy has been defined by many commentators, and, in one much read 
definition (Johnson and Scholes 1993 pg. 10), is expressed as: 
"strategy is the direction and scope of an organisation over the long term: ideally, 
which matches its resources to its changing environment, and in particular its 
markets, customers or clients so as to meet stake holder expectations. " 
Mintzberg (1995 pp. 13-21), however, perhaps summarises the different views of strategy 
the most clearly, he notes that strategy is typically viewed as a plan, a pattern of actions, a 
competitive position or a perspective. The view of strategy as a plan clearly refers us back 
to the military origins of the word, with the business manager implementing consciously 
intended courses of action. The definition of strategy as a pattern conjures up 
consistencies or trends in behaviour, whether intended or not, for example, when Picasso 
went through his 'blue period' this could be perceived as his current strategy at that time. 
Similarly, the perspective definition of strategy leads us to behaviour once again, but this 
time behaviour is ingrained into the corporate ideology: it is the shared concepts and 
culture of the organisation that distinguishes McDonald's 'quality, service, cleanliness, and 
value' from other fast-food retailers or Audi's 'Vorsprung durch Technik' from its 
competitors (particularly non-German ones). Lastly, the definition of strategy as a 
position, links the organisation with its environment, for example, a company develops its 
competitive advantage and pursues a strategy of differentiation or economy of scale 
(Porter 1980). Indeed, various commentators have formulated descriptive models that 
illustrate the types of strategy pursued by different business organisations; Simons (1990) 
8 
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provides a succinct review (see Table I) of several of the more influential of these, and 
notes that: 
"strategic archetypes demonstrate that firms can compete successfully in a variety of 
ways". 
Table 1: Illustrative Studies of Strategic Archetypes 
Study Identified arcbetype 
Mintzberg (1973) Entrepreneurial 
Adaptive 
Planning Mode 
Utterback & Abcrnathy (1975) Perfonnance maximising 
Sales maximising 
Cost minimising 
Miles & Snow (1978) Defender 
Prospector 
Analyser 
Reactor 
Porter (1980) Overall cost leadership 
Differentiation 
Focus 
Features 
Opportunity seeking, founding CEO, bold decisions, growth 
oriented high uncertainty. 
Reactive, incremental goal setting, relative certainty in decision 
making. 
Analysis dominates decisions, integrated strategies, placid 
environment. 
Uncertain environment. offers unique products. searches for new 
opportunities. 
Standardised products, more stable environment, high level of 
competition, some product differentiation. 
Standard product, extreme price competition, high efficiency,low 
innovation, sophisticated control techniques. 
Stable environment, limited product range, competes through low 
cost or high quality, efficiency paramount, centralised structure. 
Always seeking new product and market opportunities, uncertain 
environment, flexible structure. 
Hybrid. Core of traditional products, enters new market after 
viability established, matrix structure. 
Lacks coherent strategy, structure, inappropriate to purpose, 
misses opportunities, unsuccessful. 
Low price, high market share focus. Standardised product, 
economies of scale, tight cost control. 
Product uniqueness brings brand loyalty, emphasis on marketing 
and research. 
Focus on defined buyer group, product line or geographic market. 
Niche strat~. 
Sourtt: Simon~ R. (1990) 
Finally, Band and Scanlan (1995) note that: 
• strategy is a product of rational analysis, ideally comprehensive but in reality bounded 
by certain cognitive limits which condition the assumptions upon which strategy is 
built. 
• strategy is a function ofleadership, particularly of the symbolic role that leaders play 
in setting vision and mobilising the organisation to achieve it. 
9 
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• strategy is interactive, a product of negotiation or information exchange between 
leaders and followers. 
2.1.1 Strategic Management 
The above points suggest that a certain amount of thinking and planning is required for 
strategic management to be successful. It is perhaps useful to make the distinction clear at 
this point between strategic thinking and strategic planning. The Strategic Planning 
Society' defines these tenns in the following way: 
"Strategic thinking is the creative thinking and learning process of the board and 
senior managers that focus on policy formulation, analyses of the changing 
political, economic, social technological and physical environments, and the 
competition, which allows them to position the organisation for maximum effect in 
its markets. " 
"Strategic planning is the organisational work and process through which purpose, 
vision, missions, objectives, strategy, major policies and key goals are developed in 
a systematic way. Strategic planning in large complex organisations is required to 
develop: corporate strategy, business strategy and functional strategy. Strategic 
planning should provide an integrative framework for other forms of planning, and 
is a necessary preliminary to financial projection, project planning, operati~'lal 
planning and budgeting in any strategically managed organisation. " 
Strategic thinking and planning, as seen from the above, becomes essential therefore to 
any strategic management process. It must be remembered however, that there are many 
different approaches to strategic thinking and planning. Morgan (1986) identified 9 
approaches or cognitive mindsets (which he called metaphors) to explain how managers 
might view the organisations within which they work. The names of these metaphors are 
I Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (1993) and The Strategic Planning Society Membership 
Handbook (1996) 
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illuminating in themselves, where he identified organisations as: machines, organisms, 
brains, cultures, political systems, psychic prisons, instruments of domination and of flux 
and transformation. Interestingly, the belief of an individual in any particular perspective 
is suggested to predispose them toward a certain way of understanding of an organisation 
and to lead them to a certain predisposition in their involvement with it. In this way, a 
narrowness of scope can result and even conflicts of interest could arise, which can clearly 
lead to extremes of action if a suitable compromise is not found (see, for example, the 
clash between strategy and finance: Kaplan and Norton 1992; Grundy 1992; Tornkins 
1991; Barwise et al. 1989). 
Likewise, strategic management has been approached in various ways, typically that of a 
process or as a result of structure or arrived at through logical incrementalism or as a 
necessary contingency. A brief outline of each approach is given below. 
The Process Approach: 
Many commentators (see for example: Byars, Rue & Zahra 1996; Pearce and Robinson 
1991 pg. 1; Thomas 1988), break the strategic management process down into three 
stages: strategy formulation, implementation and control (see Figure 2 below). This 
approach is founded in the rationalist school, where one assesses the environment, 
formulates a strategy and then goes on to secure its implementation (Kay 1995 pg. 337). 
It is an approach that because of its logical sequen~;ng is particularly popular amongst 
teachers of strategy and practitioners: strategy managers can follow an easily charted 
process, using the many strategic tools and guides that have been designed to help. It fits 
the military origin of strategy and is 'comforting' in its mechanistic, impersonal and 
unemotional framework. 
At this point it is perhaps useful to note that this rational or systematic view is particularly 
valuable when discussing and implementing controls (see Section 2 of this chapter for 
further details). 
\I 
Literature Review 
Figure 2: The Traditional Strategic Management Process 
. Strategy ~ Strategy ~ Strategy 
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Source: Preble (1992) 
The Structure Approach: 
The 'structure approach' to strategy was developed from Chandler's (1962) ground 
breaking work which described structure following strategy: i.e. changes in strategy 
ultimately resulting in changes in organisational structure. In thinking about the logic of 
this approach it is useful to refer to a definition of organisational structure; Mintzberg 
(1979 pg. 2) defines structure as: 
"the sum total of the ways in which the organisation divides its labour into distinct 
tasks and then achieves co-ordination between them. " 
The "7 S's" of Peters and Waterman (1982) however, remind us that structure alone does 
not make an organisation. Structure, on the one hand, plays a vital role in shaping the 
organisation and as a result influences strategy, and conversely, strategy shapes an 
organisation and influences organisational structure (Galbraith and Nathanson in Schendel 
and Hofer 1979 pp. 249-283). Mintzberg (1995 pp. 350-371) points to a range of 
"situational factors" that influence organisational structure, namely: the age and size of 
the organisation, its technical system, the characteristics of the organisational environment 
and the influences of power systems. These factors or contingencies, engender "pulls" on 
the organisation, thus resulting in various differently shaped organisational configurations: 
that of an entrepreneurial or machine or professional or diversified or innovative or 
missionary or political organisation. 
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The Incremental Approach: 
The incremental approach to strategy was born from the observation that organisations 
changed their strategies in ways which were at odds with that prescribed in the strategic 
planning literature of the 1970's. Rather than following a logical step by step process, 
strategies were perceived to emerge: 
"'Logical incrementalism' is not 'muddling' as most people use that word. It is 
conscious, purposeful, proactive, good management. Properly managed, it allows 
the executive to bind together the contributions of rational systematic analyses, 
political and power theories, and organisational behaviour concepts. It helps the 
executive achieve cohesion and identity with new directions. It allows him to deal 
with power relationships and individual behavioural needs, and permits him to use 
the best possible informational and analytical inputs in choosing his major courses 
of action. .. " (Quinn 1978). 
The Contingent Approach: 
Contingency theory leads us to the conclusion that no 'best' form of organisation can exist, 
but rather successful organisations have arrived at a fortuitous match between the 
organisation and its environment (Kay 1 Q95 pg. 361). Similarities here exist with the 
Ricardian economics theory of comparative advantage, with each nation state pursuing 
areas of excellence, surviving through international trade, and in so doing producing an 
efficient market. In management terms, however, the organisational form is arrived at as a 
match between internal and external forces. 
The current state of internal competing values (see for example Quinn 1988 pg. 48) 
undergoes constant change, being buffeted through a continuous process of negotiation 
and imposition. The organisational strategic management process is, indeed, not set in a 
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vacuum, but rather formulated with reference to complex inter-relating factors. Johnson 
and Scholes (1988 pg. 113-5) comments upon these influences (see Figure 3 below). 
Figure 3: Influences on Organisational Strategy 
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Source: Wilson et al. (1992) adapted from Jobnson and Scboles (1988 pp. 113-5) 
It is clear that the factors affecting strategy are numerous and specific to the strategy in 
question and the organisation as a whole. Morgan, similarly, concludes his discussion of 
"images of organisation" by noting that "organisations are many things at once!" His 
book is as much a critique of existing perspectives as it is a review, and one is left 
searching for new metaphors. Likewise, the complexity of organisations and the impact 
upon strategic management is highlighted by Stacey (1991) in his treatment of 'scientific 
chaos and dynamic management'. All of these complexities of organisational management 
as a whole and strategic management in particular, lead us to the paradox that on the one 
hand our perspectives are flawed and can never be fully perfect, and on the other, that 
because understanding the organisation's advantages and disadvantages, in both a past and 
future time frame, is so important, it is necessary to improve that vision. Indeed, the 
rationalist view of an organisation with 'X' inputs and 'V' outputs and the strategy 
process as a logical sequence from formulation to implementation and evaluation, 
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including various control feedback loops, is at odds with Mintzberg's compelling 
practitioners' picture of emergent strategy (see Figure 4). The need to understand how 
strategy emerges and how intended strategy can become unrealised, is indeed the basis of 
much strategy research and provides a key rationale behind the need for strategic control. 
Figure 4: Deliberate and Emergent Strategies 
Sourct: Mintzberg (199S pg. IS) 
In terms of strategy, Kay (1995) noted that the distinctiveness and success of an 
organisation . lies in its mix of business relationships and capabilities. The business 
relationships being both internal and external to the organisation, in other words the 
relationships the organisation has with its stakeholders (suppliers, customers, employees 
and shareholders) and its environment within which is operates (competitors, government, 
economic pressures, etc.). The distinctive capabilities (derived from organisational 
architecture, reputation, innovation) and a business organisation's strategic assets (for 
example, coming from the benefits of a monopoly situation or from a protected market or 
from the cost advantages of being already incumbent in the marketplace) together create 
the firm's competitive advantage. 
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Looking at an example in European retail banks, according to Heffernan (1996 pg. 312): 
"In banking, external and internal architecture is related to the establishment of 
long term relationships between the bank and its customers and the bank and its 
officers. Architecture varies considerably amongst countries. In Germany and 
Japan, shared directorships and cross-holdings of shares give rise to strong 
relational contracts between banks and non-financial firms, whereas British and 
American banks tend to rely on transactional or classical contracts, making lending 
decisions on the basis of security of assets and project feasibility." 
Reputation in retail banks is of extreme importance, as shown clearly in the history of bank 
insolvency, where a loss of depositor confidence in a bank's liquidity leads quickly to a 
'run' to remove deposits, which can snowball into bankruptcy. A bank's reputation may 
also be one reason for the inertia in consumers' banking habits, with few customers 
moving from one retail bank to another partly because of the efforts of the banks to 
portray themselves as solvent and secure institutions (backed up by protective regulatory 
systems), thereby assuaging their depositors fears (Kay 1995 pg. 291-292). 
Innovation, for example the recent introduction of telephone banking services, is generally 
more of an uncertain distinctive capability than perhaps in other industries, due to the 
problem that bank innovations tend to be expensive to implement and when they are 
implemented they t--ld to be easily copied. As a result of this certain categories of 
"strategic attitude" amongst bankers can be distinguished (see Figure 5 below), where: a 
conservative banker has a high degree of personal intuition and instinct (independent of 
the market) which could lead to a 'I have always done it this way, I know best' approach; 
compared to an inventive banker who is highly sensitive and responsive to the market 
place; or an imitator who is guided by the principle 'never. do something the first time' 
and is a strong follower of 'herd instinct'; or fInally, the collective player attitude amongst 
groups of bankers be they in savings banks and co-operative banks or joint ventures and 
strategic alliances. An individual bank's strategy tends to be shaped by the sum of the 
total of different bankers' attitudes, where in some banks one strategic attitude may 
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become pervasive in its culture and in others the attitude may be confined to a sub-cultural 
element (Schuster 1996 pg. 6-7). 
Examples of strategic assets amongst retail banks would be the branch network and loyal 
customer base, both of which, as Kay points out (pg. 300) have remained nationally based 
within Europe to date. 
low 
Market 
autonomy 
high 
Figure 5: Strategic Attitudes of Bankers 
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Source: Schuster (1996) 
The state of the mix at any point in time of these business relationships and capabilities in 
turn defines the existing state of competitive advantage of the business organisation. Kay 
argues further that success comes from capitalising upon unique features. A successful 
strategy therefore should pursue and safeguard these unique features, rather than more 
generic strategies, such as differentiation or cost leadership, because they are less 
appropriable by competitors. Returning to the example of European retail banking, the 
current situation would appear particularly difficult: on the one hand new market entrants 
(such as the supermarket banks in the UK) can bring with them good business 
relationships with potential customers, and on the other, change in the market place (with 
the arrival of the Euro for example) erodes the protected nature of the banking market and 
facilitates the potential entry of competing banks with similar or better business 
capabilities. 
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2.1.2 Summary 
Organisational strategy in simple terms is about positioning the business organisation and 
its component parts in a particular way in a defined future. In so doing however the 
manager needs to understand a multitude of influencing factors upon strategy. These 
factors are both internal and external to the organisation. The total number of factors 
considered by the manager is perhaps dependant upon his own perspective of the 
organisation or more realistically the perspectives brought to the fore during the strategic 
thinking and planning processes. To summarise the various approaches to strategic 
management one could say strategy is based on the juxtaposition of internal focus versus 
external focus, centralisation versus decentralisation and 'best' strategic fit. The definition 
of 'best' strategy consequently is perhaps more aptly described as the 'most successful' 
strategy, which of course can only be definitively judged with the benefit of hindsight. 
Sectiou 2: Control 
2.2.0 The Meaning of Control 
The origin of the word 'control' is the French tenn meaning 'inspection' and indeed, 
control has this connotation in several European languages (Hofstede 1968 pp. 9). It is 
howevpr, a word with many different interpretations and nuances, including that of 
'checking' and 'testing', as well as the idea of 'domination' and 'power' and that of 
'regulation' and 'monitoring'. Indeed, Rathe (1959) has listed '57 varieties' of meaning 
for the word control. 
2.2.1 Control Systems in Organisations: 
The focus of this study is the investigation of strategic control practice. As we have seen 
in Section 1 of this chapter, however, strategy is a complex issue as it affects all the 
systems within a business organisation. Managers must 'struggle' for some fonn of 
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control over these numerous systems. Before discussing this further, however, we first 
need to explore what is meant by the terms (a) systems and (b) control. 
(a) What is a system? 
Broadly speaking, a system can be described as a collection of interacting components 
(Shwarzenbach and Gill 1992; Beer 1966 pp. 241). It needs to be born in mind however, 
that the point of interest could also be one single part of a system or perhaps the wider 
'universe' within which the system lies. The system of interest, for example, may be that 
of a vehicle, the engine of the vehicle, or a particular valve within the engine; it may be a 
human being, or a part of the human body such as the human nervous system; likewise it 
might be the economy of a particular country, or of an individual industry within that 
country. The interaction of the system in question with that of its surroundings or 
environment, may on the other hand be of interest to the observer, for example, a study 
might be made of the impact of a nuclear power station on the surrounding community, 
rather than on a specific system within the nuclear reactor. 
In any definition of the system of interest, careful consideration needs to be made of where 
to draw the boundaries to the system and of which signals crossing the system boundary, 
and internal to it, are of relevance (Shwarzenbach and Gill 1992; Miller and Rice 1967 pp. 
7-10). The signals entering across the boundary to the system can be called 'system 
inputs' and the signals leaving the system across the boundary to the environment (,""]. be 
termed 'system outputs'. In this way the system can be simplified into a simple 'model' of 
cause and effect relationships, often represented by a block diagram, where blocks are 
used to represent separate functional parts of the system and arrowed lines are used to 
depict signal flow paths. A mathematical model of the system can then be made. The 
separate equations of input-output relationships of components as a result can be 
calculated and combined in order to build up a more complex model of larger systems 
made up of several component parts. 
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Types of system 
Boulding (1956) noted a hierarchy of systems, his "system of systems", with nine levels 
each having different control characteristics: 
--~--l. Static structures or frameworks (e.g. a bridge or the pattern of electrons around a 
nucleus), the accurate description of which being the origin of organised theoretical 
knowledge in nearly all fields. 
2. Simple dynamic (mechanical) systems (e.g. a clock). 
3. Cybernetic or closed-loop systems, with given goals, (e.g. a thermostat or biological 
homeostasis), where the communication and interpretation of information is an 
essential part of the system. 
4. Open, self-maintaining systems (e.g. a cell), often capable ofreproduction and having 
a 'life'. 
5. Plant, or society cells, with "differentiated and mutually dependent parts (roots, 
leaves, seeds, etc.) and second, a sharp differentiation between genotype and 
phenotype2 ... " 
6. Animal, characterised by the brain. 
7. The human system, characterised by language and self-consciousness. In particular, 
self-reflection introduces knowledge of life and death, with notions of life span (and 
after-life), history and future aspirations shaping human behaviour. 
8. Social organisations. (Le. the impact or "role" of individuals on social systems and ~ 
their channels of communication). 
9. Transcendental systems (Le. "the inescapable unknowables"). 
This hierarchy succeeds in highlighting the gaps of theoretical and empirical knowledge; it 
also highlights the differences between the social and physical sciences. In the physical 
sciences definitions for many of the intangibles have been agreed upon, whilst in the social 
sciences there is general agreement with many systems models existing up to the fourth 
2 Phenotype is defined by The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) as: ''A type of organism distinguishable 
from others by observable features; the sum total of observable features of an individual, regarded as the 
consequence o/the interaction o/its genotype with its environment", er. genotype: "The genetic 
constitution of an individuaf'. 
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leve~ however with considerably fewer existing beyond that. The traditional 
organisational theory ofTaylor (1911) and Fayol (1949), for example, fits the second level 
type sub-systems in Boulding's hierarchy, whereby extra productivity could be obtained 
from a worker through a simple increase in an individual's wages over that of the average 
level. Cybernetics, in addition, has led to many sub-systems at the third level which form 
the basis of much of the current management accounting and operational systems, albeit 
that these systems can be complex with numerous interacting feedback loops. Beyond 
that, however, consensus in social sciences' literature is less forthcoming with often 
divergent views appearing. Sociologists and the later day behavioural scientists and 
industrial psychologists have attempted to contribute to the systems theory of 
organisations at the eighth level, albeit that they themselves are at the less complex level 
seven. Hofstede (1980 pg. 15) notes: 
"Man the social scientist is at level 7; he is less complex than his object. He can 
never completely grasp what goes on at the level of social systems, and therefore his 
perception of them will never be the same as his colleague's perception." 
This does not mean however, that our exploration of these higher order systems is 
fruitless, but rather we must be aware of its shortcomings and the need to look at our 
subjects from many different angles. Hofstede suggests further that: 
"Social scientists approach the social reality as the blind men from the Indian fable 
approached the elephant; the one who gets hold of a leg thinks it is a tree, the one 
who gets the tail thinks it is a rope, but none of them understand what the whole 
animal is like. We will never be more than blind men infront of the social elephant; 
but by joining forces with other blind men and women and approaching the animal 
from as many different angles as possible, we may find out more about it than we 
ever could do alone. " 
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Checkland (1981 pp. 110-122) introduces another systems typology, his "systems 
classes": 
• natural systems which are fundamental to the universe as it exists. 
• designed physical systems which are conceived by humans for a purpose, e.g., a 
vehicle. 
• designed abstract systems which are conceived by humans to represent and order the 
product of human consciousness, e.g., mathematics, philosophy, etc. 
• human activity systems which provide coherency, purpose and sustainability ofhurnan 
life, e.g., from simple bartering as a means of existence to the formation of complex 
international organisations. 
• transcendental systems which include all systems beyond knowledge. 
These classes could be seen as a reductionist's attempt at minimising the number of 
systems that can be used to describe reality. Checkland, indeed, designed this typological 
map as a means of simplifYing systems theory, however many social systems do not fall 
clearly into one of the above classes. Taking Boulding's systems hierarchy, by way of 
comparison, levels one, two and three are designed physical systems; levels four, five, six 
and the existence of man in level seven would be natural systems; transcendental systems 
are clearly a direct copy of Boulding's level nine; but levels seven and eight are both 
human activity systems and designed abstract systems, as well as being partly based upon 
human emotion which is fundamentally part of the nature of man and consequently f7.\ls 
into the class of natural systems. This over simplification can as a result lead to confusion 
and so in order to avoid this, this thesis will only refer to Boulding's more specifically 
detailed hierarchy of systems. 
Both systems typologies however, highlight the complexity of social systems, whereby 
business organisations, which is what this thesis is concerned with, are depicted as human 
activity systems that make use of designed physical and abstract systems, but are 
characterised by a natural order of relationships or natural systems. Interestingly, 
Checkland quotes the 19th century sociologist ninnies, distinguishing between the 
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'community' to which we belong, made up offamily, neighbours and friends, and 'society' 
where we associate ourselves with others for a particular purpose and end. This 
distinction he argues fonns the basis of human behavioural activity. 
Beer (1966 pp. 256-257) notes that 'complex' economic, social and industrial systems 
must have viable characteristics which include the ability: 
• to respond to a stimulus which was not included in the list of anticipated stimuli when 
the system was designed; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
to learn from repeated experience the optimal response to that stimulus; 
to grow and renew themselves; 
to be robust against internal breakdown and error; 
and, most importantly, to be capable of change and survival in enyironments that may 
not have been envisaged by their designer. 
He adds that treating these systems: 
"through concepts. models and controls that are deliberately of low complexity is to 
rob these systems of their viability. " 
In this way, any artificial isolation of a system, for ease of management, risks denying the 
system any hope of viability. Likewise, concentration upon a r~rticular sub-system to the 
exclusion and detriment of the other parts of the system risks system dysfunction. 
(b) Types of control 
Let us now take a snapshot of a business organisation at a particular moment in time as 
our system for analysis. Its legal entity could be likened to that of a static structure; it 
may use many basic manufacturing tools that are simple dynamic systems; its accounting 
and production control is likely to be based predominantly upon cybernetic closed-loop 
systems; a meritocratic career progression policy could be seen as a human system; its 
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use 0 f quality circles and the formation of a company football team would fulfil the criteria 
of social organisations or social systems. Clearly in this highly limited description of a 
company numerous levels of system can be seen to exist based potentially upon all of the 
systems classes. How then does this knowledge help us to control the business 
organisation? 
Before answering the above question it is important to first note that numerous types of 
control exist and structure the world in which we live. This thesis deals however with 
management control and in particular strategic control 
The relatively new science of cybernetics, which according to Wiener (1962 pp. 11) 
encompasses "the entire field of control and communication theory" in the animal 
(including man) and machine, has taken over the subject of control in the same way that 
chemistry has taken over the chemical elements. The chemical elements existed before, 
but it was not until chemistry studied them that a periodic table was produced and many 
new insights into the elements were made, likewise control has always existed, but 
cybernetics has contributed a new structure for our understanding of control The science 
of cybernetics, named by Wiener in 1948 from the Greek for steersman, allowed 
organisms for the first time to be discussed and analysed in the same terms as purposeful 
machinery with defined inputs and outputs. The classic example of a Pavlov dog (Pavlov 
1849-1936) was thus absorbed into the new cybernetic school. Of particular interest here 
however, is how cybernetics had the effect of introducing a 'simplistic' ITamework and 
terminology with which human organisations and their control systems could be depicted. 
Cybernetic control models thus allowing for valuable insights to be made into management 
control systems and providing the means to design and improve these systems. 
At this point it would be useful to put forward a working definition of cybernetics, 
however, as Apter (1966 pp. 2-20) points out, genuine differences of opinion exist as to 
what cybernetics is and what it should be. On the one hand cybernetics is defined as a 
science (Wiener 1948) and on the other an art (Couffignal 1963). For the purpose of this 
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chapter therefore, I will follow the broad path outlined by Ashby (1956), where, in the 
words ofPask (1961), cybernetics: 
"gives emphasis to abstracting a controllable system from the flux of the real world" 
··~-This above statement, whilst not a definition, still limits cybernetics to level 3 in Boulding's 
hierarchy -at this point in time of human knowledge. The rationale behind this statement 
is that other systems above level three on Boulding's scale, are clearly not so easily 
depicted. Not only are the systems more complicated, which makes control design more 
difficult, but preference and human emotion appear further up the hierarchy making the 
prediction of system outputs from inputs more uncertain. Any attempt at controlling these 
systems must therefore be more complex and more judgmental. 
Management Control 
The science of cybernetics has enabled the design of 'simplistic' models of organisms and 
their control systems, to varying degrees of accuracy. Models of business organisations' 
management control systems have also been created which are often simple in nature. 
Often, however, they are not fully capable of representing the complete picture of reality, 
with, for example, many of the inputs or stimuli to the control system being ignored or 
forgotten. This said, if the limitations of the model are known or at least realised, the 
outputs or actions can be modified accordingly and ~"grees of error allowed for. 
Lorange (1986) highlights a valuable set of limits for management control, as seen in 
Figure 6 below: 
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The limits of control are shown in the Figure 6 to be dictated by the system environment: 
there is little hope of control or no control at all in systems where the management have 
little or no influence. This depiction is similar to the three levels of uncertainty 
encountered in cybernetics (Beer 1966 pp. 259-261), firstly, that of mishap or system 
'emergency', where no control can be exercised other than by pursuing ad hoc crisis 
measures or by ensuring a fail-safe system design, secondly, the existence of inherent 
'probabilistic' system behaviour, where management must strive to improve their 
knowledge and experience of system behaviour in order to reduce unpredictability, and 
thirdly, system 'indeterminancy', which puts forward the hypothesis that is impossible to 
measure a system completely and so uncertainty must be accepted. These limitations as 
outlined above, highlight the paradox of control system design, on the one hand they show 
that no system can be completely controlled, on the other, it becomes clear that without 
controls, system utility is lost. Control systems must therefore be designed and monitored 
so that control is optimised given the current level of certainty and uncertainty. 
In looking at what dictates the level of management control that can be obtained, Otley 
and Berry (1980) note that all controlled management systems require four necessary 
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conditions to be met before a process can be called controlled. These state that there must 
exist: 
• an objective for the system being controlled (without an objective control has no 
meaning); 
• a means of measuring results along the dimensions defined by the objective; 
• a predictive model of the system being controlled (so that causes of the non-
attainment of the objectives can be determined and proposed corrective actions 
evaluated); 
• a choice of relevant alternative actions available to the controller. 
They explain that failure of any of the above can cause the system to go 'out of control'. 
Similarly, Anthony et al. (1989 pp. 7) highlight that all controlled management systems 
need at least four components, namely: 
• an observation device that detects, observes and measures, or describes the activities 
or other phenomena being controlled; 
• an assessing device that evaluates the performance of an activity or organisation, 
usually relative to some standard or expectation of what should be, and identifies out-
of-control activities and conditions; . 
• a behaviour modification (L~vice for altering or changing performance if the need for 
doing so is indicated; 
• a means of transmitting information within and among the parts. 
They note further that these components interrelate with each other, forming the core 
structure of all controlled systems. 
Certain similarities exist between the two viewpoints. The four components and four 
conditions can be combined to produce a list of fundamental requirements for a 
management system to become controlled. These being: 
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• a means of observation or description; 
• a means oftransmitting information within the system; 
• a measurement device against which performance is compared to that predicted, 
based upon the system objective; 
• a means of modification or corrective action. 
Having established some of the fundamental requirements of management control, let us 
now investigate how management control can work in practice. Firstly we shall outline 
open-loop control systems (at Boulding's level two) and closed-loop control systems (at 
level three), then we shall contrast these to behavioural control systems (at level eight). 
A pictorial description is the easiest way to distinguish between open-loop and closed-
loop control (see Figures 7 and 8 below). Open-loop control is effectively about 'getting 
things right in the first place', through the formulation of objectives and the preparation of 
methodology to achieve them, taking into consideration all possible eventualities. No 
amendments are made to the system once it is under way. Deficiencies in open-loop 
systems arise from predicting accurately and for all eventualities, what the desired inputs 
should be in order to obtain the desired output, for example: the quality of toast will 
depend upon the type of bread and temperature of the toaster; and the effectiveness of an 
interest rate change will depend on numerous factors affecting the whole economy 
Fiaure 7: Open Loop 'Control' 
Input Variable ,-__ -, Controlled Output ~ I System f-I---I~~ 
Closed-loop control is a refinement to open-loop control, whereby a standard is used 
against which the final output or outputs of the process stages are measured and 
compared, thus allowing for any modification to be made in an attempt to minimise the 
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error between the output and the objective desired (for example, a thermostatic control on 
a heating system or, where the loop is closed through human action, the keeping of a 
steady speed whilst a car is being driven along an undulating road). Theory leads us to 
two classifications of closed-loop control systems: feedback and feedforward control 
systems. Cushing and Rornney (1987 pp. 101) explain that: 
• Feedback controls operate by measuring some aspect of the process being controlled 
and adjusting the process when the measure indicates that the process is deviating 
from plan (see below). 
• Feedforward controls monitor both process operations and inputs in an attempt to 
predict potential deviations, in order that adjustments can be made to avert problems 
before they occur (see below). 
Figure 8: Closed Loop Control 
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Closed loop control systems have been used widely in the design of control systems for 
machinel)', operational logistics and other technical systems. Furthermore, they have been 
highly influential in the design of management control systems (Wilson 1973 and 1974). 
Anthony's (1989 pp. 26-28) seminal work certainly put forward a view of organisational 
processes as a closed-loop system, including organisational programs, budgets, operations, 
performance measures and reports, likewise his view of management control as focusing 
on various types of responsibility centre with monetary inputs and outputs (i.e. expense, 
revenue, profit and investment centres), has contributed to financial control being 
synonymous with manao~ment control in many organisations. 
Financial control systems are clearly however, only one possible approach to management 
control (Goold and Campbell 1987). Hofstede (1978), indeed, reminds us that 
management control in an organisation is a social process. Social systems and to a lesser 
extent socio-technical systems are based upon groups of people with variable human 
behaviour. Communication in particular is prone to error and similarly there is no 
guaranteed compliance of individuals to the dictates of the control system. Kaplan and 
Norton (1992) integrate both of these different views of the organisation, amongst other 
things, into a balanced approach to performance measurement; noting that: 
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"The traditional financial performance measures worked well for the industrial era, 
but they are out of step with the skills and competencies companies are trying to 
master today." 
Their "Balanced Scorecard' includes financial, customer, internal business and innovation 
and learning perspectives, with the aim of providing managers with a more comprehensive 
and relevant range of information in their bid for control. 
According to Sirnons (1994), management control systems are: 
"the formal information-based routines and procedures used by managers to 
maintain or alter patterns in organisational activities. " 
He highlights four types of management control system, where: 
• belief systems are an "explicit set of shared beliefs that define basic values, purpose 
and direction"; 
• boundary systems are ''formally stated limits and rules that must be respected"; 
• diagnostic control systems are ''feedback systems used to monitor organisational 
outcomes and correct deviations from pre-set standards of performance"; 
. • interactive control systems are those that "managers use to regularly and personally 
involve themselves in the decision activities of subordinates. " 
Management control systems, as discussed above, are clearly varied and are not purely 
cybernetic. Management control systems are clearly also formulated within an 
environment of economic, political, social and technological flux, which directly influences 
how control is exercised over corporate finances, operations and human resources. 
Indeed, this view of management control systems portrays an organisation that must deal 
with dynamic change, with continuously shifting and often conflicting demands and 
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objectives for its business activities. It is far removed from a rationalist view of an 
organisation with 'X' inputs and 'V' outputs. 
Deficiencies of Cybernetic Control for Organisations 
It can be seen from the Boulding hierarchy, that system development becomes increasingly 
complex the further up the scale that one goes (partly because that was the way he 
designed it, but also more importantly because we have an almost complete understanding 
of static structures and simple dynamic systems at levels one and two, yet a scant 
knowledge of systems at levels seven and eight) and it is therefore not surprising that 'man 
made' systems attempting to satisfY the requirements of the higher levels fail to be fully 
comprehensive and that similarly simpler 'man made' systems, despite their validity, are 
often limited in nature. Boulding's hierarchy, indeed, provides a useful reminder that 
typical management science models and control systems in particular are only level three 
and can only claim to cover certain problems at level eight, i.e. those aspects at level eight 
that are really on level three! It needs to be remembered however that most of 
management activities revolve around Boulding's level eight. 
Clearly cybernetic control, which deals with fully controllable systems, requiring a 
complete knowledge of all system inputs and outputs, can not be the only means for 
controlling business organisations. Other control systems are required to help provide 
organisat',:aal control over business systems. 
2.2.2 Major Features of Organisations (level 8 systems): 
Systems theory provides the conceptual framework for the analysis of complete systems 
and their interaction with the environment. It encourages a holistic viewpoint, whilst 
accepting the value of breaking down systems into 'simpler' or more readily 
understandable sub-systems for the purpose of analysis. In so doing a commercial 
organisation, for example, can be split into numerous processes or specialisations whereby 
the focus of attention can be placed upon a particular sub-system of interest. This 
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'abstract' vision of organisational sub-systems can facilitate the establishment of a 
normative view of what should be done and a descriptive view of what is done (and, 
hopefully, that can lead to a view of what can be predicted to happen) for each sub-
system. This clearly is of considerable use to those involved in trying to understand 
organisational systems, in particular for those who need to control them and for those 
~~-- seeking to design improved systems and, of particular interest here, control systems. 
Problems arise however, when the observer wishes to no longer focus on the control of a 
discrete cybernetic system for example, but to tackle issues affecting a complete 
organisation, including the human element. Boulding's hierarchy reminds us that social 
organisations contain human behavioural systems at level seven and indeed many, if not 
all, of the other lower level systems. This introduces considerable complexity into control 
systems analysis and design. 
Indeed, when analysing level eight organisational systems and, in particular, business 
organisations, it is important to remember the complexity and sophistication of the 
systems being studied. Returning to Morgan (1986), he reminds us with his metaphors 
that different images can be obtained from analysing the same business depending upon 
our interpretation and understanding of its systems. These are all valuable viewpoints and 
may help us to simplifY and explain the organisational system, however each is 
fundamentally biased in approach and limited in scope as they do not include other values 
gained from different perspectives that are continuously growing in number. MorC'~n 
(1986 pp. 342) explains: 
"In trying to understand an organisational situation we have to be able to cope with 
these different and potentially paradoxical meanings, identifying them through some 
form of decomposition while retaining a sense of their interrelationship and 
essential integration. " 
He notes further that fundamentally our vision of organisations will be determined by 
ourselves and the different dimensions in our minds rather than in the system itseI£ 
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Indeed, one viewpoint put forward by Organisational Behaviourists is that an organisation 
is made up of , formal' and 'informal' elements. This viewpoint, first identified following the 
Hawthorne Studies in the 1920's and 1930's, introduced new levels of understanding into 
human action, showing that motivation, attitude, sentiment and behavioural norms (being 
-- certain 'informal' elements compared to the legitimate and officially recognised 'formal' 
elements) had a significant impact upon organisational function. Later research on job 
design (see, for example, Walker 1950; Hackrnan and Oldham 1975; Campion and Thayer 
1987), satisfaction (see, for example, Maslow 1954; Herzberg 1959; Locke 1968; Smith, 
Kendall and Hulin 1969), team work (see, for example, Homans 1950; Stogdill 1974; 
Yukl 1989), etc., has also contributed to our view of what exactly an organisation is and 
what contributes to its behaviour. Many of the above organisational behaviourists would 
argue that organisations are not simple mechanistic structures, but are people centred. 
Organisational controls can therefore on the one hand provide valuable frameworks for 
human activity and on the other kill individual initiative and autonomy. Lawler (1976) 
concurs, noting that "because of people's intrinsic motivation to do well. a 'properly' 
administered control system will motivate people to exercise self-control." Indeed it 
could be argued that organisational control is a reflection of society's values toward 
control and the current understanding of those values. 
2.2.3 Overview of the Control Literature 
This second section has discussed the methods of organisational control and their 
subsequent limitations. It introduced the notion of control in a systems context, relying 
upon Boulding's (I956) hierarchy of systems as a framework to define the boundaries of 
control systems and as means of comparison. Cybernetic control and social organisational 
control were contrasted, with the limitations to each control system being highlighted. It 
was also noted that cybernetic control is a fundamentally rational approach to systems 
control, which indeed works well where a complete knowledge of the system is available. 
It was made apparent, however, that degrees of error are introduced, commensurate to the 
existence of imperfections in our knowledge of the system in question. In dealing with 
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business organisations it was argued that cybernetic control systems can still be a valuable 
tool, as in the case of budgetary control for example, although over-reliance was warned 
against in systems with higher levels of complexity. In these more complex systems, other 
approaches to control were shown to be needed, albeit whilst maintaining an awareness of 
the imperfections in control system design in such cases. 
Section 3: Strategic Control 
2.3.0 Origins and Characteristics 
Strategic control finds its origins in the rationality of the long range planning era of the 
1960s and 70s. Indeed, the classical approach to strategic management, leaves strategic 
control as one control method amongst many, but one that provides feedback of strategic 
performance (Band and Scanlan 1995). This traditional approach encourages managers to 
develop measurable standards of performance, to measure and evaluate performance 
against these standards, and subsequently, if necessary, to take corrective action. This 
viewpoint is still advocated by some recent writers (see for example: Kellinghusen and 
Wiibenhorst 1990; Rarrison 1991). A frequently quoted definition of strategic control by 
these 'feedback' strategic control commentators is that of Schende1 and Rofer (1979 pg. 
18) where: 
"Strategic control focuses on the dual questions of whether: (1) the strategy is being 
implemented as planned; and (2) the results produced by the strategy are those 
intended. " 
Other strategic control commentators however, as discussed below, highlight the 
complexities of strategic decision making and the continuously changing nature of the 
business environment as the basis of their argument against the classical feedback model. 
In so doing, they argue for ways of coping with ambiguity and they put forward new 
forms of strategic control as solutions. 
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The call for greater strategic control dates to around 1980. Horovitz (1979) called: 
''for new tools - strategic control - focused on setting standards, measuring and 
evaluating performance in the following areas: key assumptions concerning the 
evolution of the environment and the resources of the firm, the constance of crucial 
factors of success, the development of distinctive competences and key results. " 
The ground breaking work ofSchreyogg and Steinmann (1987) has been highly influential 
in developing the concept of strategic control from a purely feedback approach to that of a 
feedforward process. They note that waiting for feedback until strategy has been 
implemented, may be too late for corrective action to be taken, and also, that because 
feedback control is 'single loop' (Argyris 1976), all deviations away from the standard are 
portrayed as bad or at least undesirable. They refer to the definition of strategic control 
as: 
"the critical evaluation of plans, activities, and results, thereby providing 
information for future action. " 
The need to monitor strategic 'means' (i.e. strategy implementation), as well as strategic 
'ends' (i.e. the achievement of the formulated strategy) is fundamental to their "3 step 
model of strategic control". This model introduces premise control, impleIr":J.tation 
control and strategic surveillance during the strategic formulation and strategic 
implementation stages of the strategic management process (see Figure 1 0 below). 
Strategy formulation begins at "time 0", "time 1" defines the point at which initial strategic 
premises are made, "time 2" is the point where strategy implementation starts and "time 3" 
indicates the end point of the strategy life cycle. 
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Premise control is designed to systematically and continuously check the validity of all 
premises or underlying assumptions established during the planning and implementation 
processes. Premises will be made for, for example, infIatj,,~ and interest rates, likely 
legislation, potential competition, etc. Implementation control evaluates continuously 
whether any adjustment to strategic direction should be made following recent 
developments and information now available since strategy implementation has begun. 
Strategic milestones (e.g. critical times, costs, new product developments, etc.), 
intermediate goals (e.g. short term production targets, return on investment, cashflow, 
etc.) and strategic thresholds (e.g. time and cost limits) can be used for the implementation 
control of new and current strategy, and when they are reached, in simplistic terms, a 
'stop/go' decision is taken as to whether the strategy is to be pursued or halted. Strategic 
surveillance monitors the full range of factors that may impact upon strategic activities, it 
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endeavours to provide early warning of all critical events so as to provide the greatest 
response time and flexibility possible in the pursuit of potential responses. 
A development of this model to include special alert control, to manage surprise 
occurrences, was made by Preble (1992). Special alert control deals with unlikely, yet 
- high impact eventualities, and like Lorange's strategic leap control, it can be said to require 
"a shift from peace to wartime approaches" (Lorange 1986 pg. 118). It allows for a rapid 
review of organisational strategy in the given new context (pearce and Robinson 1988), 
drawing on the tools of strategic surveillance and crisis audits in order to manage the crisis 
effectively and efficiently. Starting at "time 0" special alert control is maintained 
permanently throughout the strategy life-cycle to "time 3". 
Clearly, operational controls will also be required within the above model to assess 
whether the implementation of strategy is proceeding as planned (Schreyogg and 
Steinmann 1987). Existing operational controls being the first tools used in the design of 
the strategic control system, hopefully providing much of the information required to 
allow for strategic control and thereby reducing the need to introduce new supplementary 
controls (Kellinghusen and Wiibenhorst 1990). In this way, operational controls are used 
permanently during the normal day to day operational activities of the business 
organisation and are 'mined' throughout the period "time 0 - time 3" for strategically 
relevant information. The use of a balanced scorecard would appear to facilitate this 
mining process (Kaplan and Norton 1996). 
In addition, in order for premise control and implementation control to be carried out 
adequately, information is required on environmental changes. This information needs to 
be managed, so that all relevant data is highlighted, collected and acted upon (Aguilar 
1967): such a process is called environmental scanning and, like premise control, is a 
subset of Schreyogg and Steinmann's strategic surveillance. Unlike premise control 
however, it is not a directed system of surveillance but instead is a permanent 
environmental scanning system for the identification of change operating throughout the 
period "time 0 - time 3". 
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Scenario planning can also be used for strategic control purposes: this is a function 
where plans are fonnulated for and tested against a diverse range of eventualities (Lorange 
1986 pp. I 12-1 17). Typically a range of worst and best case scenarios are envisaged, so 
that management are aware of the implications of certain possible occurrences and so that 
the most resilient of plans can be developed. In this way, it is hoped, the need for crisis 
-iilithagement is reduced. Scenario planning if it is to be fully effective needs to be part of 
an on-going organisational learning process (Van der Heijden 1996, Wack 1985). As such 
it will take place formally at periodic moments in an organisation's strategic planning 
process and ultimately learning information will be gathered informally and continuously 
throughout the day to day activities of the organisation's staff. In both cases it will occur 
during the period "time 0 - time 3". 
A full breakdown of the types of strategic control is contained in Table 3; this table is 
based on the valuable summary of characteristics of strategic control as used by Preble 
(1992), however it is expanded to include operational control, environmental scanning and 
scenario planning. 
Other contributors to the strategic control literature highlight the need for alignment and 
focus if strategic control is to remain not just a theoretical concept but is to become a 
practical and irnplementable reality. Organisational structure, strategic planning and 
perfonnance management need to be aligned in accordance with an organisation's critical 
success factors (Bungay and Goold 1991) and control. need to be focused on strategic 
uncertainties (Sirnons 1991). Indeed, strategic control systems need to be designed: 
"to assure the maintenance of competencies and insure against adverse effects from 
contingencies" (Band and Scanlan 1995). 
In so doing, competitive advantage can be maintained through the protection of core 
competencies and reinforced by exploiting new opportunities and tackling perceived 
threats prior to any competitor action. 
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It is valuable to note that strategic controls will make use of all types of control, from 
financial control through to behavioural control. All types of control are required due to 
the complexities and the wide range of factors that influence the control of strategy. 
Indeed, as seen from a more recent definition, strategic control has developed in scope and 
has been made more practical in nature since 1979: 
"Strategic control involves the continuous monitoring and evaluation of 
organisational strategy with an emphasis on the attainment of long term objectives 
within estimated resource constraints" (Band and Scanlan 1995). 
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Table 2: Characteristics of Strategic Control Components 
Characteristics 
Components of 
Strategic Control 
Purpose Mechanism Procedure Degree Information OrganJsatU!nlpeople 
of Focus Sources 
Premise Control Keep planning and Strategic List premi~ High Multiple sources Internal scanning staff and 
implementation surveillance specialists 
premises valid Identify key success Updated forecasts 
premises Consultants 
- Track assumption 
------
_Top managers __ 
development 
Update premises 
ModifY stnItegy 
Implementation Evaluate strategic Stop/Go Establish strategic High Classical Operational control personnel 
Control direction in the light assessment thresholds accounting! 
of past events during financial reporting Special project team 
implementation Determine intermediate and other personnel 
goals and strategic operational 
milestones controls Top managers 
Continuously evaluate 
results relative to strategic 
. direction 
Operational Day to day Functional Establish standards High Multiple sources All employees on a 
Control management of and/or and methods functional and/or 
operations (to see if departmental Determine intermediate departmental basis 
implementation controls goals Internal and 
proceeds as planned) external Consultants 
Periodically collect control 
data (e.g. monthly reports, Personal and Relevant experts 
annual planning cycle) impersonal 
Evaluate results relative to 
operational tarJ!;ets 
Strategic Early detection of Environmental Maintain a wide scanning Moderate Multiple sources Scanning unit personnel 
SUTVe/Oance internal and external scanning process. and methods 
changes that could (wide Technical specialists 
affect strategic Continuously scan angle) Internal and 
activities (directed external Issues management team 
and non-directed Feedback strategically 
surveillance) relevant data Environmental monitors 
Top mana~ement team 
Environmental Provide information Identification of Establish current position High Multiple sources Scanning unit personnel 
Scanning on operating and change and/or norm and methods 
remote environment (wide Organisational planning staff 
changes (non- Identity any deviation range) Internal and and managers 
directed surveillance) external 
Consultants 
Personal and 
impersonal 
Scenario Fonnulate plans for a Annual Establish current position Moderate Multiple sources Planning staff and business 
Planning range of eventualities planning cycle and methods level managers 
(proactive) IdentifY a range of potential 
Long range future outcomes Internal and Top management team 
planning external 
meetings Evaluate potential outcomes Consultants and relevant 
Personal and experts 
impersonal 
Special Alert Strategic readiness in Crisis Detennine vulnerable areas High Scanning system Planning staff and business 
Control times of crisis audits/crisis level managers conduct crisis 
management Develop alternate scenarios Manager(s) at audits 
and action plans erisis 
Scenario Crisis management team 
planning Practice reaction via Media infonns 
simulated emergencies company Communication consultants 
Scientists, medical personnel, 
neutral experts 
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Section 4: Factors Influencing Strategic Control 
2.4.0 Introduction 
A review of the literature leads to the identification of three broad categories or sets of 
factors that can be seen to influence strategic control, these are outlined below in sections· 
2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. Before they are discussed in detail however, it is important to 
remember that increased complexity is introduced, when the realisation is made that the 
various types of strategic control that exist, can be used to maintain control over one 
aspect of strategy or over the whole strategy. This can clearly lead to a duplication of 
resource needs, for example, in information requirements, and consequently calls for an 
integrated strategic control system so as to ensure maximum efficiency and effectiveness. 
Likewise, the often blurred distinction between operational and strategic controls adds to 
the complexity of strategic management and the need for a categorisation of what is 
strategic and what is operational or what is both, as well as an understanding of which 
resources are required for one strategy and which of those resources can be used for more 
than one strategy. 
2.4.1 Human Resource Issues: people/actors 
One of the earliest studies into strategic control mechanisms, and the closest of all studies 
to the investigation reported in this thesis, is that of Horovitz (1979). In looking at 
planning and control practices in medium to large British, French and German companies, 
in particular the practices of senior management, Horovitz identified four areas of 
empirical findings. Firstly, the length and makeup of long range planning activities was 
found to be relatively distinct between the three nations. British organisations tended 
toward the aggregation of SBUs five year plans, with information moving in a 'bottom-up' 
process toward a central planning department. German firms, followed this pattern, 
however the information was found to be usually more operational than strategic and was 
offered up in conjunction with the budgeting process and based on a three year time span. 
France on the other hand, was shown to carry out very little long range planning at that 
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time, with, indeed, some French managers viewing its worthiness with significant 
scepticism, and with those that did pursue long range planning, using it more as a financial 
forecasting exercise for the next three year period, rather than any fonn of strategic 
review. 
Secondly, on the whole, information was found to be "mostly detailed, short term, dealing 
with operations and internal." British firms, by comparison with their continental 
counterparts however, were shown to have a greater degree of centralisation, more 
separate control and planning departments, and more sophisticated planning processes. 
Thirdly, information was "biased by cultural factors": British management emphasised 
financial perfonnance and French and Gennan managers placed emphasis on production. 
Horovitz's reasoning for this was the educational backgrounds of management, i.e. British 
management were believed to have predominantly a background in accountancy and the 
French and Gennan managers were largely engineers. 
The final area of findings, was the lack of monitoring of key success factors. Over half of 
British Managing Directors were able to state their key factors of success, compared to 
only very few Gennan Chief Executives and only slightly more French. Of particular 
importance however, is that in no country was any monitoring of the key success factors 
found, nor was any information system found in existence to do so. Indeed, it appears: 
"Top management looked at operational results rather than monitoring directly 
whether a strategy was well implemented. " 
The findings of Horovitz lead to the proposal that nationality is an important influence 
upon strategic control practice. It follows therefore that employee, top management and 
the firm's legal nationality, as well as the organisation's country of operation, may affect 
the organisational strategic control system. This proposition would tend to be supported 
by comparative management writers such as Weinshall (1977), Hofstede (1980), Laurent 
(1986) and Lawrence (1995 and 1998). 
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What constitutes nationality is a complex issue and can not be treated fully here, however, 
certain key aspects can be identified, for example, the existence of commonly shared 
values, a common culture and history, reinforced perhaps through a common education 
system and a common territory. 
Similarly, as discussed previously in Sections 2 and 3 of this Chapter, on a more individual 
or persona1level, an individual's own experiences, aspirations, beliefs and values will 
impact upon the business organisation and the management of that organisation. Top 
management education, the level of connnitment and individual preferences, for example, 
will all impact upon the organisation and should therefore ultimately impact upon strategic 
control practice. The organisational culture, the level of employee involvement in decision 
making or level of empowerment, the degree of centralisation or decentralisation in 
decision making and the type of incentive system, for example, can similarly be expected 
to impact upon the strategic control system. 
2.4.2 Strategic factors 
In the same way as an individual's aspirations, beliefs and values can be expected to 
impact upon the practice of strategic control, then so should the shared values of the 
organisation. As already discussed in Section 1 of this chapter, these common beliefs and 
practices, often referred to as organisational culture, are the bedrock of organisational 
strategy underlying th(' strategic initiatives pursued by a firm. This suggests, for example, 
that an entrepreneurial organisation would have different strategic control practices to 
those of a mutual or co-operative organisation. Taking this logic further, one might 
expect the strategic control practices of an organisation pursuing one form of strategic 
archetype to be different to another pursuing a different strategic archetype, for example, 
one business maintaining Porter's (1980) cost leadership strategy compared to another 
maintaining his focus strategy. This would mean potentially different strategic control 
practices for each strategic archetype outlined in Table I. Lorange (1993 pp. 153-164) 
appears to support this argument, noting for example that in new or high growth 
organisations strategic control practices should be oriented to monitoring strategic 
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premises, the progress of key strategic programs and implementation of strategy closely; 
the aim being to secure future strategic strength. In more mature organisations, however, 
where there is already existing strategic strengths, Lorange argues that strategic control 
needs to ensure budgetary and operational control over the strategy. In this way, a new 
firm would emphasise market share performance indicators and a more established mature 
-business would emphasise efficiency and profitability indicators.-----~ 
Fiegner (I994) also supports the argument that strategic control practices should be 
different depending upon the strategy pursued, stating that: 
"(1) firms demonstrating Cost-leader tendencies have more effective strategic 
control systems when their controls are 'tighter' (i.e., greater degree of 
formalisation, upper management supervision, and role specialisation); and (2) 
firms demonstrating DifJerentiator tendencies have more effective strategic control 
systems when their controls are 'looser'. " 
He notes further that companies that are neither pursuing a cost leader or differentiator 
strategy, show that implementation control is more effective when loosely managed and 
strategic surveillance when tightly managed. 
One last perspective on the impact of strategy upon strategic control practice, can be 
gained from looking at. the different approaches taken by managers to strategic 
management process. Goold, Campbell and Luchs (l993a and 1993b) portray three 
stereotypes, as to how the corporate headquarters "adds value" to large, diversified 
companies, namely through "strategic contror' or "strategic planning" or "financial 
contror'. 
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• Strategic Planning cof1llanies focus on a few 
core businesses with the centre actively 
participating in fOrmJlating strategies with 
the business units. 
• Financial Control cOf1llanies mainly delegate 
strategic decisions to profit responsible 
business unit managers and the centre 
agrees and monitors short term financial 
targets. 
• Strategic Control cOf1llanies are committed to 
decentralisation, but in addition have 
extensive strategic planning systems through 
which the centre challenges, reviews and 
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monitors business level strategies. Source: Gouldetal.(1993b) 
These stereotypes suggest that the level of interest the parent company has in the strategic 
management of a subsidiary will dictate the type and degree of control they will exercise 
over the subsidiary. Similarly therefore, it could be argued that whichever approach is 
taken to strategic management (whether process, structure, incremental or contingent as 
outlined in Section 1) will influence strategic control practices. 
2.4.3 Operational Issues: control factors 
We have seen above that human and strategic issues can be shown to have a direct 
influence on strategic control practices. The inter-related nature of these factors and their 
relationship to other aspects of the business organisation now needs to be examined. 
The relationship between strategy and structure was first noted by Chandler, since then a 
growing body of research has been developed by way of supporting evidence, with many 
writers concurring with the notion that "structure follows strategy" (Chandler 1962 pg. 
14), see for example: Rumelt 1974; Harnmond in Rumelt et al. 1994 pp. 97-154. 
Chandler's work showed how different strategies, such as vertical integration and 
diversification, presented different types of organisational difficulty which tended to result 
in different forms of organisational structure being introduced to help deal with these 
difficult issues. Later commentators (Peters and Waterrnan 1982; Mintzberg 1979; Bower 
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and Doz in Schendel and Hofer 1979), however, re-introduced the independence of 
strategy and structure from one another, whilst still underlining their inter-related nature. 
Other commentators have also researched the relationship between structure and control, 
one notable example being Weber's (1947) bureaucratic control over bureaucratic 
- structure. Similarly, however, to developments in commentary on the strategy-structure 
relationship, later writers distinguish between control and structure, with, for example, 
Ouchi (1977) noting that "structure is related to control", yet "the structure of an 
organisation is not isomorphic with its control system", and that other environmental 
factors need to be considered as a variable in the relationship. 
It is valuable to note at this point the range of factors that impinge upon organisational 
structure, and likewise, it is important for business management to be aware of what the 
likely impact of a certain structure might be. Mintzberg's configurational approach to 
structure (Mintzberg, Quinn and Ghoshal 1995 pp. 350-371), lists the age and size, the 
technical system of production, the environmental characteristics and power system of 
the organisation as situational factors that influence the shape of organisational structure. 
Mintzberg notes: 
Age and Size 
• The older an organisation, the more formalised its behaviour 
• The larger an organisation, the more formalised its behaviour 
• The larger an organisation, the more elaborate its structure; that is, the more 
specialised its job and units and the more developed its administrative components 
• The larger the organisation, the larger the size of its average unit 
• Structure reflects the age of the industry from its founding 
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Technical System 
• The more regulating the technical system - that is, the more it controls the work of 
the operators - the more formalised the operating work and the more bureaucratic 
the structure of the operating core 
• The more complex the technical system, the more elaborate and professional the 
support staff 
• The automation of the operating core transforms a bureaucratic administrative 
structure into an organic one 
Environment 
• The more dynamic an organisation's environment, the more organic its structure 
• The more complex an organisation's environment, the more decentralised its 
structure 
• The more diversified an organisation's markets, the greater the propensity to split it 
into market-based units, or divisions, given favourable economies of scale 
• Extreme hostility in its environment drives any organisation to centralise its 
structure temporarily 
Power 
• The greater the external control of an organisation (e.g. by a corporate parent or 
government), the more centralised andformalised its structure 
• A divided external coalition will tend to give rise to a politicised internal coalition 
and vice versa 
• Fashion favours the structure of the day (and of the culture), sometimes even when 
inappropriate 
Certain configurations of organisation are identified by Mintzberg to be the result of these 
influences, i.e. an entrepreneurial, machine, professional, diversified, innovative, 
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missionary or political organisation structure. Table 4 below provides an overview of the 
key differences ofMintzberg's organisational configurations. 
Table 3: Types of Organisational Structure 
Configuration Prime Coordinating Key Part of Type of 
Mechanism Organisation Decentralisation 
Entrepreneurial Direct supervision Strategic apex Vertical and horizontal 
organisation centralisation 
Machine Standardisation of work Technostructure Limited horizontal 
organisation processes decentralisation 
Professional Standardisation of skills Operating core Horizontal 
organisation decentralisation 
Diversified Standardisation of outputs Middle line Limited vertical 
organisation decentralisation 
Innovative Mutual adjustment Support staff Selected 
organisation decentralisation 
Missionary Standardisation of norms Ideology Decentralisation 
organisation 
Political None None Varies 
organisation 
Source: Mintzberg (1995 pg. 365) 
The range of organisational configurations or structures is useful not only in identiJYing 
and distinguishing between the typology of one company compared to another in a 
different industry or sector, for example highlighting some useful structural differences 
between a professional law firm and a production line based car manufacturer, but is also 
equally valuable at distinguishing between same sector or same business fIrms. In the case 
of banks for example, an 'entrepreneurial' bank could be seen as one that is 'top down, 
with simple structures and having few support staff' compared to a 'diversified' bank 
which could be seen as 'a set of independent identities with their own structures, which 
emphasises performance standards'. It is this comparative aspect that makes Mintzberg's 
configurations of particular value, allowing for clear distinctions between organisational 
structures to be made. 
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Other influences on organisational structure, not mentioned explicitly above, include the 
capacity of information systems, specific choices affecting multinational corporations and 
differences resulting from varying systems of corporate governance. Firstly, it is clear 
from even a cursory glance at the various types of strategic control in Figure 10, that they 
., ---are dependant upon information availability. Indeed, careful consideration of information 
and the management of that information is required for strategic control to work (O'Brien 
1991), and various information management systems have been produced to help with 
strategic management and performance measurement (a comprehensive review of which 
can be found, for example, in Business Intelligence 1993). 
Many choices are also open to multi-national corporations in how they control their 
strategy and organise their corporate structure. The issue of centralisation or 
decentralisation is at its most complex with these multinational corporations, which often 
have more than half of their assets, turnover and profits emanating from abroad. 
Complexities arise, for example, from the multiplicity of different cultures, competitive 
structures, host governments and partner relationships with other firms. Prahalad and Doz 
(1981) note that: 
"as subsidiaries mature and become autonomous with respect to strategic resources, 
such as technology, capital, management and access to markets, the HO's [head 
office's] ability to control the strategies of subsidiaries is significantly rec.'?:ced." 
In order to maintain contro~ they note further that the creation of: 
"a sophisticated organisational context - a blending of organisational structure, 
information systems, measurement and reward systems, and career planning and a 
fostering of common organisational culture - can compensate for the erosion of 
HO's capacity to control subsidiaries. " 
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This said, however, varying degrees of strategic control are possible (Prahalad and Doz 
talked of four categories: fragmented, dependant, autonomous and integrated 
multinational corporations) and constant awareness of the influences on strategic control 
needs to be maintained. 
---Lastly, it is important to mention explicitly the influence of different corporate governance 
systems upon strategic control. Prowse (1994 pg. 71) argues in his study of the corporate 
governance oflarge non-financial finns in the USA, UK, Japan and Germany that: 
"corporate control systems observed in each country are uniquely related to the 
broad legal and regulatory environmenl of the firm. " 
Clearly, this viewpoint reinforces the importance of national background upon strategic 
control and the need to understand the complex issues that arise as result of it. 
Another fundamental observation of how strategic control is managed will depend upon 
the extent of the strategy's capital requirement. Clearly, an expensive, financially critical 
strategy will be more closely and frequently controlled than a cheaper, less financially 
critical strategy. Following on from this, as already mentioned briefly above under 
corporate governance, the source of the finance may also dictate the level of strategic 
control: with for example, a strategy with external finance having to be monitored more 
closely and frequently, to satisfY the investors requirements, than an internally fnanced 
strategy. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has shown that various types of strategic control exist and that human 
resource factors, strategic factors and control factors impact upon strategic control and 
I Prowse (1994) notes that the environment includes: "laws on antitrust, insider trading,financial 
disclosure, the ability of financial institutions to be large stakeholders in firms and the ability of firms to 
tap non-bank sources of external finance. " 
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ultimately effect strategic control system design. It has also been shown that in order to 
understand strategic control fully an understanding of strategy and control is needed, as is 
the realisation that many different 'choices' are open to managers in the 'struggle' for 
strategic control. 
It has been shown that strategic control in simplistic terms provides a system for the 
management (i.e. evaluation, inspection, surveillance and monitoring) of strategy and, like 
other areas of management, strategic control is open to a diverse range of influences from 
inside and outside the organisation. In managing strategy, strategic control requires that 
various questions are answered and that choices are made. It demands that managers 
think continuously about the key success factors of the organisation: what they are and 
whether they are still valid. Strategic control provides a system that attempts to reduce 
uncertainty and help in decision making. It does this through providing a comprehensive 
framework, that first of all requires an understanding of the current organisational position 
and then goes on to ask for justification for where the organisation wants to go. Once 
these fundamental questions are satisfactorily answered, it asks for continuous updates on 
whether this decision is stilI the right one for the organisation and whether progress 
towards attainment of the strategic goal is proceeding correctly. It also demands that 
provision be made for emergency manoeuvres. In all cases strategic control aims to 
provide an early warning of change away from that foreseen. In short strategic control 
assures that a comprehensive and integrated approach is taken to strategic management. 
An evident paradox, as a result of operational complexity, however, would appear to 
exist, between what strategic control theory is recommending and the actual practice in 
industry. In particular, Goold and Quinn (\990a) note that the following problems need to 
be overcome in the development of a strategic control system: 
• devising strategic controls that can accommodate uncertainty and flexibility in the 
implementation of strategy; 
• defining strategic goals that are suitable for motivating managers; 
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• ensuring that strategic control systems assist, rather than attempt to replace, 
management judgement; 
• building a strategic control system that enhances, rather than destroys, mutual· 
confidence between management. 
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Chapter 3: Research Framework 
3.0 Introduction 
It is useful at this point to remind ourselves of the primary aim of this study. This 
study aims to explore how European retail banks control their strategy in today's 
rapidly changing environment with a view to offering some propositions for 
improvement of current practice. In order to investigate fully the different practices of 
the retail banks, this study sets out to compare actual strategic control practice with 
the recommended practice as identified in the strategic control literature and 
summarised in Table 2. 
A comprehensive literature review as outlined in Chapter 2 was therefore carried out at 
the start of this study in order to ascertain the existing state of the 'art' as described by 
strategic control commentators. Subsequent revisits to the literature up and until the [.. --
time of writing has kept this body of knowledge up to date. 
This chapter critically analyses the literature review, highlighting the relationships in 
the research variables, leading to the identification of a generic research model and a 
number of specific research objectives for the study. 
How these research objectives are in turn translated into an appropriate research 
design is discussed in the next chapter. 
3.1 Development of the Research Framework 
. The first task has been to translate the broad aim of the study into a set of parameters 
covering the research area. These research area parameters, as examined in Chapter 2, 
have been distilled into a conceptual research model, as detailed in Figure 10 below. 
In describing the conceptual research model, the McKinsey 7 -S framework is taken as 
the point of departure (Peters and Waterrnan 1982). This framework, created as a 
useful way to think about business organisations, stressed the existence of at least 
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seven variables, namely: strategy, structure, systems, style, staff, skills and shared 
values. These seven "8's" have been reduced to a smaller number of fundamental 
parts, thereby creating a workable model of the 'strategic control organisation' (see 
Figure 10, Box I). Strategic control it must be remembered, is essentially about 
keeping control (through systems and structures) over the strategy (the long and short 
term direction and goals) of the organisation. The relationship between the 'strategy', 
--'people' and 'control' parts of the strategic control organisation is represented by 
arrows; along side these arrows is the name of the 'theory' relevant to this relationship. 
Figure 10: PhD. Generic Research Model 
S.L.E.P.T. (S.W.O.T.' 
STRATEGY 
shared values 
strategy 
'Ira!::; the:r;: "'-
~ 
CULTURE 
! theory of nationality 
NATIONALITY 
comparative management 
theory 
PEOFLE 
..... 
skills 
(style) 
CONTROL 
structure 
.ystems 
(style) 
~ntrot / :~ry 
Box 1: The Strategic Control Organisation 
Box 2: The Business Environment 
The strategic control organisation (box I) is positioned within 'the business 
environment' (box 2). This environment comprises social, legal, economic, political 
and technical pressures on the organisation (abbreviated to S.L.E.P.T.) which in turn 
present opportunities and threats to the strategic control organisation with the 
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organisation's exact position at any given time vis a vis the outside world being able to 
be described in terms of strengths and weaknesses (abbreviated to S.W.O.T.). 
Based upon the theoretical construct of the McKinsey 7 -S framework, this conceptual 
model is proposed as a generic research model for the exploration of strategic control 
practice in all business organisations -and not just the retail banks of this investigation . 
. ~- Indeed, the research model is broad in its nature, so that as many different contexts as 
possible (including those currently undefined in strategic control literature) can be 
explored and cross referenced with one another, so that patterns of strategic control 
can be ascertained. 
It was decided that an investigation into all areas of the strategic control organisation 
(box 1) would be a complicated task and so the influence of the business environment 
(box 2), whilst it couldn't be ignored, would need to be limited in some way. In order 
to limit this influence, it was decided therefore to explore one area of environmental 
influence only. 
The impact of nationality on the strategic control organisation was chosen and arrows 
once again are used to depict this relationship in the generic research model, with the 
relevant 'theory' to the relationship written along side. By selecting this one 
environmental influence to explore, it was hoped that a meaningful result could be 
obtained, rather than aiming to explore the influence of the entire environment or any 
arbitrar} number of environmental influences on strategic control and so risk getting a 
weak and blurred response. 
This procedure would ensure that all individual differences in strategic control systems 
were highlighted for each retail bank investigated, and that patterns could be drawn in 
the findings on the basis of, it was hoped nationality, or perhaps because of internal 
influences, such as company structure or shared values. The research objectives were 
identified therefore as: 
• to identifY the strategic control practices in retail banks of different nationalities; 
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• to compare and analyse the different approaches to strategic control in order to 
distinguish any patterns of practice; 
• to compare and analyse these different approaches to strategic control in order to 
identifY a 'best' practice model. 
These objectives originate from the researcher's own interest in the subject area and 
---have been developed and focused into their current form as a result of a subject area 
literature review, see Chapter 2. An awareness of cultural diversities, witnessed at first 
hand from periods spent in different countries and developed through wider 
investigation of the complexities as reported in the Comparative Management 
literature, have provided a valuable starting point for this investigation. In addition, an 
awareness of the apparent importance to business organisations (and to humanity in 
general) of planning for the future, and their desire for greater control over their 
organisations', provides another rationale. Interestingly, management's desire for 
control over business issues, including strategy, can be seen to form the raison d'etre 
behind much of management literature. 
3.2 Perspectives from Different Countries 
Having set out the research objectives it is useful at this point to examine in further 
detail the issue of nationality. 
In Chapter 2 th<;: views of organisational behaviourists were shown to have identified 
commonalties of human behaviour, with certain fundamental recurrent patterns of 
behaviour being identifiable in all people and organisations (and presumably therefore 
in all countries). Indeed organisational behaviour is only one element of the 
convergence theory argument first put forward in the 1960's that stressed the 
homogeneity of management in countries around the world (Kerr et al 1960). The 
pursuit of profit maximisation (Marx's capitalistic goal) through efficiency and cost 
minimisation, helped by the same easily accessible technology, were also identified as 
commonalties of purpose for all business organisations across the world (Lawrence 
1995). 
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Contrary to this view, however, is the culture based management perspective. 
Weinshall (1977), Hofstede (1980) Laurent (1986), Lawrence (1995 and 1998), 
amongst others, have been influential in identiJYing differences in management style 
and practice in different countries. 
Weinshall (1977) was one of the first commentators to document some of the 
differences amongst management practice in different countries. He noted, for 
example, that British managers, whilst being more reserved than their American 
counterparts, used frequent verbal exchanges, such as face to face meetings or the 
telephone, as their favoured means of communication within organisations compared 
to French managers who favoured the written word. Another early study led by the 
Laboratoire d'Economie et de Sociologie du Travail (Maurice et al. 1980) in Aix en 
Provence, France, identified that some French companies were more hierarchical than 
their German counterparts, with French firms often having a greater number of 
supervisory personnel. 
The most influential study in shaping the way many commentators think about country 
differences, has however been perhaps that of Hofstede (1980). Hofstede's research 
was based upon answers to some 100,000 survey questionnaires distributed to IBM 
employees based in 72 different countries (the results from 40 countries were used in 
the first instance and later on data from 50 countries and 3 regions was identified). He 
developed four dimensions from these findings, namely: power distance, individualism, 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance (see Table 4 below). Each country w't~ 
allocated a score for each of these dimensions, the higher the score the closer the fit 
with the definition of the dimension (the distance between the highest and lowest 
scoring countries being about 100 points). 
The power distance dimension describes the extent to which the unequal distribution of 
power is accepted within the workplace. France for example can be seen to have a 
higher tolerance of unequal power distribution or inequality (scoring 68) than Britain 
or Germany (both scoring 35). 
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Table 4: Hofstede's Scores on Four Dimensions for 50 Countries and 3 Regions 
Country Power DiJtanc:c Individualism Masculinity V.certainty 
Avoidance 
Indn: Rank Index Rank Index Rank lodes: Rank 
ArJZ;entina 49 35-36 46 22-23 56 20-21 86 10-15 
Australia 36 41 90 2 61 16 51 37 
Austria 11 53 55 18 79 2 70 24-25 
Belgium 65 20 75 8 54 22 94 5-6 
Brazil 69 14 38 26-27 49 27 76 21-22 
Canada 39 39 80 4-5 52 24 48 41-42 
Chile 63 24-25 23 38 28 46 86 10-15 
Colombia 67 17 13 49 64 11-12 80 20 
Costa Rica 35 42-44 15 46 21 48-49 86 10-15 
Denmarl< 18 51 74 9 16 50 23 51 
EQuador 78 8-9 8 52 63 13-14 67 28 
Finland 33 46 63 17 26 47 59 31-32 
France 68 15-16 71 10-11 43 35-16 86 10-15 
Germanv (Federal Republic) 35 42-44 67 15 66 9-10 65 29 
Great Britain 35 42-44 89 3 66 9-10 35 47-48 
Greece 60 27-28 35 30 57 18-19 112 I 
Guatemala 95 2-3 6 53 37 43 101 3 
Hong Kong 68 15-16 25 37 57 18-19 29 49-50 
Indonesia 78 8-9 14 47-48 46 30-31 48 14-42 
India 77 10-11 48 21 56 20-21 40 45 
Iran 58 19-20 41 24 43 35-36 59 31-22 
Ireland 28 49 70 12 68 7-8 35 47-48 
Israel 13 52 54 19 47 29 81 19 
Italy 50 43 76 7 70 4-5 75 23 
Jamaica 45 37 39 25 68 7-8 13 52 
Japan 54 33 46 22-23 95 I 92 7 
Korea 60 27-28 18 43 39 41 45 16-17 
Malavsia 104 I 26 36 50 25-26 36 46 
Mexico 81 5-6 30 32 69 6 82 18 
Netherlands 38 40 ·80 4-5 14 51 53 35 
Norway 31 47-48 69 13 8 52 50 38 
New Zealand 22 50 79 6 58 17 49 39-40 
Pakistan 55 32 14 47-48 50 25-26 70 24-25 
Panama 95 2-3 11 51 44 34 86 10-15 
Peru 64 21-23 16 45 42 37-38 87 9 
Philippines 94 4 32 31 64 11-12 44 44 
Portugal 63 24-25 27 33-35 31 45 104 2 
South Africa 49 36-37 65 16 63 13-14 49 39-40 
Salvador 66 18-19 19 42 40 40 94 5-6 
Singapore 74 13 20 39-41 48 28 8 53 
Spain 57 31 51 20 42 37-38 86 10-15 
Sweden 31 47-48 71 10-11 5 52 29 49-50 
Switzerland 34 45 68 14 70 4-5 58 33 
Taiwan 58 29-30 17 44 45 32-33 69 i-Thailand 64 21-23 20 39-41 34 44 64 
Turkey 66 18-19 37 28 45 31-33 85 16-17 
Uru~uav 61 26 36 29 38 42 100 4 
United States 40 38 91 I 62 15 46 43 
Venezuela 81 5-6 12 50 73 3 76 21-22 
YUJ(oslavia 76 12 27 33-35 21 48-49 88 8 
Rt2"ion: 
East Africa 64 21-23 27 33-35 41 39 52 36 
West Africa 77 10-11 20 39-41 46 30-31 54 34 
Arab Countries 80 7 38 26-27 53 23 68 27 
Source: Hofstede and Bond (\988) 
Individualism deals with the attitude toward group behaviour within an organisation, 
where: 
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"At one end of the scale we find societies in which the ties between individuals 
are very loose. Everybody is supposed to look after his or her own self-interest 
and maybe the interests of his or her immediate family... At the other end of the 
scale we find societies in which the ties between individuals are very tight. 
People are born into collectives or in-groups. Everybody is supposed to look 
after the interest of his or her own in-group." (Hofstede 1983) 
According to the findings, Britain (scoring 89) is less collectivist or its people are more 
individualistic than France (scoring 71) and Germany (scoring 67). 
Masculinity, as its name implies, describes the extent to which employees adhere to 
'masculine' values, such as an assertive and competitive attitude, or 'feminine' values, 
such as a < modest and nurturing attitude. On this index, the French score 43, 
identifYing them as more feminine than the British and Germans who both score 66. 
Finally, the uncertainty avoidance dimension describes the extent to which new, 
unusual or surprising situations are avoided by employees, with those countries scoring 
highly on the uncertainty avoidance dimension often trying to avoid such situations 
through close adherence to rules, beliefs and accepted practices. Here, France stands 
wide apart from Britain, scoring a high 86 compared to 35, with Germany falling in-
between with a score of65. 
A fifth dimension was later added (Hofstede and Bond 1988) called Confucian 
Dynamism, which was described as dealing with "the time perspective in a society for 
the gratification of people's needs" (Hofstede 1993, pg. 9). The results of this 
dimension (carried out amongst students within 22 countries) show in particular a clear 
distinction between East Asian countries and English speaking countries (see Table 5 
below). Hoftstede (1988) noted this difference commentating that Confucian 
Dynamism deals with a society'S search for "virtue" whilst uncertainty avoidance 
cultures believe in "absolute truth", the former he calls a uniquely Eastern dimension, 
the later a uniquely Western dimension and the other three dimensions (power 
distance, individualism and masculinity) common to both. 
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Table 5: Confucian Dynamism Scores 
Country Confucian Dynamism Country Confucian Dynamism 
Index Index 
Hong Kong 96 Germany (Federal Republic) 31 
Taiwan 87 Australia 31 
Japan 80 New Zealand 30 
Korea 75 USA 29 
Brazil 65 Great Britain 25 
India 61 East Africa 25 
Thailand 56 Canada 23 
Singapore 48 Philippines 19 
Netherlands 44 west Africa 16 
Sweden 33 Pakistan 0 
Source: Hofstede and Bond (\988) 
Hofstede's studies highlight some fascinating differences between countries and indeed 
groups of countries. Other commentators however, have also contributed to the 
development of our understanding of country specific differences. Horovitz (1979) it 
must be remembered, reported that top management control in Britain, France and 
Germany is short term and focused on internal operational detail: 
"Chief executives appear to receive information on short term performance more 
than long run issues. Content analysis of daily, weekly and monthly reports sent 
to chief executives show that information deals predominantly with sales, profit, 
personnel, cash, deliveries, cost, putput and balance sheet information." 
He adds that the cultural differences of the managers from the different countries 
studied also appear in the type of information that they use: 
"British chief executives put predominantly emphasis on finance whereas French 
and German chief executives put first emphasis on production, matching well 
educational backgrounds of managers (accountants vs engineers)." 
Laurent's study (1983 and 1986) showed that conflict avoidance varied from country 
to country, see below, with for example the UK and Germany having a greater and 
more similar tolerance to conflict than their French management counterparts. 
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"Most organisations would be better off if conflict could be eliminated forever. " 
Positive responses % 
Sweden 4 
USA 6 
UK 13 
Germany 16 
Holland 17 
Switzerland 18 
Denmark 19 
France 24 
Belgium 27 
Italy 41 
On the other hand, as seen in the following illustration, the French and German 
managers were more similar in their requirement to have precise answers to 
subordinates' management questions than their British counterparts: 
"It is important for a manager to have at hand precise answers to most of the 
questions that his subordinates may raise about their work." 
Positive responses % 
Sweden 10 
Holland I7 
USA 18 
Denmark 23 
UK 27 
Switzerland 38 
Belgium 44 
Germany 46 
France 53 
Italy 66 
Lawrence has also been an influential commentator in adding some more country 
specific detail to the cultural differentiation studies mentioned above. His studies, for 
example, on German, French and British management illuminate our depth of 
understanding of management in different countries, see Figure 11 below. 
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Figure 11: A Thumbnail Sketch oCBritish, French and German Management 
Britain France Germany 
• Management is about the • Management is about the • Management is about 
individual and their leadership application of educated engineering knowledge or 
ability, rather than the system: cleverness: "managers need specialist skills, known as 
"People with the right human to be qualified educationally, "Technilt', and their 
qualities ... - are presumed to to be capable in the area of application. 
be capable ... " analysis and synthesis, to be • Experts are recruited as 
• Managers are recruited and good at logical argument. " managers: with acquired 
promoted on the basis of • Intellectual virtuosity is key; specialist knowledge and 
general credentials, e.g. social managers must demonstrate relevant job experience being 
and political skills, judgement, their ability. Safeguarding la prized. Likewise promotion 
charisma and that Ubiquitous palrie, one's motherland, and depends upon demonstrable 
British humour. its status is a plus. achievement. 
• Organisations tend to be short- • Organisations tend to be • Organisations tend to be 
termist, relying on equity formal and bureaucratic. organised functionally and 
finance and not debt finance. There is close co-operation have few layers of general 
Profit is the rationale; hence between government and management. 
the use of profit centres. industry. 
Source: adapted from Lawrence (1995) 
Trompenaars (1996) reminds us that: 
"Strategy is a systematic way of acting on the environment. By definition this 
process in intimately related to the cultural context in which it unfolds ... 
Every country and every organisation faces a) dilemmas in relationships with 
people; b) dilemmas in relationships to time; and c) dilemmas in relations 
between people and the natural environment. While cultures differ markedly, 
they do not differ in needing to make some kind of response ... 
In the final analysis culture is the manner in which these dilemmas are 
reconciled, since every nation seeks a different and winding path to its own 
ideals of integrity. " 
In looking at the management of banks, certain bank specific factors as well as some 
more general country or culture specific norms can be seen as an influence; see Figure 
12 below: 
63 
Research Framework 
Figure 12: Innuences on Bank Management 
General Factors Bank Specific Factors 
Cultural 'foundations' International Country specific 
Current state of development • Globalisation • Historical 
(social, economic, political, ~ • International bank development 
• 
legal, technological, etc.) and loan • National banking 
• Customs and habits agreements law 
• Language • EU-banking rules • Local markets 
• Communication and regulations (stock exchange) 
• Role of sexes • Interbank business • Impact of 
Conflict orientation 
.. • International technology (e.g. 
Inter-relationship of systems consortia payment 
• 
• 
• Joint ventures transaction habits) 
• Strategic alliances • National customs 
• international • National customer 
communication groups in retail 
• international and wholesale 
customs business 
• international 
customer groups 
... 
Source: Schuster (1996) 
The degree of influence of the above factors is however more difficult to judge. What 
needs to be underlined in the above figure is the inter-relationship between the internal 
organisational influences with those of the external environment. These inter-relating 
influences can also be seen from? look at a 'typical', albeit not comprehensive, SWOT 
analysis for a traditional high street retail bank; see Figure 13 below. 
Interestingly in terms of strategy, Edwards and Lawrence (1996), note that: 
"the particular industry is more important in structuring executive perceptions, 
defining issues and developments, and in shaping strategy than is the national 
culture· of the country." 
This does not mean that they do not believe national culture to be important, but rather 
it does not have a determinant effect. Indeed, all of these studies illustrate the 
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differences in management behaviour in each country, as a result of the managers' 
different cultural background and business environment. They show that different 
approaches exist and that managers have different styles. The question of whether 
they will have a determinant effect on strategy and strategic control in particular is 
however unclear. One aim of this study will be to investigate this question further. 
Figure 13: SWOT Analysis of a Typical Retail Bank 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Traditional family based relationships High level of fixed costs 
Customer inertia Poor level of customer services 
Branch network Lack of customer information 
Product range Product, not market, focus 
Management skills/resources Lacks brand strength 
Processing technology Lack of flexibility to respond 
Communication network Traditional management practices 
Brand image Complexity of operations 
Trustworthy reputation 
Opportunities Threats 
Develop enhanced customer service New market entry competition 
Develop effective marketing systems New technologies 
Reduce cost structures Product innovations 
New distribution opportunities Changing customer attitudes/needs 
Market/product/customer segmentation Innovative delivery systems 
Product innovation Legislation 
Social changes 
Brand positioning/strengthening 
Source: Pragma Consulting in McGoldrick and Greenland (1994) 
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Chapter 4: Research Design i 
k 
4.0 Introduction 
This Chapter describes the practical detail of the investigation. It highlights the 
choices that have been made in the selection of an appropriate research strategy, 
drawing on the commentary of McGrath (1982). The research methods chosen to 
investigate the four research questions are described, as are the attempts that have 
been made to ensure valid and reliable findings. It identifies the sample frame, the 
sample of respondents investigated and it explains how the information gained from 
these respondents was treated. The limitations of the research design and problems 
faced in conducting this research are also explored. 
4.1 The Research Strategy 
This research at first sight appears to be rooted in the phenomenological tradition: one 
that perceives the world as a subjective and social construct, with the academic 
observer being an integral and fundamental part of the observed research (Easterby-
Smith 1991 pp. 21-43). Features of the phenomenological paradigm, first outlined by 
19th century writer Husserl (Gibson 1931), suggest a research focus on the 
interpretation of meanings and the development of ideas and understanding through 
inductive reasoning. This research philosophy as a result, is particularly suited to 
qualitative research methods. 
Pragmatism however, demands a more 'dirty' (less pure) approach in the use of 
research methods in order to corroborate, or reject, a degree of generalisability of the 
research findings within a short time frame. This pragmatic approach, aims to allow 
for a significant level of theoretical analysis and reflection, as well as providing the 
opportunity to apply the research findings, in the sense of providing some meaningful 
explanations and proposals, for the benefit of business. In this way, a positivist 
philosophy will be assumed for certain aspects of the research; positivism being a 
philosophy that describes the world as externally existing and objective, with the 
academic observer being independent and the research value-free (Easterby-Srnith 
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1991 pp. 21-43). Features of the positivist paradigm to be used (for example: the use 
of other researchers' work as a basis upon which to explore further in research 
interviews) will speed-up the lengthy nature of certain aspects of phenomenological 
research. 
The nature of the research area is one that requires the identification and exploration of 
varying types of organisational behaviour. Furthermore strategic control practices are--
relatively unknown, due to the rather putative state of current strategic control 
commentary. These two observations suggest that a more qualitative, rather than 
quantitative approach to the research framework, should be followed, whereby some 
form of relationship is built up with the respondents in order to investigate the subject 
area fully and extract meaningful data. This process suggests also the need for a 
relatively unstructured research agenda, in order to allow the respondents themselves 
to be the guide to their own strategic control practices. 
McGrath's (1982) description of the dilemmas in choosing a research strategy fit well 
the pragmatic approach of the researcher and the approach followed in this study. 
Drawing upon McGrath's discussion, it must be realised that every research strategy is 
a matter of ' best fit'; one which attempts the best compromise for the various choices 
that have been made and that need to be made in the future in the selection of the 
research method. Indeed, other research strategies exist and could, ultimately, have 
been pursued, however, all of which would have been less pertinent and valid to the 
investigation of th .. research questions than the chosen research strategy. The list of 
possible research strategies is listed in Figure 14 below. 
McGrath lists eight methodological strategies for acquiring knowledge about a 
research problem (listed in the slices below'). Three 'points ofrnaximum concern' are 
also identified, labelled A, B and C, which are conflicting pressures in all research 
activities, whereby, for example, the total appeasement of one, will only force a 
'dilemma' in terms of the two other criteria. In summarising the rationale for the 
selection of an appropriate research strategy an outline of each will be given. 
1 Interesting cultural differences exist in describing the diagram, as an American McGrath likes to 
view these research strategies as eight "pie slices", being British [ see them as Hslices of cake", and so 
do Germans, whereas a Frenchman is taught to think of them as "slices of camembert". 
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A 
Universal 
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B 
LaboratOf)' 
Experiments 
Experimental 
Simulations 
Computer 
Simutations 
A Point of maximum concern with generality over actors. 
Research Design 
Field 
Experiments 
Particular 
Behaviour 
Systems 
c 
B Point of maximum concern with precision of measurement of behaviour. 
C Point of maximum concern with system character of context. 
I Settings in natural systems. 
II Contrived and created settings. 
III Behaviour not setting dependent. 
IV No observation of behaviour required. 
Ruokel aod McGrath (1972) 
Field studies Field studies are at the point of maximum concern about realism of 
context. The natural setting for the participants is of paramount importance in the 
carrying out of this research strategy. Field studies are as a result as unobtrusive 
as possible, to the detriment of the precision of measurement and generalisability 
of the fmdings. An example of which in the business context would be non-
participant observation of supermarket customers going about their shopping in 
order for a picture to be built up about buyer behaviour. 
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Field experiments Also taking place in a 'real' setting for the participants, they 
compromise unobtrusiveness in an attempt to increase precision of measurement 
of behaviour. In this situation, a supermarket may, for example, test new product 
displays along side existing displays in order to gauge their impact on the 
customer's buyer behaviour. 
__ Experimental simulations In the case of experimental simulations, the settings are 
contrived for the participants, albeit whilst attempting to maintain some form of 
realism. Both experimental simulations and field experiments lie in between the 
points of maximum concern about precision and context, but fall short in dealing 
with the concern of generalisability. 
Laboratory experiments Here the setting is created and contrived to the extent 
that a 'generic setting' is maintained for the purpose of the research. This is done 
in order to maximise the precision of measurement of the behaviour being studied, 
compromising generalisability and concerns with context. Here the experimental 
reality is what counts. 
Judgement tasks Judgement tasks are not context dependent, with instead 
'universal' behaviour being dominant. Realism of context is at a minimum 
therefore, with moderate generalisability and precision of measurement being the 
reward. 
Sample surveys Generality is a prime concern for researchers usmg sample 
surveys, with contextual issues being 'neutralised' through the use of behaviour 
related questions rather than context related questions and precision being gained 
through the use of effective population sampling techniques. 
Formal theory McGrath (1982) points out that quadrant four strategies differ 
from those in the other quadrants in that they are not empirical. As such the 
influence of behaviour and the presence of actors is removed from the theoretical 
constructs of quadrant 4 strategies. Formal theory maximises generalisability, but 
compromises on realism of context and precision of measurement. 
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Computer simulations Similar to experimental simulations and judgement studies, 
computer simulations attempt to satisfY two dilemmatic extremes. In this case . 
generalisability and contextual concerns are optimised at the expense of the 
precision of measurement of behaviour. 
The above summary helps in identifying the choices available in the selection of an 
appropriate research strategy. Computer simulations must be put to one side due to 
our incomplete knowledge of the subject area, as it is currently known; similarly the 
lack of a single widely applied theory prevents a formal theoretical approach to the 
research strategy being taken. In addition, time limitations prevent the use of field 
studies and the practicalities of commercial activity rule out the option of field 
experiments, laboratory experiments and experimental simulations. 
Sample surveys are also ruled out in this particular research, because the strategic 
control context can not be fully 'neutralised' or put more simply the context can not be 
explicitly and unambiguously defined at this point in our understanding of the subject 
area. According to McGrath (1982), when following a sample survey strategy: 
"the investigator tries to neutralise context by asking for behaviours (often, 
responses to questions) that are unrelated to the context within which they are 
elicited (often, doorstep or telephone). " 
Such an approach, in practical terms, requires either a complete understanding of the 
subject area and the likely responses to research questions or requires a very precise 
small study to be carried out in order that a full range of responses can be captured to 
a small number of open ended research questions. In the case of strategic control 
practice however, there is no full knowledge about the likely responses to the research 
questions, making the design of any survey questionnaire imprecise. This imprecision 
would force assumptions to be made about the likely responses or would lead to an 
unwieldy survey questionnaire, with too many open ended questions to be completed, 
leaving too much room for ambiguity. In either case construct validity would be 
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difficult to justifY and much of the richness to be gained form an investigation into the 
subject area would risk being lost. 
The research strategy is thus limited to a judgement tasks strategy; in this case, it is the 
best way of instilling confidence in the respondents and thereby eliciting the 'best' 
(most valid) data. A judgement task strategy can be described, using the McGrath 
model, as a compromise between the need for generalisability of actors actions (Le. can 
the respondents behaviour be generalised?) and precision in the measurement of 
behaviour (Le. are the research findings an accurate picture of real practices?). In this 
way, a 'general overview' of strategic control practices within the sample of retail 
banks can be ascertained which is 'satisfactorily precise' in its measurement. Concerns 
for the character of the context of the research, whilst clearly not being dealt as 
completely as would be in the case of non-participant observation in a field study, are 
also 'satisfied' by the use of relevant expert respondents. As Mcgrath (1982) notes; 
"The judgement study typically uses only a few population units, constructed as 
'judges' of stimuli ... " 
The fact that the judges or expert respondents reported strategic control 'behaviour' is 
not setting dependent also facilitates the research process, highlighting the fact that 
contributions from external sources can be equally valid and pertinent as those from 
within the sample of retail banks. A description of how the judgement task research 
strategy was translated into a detailed set of research methods is discussed in further 
detail in Section 4.2 below. 
4.2 Research Methods 
Figure 14 highlighted the need to satisfY the dilemmas 0 f the judgement task research 
strategy, namely to nullifY contextual concerns through the use of expert respondents 
and to ensure a degree of generalisability and precision of measurement. These three 
requirements were kept in the forefront of the researcher's mind in selecting the most 
appropriate research methods. 
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The choice of a judgement task strategy led to a research design with three integrated· 
parts: 
• a sample of retail bank respondents were interviewed and asked to report 
behaviour in given situations and provide detail of organisational strategy and 
control; 
• follow up interviews with the same respondents were carried out to probe specific 
areas; 
• other sources (internal and external to the retail banks) were investigated and the 
findings were compared with interview data. 
This research design made use offour different data collection methods: 
(a) interpretivist interviews within the retail bank sample - to gain a 'rich' picture and 
develop content validity; 
(b) more positivist follow up interviews with the same respondents - to probe specific 
areas and so gain necessary precision; 
(c) interviews with 'generic judges' - to explore construct and content validity; 
(d) secondary data sources - to supplement and check upon findings. 
Interpretivist interviews within the retail bank sample were carried out with at least one 
senior member of each retail bank'srnanagement team and at least one specialist 
'strategic thinker' (often to be found within the corporate headquarters). The aim of 
these interviews was to gain as 'rich' a picture as possible of strategic control practices 
within the particular retail bank. Considerable effort was made to ensure that several 
respondents were interviewed in each banking organisation in order to provide for 
some triangulation of responses, thereby ensuring some degree of content validity from 
the respondents. It is for this reason that three interviews were required within the 
German banks and four were necessary within one of the French banks. In the same 
way, at least two banks from each country were studied in an attempt to establish some 
degree of generalisability from the findings (see Table 6 below). 
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Table 6: Retail Bank Interview Distribution 
Britain France Germany 
Bank I 2 2 3 
Bank 2 2 4 3 
Bank 3 2 
Total Interviews (18) 6 6 6 
More positivist follow up interviews with the same respondents were carried out by 
telephone in order to probe specific areas and clarifY the infonnation given or indeed 
plug any infonnation gaps that were found. Where respondents were unavailable to be 
spoken to on the telephone, they were written to and asked to supply the relevant 
information by post. These interviews and follow-up contacts were an essential part of 
the research design in gaining the necessary triangulation and precision required in the 
findings. 
In addition, several interviews were carried out, at different stages throughout the 
study, with leading experts from all three countries (see Table 7 below) in order to gain 
an overview of perceived national strategic control practices. 
Table 7: Expert Interview Distribution 
Academics 
Other experts 
Total Interviews (7) 
Britain 
2 
3 
5 
France Germany 
Excerpts of these interviews can be found in the Appendices. National experts in the 
research area were selected from amongst British, French and German academics2 who 
have commented on the subject of strategic control. One leading strategic thinker, one 
senior management consultant and one European banking analyst were also 
interviewed. These interviews have been particularly valuable for ensuring that an 
appropriate research design was used, for example, encouraging the researcher in the 
2 Leading strategic control commentators were interviewed, including David Asch, Michael Goold 
and Georg Schreyogg, and in addition, considerable support was given by members of Loughborough 
University Business School and its Banking Centre. 
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use of interpretivist interviews and in the rejection of a sample survey (questionnaire) 
research method. All of these interviewees were treated as 'generic' judges of the 
research area, whereby national strategic control practices could be explored from both 
a theoretical and practical viewpoint. In this way, the wide ranging semi-structured 
interviews were used to provide construct validity of the research design as well as 
content validity of the research findings. 
The proposed methods for data collection have also been designed around the need for 
validity and reliability in the research in order to assure some form of precision and 
generalisability in the findings. Careful attention was paid to content and construct 
validity for the interview questions (where the following questions, posed by Sekaran 
(1992 pg. 172), are answered for content validity: "does the measure adequately 
measure the concept?" i.e., is the complete scope of the area of interest fully covered, 
and for construct validity: "does the instrument tap the concept as theorised?" 
Construct validity was maintained by starting with highly open interview questions in a 
relatively unstructured format. More directed closed questions were only asked once a 
full picture of strategic control practice had been ascertained from the respondents and 
a clarification of the detail was needed. Emphasis throughout the interview process 
was on allowing the respondents to tell their own story of strategic control practice 
'warts and all'. 
The interviews were carried out in the same general format in all three countries (a list 
of typical interview questions used can be found in Appendix I). Interviews were 
conducted in the offices of the interviewees in all cases, except in the case of follow-up 
interviews which were conducted by telephone. In the UK and France, the interviews 
were carried out in the interviewees' own language, with the researcher at ease with 
his ability to ensure that all the nuances of behaviour could be captured in either 
language. In Germany English was used mostly, due to the fact that nearly all the 
respondents could speak fluent English, but on occasion a mixture of English and 
German was used to facilitate the flow of the discussion, and on one occasion German 
was used throughout with a translator being present in order to ensure that no 
misunderstandings were made. All the face to face interviews were tape recorded, 
except for two, where the respondents declined to be recorded, but agreed that notes 
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could be taken during the interview instead. Detailed notes were made of all telephone 
interviews. 
The interviewees responses have been combined, allowing for a relatively 
comprehensive picture to be built up and a detailed 'story' to be told for each for each 
of the retail banks investigated. In the editing of these 'stories' the fullest description 
given by a respondent has been used in preference to less complete descriptions. 
Effort has also been made to try to ensure that the respondents are not directly 
identifiable. None of the respondents were told the names of the other organisations 
participating in this study at any time. In addition none of the names of the other 
respondents from within the same organisation were volunteered, and was only 
requested and supplied once. 
The sampling method for the interviews was carried out on a judgement sample basis. 
Sekaran (1992 pg. 237) describes the advantages and disadvantages of this non-
probability sampling as "sometimes, the only meaningful way to investigate" with 
respondents being "selected on the basis of their expertise in the subject investigated. " 
This approach was perceived as the most appropriate method of selection. In 
particular, it was perceived that one of the best people to tell the 'story' of strategic 
management in a retail bank is one of the managers within the bank's 'strategy 
department' or a member of its senior management team. 
The contextual concerns, as identified in Figure 14, were also compensated for by the 
fact that retail banking practices are relatively well documented. Banking it must be 
remembered has a long history, one with religious and socio-political roots3, and i~' 
fundamental part of any economy, both of which have contributed to it being the foJ L_ 
of attention of many commentators over the years. The body of published retail 
banking literature has been used as external references against which the research 
findings of this study have be checked, allowing for similarities and differences in 
findings to be examined. Company information in a similar way has also been used to 
3 The story of the 'money lenders' outside the Temple of Jerusalem as described in the new testament, 
perhaps sets the tone for many people's first thoughts on the practice of banking. This said, the 
polemic over usury (i.e. whether one should lend money at interest) certainly appears to have been 
overcome with payment for financial services now being an accepted practice throughout the world 
today. 
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introduce and supplement the retail bank stories. The sources of all non-interview data 
are identified where this information is used. 
The rationale for the selection of the three nationalities to be studied, i.e. British, 
French and German, have been selected because of their relatively distinct national 
cultures, as outlined by, amongst others, Hofstede (1980), Horovitz (1980) and 
·-Lawrence (1995 and 1998), see Chapter 3. They are also three relatively easily 
accessible countries for the researcher, both in terms of geography, language and 
understanding. In addition, the retail banks within these countries operate within the 
three largest economies of Europe and as such posses some of Europe's largest retail 
banks. 
The extent to which, however, particular findings can be translated into a statement of 
broader national characteristics, i.e. this is how the French carry out strategic control, 
is strictly limited. This research has been based upon retail banking alone. Strategic 
control practices in other sectors have not been investigated. The validity and 
reliability for any generalisation that moves away from the reported patterns 
discovered in retail banking is therefore unclear. The rationale behind this is that the 
industry context may not be the same in another industry: the backgrounds and 
aspirations of the people working in different industries may well be different; the 
strategies pursued and the controls used may also be different. Each change in context 
will make generalisability of the findings increasingly erroneous. 
The limitations to the validity of the findings were not so much one of worries over 
reliability in the sample of respondents, but rather one of accessibility to the 
information. Gaining access to the respondents was often difficult, due to the busy 
nature of the respondents' professional lives. But more difficult at times was gaining 
the fullest of pictures of actual strategic control practice. Some respondents were 
more open in the information they provided than others. Some interviews led to 'the 
door being opened' and further information being available, with perhaps subsequent 
interviews being arranged with other employees. In other cases, however, a more 
limited and less co-operative response was the outcome. In some cases, of course, the 
outcome was not particularly rewarding in terms of strategic control behaviour, not 
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because of the respondents lack of co-operation, but because the strategic control 
behaviour itself was rather limited. 
4.3 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the research strategy choices that were faced at the outset __ _ 
of the investigation of strategic control practices within European retail banks. It has 
highlighted the rationale for the selection of a judgement task strategy and has gone 
into the detail of how this strategy was implemented in the research process. The 
research methods for the investigation have been set out, outlining the choices that 
have been made and noting the problems that have been overcome as well as the 
highlighting limitations within the research. 
The precise research questions used in the investigation can now be identified as 
follows, as a guide for the interpretation of the research findings as described in the 
next chapter. 
I. How is strategy controlled by British, French and German retail banks? 
2. Do British, French and German retail banks employ distinct strategic control 
methods that differ significantly from one another? 
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of these strategic control methods? 
4. How does current strategic rontrol practice amongst the retail bank sample 
compare to commentators' theoretical models of strategic control? 
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Chapter 5: Research Findings 
5.0 Introduction 
Seven banks are the subjects of this research. These banks are well known 'high 
street' names in their respective countries. Three banks have been researched in the 
UK, two in France and two in Germany. 
The evidence detailed here is a faithful portrayal of that reported from always more 
than one respondent in each banking organisation. Where supplementary information 
has been obtained this has been incorporated accordingly, with a note made of its 
source. 
In this chapter the three principal elements of the strategic control organisation, as 
described in the Generic Research Model in Chapter 3, are used as the basis of 
comparison. As such the findings from each retail bank are grouped under the 
headings of strategy, control and people. 
The fmdings from each banking organisation are outlined in turn and, where possible, 
the respondents own comments have been used to tell their own 'story'. Care has 
been taken, however, to ensure the anonymity of the respondents and employees 
within the banks, with, for example, commentary being kept in the third person where 
appropriate or employees' general positions being referred to rather than their names 
or exact tifs. 
Preceding each bank's story is a brief description of basic impartial data, such as 
fmancial results, number of employees, etc. This data is provided by way of 
introduction, giving the reader a thumb nail sketch of the banking organisation's 
general business situation and a flavour for where this positions the bank in its 
domestic market and in the wider European context. A brief overview of each bank's 
history is also provided to help situate each bank in its national and cultural context. 
The sources of secondary data used for these purposes are stated where quotes or use 
of such information is made. 
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An overview of the position of the retail banks that have participated in this research 
within the league-table of The Banker's 'Top 50 Europeans' can also be found on the 
following pages as a supplementary 'positioning' mechanism (see Tables 8, 9 and 10). 
For ease of reference the research fmdings from each bank are listed in alphabetical 
order. The order therefore is as follows: 
Abbey National 
BNP 
Credit Agrico le 
Deutsche Bank 
Dresdner Bank 
Lloyds TSB 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
At the end of each bank's 'story' are two short summaries. The fIrst summarises the 
specifIc characteristics of each bank's strategic control components. The second 
provides a 'quick reference' summary of the fmdings for each banking organisation. 
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Table 8: 'Top 50 European Banks 1997' 
Rank Name Capital Strength Asset size 
($ million) ($ million) 
I HSBC Holdings 27,392 473,608 
2 Credit Agricole Groupe 22,280 419,980 
3 Deutsche Bank 17,731 581,979 
4 ABN AMRO Bank 15,864 414,654 
5 Union Bank of Switzerland 13,570 396,878 
6 Barclays Bank 13,020 388,955 
7 Credit Suisse Group 12,984 473,832 
8 Rabobank Nederland 12,680 209,692 
9 National Westminster Bank 12,342 306,605 
10 Halifax 11,995 216,802 
11 Banque Nationale de Paris 11,521 339,819 
12 Groupe Caisse d'Epargne 10,971 214,854 
13 Dresdner Bank 10,456 372,594 
14 Lloyds TSB Group 10,408 261,462 
15 Societe Generale 9,745 441,115 
16 Commerzbank 8,829 287,891 
17 ING Bank Group 8,730 190,269 
18 Bayerische Vereinsbank 8,729 249,709 
19 Compagnie Financiere de Paribas 8,538 245,188 
20 Abbey National 8,067 249,393 
21 Banco Santander 7,952 171,092 
22 Credit Mutuel 7,852 108,373 
23 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 7,792 331,225 
24 Credit Lyonnais 7,131 250,279 
25 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 6,800 139,346 
26 Swiss Bank Corp 6,371 301,620 
27 Dexia 5,951 202,762 
28 Cariplo 5,946 121,374 
29 Bayerische Landesbank 5,946 233,063 
30 Kreditansta1t fUr Wiederaulbau 5,607 147,856 
31 Groupe Banques Populaires 5,427 111,222 
32 Banca di Roma 5,374 118,001 
33 I" Banca San Paolo di Torino 5,339 145,929 
34 Bayerische Hypotheken & Wechsel-Bank 5,208 203,981 
35 Argentaria 5,069 76,922 
36 Royal Bank of Scotland 5,012 117,117 
37 Banca Commerciale ltaliana 4,717 115,789 
38 Bank of Scotland 4,486 89,948 
39 Bankgesellschaft Berlin 4,480 196,242 
40 Bank Austria 4,241 124,157 
41 Standard Chartered 4,189 78,024 
42 Generale Bank 4,176 160,136 
43 Instituto Mobiliare ItaHano 4,101 51,829 
44 Credito ltaliano 4,101 51,829 
45 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 3,996 87,897 
46 Den Danske Bank 3,932 77,169 
47 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 3,680 103,308 
48 DO Bank 3,619 205,227 
49 Kredietbank 3,588 112,989 
50 Banco Central Hispanoamericano 3,454 77,386 
Source: The Banker, September 1998 
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Table 9: 'Top 50 European Banks 1996' 
Rank Name Capital Strength Asset size 
($ million) ($ million) 
I HSBC Holdings 25,716 401,685 
2 Credit Agricole 22,235 477,336 
3 Deutsche Bank 18,517 569,906 
4 ABN AMRO Bank 16,098 341,396 
5 Union Bank of Switzerland 15,743 324,756 
6 Barclavs Bank 12,635 315,846 
7 Groupe Caisse d'Epargne 12,368 224,301 
8 National Westminster Bank 11,914 314,716 
9 Banque Nationale de Paris 11,612 355,366 
10 Credit Suisse Group 11,611 389,300 
11 Rabobank Nederland 11,423 190,019 
12 Compagnie Financiere de Paribas 10,765 290,720 
13 Societe Generale 10,735 339,996 
14 Swiss Bank Corp 10,264 267,339 
15 Dresdner Bank 9,325 355,605 
16 Lloyds TSB Group 8,937 250,241 
17 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 8,320 295,774 
18 Commerzbank 8,157 287,692 
19 Credit Mutuel 8,065 111,432 
20 Credit Lyonnais 7,757 310,040 
21 !NG Bank 7,609 178,614 
22 Abbey National 7,460 210,581 
23 Bay~ische Vereinsbank 7,348 258,505 
24 Banco Santander 7,034 149,881 
25 Cariplo 6,615 125,910 
26 Dexia 6,592 215,781 
27 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 6,288 131,069 
28 Kredit. fUr Wiederaufbau 6,093 153,207 
29 I" Banca San Paolo di Torino 5,943 171,317 
30 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 5,805 112,857 
31 Banca di Roma 5,662 141,077 
32 Bayerische Landesbank . 5,648 221,488 
33 Argentaria 5,593 83,832 
34 Bayerische Hypotheken & Wechsel-Bank 5,558 218,294 
35 Banca Commerciale ltaliana 5,327 115,448 
36 Bankgesellschaft Berlin 5,245 216,265 
37 Instituto Mobiliare ltaliano 4,889 52,228 
38 Groupe Banques Populaires 4,525 115,445 
39 Generale Bank 4,395 173,226 
40 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 4,368 93,177 
41 Den Danske Bank 4,277 75,989 
42 Royal Bank of Scotland 3,967 95,479 
43 Standard Chartered 3,980 71,554 
44 Svenska Handelsbanken 3,752 83,121 
45 Bank of Scotland 3,595 77,044 
46 Credito ltaliano 3,504 114,378 
47 DGBank 3,457 210,156 
48 Caja de Ahorros y Pen. de Barcelona 3,445 75,773 
49 Kredietbank 3,430 113,217 
50 Credit National 3,323 55,089 
Source: The Banker, September 1997 
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Table 10: 'Top 50 European Banks 1995' 
Rank Name Capital Strength Asset size 
($ million) ($ million) 
I HSBC Holdings 21,445 351,601 
2 Cn!dit Agricole 20,386 386,388 
3 Union Bank of Switzerland 19,903 336,188 
4 Deutsche Bank 18,937 503,429 
5 CS Holdings 13,751 358,734 
6 ABN AMRO Bank 13,372 340,642 
7 Groupe Caisse d'Epargne 12,667 229,916 
8 Swiss Bank Corp 11,733 250,566 
9 National Westminster Bank 11,501 260,846 
10 Banque Nationale de Paris 11,453 325,250 
11 Rabobank Nederland 11,310 182,944 
12 Barc1ays Bank 11,068 261,705 
13 Compagnie Financiere de Paribas 10,980 272,213 
14 Societe Generale 10,474 326,507 
15 Dresdner Bank 9,203 332,909 
16 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 8,717 291,314 
17 Commerzbank 8,210 281386 
18 Credit Lyonnais 7,835 339,394 
19 Credit Mutuel Confederation Nationale 7,775 105,306 
20 Lloyds TSB Group 7,171 229,495 
21 Cariplo 7,015 117,640 
22 San Paolo Bank Holding 6,796 160,908 
23 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 6,439 116,426 
24 Bayerische Vereinsbank 6,278 247,648 
25 Internationale Nederland Bank 6,254 154,049 
26 Kreditanstalt fiir Wiederaufbau 6,228 167,139 
27 Bayerische Hypotheken & Wechsel-Bank 6,116 208,276 
28 Abbey National 6,109 159,870 
29 Banco Santander 6,021 135,614 
30 Bankgesellschaft Berlin 5,853 196,410 
31 Argentaria 5,645 105,058 
32 BNL-Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 5,493 107,871 
33 Banca di Roma 5,360 134,016 
34 Bayerische Landesbank 5,208 211,676 
35 Banca Commerciale Italiana 5,118 100,386 
36 Groupe Banques Populaires 4,633 112,653 
37 Instituto Mobiliare Italiano 4,530 43,909 
38 Generale Bank 4,521 161,114 
39 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 4,168 85,989 
40 Den Danske Bank 4,075 70,319 
41 DGBank 3,712 200,138 
42 Svenska Handelsbanken 3,665 71,538 
43 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 3,554 65,900 
44 Banco Central Hispanoamericano 3,409 92,389 
45 Caia de Ahorros y Pen. de Barcelona 3,326 75,838 
46 Royal Bank of Scotland 3,305 80,651 
47 Norddeutsche Landesbank 3,239 139,746 
48 Kredietbank 3,199 104,575 
49 Credit Local de France 3,178 94,066 
50 Union Europeenne de CIC 3,134 112,871 
Source: Tbe Banker, September 1996 
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The Abbey National Story 
Introduction 
Two different viewpoints were found during the investigation of this story: on the one 
hand a clear and comprehensive formal strategic management and strategic control 
system was outlined, on the other a difference was highlighted between this formal 
system and reality. Indeed, emphasis was placed by one respondent on the supremacy 
of the informal system over that of the formal system. The informal system, 
particularly when a consensus of opinion was formed, was used in preference to the 
formal system. The rationale suggested for this by the respondent was that the 
informal system was: 
• more flexible; 
• it allowed for quick and yet still effective actions to be carried out; and 
• it benefited the share price of Abbey National. 
Description ofthe bank 
Abbey National changed from a Building Society to become a bank in 1989. Today it 
comprises retail banking, Finance House (business [mance), general insurance, life 
assurance, wealth management (private banking) and treasury & wholesale banking 
businesses. Abbey National Group total assets amount to £151 billion (£34 billion on 
conversion), net income equals £0.954 billion ~~d capital resources equate to some £4 
billion. In terms of security it has a: Aa2 Moody, AA Standard & Poor and AA 
IBeA rating. The number of ordinary shareholders totals some 2.4 million. The 
number of employees totals 25,500 (some 16,500 in Retail Banking), who serve some 
15.3 million customers. 
The Retail Banking arm contributes almost 50% of the Group profit. It has some 850 
high street branches. Distribution of banking services is via the traditional branch 
network, via some 2,000 automated teller machines and 768 remote machines, 
electronic banking and through a range of card products (i.e. debit and credit cards). 
The Abbey National "corporate purpose" is the following: 
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"To achieve above average growth in shareholder value over the long term by 
meeting the needs of our customers, our staff and all of the other stakeholders 
in our business. " 
Source: Abbey National PLC Directors' Report & Accounts 1997 
Table 11: Abbey National's place within its local, European and world markets 
Year Ranking Assets Pro-tax profit Return on Cost/Income 
(in terms of Tier 1 ca ital $m) Assets Ratio 
UK Europe World Sm Sm % % 
1997 6 (8,067) 20 39 249,393 2,115 0.85 45.69 
1996 5 (7,460) 22 43 210,581 1,982 0.94 41.60 
1995 5 6,\09 28 54 159,870 1,590 0.99 
-
1994 5 5,788 24 53 147,373 1,456 0.99 
-
1993 4 5,017 21 53 124,133 1,043 0.84 -
1992 4 4,814 26 54 108,576 853 0.79 -
1991 3 5,557 21 44 107,379 1,156 1.08 
-
1990 3 5,203 17 35 89,639 1,122 1.25 
-
1989 4 (3,940) NA 42 59,732 804 1.35 -
Source: The Banker, July & September 1988-98 
A history of Abbey National 
Abbey National sees its beginning in 1849 with the formation of the National 
Permanent Mutual Benefit Building Society (set up not to act as a building society but 
instead to exploit a loophole in the Electoral Law of the day that conferred voting 
rights on landowners). The National Permanent Mutur1 Benefit Building Society was 
to benefit from the removal of the last of usury laws in 1854 and the general trend of 
people dissatisfied by the yield from government bonds brought about by the UK 
economic crises following the Crimean War and that of 1866, and was soon 
concentrating on becoming "more emphatically than it has ever been yet, a Savings 
Bank and Building Society." It renamed itself the National Freehold Land and 
Building Society (abbreviated to the National for our purposes here) in 1874. 
1874 also saw the founding of The Abbey Road Building Society (abbreviated to 
Abbey), which was to remain a small London based building society throughout the 
1800s. 
84 
Research Findings 
Both building societies benefited from Victorian England's house building boom and 
both societies' results were also to reflect the slow down in building that gradually 
took place in the early years of the 1900s. The First World War put a virtual stop to 
house building in England, depriving both societies of the main source of their 
revenue. The 1920s however saw a return to widespread house building and 
consequently an improvement in building society revenues stimulated by the 1923 
House Building Act, encouraging some 1.3 million houses to built in the space of 7 
years. The National increased its assets during the 1920s by some tenfold, raising its 
place in the UK building society league table from eleventh position to sixth. Abbey 
meanwhile had leaped ahead increasing its assets thirtyfold, moving from sixteenth 
place to second place, and in 1925 had opened its first offices outside of London in 
Blackpool, Reading, Southend and Watford. The 1930s world economic crisis largely 
passed the building societies by, with building society accounts and house purchases 
perceived as a safe investment by the public whilst the stock prices crashed. It was 
during this time that Abbey opened its stylish new headquarters building on Baker 
Street in 1932 (still its headquarters today). 
The Second World War had put a virtual stop to house building in the UK and many 
of the houses that had been built in Britain's urban areas were destroyed or damaged 
during the war period necessitating a major reconstruction programme in its 
aftermath. In order to generate the economies of scale that were necessary to tackle 
the Government's challenge (to build four million houses in ten years), National and 
Abbey proposed to merge and together they formed the new Abbey National Building 
Society in 1944. 
The 1950s saw a return to relative normality for Abbey National, although the arrival 
of interest rate volatility in the second half of this century has been a new 
phenomenon for the UK economy and the Abbey National Building Society. Despite 
this, by 1970 home ownership in the UKhad risen to 50% of the population. 
The 1960s saw the introduction of the computer into Abbey National's operations and 
during the 1960s and 70s its commercial strategy concentrated on 'customer needs' 
through improving products and services, including the expansion of its branch 
network. Overcoming the economic slump in the early 1970s Abbey National 
continued to grow and was in a position to capitalise upon the increase in demand for 
85 
Research Findings 
homes and speculation in housing that occurred in Thatcher's Britain of the 1980s. 
This period of growth put Abbey National in direct competition with the UK's high 
street banks and so in 1989 its members were asked to vote on being the first ever 
building society to convert itself into a public limited company. Abbey National plc 
was born. 
Control 
"The way that the UK retail value centre works is that it is effectively split into 
a number of areas which are largely product related really [see UK Retail in 
Figure 15]... In pure planning terms those are the bits that go to make up the 
UK retail value centre... We can call them planning units, because what you 
have got supporting this, across these jive, are basically your distribution 
businesses, branches and Abbey National Direct. " 
In reporting terms, the UK retail value centre is separate to Abbey National 
Independent Consultant Group (ANICG). ANICG, the independent financial advisors 
sales force and benefit consulting business; was described in the following way: 
"This is entirely separate distribution channel and in reporting terms, this 
reports in to Charles Toner, Deputy Chief Executive, and all this lot [lending, 
savings, general insurance and banking] report into Andrew Pople [Managing 
Director ofUK Retail]. " 
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Figure 15: Abbey National Organisational Structures 
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Strategy 
" .. .in terms of a three year planning process, there is an overall UK retail 
value centre plan ... .. 
This retail banking plan is then broken down to cover all the planning units (these are 
shown in italic script in the UK Retail Value Centre diagram in Figure 15), with seven 
product area plans being the result: 
" ... there is a plan for general insurance and then a plan for banking ... 
effectively 7 product area plans, sitting underneath an overall plan for UK 
Retail because clearly there has got to be an overarching strategy for what we 
are trying to do in customer marketing terms, which we are trying to do with 
an overall distribution strategy, what are we trying to do in terms of an 
overall IT strategy, etc., and it is clearly the case that you could have plans for 
all of these businesses that would be perfectly sensible enough in themselves, 
but when it actually comes to delivering them all - you know there are clashes 
like can the distribution channels sell not only physically but can they sell all 
of these products in terms of the priorities they are bound to have on different 
things -will it be possible to do all of that?" 
Each of these planning units produces an individual product plan, which is then 
submitted to a central Corporate Strategy & Planning department to synthesise it into 
one single UK ret'.:: plan, which in turn is reviewed and then submitted to the Group 
Executive. The co-ordinating body of all these various plans is Corporate Planning, 
whose: 
"responsibilities include managing the planning process across the group 
amongst other things. And members of the Corporate Planning team will 
work with some of these value centres so there will be one person from the 
team working with the ANTS team [Abbey National Treasury Services] on 
developing their plan. One person will be working with First National. 
Corporate Planning are not doing too much work with Retail at the moment 
this year, they are a bit more self-contained; and then Corporate Planning are 
responsible for managing the review process . .. 
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The three year planning process is described in Figure 16 below. 
Figure 16: Overview of the three year planning process 
Strategic Framework 
Target Review Meeting 
Putting plan together 
Plan Challenge Meeting 
Executive Committee 
Review 
Adjust Plan 
Performance Contracts Group Plan to Board 
Source: Corporate Planning, Summer 1997 
The typical content of these plans was said to include fmancial, strategic and 
operational issues, as well as outcomes, outlining one or two alternatives to that of the 
preferred strategy, and giving an external focus as well as that of a Group/value centre 
focus. The need to develop shareholder value was also reported to be a key outcome. 
A Group strategic plan or "strategic framework document" is the result of this 
process. The process changes each year, but the general approach was reported as 
being the same: 
"Essentially when we changed our process around, one of the feelings about 
the process was that there wasn't enough direction from the corporate centre 
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to the business units at the start of the process. So basically we do what we 
call the strategic framework document, which goes to one of the four quarterly 
strategy conferences that our Executive Directors have. It's usually in March 
or early April and they will comment on it, Corporate Planning will edit it and 
update it and then will send it to the Board. Now what that is trying to do if 
you like is capture the overall Group strategic agenda at a particular point in 
time, so that everyone is clear about what are the big issues at the moment ... 
We don't do it to a sort of set template or anything I mean it looked quite 
different this year compared to the previous years, partly because we don't 
want it to become a sort of formulaic stale sort of document - but one of the 
things that strategic framework will cover is to try and set out what some of 
the value creation targets will be for the Group over a three year period and 
also what the short term targets need to be as well. Those also become an 
input into what we call target review meeting. " 
"All of this process is really describing mainly the value centre; so UK Retail 
will translate the targets into how they wish them to filter down as targets or a 
framework for each of their areas ... -that's their responsibility. " 
One respondent noted that in order to check on the value centres' targets a review 
meeting is held for each one: 
"Basically we will have a target review meeting for these four areas - we will 
have four of them [i.e. UK Retail, ANTS, FNFC, SMA]. " 
The agenda of these review meetings was described by a member of the Corporate 
Planning Department: 
"It's really got three parts to it, the first one is a review of the progress of the 
existing plan, so there is afull circle into this. Corporate Planning will do a 
briefing note for that meeting which will be circulated to not only the people 
who are on the panel but also the people from value centres coming to the 
meeting setting. The briefing sets out our assessment of how we are meeting 
the climate at the moment and it discusses essentially whether the strategy and 
plan is on track -so that's the first item of the agenda. 
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Second item on the agenda is then agreeing effectively the financial targets or 
parameters for the plan with a view that the centre is always going to be 
setting quite stretching targets for value centres. When we introduced value 
based management we very much majored on three year value creation 
targets and I think as a result we ended up with some tendency towards 
'hockey stick' type plans, that delivered the value creation objectives, but 
don't always necessarily deliver what we are looking for in terms of year 1. 
So this year there were targets expressed in terms of profitability for 1998 and 
also 3 year value creation targets. 
And then the third element of the agenda is very much agreeing, trying to get 
some consensus around, what are the key strategic issues that need to be 
addressed in this year's plan [and the full three years of the plan]. So that 
when UK Retail for example kick off their planning process with all the people 
that run these businesses, they can effectively be reporting about the views of 
the meeting that we have agreed . .. 
The people at these review meetings are chosen by the leadership of the value centres 
and face questioning from senior Group managers: 
" ... they will select the people that they want on their own teams to come with 
them. In the UK retail meeting this year there were probably four people from 
UK Retail: the person that's basically responsible for co-ordinating the plan 
process, the Head of UK retail, and the Customer Marketing Director. Those 
were the three people that came to that meeting. 
The Challenge Panel is: Peter Birch. Chief Executive, Ian Harley, Finance 
Director', Charles Villiers, he's Managing Director Corporate Development 
and Andrew Barton the Corporate Planning Manager. Those are effectively 
the four panel members and then one of the Corporate Planning team 
basically acts as a secretary to that group . .. 
1 lan Harley succeeded Peter Birch as Chief Executive on I" March 1998 
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Corporate Planning has considerable input in shaping the strategic thinking process of 
the value centres: 
" ... there is other documentation that we provide, a set of economic 
assumptions that go out to all of our value centres. We produce quite a 
detailed template of what we would like to see in a plan. The way we have 
done it this year is that we have effectively suggested that there are certain 
schedules that if you like are mandatory for the plans and we then give them 
quite a lot of guidance as to all those planning techniques that they might use. 
There are clearly some financial schedules that need to be completed, but 
there are also what you might call strategic diagrams that would be pretty 
useful. Also because the Executive Summary of any plan is so important we 
give them quite a lot of guidance as to the way we would like to see that laid 
out, I think on the basis that if you give people a good template they have got 
something to get their teeth into -but they can clearly choose to deviate from it 
and I'm sure they will do. " 
Corporate Planning has considered that the value centres might use scenario planning, 
and occasional ad-hoc exercises were reported, for example the "Distribution 
Scenario 2002" exercise carried out in 1992/3, but its use does not appear to be usual: 
"Group Risk do an annual 'scenarios' exercise, but I would describe this as 
more akin to a stress testing exercise. " 
" ... the Economists have provided [the value centres] with some sort of 
economic scenarios ... we don't provide the sort offormal scenario analysis a 
la Shell or anything like that in the planning process. We are certainly quite 
insistent that they need to do some strong sensitivity testing of the financial 
outcomes of the plans, not least so that they can see what are the critical value 
drivers of the plans. But I think we would see any use that we make of 
scenario planning in the organisation as effectively a one off strategic 
exercises outside the formal three year planning process. 
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At the end of this planning process comes the value centre's plan challenge meeting 
as a [mal check on the validity of their plan: 
..... these plans will be completed pretty much by the end of August and then 
there is a set of plan challenge meetings set up for mid September -same panel 
as with the target review meetings and probably in most cases a slightly wider 
group of people coming from the value centre: so in UK Retail we would 
envisage there being probably a five hour meeting and I would expect that 
each of the people that head up these product areas would attend that meeting, 
along obviously with the Managing Director and the Planning Co-ordinator. 
Now we will discuss the plans and if there are some things that people really 
disagree with and they may want to begin some work making some changes at 
that point in time, but at that stage the plan is neither approved or 
disapproved, it's really sort of a debate around the strategy and the numbers. 
What is almost going on in parallel to this is that Corporate planning are 
working with Group Finance to consolidate all the financial implications of 
these plans together. " 
These meetings will all take place within 10 days of one another, and 
Corporate Planning will again provide the panel and the attendees of the 
value centres with a briefing, so if you like the exam questions are set out, 
there is not attempt to sort of play clever with them! 
... in parallel to this, Finance are away effectively consolidatin.;: all the 
numbers and if you like the Executive Committee will review the overall 
Group financial picture ... and will then send out some challenges to the value 
centres so they can then adjust their plans accordingly. Now by this time, 
these guys are now into the budgeting process anyway, so this would come 
back at the end of October together with the budget and there may then still be 
some further iteration and review but we will get the plan to the Board in 
November and then the Board see the budget in December -essentially the 
numbers will be the same, it is just that we don't want a joint/plan budget 
discussion, otherwise it will become a budget discussion! Once this has been 
done what Corporate Planning then do is to translate the plan into a form of 
contract between the Chief Executive and the Directors, whereby essentially 
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the Chief Executive is essentially saying you have the capital go away and 
deliver this plan and these are the financials that I am expecting you to deliver 
and here are some of the key initiatives that this plan is going to be critically 
dependent upon -these would be listed out and some non-financial indicators 
would be as well. " 
These contracts and their signatories were explained further as being between the 
Chief Executive and the heads of the businesses: 
" ... Retail, they have been given some split responsibility, effectively this year 
that will be a contract between the CEO and the Managing Director of Retail 
and the Deputy Chief Executive [responsible for the wealth management side 
of UK Retail]. The Treasury contract will be with the Chief Executive of 
Treasury; First National will be with its Chief Executive; Scottish Mutual it 
will be with its Managing Director. Retail in particular used to be a problem 
because there was such a shared responsibility in the business -effectively it 
was a contract with three people, which is by no means perfect. Now the wtry 
that things worked last year was that we had what we call this Cl monitoring 
process which is a monthly monitoring system and the Cl of the following 
year will get drawn up in January of that year and essentially they should 
drop straight out the performance contract, but our view was that actually it 
has ended up becoming a reformatting exercise and it's really not necessary, 
so what we will be doing this year is effectively making the performance 
contract look more like a set of Cl's, so that we don't have to repeat !.!:e 
exercise. 
Cl's are reported every month for functional areas and there is someone else 
in Corporate Development who is basically responsible for managing that 
process and those Cl's will be reviewed by the Executive Committee every 
month. " 
The name "Cl" is arrived at from taking the letter 'C' of the word 'contract' and 
taking the number' I ' to denote the contract is with the first line or top of the value 
centre hierarchy, i.e. the Managing Director. These Cl's are subsequently cascaded 
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down, with the next contract with the next level of management being called 'C2' 
contracts: 
"Yes, all the Cl's in the UK Retail will be largely the Managing Director of 
Retail's, the C2 's will effectively become a set of C2 's for [the person] who 
runs the lending business and effectively it cascades down ... [The Managing 
Director's] Cl's for UK Retail will have clear Cl's that relate to lending, 
saving, generally insurance, banking, etc., and with the C2 's it's just a natural 
cascade . .. 
These contracts include fmancial, operational and strategic objectives and milestones. 
They are reported upon monthly, in effect becoming one of Abbey National's main 
forms of monitoring and control of strategy: 
"The main sources of monitoring and control I guess are firstly the Cl 
process, secondly obviously the monthly reporting of financials which is done 
by value centre, thirdly these target review meetings and fourthly which we 
have never yet used but we can do is basically to call an ad hoc meeting to say 
this strategy is off track we really need to review . .. 
An employee reward payment system was said to be directly linked into the results of 
these contracts: with a performance review held quarterly for this purpose. 
One respondent also reported that there was a strategic conference: 
"The way I like to think of it is that we have got an annual planning process, 
but we have got a continuous strategy process. So basically we have strategy 
conferences in - they roughly come in January, March, May, September-
October and the Chair of those conferences is Charles Villiers, the Managing 
Director Corporate Development, and really there will normally be 10 to 12 
items on the agenda ... largely major value centre issues and sort of Group 
issues, M & A opportunities, etc. Now I think what we are trying to get to is a 
process whereby -we are creating a process whereby we don't wish Planning 
and Strategy to be seen as a sort of calendar event, suddenly we do our 
strategy for 3 months of the year then we forget about it. One of the things 
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that we will be lookingfor as part of the documentation of the plan is what are 
the outstanding strategic issues, what are the sort of projects that are in 
place ... what are the milestones that are dealt with? Now our view, and we 
have gradually been edging towards this, is that anything that's major that's 
outstanding ought to be coming back to one of these strategy conferences, so I 
don't know maybe there is some big distribution issue in UK Retail and we 
said we haven't cracked this yet but we have got a project underway, we 
expect to have the milestones, so at the March conference next year we are 
going to have a paper on that. That's basically what we are looking to do. 
Now clearly there will be other stuff coming if you like externally out of this. 
The fact that four building societies announced plans to convert to PLCs 
within 3 months of one another was a reasonably significant event which is 
possibly worthy of a paper or M & A opportunities of a major nature may 
come up which would be fed into these meetings. " 
The people attending these strategy meetings were described in the following way: 
"This is the Executive. Not the Non-Execs, but the Executive Directors of the 
company. " 
One respondent noted that these conferences served as an extra forum of debate: 
" ... the whole point of this is that issues that are not going to be picked up as 
part of people's individual plans should be addressed" 
"[The Managing Director Corporate Development] will ... put the agenda up 
for discussion with his Executive colleagues and they will say - suggest things 
that they think should be discussed. [The Managing Director Corporate 
Development] will also use the strategy conference agenda to often just kick 
start a debate about something. So we had a paper for example that went to 
this year's January strategy conference about alliances and joint ventures 
which is much more of a sort of discursive type of paper to get a debate going 
-so often some sort of softer issue would come to those meetings. " 
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The strategic planning process was also reported to be open to review and 
amendment: 
"We are in our third cycle of our three year planning under value 
management so to speak and we have made changes, small changes each year. 
The first year we didn't have this Executive Committee Review stage and it 
essentially led to a lot of confusion about has my plan been approved or not? 
We also didn't have such strong linkage into the budget process then -we had 
all of these wonderful plans and we also happened to be acquiring N & P at 
the same time, which put a different complexion on quite afew people's plans, 
so we kind of got to the end of the planning process and there was still this -we 
would talk so much about 'planning with consequences' and yet we got to the 
end of the planning process and to be quite honest, there probably wasn't 
'planning with consequences' because most people were saying that life's 
going to completely change as a result of N & P. So, we went through quite a 
thorough review process ourselves with all of those that had been involved in 
planning process, trying to sort of pick out the things that had gone well and 
hadn't gone well and this was one of the changes that we made: this 
Executive Committee Review and in the second run, ie. in last year's three 
year plan, we introduced this concept of the performance contracts as well to 
really sort of push home the message -yes your plan is near signed off, clear 
contract integration into the Cl's. The tweaks this year have been much more 
minor, it's been more around the targeting of the beginning of the process to 
try and get more of a short-term target as well as long term one, so we don't 
get to the situation where the Chief Executive says well I love everybody's 
plans, nice value creation, but next year's profit and return on capital is lower 
than we are looking for! So we are now trying to be a bit more explicit about 
that at the beginning of the process. " 
An informal update was also said to take place outside of the formal reporting 
schedule in order to check on how businesses and functions were developing. This 
informal review, based upon "trust, expertise and personal credibility", was said to 
prepare the ground for the formal reviews -allowing weaknesses to be explained away 
and successes to be highlighted. One respondent stressed, perhaps cynically, that 
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Abbey National was after all a "learning organisation", particularly at times of 
performance review. 
People 
"One of our favourite phrases is 'planning with consequences' [see Figure 17 
below). We are trying to get awtry from the situation whereby the plan was 
something that people did to keep the Group centre happy and then stuck it on 
the bookshelf andforgot about it. One of the wtrys that you make the plan real 
is to focus on how it is going to be delivered and you know often there will be 
new initiatives, so you will want milestones for those and you clearly want 
enough financial and non:financial parameters- / think it can be such that 
people certainly at that first level below the Head of the value centres and 
arguably at the next level as well, such that they can say: a) what is my part 
in delivering this plan; and b) how am / doing against it? That's the objective 
of where we want to be: we want people in the organisation to understand 
how the lending plan fits into part of the overall UK Retail plan and for the 
guy who is running all the mortgage centres that he understands what his key 
initiatives in running that part of the operation are within the overall lending 
strategy for example. / think it has been sort of a gradual process" 
A multi-faceted culture, albeit one that was not always clearly defined, was reported 
to exist within Abbey National as a whole: 
"/ would say each of these businesses have got quite distinct cultures. If you 
go to somewhere like First National, the First National team have largely 
worked together for probably 15-20 years, the average age of that sort of top 
team will be higher than in UK Retail and certainly length of service with that 
business is much, much higher. / mean the full UK Retail team, including the 
people who are managing the distribution strategy, the Abbey National Direct 
business, etc., is really quite diverse and they haven't been as a team for very 
long. Scottish Mutual/think is a culture which has changed, but obviously 
historically has a sort of strong typical mutual life assurance type culture . .. 
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Figure 17: Excerpts from a Corporate Planning Department presentation 
Main thrusts behind Abbey National's planning process 
Corporate centre provides a framework and constructive challenge 
·Planni ng with consequences" 
• Corporate centre as investor 
• Value centres obtain resources and commit to deliver 
Value centres identify and recommend the highest value creating strategy 
• Focus on value creation 
• Understand value drivers 
• Consider altematives 
Characteristics of value managed Companies 
Maximising shareholder value creation is the goveming objective - basis of all major 
decisions 
Management understand how value is created 
Decision makers act on this understanding 
• Look for real aHernatives 
• Select the value maximising options 
• Reinforcing perfonnance measures 
• Aligned incentives 
Value based management - Process overview 
Organisation and Accountability 
I Strategy & Planning I 
~l~ 
'--pr-OJ-·ec-tslB--udg-et-s--'1 I Performance Measurement I Ir--I-nc-e-n-tives----. 
Source: Corporate Planning, Summer 1997 
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An Abbey National HQ culture was however seen to be dominating the organisation 
as a whole: 
HI suppose that Head Office culture and the Retail culture probably to some 
extent went together. I mean 10 years ago it was still a Building Society and 
effectively it was clearly a unitary business and I think there is still something 
of a tension in the fact that the UK retail business is still very large and we do 
not have clearly defined Group head office functions as opposed to head office 
support services. " 
One respondent noted that because Abbey National retail bank used to be a building 
society, it had a very strong customer focus, based upon the need for "good service". 
This was said to have the effect of making the culture competitive and led to a "do it, 
don't question it" philosophy. A "top down, bureaucratic, command and controf' 
culture was perceived as existing by one respondent, who went on to note that "your 
own ideas are unacceptable" in a retail culture and that only "6 people out 20,000 
were making any decisions." 
When asked whether the culture was one of 'review and monitoring' one respondent 
replied: 
"My judgement would be that they wouldfeel that they're reviewed quite a bit. 
I think there might be still a certain element of play in the game when it comes 
to Cl's. I think things have changed, certainly 6 years ago, there was quite a 
strong sort of 'good news' culture in the organisation, so problems would not 
necessarily come to the surface as quickly as they might have done and 
certainly we have had examples in the past where there were problems that 
people knew about which were not getting clearly shown up in the old Cl 
process, but I think it has become a much more, increasingly, rigorous process 
but that's still not to say that one or two issues can't be hidden somewhat. " 
The CEO and his influence on the strategic management process was described in the 
following way:. 
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" ... our Chief Executive is a very key influence on the way that this process 
works. When he retires next April and when we have a new Chief Executive, 
we will probably have the same boxes on the chart, but the way they will 
actually work will be somewhat different because there will he a different 
personality with their own sort of particular view of strategy in place. So I 
think he is very influential, hut he is also someone who delegates quite a lot. 
He was more than happy for Corporate Planning to work all of this up and he 
was certainly more than sympathetic to the notion of shareholder value, hut he 
isn't someone who sort of gets really interested in the detail... " 
One respondent noted that the strategic management system favoured "getting things 
done, hut not doing the right thing". With the planning process encouraging 
managers to provide lots of new exciting initiatives and new things to do, rather than 
developing the underlying business strategy. This 'think new' philosophy or "good 
news culture" was stressed as being a fundamental weakness of the system, whereby 
senior management were perceived as being excited by new ideas whilst forgetting 
that it is the getting the fundamentals right that drives the business forward. Indeed, 
the respondent went on to note that there was a lack of clear strategy and practical 
understanding of what strategic management itself meant. The need for more 
continuous improvement was stressed. 
Fundamental problems were seen to exist in that short term new initiatives could be 
easily monitored to see if they were implemented as per timetable, as could short term 
fmancial progress, how< er the very nature of strategy means that end-of-strategy 
review is more limited. The long-term picture was seen to be even more blurred 
because the world evolves, changing the parameters in which a fixed organisational 
structure needs to operate. 
One additional complication as perceived by a respondent was that banks, as asset-
based organisations, lack short-term pressure to perform: the very nature of banking is 
to instil confidence and thus generate stability. This has the effect of maintaining 
customers and capital, regardless of short-term performance fluctuations. This in turn 
was said to effect the need for rigour in the short-term planning, implementation and 
control process. 
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A note on strategic control 
One respondent was asked as to whether he felt that Abbey National was probably 
one of the more rigorous banks in terms of reporting and monitoring, controlling and 
evaluating strategic management. That person's response was as follows: 
"Well I hope so, I don't think I would be that arrogant and say we definitely 
are! I would certainly say that our objective is to be and certainly from a 
personal point of view and I am sure that my boss would say the same thing: 
we are aiming to have one of the most constructive strategy processes amongst 
the banks, we do believe that an effective process actually is valuable in its 
own right, but a lot depends on what happens in the 'putting the plan together 
box' as much as anything. I mean you can have a great control process but if 
you haven't got good quality thinking in here -that's really where it all 
happens. " 
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Summary of the Characteristics of Strategic Control Components in 
Abbey National 
Components of 
Strategic Control 
Real life practice in: 
Abbey National 
Premise Control 3 year plan 
Implementation 
Control 
Strategic 
Surveillance 
Special Alert 
Control 
Operational 
Control 
Environmental 
Scanning 
Scenario 
Planning 
Annual "strategic framework document' and on-going papers 
"Value creation targets" are outlined, monitored and 
challenged at the annual "target review meeting" 
"Performance contracts" are signed between the CEO and 
business heads, business heads and their subordinates, and are 
reported upon monthly 
Informal updates, based upon "trust, expertise and personal 
credibility", are used to check on progress 
4 strategy conferences are held each year attended by the 
Executive 
No evidence of this was discovered 
Monthly reporting data is fed into the monitoring and control 
of strategy 
Information is supplied to the strategy conferences upon 
request 
Economic scenarios are used for sensitivity testing, but there 
is little of a strategic nature 
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Summary of Findings within Abbey National 
Control 
• Structure 
Abbey National Group's structure follows that ofMintzberg's (1995 pp. 350-
371) 'entrepreneurial' organisation (in the sense that there is significant 
supervision and involvement in the businesses from the top), yet one operating 
within a diversified business context. The corporate centre appears to 
comprise only a few top managers making the decisions, supported by a small 
professional support staff. 
• Systems 
A 3 year planning mechanism is used for each product area, as well as for the 
combined Group strategic framework document, with some limited scenario 
planning: outlining fmancial, operational and strategic details. Targets to be 
met by the businesses are filtered down from this by the centre. These targets 
are in turn translated into a set of performance contracts between management 
layers. A review of these targets is made quarterly by the Board. 
Whilst monthly fmancial reporting forms much of the basis of implementation 
control, and is perceived as being the key aspect for control by many 
managers, informal control is strong. Informal controls, based upon "trust, 
expertise and personal credibility", depending upon the viewpoint could be 
seen to contribute to Abl-<:y National's organisational learning. 
• Style 
People 
Control is reviewed and adapted on a periodic basis within Abbey National: 
with "tweaks" taking place at the top as well as at the bottom. 
• Staff, skills and style 
Strategic planners appear to aim for "planning with consequences", yet worry 
that managers will interpret this as an invitation to discuss finance. 
Considerable effort, almost prescriptive in its nature, appears to be made by 
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Corporate Management to ensure however that a balanced view of strategy is 
formed and maintained. 
Business unit cultures seem quite independent and varied (on a general British 
theme), but a Building Society or at least Retail Bank culture of "command 
and contror' appears to dominate at the centre. 
Strategy 
• Shared values (super-ordinate goals) 
The underlying ethos at Abbey National was said to be that of shareholder 
value generation. 
Annual target review meeting are used, amongst other things, to develop 
consensus around key strategic issues, which are in turn agreed at the annual 
plan challenge meetings and reviewed at the Executives' quarterly strategy 
conferences. 
• Strategy 
Abbey National is said to have "an annual planning process, but ... a 
continuous strategy process." 
The strategic framework document captures the overall Group strategic 
agenda for the year, with a 3 year perspective. 
Corporate Planning provides business units with "certain schedules" and 
"guidance" for the formulation of product plans. 
"Our Chief Executive is a very key influence on the way that this process 
In attempting to position Abbey National in terms of the strategic archetypes 
in the literature review of Chapter 2, one respondent reported that it is adaptive 
(Mintzberg 1973), sales maximising (Utterback & Abernathy 1975), an 
analyser (Miles & Snow 1978) and pursues a differentiation2 strategy (porter 
1980). 
2 There is evidence that Abbey National also pursues a 'focus' strategy, where for example: "Abbey 
National's 'Because Life's Complicated Enough ... ' advertising campaign, featuring comedian Alan 
Davies, reinforces the Company's customer1ocused approach." Source: Abbey National PLC 
Directors Report & Accounts 1997 
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The BNP Story 
Introduction 
This story describes the strategic control system of the Banque Nationale de Paris or 
BNP's domestic market banking activities. It does not draw on the somewhat 
different approach to strategic management and strategic control of BNP's 
international banking division. 
Description ofthe bank 
BNP comprises two core businesses: domestic banking activities throughout France 
and international banking and fmance. It has a worldwide presence in 79 countries, 
with some 700 foreign offices. Its total assets amount to FF2,034 billion and capital 
reserves are FF63.9 billion. In 1997 its net income totalled almost FF6 billion, six 
times the figure of 1993, the year of its privatisation, and a 54.6% increase on 1996. 
In terms of security it has a: Aa3 Moody, A + Standard & Poor and AA- IBeA rating. 
Some 2.5% of shareholder equity is held by staff. The number of employees totals 
53,000 (39,000 in France and 14,000 abroad). 
Pretax income for the domestic banking division amounted to FF2 billion. It has 
some 5.3 million retail customers, served by some 2,000 branches (and a similar 
number of 24 hour automated teller niachines) and a telephone bank operation. It is 
also prides itself on :lCing France's I st business bank (with I in 3 SMEs being a 
customer). 
In the words of one respondent: 
"BNP is a fairly traditional bank, an extremely international and dynamic 
bank, but is fairly classical in many ways. It has an extremely good team 
spirit, so a very good atmosphere. It is a self-starter more than anything else, 
and probably afairly gentle employer. So people are I think confident about 
working in BNP: maybe BNP could be a bit more demanding, because the 
environment is changing and becoming more and more demanding. I think 
the culture of the bank is shifting gradually to follow the outside world trend, 
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which is more demanding and a bit more ruthless than the BNP way. But 
apart from that BNP is a dynamic and gentle culture. " 
"The first characteristic is that strategic thinking is carried out in quite a 
collegiate way, because if you are in a particular area or taking the bank as a 
whole there is a Comite de Direction Generale, which re-groups the 20 people 
in charge of vision, policy, etc., and who regularly bring up for discussion 
particular ideas for the update or revision of a particular vision. Now, clearly 
for banks like us with extremely widespread activities, it does not mean that 
we review the strategy every six months, but let's say, in the beginning there 
was a noticeable element which was the privatisation of the BNP. On this 
occasion, the principal managers [cadres] of the bank, the 20 or 25 most 
important managers met in order to establish the strengths and weaknesses of 
the BNP and to define a strategy which above all uses these strengths and 
creates easier discussion of the privatisation of the BNP. So this mechanism 
was then introduced, an important mechanism where the strengths and 
weakness analysis of the BNP in the international banking market were 
established, where objectives were defined and where a development plan was 
put together for management. Even 4 years later, we are still on the strategic 
discussion of '93, which established pretty much the strategy of the bank 
following privatisation. " 
A history of BNP 
The BNP is the result of a merger between two banks: the Comptoir National 
d'Escompte de Paris (CNEP) and the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et 
l'Industrie (BNCI), both of which have origins dating back to 1848. 
Following the revolution in that year, the provisional government of the Second 
Republic set up national discount bank branches in every major French city. The aim 
of these local banks was to stimulate the local economy, providing a source of much 
needed credit from local and central government funds. They became fully private 
institutions under the Second Empire, gaining independence by imperial decree from 
their central and local government stockholders in 1853. 
107 
Research Findings 
The Paris discount bank decided at this point to remove the word National from its 
name and set out on an expansive drive. Thanks to the signing of a Free Trade Treaty 
with Britain in 1860, competition with France's historic arch rival was, as stated in the 
company reports from that time, "on an equal basis", helping it to become the first 
French bank to open up branches in London, Shanghai, Calcutta, Y okohama and 
Sydney with the aim of "taking French credit to the point of production". In 1889 
however, the "French banlC' as it had by become known, went insolvent due to an 
unsuccessful speculation in copper. Fortunately for the bank, the Finance Minister of 
the day came to the rescue deciding that the state would underwrite its debts, 
describing it as "as precious toof' which had "given notable service in the interests of 
trade and the state." This move heralded the return of the old name of Comptoir 
National d'Escompte de Paris and through building up a well located network of 
branches throughout France and developing its international merchant banking 
activities, a more consistent management style enabled it to develop and maintain its 
position as France's third largest deposit bank until the 1950's. 
The Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse meanwhile, was to fmd itself embroiled in 
the events of the Franco-Prussian war. Mulhouse, located in Alsace, was to become 
part of a German Reichland along with its neighbouring Lorraine region in 1871. 
During the period until the First World War, the bank was able to benefit from 
Alsace's position in the 'economic crossroads' of two countries allowing it to build up 
France's fourth biggest branch network. In 1913 the bank unifted its French branch 
network under the name Banque Nationale de Credit. However, the worldwide 
depressior' of the 1930's soon hit the bank, and due to its over large exposure in 
property development, forced its collapse in 1932. Once again however, luck was on 
the side of the bankers and the Government stepped in to save the day. A newly 
named bank was the result and following a widespread internal restructuring program 
the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (BNCI) was back on a sound 
commercial footing. By the 1960's the BNCI was in a position to replace the CNEP 
as France's third largest bank. 
In 1945, both the CNEP and the BNCI were nationalised, with de Gaulle noting that it 
was necessary to "Harness banking resources in the drive for national 
reconstruction." In 1966, the Finance Minister of the day decided to go further and to 
"reopen the file, and carry out a concentration of the nationalised banks" creating in 
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the merger of the BNCI and the CNEP "a financial strike force, aimed in particular 
at exporting." The Banque Nationale de Paris was born. Some thirty years later 
however, the virtue of nationalised institutions was rethought and in 1993, BNP was 
privatised. 
Table 7: BNP's place within its local, European and world markets 
Year Ranking Assets Pre-tax profit Retnrn on Cost/lncome 
(in terms of Tier 1 ca ital $m) Assets Ratio 
France Europe World $m $m % % 
1997 2 (11,521) 11 23 339,819 1,372 0.40 69.5 
1996 3 (11,612) 9 21 355,366 976 0.27 72.5 
1995 3 (11,453 10 19 325,250 632 0.19 -
1994 4 (10,425 10 22 271,635 581 0.21 
-
1993 3 (9,739 7 24 250,443 263 0.11 
-
1992 3 (10,221 8 14 284,769 680 0.24 -
1991 4 (10,231) 8 15 275,876 862 0.31 
-
1990 3 (9,368) 7 14 289,747 603 0.21 -
1989 3 (6,\77) 7 18 231,463 918 0.40 
-
1988 2 (5,567) 8 20 196,955 876 
- -
Source: The Banker, July & September 1987-98 
Control 
The 'big picture' structure ofBNP was described in the following way: 
"the bank has generally two operational areas, the rest are functional support 
areas, we have a division which we call Banking Activities in France and we 
have a division called International Banking and Finance. Under the Banking 
Activities in France we have the French network and the banking and non-
banking French subsidiaries - mortgages and house loans [credit bail], other 
loan requirements [credit it la consommation]- and under International 
Banking and Finance, it's all the international network (we are present in 85 
countries) and it's all the financial activities -market activities, capital 
markets, equity activities, foreign exchange markets and it's the commercial 
bank. " 
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Strategy 
"The BNP designed its strategy and in fact confirmed its strategy quite 
naturally when there was a change of Chairman aboutfour years ago ... at the 
moment when the company was going to be privatised. So we had to 
communicate a clear strategy to our new shareholders. The strategy was 
designed at the level of the management committee, head office, but it was 
discussed or elaborated throughout the bank. .. 
The main thrust ofBNP's strategy is clearly articulated and the strategic management 
system used to pursue that strategy is relatively simple: 
"The two strategic priorities we defined at the time of privatisation are retail 
banking in France and wholesale banking on a global scale. We will pursue 
our international growth in those two areas while seizing opportunities to 
make acquisitions that promise to accelerate our growth and improve our 
profitability . .. 
Source: A quote fonn BNP's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Annual Report 1997 
"we must develop profitably -that's our objective. Our strategy is the 
methods we use in order to get there! Our objective is our ROE ratio and 
behind that we put in place the means to achieve it -that's our strategy . .. 
In terms of the retail banking strategic management process, one respondent from 
BNP's French Banking Activities (ABF) division noted that: 
"In fact, there is no strategic management system specific to ABF: we do the 
same strategic management as the rest of the BNP. There is nothing very 
original in that we are responsible for analysing the market, competition, the 
global needs of households and companies. We are responsible for putting 
this into logic and to identify a certain number of actions and orientations for 
the BNP." 
"The principal process is one of profitable development [developpement dans 
la rentabilite]: so all of our choices are made with this objective in mind. .. 
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" ... it was a goal that was decided by the leadership of the bank, that's to say 
the CEO [President], and it has been maintained We have been a private 
bank since 1993: that's to say we have shareholders and these shareholders 
want a return on their investment and everything leads on from there! ... in 
France compared to perhaps England or Germany, there are fewer private 
quoted banks, there is Societe Generale, BNP, CCF and Group Paribas, but 
compared to the English and German markets it is a lot more recent a 
phenomenon. The level of strategy revolves around that and the need for 
profitability development -a required level of profitability growth: using the 
Cooke ratio l and its famous cycle: profitability leads to an increase in capital, 
leads to the possibility of growth, etc. " 
"It was a strategy that was put into place at the time of privatisation, which 
was reaffirmed last year at the time of the publication of our results, along 
with of course a certain number of reaffirmed orientations. At that time we 
also sold or gave up a certain number of activities that we considered as 
falling outside of our strategy, for example, the sale of the Belgian bank 
Michael Baker or the sale of BNP Mortgages in England We rid ourselves of 
these activities that did not correspond to our principal strategic 
orientations. " 
"That's the big picture -after that you ask me if there's a method? It is not 
very easy to say that there's a method As a quoted private bank we have to 
say something about our strategy ... " 
"The process is one that you will find in practically all strategy and strategic 
management schools: today all the strategic thinking that we do starts with a 
market analysis [reflexion sur le marche] and a competitor analysis. This is 
systematic regardless of whether it's a department or subsidiary. By market 
I Peter Cooke was Chair of the Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors that first met in 1974. This 
Committee was responsible for various agreements and concordats. The 1975 Basle Concordat 
(revised in 1983 and in 1992) formally established the "supervisory responsibilities between host and 
home banking authorities in respect of their supervision of international and banking groups" (Hall 
1997). The 1988 Basle Accord required banks from participating countries to conform to a risk assets 
ratio of8% (Heffernan pp. 252-9). Otherwise known as the Basle Capital Adequacy Agreement it 
established an accord amoogst participant banks to define capital for regulatory purposes in terms of 
Tier I and Tier 2 components. 
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analysis we mean is there any demand and above all what is our competitive 
position -are we leader, co-leader, what are our strengths and weaknesses? 
Systematically when looking at these, we look at our profitability at all times, 
because there could be a department or a subsidiary that is profitable or not 
profitable and we need to know why -is it a problem because of its competitive 
position or is it because of costs? So you have the market, the competitive 
position and the profitability of the activities: a classic approach!" 
Competitive positioning is used to establish BNP's current position, but it also is used 
to attempt to establish their position in tomorrow's future: 
"We start with: how did we get to where we are today, is it an improvement or 
a degradation -and if so how can we improve this situation- and how can we 
position ourselves in the market in relation to our competitors in the next 3 to 
5 years? " 
One respondent noted that a vision of the future is captured in the following way: 
"We use a maximum number of studies that have been carried out on the 
market. So if you take the personal market [marche du particulier] we have an 
Economic Observation Centre [centre d'observatoire economique] ... you have 
a centre for the observation of competition and there is also another centre for 
the observation of competition and products, with a view on the markets 
themselves. " 
This was clarified further by additional commentary: 
"Every month we produce a document called the "competition monitor" 
[observatoire de la concurrence]. It includes all of our competitors -there are 
the eight principal competitors and there is an approach giving the 
profitability and the levels of activity. It's with graphics: it analyses, 
summarises, shows tendencies and where we are today. So at least every 
quarter the leadership knows where we are, on top of the budgetary scorecard 
[tableau de bord budgetaire] there is the positionning of competition 
[positionnement concurrentiel] ... Along side the competition monitor -
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complementary to it- there is also a qualitative commentary with a limited 
distribution which adds a certain amount of opinion [Ies reflexions]. " 
A clear methodological distinction is made by staff at BNP between the budget and 
any strategic management system: 
"You must not confuse the wider strategy with the budget. The budget of 
course relates to strategy, but we don't have a large table which says in this 
year or that -today we have so many external constraints: the euro, the moves 
to year 2000, etc., we have to move to include all of them! We do not have a 
timetable, but on the other hand we do have some thoughts on the next 3 or 4 
years albeit on orientations. " 
Likewise any monitoring of strategy is done on a much more ad-hoc and informal 
way than budgetary control. Commentators confIrmed that questions are asked about: 
"how are we doing in relation to the choices we made. In the same way, 
however, I would not want to compare that to a management scorecard 
[tableau de bord de gestion] -it's more flexible. A budgetary management 
scorecard is very clear cut: there are calculated figures. That said, we do 
look at where we are with regard to where we hoped to be, but we are not at 
the level of saying we made 105 instead of 110 in a particular area, it's more 
like are we in the right area, is it going along the lines we thought, has the 
situation this year improved, etc?" 
The budgetary planning process was described in the following way: 
"The budget process is carried out between July and October and all the 
business lines and all the profit centres of the bank are asked to provide a 
budget forecast for '98, which is discussed in October-November, approved or 
not, which is then authorised by the Board [Conseil d'administration] and 
becomes the budget for '98. Normally the budget for '98, the objectives of 
'98, should be in line with the 3 year action plan. " 
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The strategic management process, reportedly, is designed to be as purposefully 
flexible as possible: 
" ... it 's not informal in that there is a written report which is presented to the 
leadership, etc., but like all organisations, it is not like a budget. The budget 
is one thing, but it has to fit into the overall strategic orientation. The 
strategic orientation determines our perspectives, the evolution of ROE, and 
the strategic orientation leads us to say: if we are going to improve our 
profitability, that means we have to explore and ask ourselves some questions 
which impact upon this objective. So, for example, if we say we have to 
improve our operating conditions [conditions d'exploitation], then we say in 
order to improve it we must play on our strongest areas ... -but it will not 
translate itself as in the budget, by saying that 1998 prospective general costs 
are X So you see it is not exactly what you learn in certain [business] 
schools, where there is planning and the budget is to be found situated within 
the planning process, in fact with it being the first year of the plan. That's 
what you learn! The whole point of the plan here is to go beyond the 
budgetary notion and so be a lot more strategic, opening up horizons, seeing 
strong tendencies. It's not at all what you learn at [business] school. " 
Strategic decisions are seen to be driven by a fundamental conundrum: 
"The principle is whether our choices fit into the strategic orientation we have 
chosen. The problem for the bank is that in being private we have a ROE 
problem, a problem of PNBAfor its shareholders, and of course we have as a 
bank the problem of the relationship with agencies which look at our financial 
status [solidite]. So we come back to the Cooke ratio or alternatively the ROA 
-le rendement sur les actifs ponderes. All these ratios are linked: if we want to 
develop we mustn't be held back by the Cooke ratio and in order not to be 
held back by the Cooke ratio we need to improve our capital [fonds propres]. 
So we have to improve our profitability and in order to improve our capital we 
need to use, amongst other things, our shareholders capital, but of course 
shareholders won't increase their capital unless they get a good return! So 
we are in there ... " 
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The BNP also has a small, specialised strategy team supporting the Board: 
"involved in strategy and development -development is mainly important 
acquisitions- for the whole of the Group and we are a small team. So, we are 
a dozen or so here. Therefore, a dozen people for the whole of the BNP means 
we can only get involved in the essential subjects ... The strategy team attempts 
to study individual strategies in more depth in order to understand the 
fundamentals and what is important for each subject ... there are no absolute 
rules either for the subject nor for the way we operate, it is rather a function 
of the preoccupations of the moment ... What is our principal function? It is 
to try to clarifY the general direction in a way which is not necessarily . 
orthodox in order to develop all of the many opportunities that arise. That 
means we invest time on subjects that can bring something ... " 
A member of the strategy team's leadership noted further: 
"I take part in the General Management Committee Meetings [Co mite de 
Direction Generale], so I know, therefore, the subjects which have a certain 
importance, etc., so we have the time to think about which thing could be more 
important than another, so we have the possibility to allocate resources for 
things which appear important and for areas where we are able to bring 
something, and reciprocally, because the others see that we can provide 
something and that we do not have a particular allegiance, we have for them a 
certain utility and facility for certain work." 
In talking about the team's role in preparing BNP for the future it was stated that: 
"it's a bit of a reciprocal iterative process -which is quite difficult, and which I 
think can not be decreed ... in strategic management all the investment projects 
are looked at... it's a process of standardised planning which is linked to the 
annual budgeting process, etc. I think this type of working can exist, but I'm 
not sure as to whether it is the most profitable or efficient, because in so doing 
you turn strategic management into a type of routine, into which you can fall 
quite comfortably, and finally one forgets that one is there to bring some new 
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ideas and that one has certain prejudices, you become institutionalised. I 
think that institutionalised strategic management is not the most efficient." 
"My job is not to go and see people to check if they have executed what was 
asked of them, and at the end of the day, if they decide not to implement 
something en route but do something else, that is their responsibility and they 
can do so without even telling me. And I would stry, so much the better, what 
counts is that everybody assumes their responsibility. One of my 
responsibilities is to give as best a clarification as possible, so that one can 
see that where we are going is good. Their responsibility is to make the 
business run. " 
An example of a specific strategic project was asked explored with one respondent. 
This strategic project, called "vision 2000", shows a clear and rigorous approach to 
BNP's strategic management: 
"we have a working premise to follow a certain strategic path, we have 
defined a certain number of action plans, operational action plans for each 
responsible individual for implementation and also we have progress reports 
for the Board, which meets every week, which says -will stry, as this study has 
only just been done, in the fourth quarter of the year- where are we in its 
execution, what are the objectives to be reached, what has not been attained, 
etc. Also, it is something that has been presented to the whole of the 
management [convention de cadres] of the bank two months ago, so if is 
something which allows for not only a good impression to be given but also a 
concrete route plan for each General Management Committee member. " 
This said, however, it was admitted that this was a "special project" and as such it 
appears from evidence given by commentators that it is an exception to the rule. 
"There is a obligatory format, which is the budgetary process where every 
year the CEO [President Directeur General] will see one by one all the 
managers of the operational functions and will look with them at all their 
objectives, what they have achieved or have not achieved, why this worked 
and that did not -there is this review that is made, every year at every level of 
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the bank. Otherwise, for the more fundamental subjects, we know them, we 
know what is happening in a particular sector, which area it is necessary to 
get involved in or depart from ... , for these sectors where a strategic analysis 
has been made and where strategy is implemented, in general, after one year 
or one and a half years there is a review [point d'etape] is carried out, by the 
Director concerned to see what changes have arisen. I would say that this is 
part of the normal activities of the General Management Committee. " 
It was reported that the management at BNP is mainly French: 
"I would say it is true for the top management and also for those responsible 
for the international network on site, for example, the head of the New York, 
Singapore and Tokyo offices are French. There are some foreign managers in 
the financial sector, in the markets in certain sites. But in general it is quite 
French." 
The employees of the bank have spent most of their working life in the bank: 
"In general, there are few people in the bank who have worked outside of 
banking. Banking in France is not very fluid, so the people on the General 
Management Committee are people who have spent their career in the bank ... 
Today the people who are at the top of the bank did not necessarily enter the 
bank at 20, but perhaps at 30 or 35 and who have in general worked here for 
10-15 years. " 
And it was reported that their educational background was variable: 
"It's variable. There are those who entered the bank at a very early age and 
there are those who have come from the best [engineering and business] 
schools in France. A bit of everything. On this point, it is quite balanced. " 
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With regard to international placements and exposure of staff it was reported that the 
overseas offices were the main sources of information, filtering information back 
about other countries practices: 
"We have this from our sites in New York; Tokyo or elsewhere, thanks to 
which we have get some insight from outside. At the General Management 
Committee level, we do not have a member who has had any major outside 
experience. We have one or two who have good international knowledge, but --- .. -.. 
none of whom have really lived overseas. Once again one of our major 
weaknesses is an insufficient international exposure of our management . .. 
One respondent was asked about the mobility of the Directors of BNP and whether 
they were 'BNP people' or whether there was history of transfer of Directors as 
reported to exist in many large French organisations, there response was: 
"There is a strong proportion within the General Management Committee 
who have been in the BNP for a long time. There is an influence despite 
everything of the French system of administration, which is very elitist based 
upon educational background, so there are people who are very well 
educated, who move about at the top of companies. But generally, in 
comparison with other French activities and other banks, the BNP is quite 
stable ... .. 
When one respondent was asked to explain how he saw the future, they reported: 
"banking used to be a generalist trade, ajob, so you could do many different 
jobs in the bank I think there is a big trend today, and probably irifluenced by 
Anglo-Saxon companies, American especially, in that the trend is to 
specialisation. So there you have more individuality, you have less 
faithfulness to the company. An international fiscal specialist might work with 
BA, BNP and then with ICI -what is interesting for this person, is that he or 
she wants to be at the edge of international tax and the fact that it is done 
through BNP or ICI is secondary. I think the big shift, in a bank like BNP at 
least, is to go from a generalist culture, which explains why people were 
knowing and understanding each other extremely well, to a culture which is 
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more and more a culture of specialists who never merge but who work 
together for a time. This is a further deep change, but does not yet effect the 
culture of the bank, but this trend will keep goingfor afew years. " 
When asked to describe BNP's culture one respondent commented that: 
"culture is a result of its history: the BNP is 30 years old now, before it was 
the BNCI and the CNEP which joined in '66. The other impact on culture was 
its privatisation in '93: that's to stry that the profitability culture is new for its 
staff and will take time to instil itse/f. .. " 
Another respondent noted BNP's dynamism: 
" ... there is a BNP culture, which is very development -the BNP feels like it is 
growing, expanding ... People feel at ease in the development, that comes 
probably from BNP's history during the '70s: the BNP is the result of the 
fusion of two banks, two big banks, they were the 3rd and 4th banks in France 
which joined to become the biggest, and a fusion of two banks that were very 
different, and a rare success, which has given people an attitude of 
progression. People feel at ease in the conquest, there is a conquest culture 
which is quite strong. We use this by the way, in our definition of strategy, the 
strategy of the BNP is a development strategy, because it is also compatible 
with the culture of the company." 
Commentary on strategic control 
Strategic control in the BNP is not a rigorous formal process, but very much an 
informal one: 
"I would say the only thing we try to standardise systematically, if we can talk 
of systemisation, is that we talk about what others are doing. It is the only 
thing we try to do in a systematic way. All the rest has no systematic 
character. " 
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Indeed, one commentator noted: 
"The only meetings that are for talking specifically about strategy take place 
with the General Management Committee which take place once a week and 
these questions are included along with other operational questions. " 
That said, when one commentator at BNP -ilne working in the international division-
was asked whether they thought it important to control a strategy, the response was 
clear: 
"Oh yes, I think a strategy is like any plan you make, if you don't put yourself 
into a timetable and a controllable environment it is worthless. So it is of use 
that everybody has bright ideas, but in fact the ideas are not really what 
makes the difference between people, it is the way they translate it into actual 
facts. The best way to improve the probability of translating bright ideas into 
actions is to know that at the end they will be controlled and that you will be 
evaluated on what you are doing. " 
Another -also an international bank employee- reported: 
"There is certainly a requirement of transparency or readability [rendre 
lisible] in the strategy of the bank, because we have shareholders. So there is 
a strong pressure, so that at least the strategy is visible and if it is visible then 
clearly it is then judged by its results. Clearly we don't make a strategy just 
for that, we need to monitor [veille], to externalise more completely, to 
formalise, what's required by the Board, the shareholders and the 
environment. So particularly for banks that know how to do everything, rather 
than the specialised niche banks, for the large international banks that know 
how to do everything, but who do some things less well, because they can't do 
everything perfectly, there is quite a permanent effort to focus and target, to 
avoid too much diffusion, whilst keeping a hand in everywhere ... The 
adjustment of strategic direction to reality is continuous and so is the control, 
the execution of something, where we are. Given the multiplicity of things and 
the fact that sometimes things have to be cut, moved altered, you have to be 
very pragmatic, but at the same time we can't be everywhere, we have to 
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concentrate and make things readable, which is not always easy, not only for 
the management, but because the world is becoming too complex -that's why 
there is the "Direction de strategie ", "Direction de Developpement 
International", etc., in order to make things easier to read- and then this 
writing must also be readable by the shareholders, because even if we always 
have good results, there is always the perspective of what we are going to 
become in two or three years. So it's because of this very large diversity in an 
international bank and because the General Management has to be able to see 
clearly and pass on this vision to its shareholders -it's because of these two 
factors. 
In preparing for future sudden changes one respondent reported that: 
"we try to establish ourselves in the case of probable scenarios, in general we 
try to estimate the impact of a range of scenarios: what happens if the interest 
rates are different to what is expected, if demand is a little different to what is 
imagined, if the introduction of the euro in 1999 has an effect on the 
profitability of the market ... all of this we try to imagine and see what are the 
possibilities of the bank if a certain configuration results. A Iso, if we find 
ourselves in a deteriorating situation, there is no prepared process in order to 
review the business plan -that's left to the responsibility of the operational 
manager. That's to say, the role of Group Strategy is very clear [annonce], we 
try to give the largest possible vision given the analysis we do, and we try to 
agree the range of ".1rely outcomes, these outcomes [axes] are subject to 
alteration [abrogation] by the bank, with the only judge or umpire being the 
result that is arrived at by the individual responsible for the operation. if the 
bank makes an investment, for example, and the conditions go awry, then 
there is a moral duty to say that the conditions have changed and this is what I 
propose as an alternative plan, we are going to go down this path, this is what 
we will do, etc. The alarm procedure exists and merits his responsibility. It is 
not the responsibility of the Strategy Director. " 
Another respondent noted: 
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"Crisis scenarios [scenarios de rupture] are not easily put into place and 
that's one of the reasons why we try to construct a strong profit [rendement] 
base in order to protect ourselves from crisis scenarios. " 
When asked how the BNP checks to see if the strategic objectives are still valid, the 
response was a practical and financial one: 
"The ROE is the net result over capital -and you know that banks today are 
structured by business [metier] and you are aware of all the developments in 
analysing capital per activity with notions of economic risk, which leads you 
to the Cooke ratio ... so after all that, you will be able to see if your investment 
generates the level of profitability that you hoped for -as soon as you can 
clearly see the level of profitability per activity which we decompose into the 
national network, the international network as well as other market 
segments ... " 
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Summary of the Characteristics of Strategic Control Components in BNP 
Components of 
Strategic Control 
Premise Control 
Implementation 
Control 
Strategic 
Surveillance 
Special Alert 
Control 
Real life practice in: 
BNP 
Profitable development is the fundamental mantra at BNP: "all 
choices are made with this objective in mind' 
Each Director reviews their own area's strategic progress every 
18 months 
Operational heads are responsible for their business plans and 
their successful accomplishment 
Dialogue is the only thing done in a systematic way 
Observation Centres are the focus for market competition and 
product surveillance, with the publication of a monthly 
"competition monitor" 
The headquarters strategy unit attempts to highlight the best 
strategic direction to be followed 
Crises are prepared for by BNP's commitment to a strong 
profit base 
Operational Control Annual budgetary review is carried out by the CEO for all 
operational functions 
Environme:;.·:al 
Scanning 
Scenario Planning 
A budgetary scorecard is produced monthly 
Observation Centres monitor the economy, markets and 
product changes 
BNP uses "a range of scenarios" to estimate the impact of 
changing events on strategy (i.e. a form of sensitivity analysis) 
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Summary of Findings within BNP 
Control 
• Structure 
Mintzberg's (1995 pp. 350-371) classic 'entrepreneurial' organisation with its 
simple structure, led from the top is a good fit for the BNP Group. The simple 
divisional split between domestic and international market operations 
however, hides a multitude of potentially different business unit structures. 
• . Systems 
The only "obligatory format" followed for planning purposes within BNP as a 
whole is said to be the "budgetary process". Formal strategic planning is 
treated with a near contempt, whereby efforts are made to prevent any 
"institutionalisell' thinking, leaving strategic decision making/thinking to the 
Group Board and the I 2 members of the strategy team. 
A "competition monitor" is maintained on market competition and their 
products in a common-sense "systematic" way. 
BNP verges on being a fmancial control organisation: "the budget for '98, the 
objectives of '98, should be in line with the 3 year action plan. " 
• Style 
People 
Strategic management appears to be used reluctantly, almost as a sop to the 
financial markets: "as a quoted company we have to say something about our 
strategy ... " 
• Staff, skills, style 
BNP is a "fairly gentle employer." It is "quite French." 
The Board develops the vision and policy for the organisation and cascades it 
down through the bank. 
Privatisation only took place in 1993: the impact of which is still being 
absorbed by staff. 
A "development" culture can be perceived to exist; albeit that BNP's culture, 
according to Schuster's strategic attitudes (1996 pg. 7), would be more of an 
'imitator' than an 'inventor'. 
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Strategy 
• Shared values (super-ordinate goals) 
BNP pursues a fundamental strategy of ' 'profitable development". 
• Strategy 
A relaxed "we know what is happening" approach is taken to strategic 
management. 
Financial management is followed closely, where a strong link is seen to exist 
between finance and strategy through the emphasis on the word profitable in 
BNP's mission of profitable development. 
In attempting to position BNP's domestic banking activities in terms of the 
strategic archetypes in the literature review of Chapter 2, it appears that it is 
entrepreneurial (Mintzberg 1973), cost minimising (Utterback & Abernathy 
, 1975), a prospector (Miles & Snow 1978) and pursues a strategy of 
differentiation (Porter 1980). 
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The Credit Agricole Story 
Introduction 
"Credit Agricole is a mutual and co-operative organisation, which has existed 
for 100 years and which is the de facto first French banking group." 
"We are not a capitalist bank, as others." 
Description of the bank 
Credit Agricole is a co-operative group with an unusual three tier structure (see Figure 
18 on page 132). The fIrst structure is the "Casisses Locales" or Local Banks. Some 
5.5 million stockholders (mostly farmers) are represented by some 37,000 Directors 
who in turn officiate over some 2,775 Local Banks throughout France. These Local 
Banks are not banks in the normal sense: they do not have branches open to the 
public, but instead facilitate "the organisation of capitaT' -holding the capital of the 
Regional Banks or "Caisses Regionales" and electing their Directors. The real 
banking organisation in the normal sense of the word is the 56 Regional Banks 
covering the whole of France comprising some 8,200 branches. Together the 
Regional Banks own 90% of the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole, which is a 
privatised corporation (since 1988) that in general terms acts as headquarters to the 
Group. The number of employees totals almost 85,000, of which 70,000 are 
employed by the Regional Banks. Thr0"~h its network of Regional Banks, Credit 
Agricole serves some 15 million customers with 10,000 'Points Verts' (check deposit 
and cashing facilities), 9.5 million payment/credit cards and a range of remote 
banking services (telephone, Minitel, fax, Internet and television). A fInal structure 
exists, called the Federation Nationale du Credit Agricole, which represents the Group 
in discussions with Parliament, trade associations and other institutions. 
Credit Agricole Indosuez operates through a network of some 150 branches and 
subsidiaries in 60 countries, grouping together Credit Agricole's corporate banking 
and international businesses. Some 65% of its 10,600 employees work outside of 
France, where it generated 70% of its net operating income. 
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Group Credit Agricole's total assets amount to FF2,541 billion, net income equals 
FF9.86 billion and capital reserves are FF127 billion. In terms of security it has a: 
Aal Moody, AA Standard & Poor and AA+ IBCA rating. 
Table 13: Credit Agricole's place within its local, European and world markets 
Year Ranking Assets Pro-tax profit Return on CostlIncome 
(in terms of Tier 1 ca ital Sm) Assets Ratio 
France Europe World Sm Sm % % 
1997 I 22,280 2 3 419,980 2,928 0.70 64.50 
1996 1 22,235 2 3 477,336 2,540 0.53 64.30 
1995 1 20,386 2 2 386,388 2,511 0.65 
-
1994 1 17,288 1 8 328,152 1,830 0.56 
-
1993 1 14,718 1 8 282,911 1,522 0.54 -
1992 1 15,606 1 7 299,204 1,611 0.54 -
1991 1 14,663 1 5 307,203 1,599 0.52 -
1990 1 13,186 2 6 302,983 1,381 0.46 
-
1989 1 11,802 1 4 241,992 1,266 0.52 -
1988 1 (8,740) 3 5 214,382 852 - -
Source: The Banker, July & September 1987-98 
A history of Credit Agricole 
In 1894, the Agriculture Minister of the day introduced a law, which created a new 
mutual structure of agricultural credit companies throughout France: the "Caisses 
Locales" were born. Funds were made available from the Bank of France and 
distributed,ia a number of Regional Banks [Caisses Regionales], created by 
Parliament in 1899. These Regional Banks were also responsible for monitoring the 
agricultural credit companies, ensuring that only short-term personal loans were 
authorised as per the legislation of the day. 
In 1906, long-term loans were authorised to farm co-operatives, and soon after in 
1910 long-term personal loans for agricultural use were permitted. In 1919, Credit 
Agricole was allowed to make loans to the non-agricultural sector, albeit to a strictly 
limited degree. 
During the 1920s and 30s Credit Agricole played an important role in supporting the 
development of the French rural community. In 1923, in order to slow down the 
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general rural exodus that was occurring, the Government of the day authorised Credit 
Agricole to fmance a number of public infrastructure projects, in particularly the 
introduction of electricity throughout rural France. The depression years of the 1930s 
saw Credit Agricole also play a major role in supporting wheat prices. 
In 1945, the Federation Nationale du Credit Agricole was founded to represent the 
Regional Banks in their dealings with the authorities and other external bodies. 
Throughout the post-war period Credit Agricole was to play a significant role in the 
education of the agricultural community, helping them in the preparation of fmancial 
plans for their businesses and generally informing them how to manage their cash and 
savings. 
In 1959 Credit Agricole was authorised to provide mortgages in rural areas. As a 
result it quickly became the number one mortgage lender in France and today it still 
issues one in four mortgages. 
1967 saw the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole start to manage and invest customer 
deposits itself, prior to this it had been obliged to transfer savings deposits to the 
French Treasury. This transformation established the Caisse Nationale de Credit 
Agricole as the Group's central banking arm, with it receiving deposits and making 
advances to the Regional Banks. 
In 1971, Credit A:2ricole was authorised to grant loans in new sectors and to new 
categories of borrower. This process continued in 1979, 1982 and 1985. During the 
late 1980s Credit Agricole diversified into insurance and today is France's second 
largest life assurance company. It was not until 1991 however, that the Government 
removed all socio-professional and geographic restrictions on lending, allowing 
Credit Agricole to become a fully-fledged universal bank. 
The Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole fmally became a private company in 1988, 
90% of its equity is held by the Regional Banks and 10% by present and former 
Group employees. Soon after, the Group Credit Agricole produced its mission 
statement: "together, we will excel in our business, to win in Europe". 
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In 1996, Credit Agricole finalised the purchase of Banque Indosuez, with the aim of 
making it the centre of its international wholesale operations. 
Control 
"There is on one hand the whole regional network [Caisses Regionales], there 
are about 60, and they are currently undergoing afusionprocess.-Each of 
these Regional Banks covers a given territory, one, two or even three counties 
[departements I]. These are banks in their own right and qualify as 
independent banks. We will see later the extent of their autonomy and 
dependence. That's the first level, and these Regional Banks have their own 
members [societaires], which are the "Caisses Locales." And the Caisses 
Locales themselves are owned by further members. 
Secondly, there is the "Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole" (CNCA), which 
is where you are today, which has a role, on the one hand, to act as headoffice 
of the network [chef de reseau] in terms of French Banking Law. The CNCA is 
in charge of the control of the Regional Banks and is in charge of solvency 
and liquidity of the Regional Banks. We also have a role of marketing 
development. Thirdly we have a role in this development to look after 
subsidiaries, for example we created a life insurance subsidiary, a general 
insurance subsidiary, a group products subsidiary [produits collect ifs ]. 
Fourthly, we serve a little bit as central treasury, it's the word which 
describes best the internal financial relations between the different Caisses 
Regionales which I mentioned and the central Caisse Nationale. We are also 
in charge of the international development of the Credit Agricole, where for 
example we recently purchased the Banque Indosuez. 
The third entity is the "Federation Nationale de Credit Agricole" (FNCA). 
The FNCA has an essentially political role, on the one hand it is a meeting 
place between the Caisses Regionales ... and on the other the FNCA is in 
charge of the relations with Government and external bodies. It is also this 
organisation that creates the social policy of the Caisses Regionales -the 
I France has 96 administrative counties or "departements". 
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working agreements, which manages the relationship between employees and 
the Caisses Regionales .• 
The Caisses Locales and Caisses Regionales can be better described in conjunction 
with their history. 
"At the start, 100 years ago, people who organised themselves into co-
operative groups did this on the basis that they knew each other, so the 
grouping structure is a local structure, in the area, which covers several 
parishes [communes], several square kilometres. That's the structure of the 
Caisses Locales, and inside each Caisse Locale there is a co-operative 
structure made up of individuals, members, generally farmers [agriculteurs], 
who provide the capital of the Caisse Locale. Inside a county or a given 
territorial region, there are a certain number of Caisses Locales -in the 
Caisse Isle de France there are 42 Caisse Locales-these Caisse Locales 
provide their capital to a structure called the Caisse Regionale. So the 
members at the bottom are not members of the Caisse Regionale, but are 
members of the Caisse Locale. The Caisse Locale has a very small role today, 
it has the task of checking the grant of a loan to its members in its district. 
The Credit Agricole structure has evolved a lot, however, because we have 
many users of Credit Agricole who are not members. We have a small number 
of members and a large number of customers -and loans to customers don't go 
through the Caisse Locale structure. So the Caisse Locale is purely an organ 
:/'.1r the organisation of capital. What you also need to know is that the Caisse 
Locale can have a commercial activity: a profit and loss and a balance sheet. 
Some people say that this system was also constructed in order to minimise 
any power struggles, because it is a two step electoral process: in order to get 
on the Board of the Caisse Regionale, you must first be elected to the Caisse 
Locale and then to the Caisse Regionale, so there are two electoral steps ... 
The members of the Caisse Locale will create a Board [Conseil 
d' Administration] for the Caisse Locale. Next the Caisse Locale will provide 
capital to the Caisse Regionale and will nominate the Board of the Caisse 
Regionale. In order to be a member of the Board of the Caisse Regionale, you 
have to be elected once here [at the Board of the Caisse Locale] and again 
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here [Board ofthe Caisse Regionale]. This means that the Board of the Caisse 
Regionale is very stable, with few changes. That said, all of this is superficial, 
because as I said to you the Board does not have huge power, the real power 
is within the Caisse Regionale and in the management team of the Caisse 
Regionale. " 
The Federation Nationale and the Caisse Nationale fit into_this structure- in the 
following way: 
"The Caisses Regionales are autonomous. They belong to ... the Federation 
[which] is in fact the lobby of the Caisses Regionales -it is a type of 
professional union. Next, there is a second organism, a lot more difficult to 
understand, which is the Caisse Nationale. It's difficult to understand because 
the Caisse Nationale is the central organ of the Caisses Regionales: it 
monitors and controls the Caisses Regionales and says this is what you should 
do, what you are allowed to do, what you are not allowed to do ... it's a tutor's 
role and this tutor's role is established by banking law. In financial terms, 
this central organ has been bought by the Caisses Regionales [90% and 10% 
by the employees of the Group Credit Agricole]." 
Hence the term united and decentralised. 
"We are used to describing the Credit Agricole as united and decentralised. 
Decentralised -you can understand straight away as to why: the regions are 
full banks in their own right and have their own personality. United -because 
we have put into place, first of all, internal financial networks [circuits], 
secondly we have subsidiaries which are developed in the common interest of 
members." 
And then there are working groups for particular projects, bringing together members 
of the Caisse Nationale and the Caisses Regionales. 
"these are working groups which are made up of individuals from the Caisse 
Nationale, Caisses Regionales and the Federation. And once again there are 
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members of the working group that will be permanent members of the 
institution to which they belong, as well as elected representatives." 
Figure 18: Credit Agricole Structure 
FNCA or Federation Nationale du 
t Agricole Credi 
- Regional Banks representative body 
CNCA or Caisse Nationale de 
Credit Agricole 
Credit Agricole's central body ____ 
~ 
... 
Credit Agricole Indosuez INDOCAM 
Global wholesale banking Asset management 
I 
UCABAIL 
I 
UI UNIFlCA 
Leasing Investment banking Real estate 
--
PREDICA CEDICAM TRANSFACT 
Life insurance Payment systems Factoring 
BGP PACIFICA BIT 
Private Asset Casualty insurance Institutional Asset 
Management Management 
i 
Caisses Regionales de Credit Agricole 
56 Regional Banks 8,166 branches 2,775 Local Banks 
37,000 Directors 5.5 million stockholders 
Source: Information from Credit Agricole Annual Report 1997 
Discourse is paramount within the organisation. 
"It's important to remember that it is the dialectic, which differentiates it from 
other banks." 
This is also true for the ultimate decision making process. 
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"It's a mixture of CEO [president] and Directors [Directeurs Generaux]. 
There is an elaboration of a consensus. In this elaboration of consensus there 
are these working groups. The strength of the Credit Agricole is that it is a 
bank by consensus -that's clear. On top of this you have the formal structure: 
the Board of Directors, etc. That's the formalisation of a decision -it's the 
final stage. In general there is a long period of maturation and elaboration." 
Strategy 
As one Regional Director put it, strategy is a process of continuous momentum (slow 
change), with large strategic changes not being sought: 
" ... we have a strategic thrust [axe strategique], a clear direction, we are a 
private bank [banque de detail] for a large private individual clientele. We 
know how to develop our business and we have a thinking process, but we do 
not have a process that questions our business. We are a private bank, we 
accept our qualities and our characteristics of a private bank, and we do not 
trouble ourselves about this, that's to say, we are not going to profoundly 
modifY our way of being or our structure. The Credit Agricole belongs to its 
users, provincial farmers, as well as farmers in the sub-urban areas, and on 
the whole we have the feeling of belonging to our users. We can not change 
the way we do things." 
" .. .In our .'listory, we have always served clients that have trusted us. There is 
a relationship between those people who joined the co-operative, the co-
operative that brought them banking services, and we have a certain number 
of responsibilities to them as a result. We still do not today envisage breaking 
away from this way of thinking, that's to say, the thinking or the changes that 
are going on in the Building Societies in England, which were similar to us 
originally, which are moving clearly towards capitalism, this way of thinking 
is not yet ours, it might become this one day, but for the moment we are not 
there. So what I want to say, is that this historical characteristic weighs 
heavily on our strategic choices. " 
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A basic understanding of what the bank is, underlines the strategic thinking and 
management process. 
"As we are a private bank, therefore we have the necessary banking services 
for private individuals: the management of accounts, consumer credit, 
mortgages -three large activities. We provide this under a proximity concept, 
with a fairly large branch network, because this is our way of contacting our 
clients. Around this, it is evident that we monitor technologIcal changes or 
changes in behaviour, for example, we are interested in direct banking in 
order to see what the impact of direct banking will be -to eventually adapt our 
customer service, but not to change fundamentally our customer service. " 
Safeguarding the Regional Bank's current position whilst developing for the future 
are the drivers behind strategic momentum. 
"One of first preoccupations of the Board is that when we leave we try to make 
sure that there is more money than there was when we arrived. So we have a 
large worry about survival, the first element, and a second worry about 
development, because that is the culture of Credit Agricole. The Credit 
Agricole is a bank that is always trying to develop, which has always been in 
search of new markets and new activities, and it is in this sort of activity that it 
does well and wants to pursue. Firstly, survival, that's to say: prudent 
choices, and secondly, development, that's to say commercial capacity and the 
desire to be offensive. " 
Strategy and ideas in general terms are generated throughout the organisation. 
"When you have such a number of individuals it is clear that ideas can sprout 
from everywhere. You can have some propositions that come from central 
bodies -Caisse Nationale, you can have propositions coming from one Caisse 
Regionale ... " 
"It can come from the national level, from the Caisse Nationale, but, like all 
national propositions of the Credit Agricole, it involves a debate inside each 
Caisse Regionale and a different policy in one Caisse Regionale to another. 
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The Credit Agricole does not move forward as one, there are those that go 
quickly, there are those that go slowly, it depends on the subject, it depends on 
the market characteristics, it depends on the sensibilities of the management 
team." 
Vision is generated through an almost a1chemistic process of dialogue. 
"It's not one person. It's the collective whole. It's a process of colleCtive 
elaboration. That does not mean that there are not individuals that are 
personally asked to work on propositions. Here you have the Directeurs 
Generaux who are Presidents, who are responsible for their own Caisse 
Regionale. At the same time you have subject or functional working groups at 
the central level: you have the Association des Presidents, the Association des 
Cadres Dirigeants, which work as groups. Otherwise, you have the working 
groups brought together on particular subjects: one will work on assurance, 
one on personnel relations [relations sociales], on productivity. So it's by 
subject or function: so you have syndicates that bring together members of 
the Caisse Regionales, such as a Marketing syndicate, which brings together 
the individuals who are in charge of Marketing in their organisation ... 
So to speak like a Consultant, you could talk of a matrix structure... You have 
people who are specialised in assurance or collective management or new 
distribution channels or the Iniernet or Le Minitel, etc., it's these people who 
will produce the reports and afterwards it will be submitted to a critique ... 
Then it will be included in a project ... " 
Each Caisse Regionale is responsible for its own strategy, so differences can exist 
from one region to another, but as we have seen already elements of best practice 
permeate throughout the Credit Agricole as a whole, and therefore, in broad terms and 
for the purpose of this document, one region's approach can be assumed to be similar 
to that of another's. The following outlines how strategy is managed in the largest of 
the Caisse Regionale, in the Caisse Regionale Isle de France (Paris). 
"In the Credit Agricole each Caisse Regionale is an autonomous entity, 
responsible for its own decisions, taking into account its own members 
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[societaires] and its own investors [porteurs de capital]. So we take a decision 
that we believe is good for the Caisse Regionale, which is coherent with the 
whole of the Group Credit Agricole, but not totally identical to what the others 
do." 
How it goes about this decision making and implementation of decisions is likewise 
similar but not necessarily identical. 
"Our strategic choices, as I said, are guided by survival and growth. So we 
have strategic choices that are [based upon]: profit and loss accounts, 
accounting balance and expenditure on new activities. We have three types of 
choice which are going to be used. We do not have a very structured process, 
that's to say we do not have a development plan, we do not have a five year 
plan, or things like that. We have an annual process and only an annual 
process. 
Each year we will produce a budget, which will be related to the choice of 
activities, the commercial plan, the distribution of financial resources to each 
choice of activity or each choice within the commercial plan... The thinking 
and the strategic choices are going to be choices about opportunity. 
Regarding the relative choices about the survival of the company, they are 
permanent choices, they are always the same. The choices will be about the 
profitability of activities, the pursuit of productivity -these are the permanent 
thrusts. Regarding new activities, they are choices about opportunity, which 
are based upon the means of making things available and the range of 
possible actions we can have . 
... We have a gap between the 31st December, where we balance our accounts, 
create our accounts, and where we can see clearly what has happened during 
the whole year by about I5,h February. That is the traditional accounting 
process, which allows us to establish a retrospective vision of the past year 
(N-I). Then we have a budgetary process, which begins in July of the 
preceding year (N-I), which allows us to develop for the 31" December a 
budgetary approach and activities for the following year (N+ 1). Of course 
there is an interaction between accountingfigures and the development of the 
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budgetary process, but we are in this gap, there is something that we establish 
a-posteriori and there is something we envisage a-priori, which is the 
budgetary process and the process of establishing activities. It is through this 
budgetary approach that we establish the development, the activities and the 
different strategic choices . 
... it is in this budgetary working drawing, that we will allow for the decision 
to be made to develop life assurance or accident assurance;- and the day we 
make the decision, along side the budgetary approach, we will sketch the 
development of these activities over the next three years... All of these 
strategic decisions, are made over several years and every effort is made to try 
to include them both in the annual plans, for the first year of their operation, 
and in the subsequent years' plans. " 
The realisation that strategic leap is missing from the spectrum of Credit Agricole's 
strategic capabilities is, however, not missed, but rather a process of strategic 
momentum or gradual change is preferred. 
"We have a hole, it's a medium to long term gap. If I explain to you that our 
strategic direction is a function of the observation of our activity, that means 
we can not make any major changes, we will not make a revolution at Credit 
Agricole. So if it's necessary to make large strategic choices in the medium to 
long term, it's not likely that that we will do it. The large strategic choices in 
the medium to long term, in fact are not really taken in Credit Agricole, 
because I come back to what I said in the beginning, we do not question 
ourselves fundamentally about our business. We carry out our job, we try to 
be responsible carrying it out in the best way, to be among the most 
competitive, the most productive of the French banks -up to now we have 
succeeded! So we haven't any metaphysical questions, you see what I am 
saying, we don't ask any metaphysical questions about the future, because for 
the moment we are where we are and we are performing well where we are. It 
is true, however, that if the working conditions changed a lot, if all of a 
sudden the customers no longer went into the branches, at that moment we 
would really have a real problem ... as I said our objective is "survival" 
[perennite]. It is the survival of capital, it's also the survival of man. If you 
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prefer, we have three areas in the Caisse de Credit Agricole, let's take the 
case of Isle de France: we have FF6 billion capital, we have 3 thousand 
employees and we have 800,000 customers. Our objective is to lose none of 
the 6 billion capital, to lose none of our employees and to lose none of our 
800,000 customers, and, if possible, to increase the three components. Up till 
now we have succeeded, but for the past year or two with difficulty. That's to 
say, we make money, but in a quantity slightly inferior to that of three years 
ago; the maintenance of salaried employees is difficult, . but we· haven't lost· 
one single job, three years ago we had 3,000 employees, today we still have 
3,000 employees; and, with our clients, we gain one to one and a half percent 
additional customers each year. It is, however, no-longer the rhythm that we 
knew and, in fact, we ask ourselves frequently the question: what are we doing 
to counter telephone banking? We have had an answer, because today we say 
we are going to do telephone banking, we do it, but we will do it based from 
our branches. So we have decided not to develop any telephone plat/orm, but 
in liberating some time from our commercial staff, we are asking our 
commercial stafJto work more and more on the phone ... It's true, however, 
that we do not have a clear and reasoned objective for the next five or ten 
years: the only objective we have is my objective, to keep my capital, keep my 
stafJ and to keep my customers! That's the objective: it's an objective of 
conservation of acquired strength. The second element is that the Credit 
Agricole has always conserved its strengths whilst having the capacity to 
develop. In the Isle de France we believe that we have a strong capacity to 
develop, because we have only 5% of the market so we can still increase our 
market share. When I said we had no choice in the next 5 to la years, yes we 
do, because between now and 10 years time we will not have saturated our 
growth capacity within the Isle de France market. So you can see to what an 
extent our thinking is linked to the zone where we operate and our 
environmental characteristics in this zone." 
People 
..... the culture is extremely strong. It's extremely strong, very powerful and 
very present. Secondly, it is evident that there is also competition: it's clear 
that the Caisse Regionales think that the Caisse Nationale is a bit "Parisian" 
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-that always exists in any organisation. The problem is not that, the problem 
is to organise confrontation, in a friendly way, between the different divisions: 
to organise the exchange of information, of ideas, of projects and at the end to 
arrive at some action plan. The mechanism that I have described to you 
shows that it works and that in general it produces projects that hold the road. 
Secondly, inside and between each of the Caisse Regionales there is a certain 
competition. Not only in territorial terms, where each has its own territory, 
but because each Caisse Regionale would like to be classed higher than the 
others on so and so a ratio ... That could be market share, the diffusion of a 
certain product, profitability, financial ratios, commercial ratios, liquidity 
ratios. Each Caisse Regionale knows his position with regard to the others, 
they know, for example, that this Caisse has this penetration in the youth 
market, etc." 
This said when it comes to moving ahead with operational imperatives and with the 
tasks of the working groups, rivalries are put to one side in favour of the common 
interest. 
"There are 60 or so Caisses Regionales and depending on the subject, the 
competencies, the affinities, this or that individual will be brought in on this or 
that working group. It works pretty well usually, that's to say of course we 
can't have all the Caisses participating, but even though there are only 3,4,5, 
or 6 Caisses Regionales, the others will feel involved in the work that will be . 
done. It is more a way of working practice, we are not very formalised, we 
don't say that representatives have to be elected, etc., we leave it to 
competency. We have a very good example of this in the introduction of the 
Euro, which of course concerns the Credit Agricole, and around the 
introduction of the Euro we must have created 30 or so working groups, with 
the Caisse Isle de France being present in no more than 5 or 6 of these 
groups. We participate in certain areas of the thinking therefore, and we 
receive all the various reports of all the working groups, and those where we 
didn't participate we read and absorb them as if we had been involved, 
because we trust our colleagues within other Caisses Regionales who did 
participate. " 
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The Credit Agricole culture is strongly imbedded in the organisation, built upon its 
history and customs. 
"The Credit Agricole bank globally is 100 years old, including the Isle de 
France -we are not quite 100, but we were created in 1902, so we will soon be 
100. The Credit Agricole was originally conceived for people who were 
excluded from the banking system, people with whom the capitalist banks of 
the period would not lend money to and would not provide any services. So it 
was conceived for excluded individuals, conceived on the collective capital of 
the excluded individuals -that's to say, in the Credit Agricole we have two 
strong cultural elements, first of all, the people who come to us, perhaps they 
can not go anywhere else: so we are not a rich man's bank, but rather of the 
middle range. The second element is that in Credit Agricole all the resources 
have preceded the three Credits [i.e. the CNCA, FNCA and Caisses 
Regionales organisational structures], because when the Credit Agricole was 
created it didn't have any capital, people had to bring their available 
resources, so that these available resources could be loaned out. You are 
aware of the bankers' saying that "debts make the assets of a bank", in the 
Credit Agricole this is not true, it is the assets that make the debts. In a 
structural way, all the Caisses of the Credit Agricole are surplus in assets, 
they have more assets than debts. So we have these two strong elements in our 
culture, the first being that we do not choose our customers, we do not select 
our clientele, we do not select our market, we (J universal bank, some say 
catch all, catch everybody; and then the second strong element of the culture, 
is that we are a structurally balanced bank, and even an overly balanced in 
resources. So we have always a lot of resources and a little less debts: this 
plays an important role in the management of our company. 1 am going to 
add a third element which is a strong cultural element, all the managers 
[cadres], all the executives [dirigeants] in the Credit Agricole come from 
Credit Agricole. All the Directors of the Caisse are people who have been 
employees of the Credit Agricole, selected through various selection processes 
with various training programmes, so there is a large homogenity within the 
management team and very strong sense of belonging to Credit Agricole. This 
is a factor with all staff, not just managers, but as all staff, including the 
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lowest level, know that they can follow this path inside in Credit Agricole, 
there is a very strong feeling of belonging, a very strong company patriotism. 
People inside the Credit Agricole are ready to make an effort that they 
perhaps wouldn't make elsewhere. " 
A committee culture pervades the management system of Credit Agricole: with 
working groups, Directors Committees and Board of Directors meetings at the Caisse 
Nationale and Caisse Regionales levels. 
"At the Federation level, there is what is now called a Directors Committee, 
for a long time it was called the Central Committee, which sounded rather like 
the Communist Party, which regroups the Presidents and the Directeurs 
Generaux of the Caisses Regionales. Just as within the Caisse Nationale there 
is a Board which regroups the Presidents and the Directeurs Generaux of the 
Caisses Regionales -the shareholding Caisses [c£ the Federation where the 
Caisses have no shareholdingsJ. There are a certain number of people who 
are in both. 
The Conseil d'Administration of the Caisse Nationale is elected by the 
shareholders of the Caisse Nationale, i.e. the Caisses Regionales. In the 
Federation there is a Directors Committee which is elected by the members of 
the Federation, i.e. the Caisses Regionales. So you see the Caisses Regionales 
vote on both sides, as a result of being shareholders here [Caisse Nationale 1 
and members of the union here [i.e. Federation Nationale eu Credit AgricoleJ. 
So you can have people who are on both bodies: but people do not 
necessarily have the same vision when they are in each one. In the Caisse 
Nationale they have a centralist vision and in the Federation they have a 
decentralised vision. So sometimes they live with two hats on! Between the 
two there is what is called a Co-ordination Committee, where all the subjects 
that effect Credit Agricole can be discussed. In saying all of this, I'm sure that 
you are going to say that there are committees everywhere! I haven't always 
been in the Credit Agricole and so it is the question I asked myself: we spend 
an incredible amount of time in debating, discussing and obtaining a 
consensus. When I say an incredible amount of time, to give you an idea, each 
month the three or four main bosses of the Caisses Regionales, the Directeur 
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General and the Directeurs Generaux Adjoints, spend 3 or 4 days at the 
Federation, i.e. approx. one fifth of their time is at the Federation in 
discussion. " 
This committee culture has its perceived strengths and weaknesses. 
"Where is the strength, because that is an enormous loss of energy? The 
strength of the Credit Agricole is that it rests on 60 autonomous, decentralised· --.. 
and responsible banks. That's to say we have 60 decision making centres, 
totally independent and totally responsible for their territory. That's the force 
of decentralisation. The inconvenience, is that 60 centres can disappear off in 
every sense. So to fight this inconvenience, we spend a certain amount of time 
in trying to find what brings us together and not that which pulls us apart. 
Hence the one fifth of their time." 
Employees, including management, are generally French nationals, with the slight 
exception of Credit Agricole Indosuez which is more international in its makeup. 
Competitions or "concours" are used as selection criteria in order for staff to become 
Deputy Directors [sous Directeurs], Assistant Directors [Directeurs Generaux 
Adjoints] and gain access into the senior management elite. As a result top 
management thinking is similar. 
" ... within the management teams of tl1 65 Casisses de Credit Agricole there 
are about 500 managers and we all have been through the same process. We 
never talk about a manager here like they do elsewhere in saying he did ENA 
[Ecole Nationale d' Administration], he went to the Poly technique, never do we 
talk about their University past -and amongst the 10 or 12 managers of the 
Caisse Isle de France I don't know the University past of the others and they 
don't know mine, it's not important for us- but on the other hand we know that 
we all went through the Credit Agricole selection process, so somewhere that 
makes us all very homogenous. So when I said decisions are taken collegially, 
even when we don't participate, we feel like we did, because there are people 
who reason like us. This has strengths but it also has risks: ultimately if we 
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are not intelligent, we are all un-intelligent and we will remain un-
intelligentf' 
Educational background is generally high with entrants to Credit Agricole coming 
from various educational streams. 
"There are some MBAs, others have come from engineering schools, 
agricultural schools and business schools. " 
Pride and loyalty in Credit Agricole is high for the majority of employees. 
"People generally try to develop their careers internally." 
"There is a strong culture of in house training. And there is an internal 
selection process for managers." 
Remuneration includes a bonus system. 
"There is a variable part, which is linked to the results of the individual. On 
the other hand, Credit Agricole is known for paying less well than other 
banks, quite simply because there is the reassuring strength of the Group for 
employees. So historically, Credit Agricole has not paid more than other 
banks. But on the other hand, it offers a prestigious name and the loyalty and 
solidity which you can't find elsewhen, as well as the opportunity for 
considerable development. " 
Commentary on strategic control 
Controls on strategy in all parts of Credit Agricole are made both through dialogue, 
classical accounting/inspection and the use of scorecards. 
"The Caisses Regionales have their own scorecard, us [i.e. the CNCA] too, so 
there are different elements and consolidations." 
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"We have a planning department and management control ... otherwise there 
is the internal audit department [I 'Inspection Generale]. " 
" ... the internal audit department is in charge of checking compliance with 
legislation and the internal rules... Management control is more classic, 
ratios, etc." 
Dialogue is however not always balanced, with sometimes the Caisse Nationale 
taking its legal interest in controlling the Caisses Regionales a step too far for the 
liking of the Caisses Regionales: 
" ... they are responsible for passing on all the rules of professional banking ... 
there are imperative parts and there are recommended parts, but they go into 
all the detail of the rules. The Credit Agricole has in addition created its' own 
internal rules, which follow on from the text of a law... or from internal 
habits which we mustn 't breach." 
"At the strategic level, it is an area where its role is a bit controversial. The 
Caisse Nationale is tempted to provide strategic direction, i.e. we could do 
this, this is good, this is not good, etc. The Caisses Regionales continuously 
say: no, we are free to do or not do as we wish, we are independent -the 
strategy does not belong to you, it belongs to each Caisse Regionale, you can 
think about it, you can provide direction and ideas, but it is up to each Caisse 
Regionale to dedde. That's why we do not have a unique strategy for the 
Group, we have staged, differently timed strategies. On the other hand, there 
is between the Caisses Regionales and the Caisse Nationales a sharing of 
competencies -we could use a European word and say subsidiarity-
everything that the Caisses Regionales can't do is up to the Caisse Nationale 
to do. The Caisses Regionales can not pursue international activities, we have 
our territorial activities and do not know how to organise ourselves outside of 
them, so international activity is the responsibility of the Caisse Nationale. 
That's why it bought Indosuez and why she has an international network -
nobody contests this. If the Caisse Nationale, however, wants to organise a 
network of branches in France: that would provoke a strong debate with the 
Caisses Regionales, because there can't be too many on the same territory." 
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But it is not just the Caisse Nationale which has a role in the control of the Group 
Credit Agricole, with members of the Caisses Regionales often ensuring that power 
games thrive. The Federation is not just a place of debate, it is a place where the 
Caisses Regionales develop a balance of power to face the Caisse Nationale. 
" ... they [the Caisse Nationale] control and they [the Federation] they know 
things by spontaneous report ... 
.. .for example the Caisse Nationale sometimes asks for forecasts -what is your 
forecast for 1998 's net product, costs, profits. The Caisse Nationale will 
demand this information -you must send the central structure these forecasts 
now! We then send or don't send them this information, depending upon our 
relationship with them, even when it is imperative. we sometimes don't reply. 
The Federation in order to play its role, because it is a kind of counter 
balance, will also need some figures. so we will spontaneously give it the 
figures. Here they demand [Caisse Nationale] and here we make them 
available spontaneously [Federation]. We keep this power struggle alive: the 
Credit Agricole is continuously pursuing compromise and balance. " 
Risks are minimised however. 
"I would like to underline one important point here, that's the concept of risk 
control. You can see cleQl> that with this organisation we can minimise risk 
Why? Because, statistically it would be quite astonishing that all of the Caisse 
Regionale take the same risks at the same time... If one or two Caisses 
Regionales made some errors of investment, commitment, etc., the other 
Caisses would not do the same. So it limits things, it has the effect of a 
barrier. On the other side, if one Caisse Regionale has a good idea, then 
there it catches on pretty quickly ... So the fire is limited .. " 
Some use is made of scenario planning. 
"Inside Credit Agricole we prepare and elaborate scenarios and plans for: 
the year 2000, the year 2005, different types of banking, Marketing, etc. So 
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we have a certain number of areas within the Credit Agricole where we think. 
It's within the Caisse Nationale, within the Federation Nationale de Credit 
Agricole, we have places for reflection, but these places for reflection are only 
places for reflection -up to now in the decision making process we have 
always come back to our usual decision making process, that's to say the 
strategic thrusts [axes] in the short or possibly medium term, which we define 
in the way I indicated, to which we add to as required. We haven't found it 
necessary to equip ourselves with what one could call a strategic code, we 
haven't found it necessary to equip ourselves with a medium term plan, and 
we haven't found it necessary to equip ourselves with any predictive 
capability. None of this exists, because we have internal obligations and we 
live with our internal objectives: capital, staff and customers; and these 
internal obligations guide us in our day to day operations, as well as in our 
short to medium term actions. " 
Re-evaluation and monitoring of strategy is carried out. 
"When we launch a new activity, such as revolving credit, we establish. as we 
say in French, a "business plan" [English words used], which normally is for 
three years, in order to tell us that in one year's time we will have so many 
customers, etc., and with a certain number of indicators about profitability 
and risk. Periodically, and normally more frequently than annually, when we 
are at the start of an activity I would say about every three months, we look at 
the progress report in relation to the business plan that was established, and 
eventually we correct things if we notice gaps in comparison with what was 
expected; the provision can be of poor quality, that happens quite often, or the 
resources that we provided or the support that we gave to those responsible 
. for the sale of the product may not have been sufficient, and in these cases we 
will make the necessary corrections." 
"We have a monitoring process for all our activities, there are no activities 
without any reporting, the reporting even is subject to monitoring, as the 
Conseil de Direction is a group that meets every two weeks, and every two 
weeks we look at a certain number of indicators of activity, scorecard 
indicators in order to look at them activity by activity, what is the progress, 
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where we are with regards to expectations, where we are in relation with the 
evolution of the market. Based on these two forms of permanent analysis and 
based upon this permanent monitoring, we establish our questions about the 
necessary realignments or adjustments. That's to say, every two weeks there 
are a set number of subjects that are presented and if we notice any 
derailment in relation to the established direction, then the Conseil de 
Direction will say we have a derailment, which we have to understand the 
reasons for, and two weeks to a month later, we will present a correction 
project, first of all of analysis in order to know what happened, and then of 
correction in order to get back on track and change the direction back. It's. 
very interactive." 
Qualitative as well as quantitative indicators are used. 
"They are for the large part quantitative. We can have qualitative indicators, 
the qualitative indicators are more difjicult to manipulate because they 
require more interpretation, but we can have customer satisfaction, customer 
waiting time indicators, taken from customer panel studies, we can also have 
differentiated indicators from one branch to another ... " 
The distinction between what is strategic and what is tactical is purposely not made. 
"We mix very closely day to day activity management with strategic 
management. " 
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Summary of the Characteristics of Strategic Control Components in 
Credit Agricole 
Components of 
Strategic Control 
Premise Control 
Implementation 
Control 
Strategic 
Surveillance 
Special Alert 
Control 
Operational 
Control 
Environmental 
Scanning 
Real life practice in: 
Cridit Agricole 
3 year "budgetary working drawing" 
A 'dialectic' culture exists and numerous committees 
pervade all areas of activity and control within the Group 
Scorecards are used 
Management controls are reviewed every 2 weeks by the 
Regional Banks' management team 
New strategies are reviewed every quarter by management 
teams 
Control Department checks compliance of internal and 
external regulations throughout the Group 
Monthly meeting of all Regional Banks with the National 
Bank in committee 
"Ideas can sprout from everywhere" 
Aware of fundamental lack of inertia in strategic choices 
Traditional operational controls (with heavy focus on 
fmancial control) 
Dialogue and committee meetings are relied upon to 
disseminate report fmdings 
Scenario Planning Evidence of some limited use of scenarios was found, 
however they are generally not used for strategic planning 
purposes 
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Summary of Findings within Credit Agricole 
Control 
• Structure 
Mintzberg (1995 pp. 350-371) talks ofa political organisation, a missionary 
organisation and a diversified organisation inter alia: the Group Credit 
Agricole is a concoction of all these three! Diversified, because at times it is 
indeed a set of independent identities, with, in particular, each Caisse 
Regionale acting in the interests of its customers and its local markets. 
Missionary, because there is an underlying ideology of survival and 
development within the context of keeping at the very least the existing levels 
of customers, capital and employees: it is this mission that allows for the co-
ordination of the diversified and politicised structure. Political, because there 
are no dominant parts or parties within the Group, instead there are powerful 
coalitions and interest groups brought together within the CNCA, the FNCA 
and the aptly named Co-ordination Committee. The concept of subsidiarity 
reigns. 
Structure follows strategy: differences can exist from one part of the 
organisation to another. 
• Systems 
A scorecard system is used, both at the Caisse Regionale and Caisse Nationale 
level. Indicators appear to be monitored every two weeks. 
Annual and 3 year business plans are used for planning purposes, which are 
reviewed quarterly in case adjustments are required. 
The Group Credit Agricole clearly also uses the full range of fmancial 
(accounting and audit), marketing, personnel and IT/operations' systems as 
would any large business organisation. 
Supplementing these management systems are ad-hoc working groups, that 
comprise members from throughout the Group, selected on the basis of 
competence and balanced representation across the Group. These working 
groups report on particular projects that affect or could affect the Group as a 
whole. 
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Discourse is paramount: "it is the dialectic that differentiates it from other 
banks." 
• Style 
People 
Credit Agricole is a mutualist co-operative: it does not necessarily follow the 
path of capitalism. 
The overall style is one of a diversified hierarchy: with employees of the 
Caisses Regionales working their way up the internal structures of their 
particular Caisse in question. Likewise employees of the Caisse Nationale 
seek advancement within its confmes. Only at the higher levels ofthe 
organisations are inter-group activities taking place, either through the projects 
of working groups or the discussions of the Federation. Exceptionally some 
inter-group mobility does occur between the regions and the centre, although 
this transfer of personnel is very limited. 
Competition is used within the organisational structures to "organise 
confrontation, in friendly way" and produce results "that hold the road'. 
• Staff, skills and style 
Credit Agricole appears aware that its weakness is that is a fundamentally 
conservative organisation, a patriarchy, and is slow to change. It is also proud 
that this is its strength. 
Commitment from the employees appears to have been gained: with evidence 
of personnel willing 'to give that little bit extra' when required. ReciprocalJy, 
management, certainly at the Caisse Regionale level, appear to have a strong 
commitment to maintaining employee numbers where possible and if need be 
to the detriment of their bottom line. 
Outlets for discussion (and perhaps strategic conversation) pervade the 
organisation. Management comprises a French intellectual elite. 
A "friendly" competitive rivalry is engendered throughout the Group. 
Its local, agricultural origins are still fundamental in its culture today: this 
commonality of purpose is the basis of internal co-operation and trust. 
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Strategy 
• Shared values (super-ordinate goals) 
Ensuring "survival and growth" is key. 
Schuster's (1996 pg. 7) 'collective player' strategic attitude is dominant. 
• Strategy 
Strategy is based upon a dialectic. Vision is generated through an almost 
alchemistic process of dialogue. 
Strategic choices and the resultant development are made through a budgetary 
approach. 
In attempting to position Credit Agricole in terms of the strategic archetypes in 
the literature review of Chapter 2, it appears that it is adaptive (Mintzberg 
1973), an analyser (Miles & Snow 1978) and pursues a focus strategy (Porter 
1980). There is no clear fit however in terms of Utter back & Abernathy 
(1975). 
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The Deutsche Bank Story 
. Introduction 
At the time of writing various organisational changes are taking place within Deutsche 
Bank Group. In particular, its retail arm is undergoing restructuring in order to 
maintain and build upon its dominance in the domestic market. This restructuring will 
split the retail business away from Deutsche's private banking business. The research 
findings below, however, will deal with the former organisational structure and with 
the practices that were reported at that time. This story it must be remembered, like all 
the others in this thesis, provides a snapshot of strategic control practices at a 
particular moment in time. That time however, may well have past, but the lessons to 
be learnt from it have not. 
Brief description of the bank 
Deutsche Bank is a universal bank, comprising retail and private, corporate and 
institutional, investment banking and staff divisions. It has a worldwide presence in 
over 50 countries, with its most notable overseas brand name being Deutsche Morgan 
Grenfell investment banking. Its total assets amount to DMI043 billion, net income 
equals DMl billion and capital reserves are DM32 billion. In terms of security it has a: 
Aal Moody, AAA Standard & Poor and AA+ IBCA rating. The number of 
shareholders totals 382,000 (with share capital distribution of 64% institutions, 39% 
foreign and 2% staff). The number of employees total 76,000 (49,000 in Germany). 
The Retail and Private Clients Division employs some 27,\00 staff and contributes 
36% of the profit (41% of the results) of the three client focused Group Divisions. It 
has 1,450 branches and 250 investment centres in Germany (serving some 6.8 million 
customers), as well as a nation wide branch network in Italy and Spain (80 foreign 
locations in total). Distribution of banking services is via the traditional branch 
network, some 5,400 automated teller machines, Bank 24 (its telephone bank), the 
Internet and an increasing range of card products (e.g. Visa). 
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1996 
-1995 
1994 
1993 
1992 
1991 
1990 
1989 
1988 
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Table 14: Deutsche Bank's place within its domestic, European and 
world markets 
Ranking Assets Pre-tax profit Return on Cost/lncome 
(in terms of Tier 1 ca ital $m) Assets Ratio 
Germanv Europe World $m $m % % 
1 (17,371) 3 6 581,979 1,140 0.20 68.51 
1 (18,517) 3 6 569,906 3,145 0.55 71.70 
1 18,937) 4 6 503,429 2,487 0.49 -
1 13,089) 4 13 368,261 2,049 0.56 -
1 11,723) 4 14 322,445 2,664 0.83 -
1 (11,303) 4 11 303,840 2,315 0.76 -
1 (11,258) 4 10 296,226 2,280 0.77 -
1 (10,4\3) 5 11 267,702 1,631 0.61 -
1 (8,462) 4 9 202,263 2,081 1.03 -
1 (6,460) 5 13 170,808 1,816 NA -
Source: The Banker, July & September 1987-98 
A history of Deutsche Bank 
Deutsche Bank was born on March 10, 1870 when it was awarded its banking licence 
by the Prussian Government. In its statutes it was noted that: 
"The purpose of the company is the provision of banking transactions of all 
types, in particular the promotion and facilitation of trade relations between 
Germany, the other European countries and overseas markets." 
By 1873, it had spread from its base in Berlin to set up five branches: in Bremen, 
Yokohama, Shanghai, Hamburg and London. It also had started to accept cash 
deposits, an unusual activity for German banks of the day! 
During the 1880's and 1890's it was actively involved in the development of the 
German electrical engineering industry and the iron and steel industry, using this 
business as base for financing its foreign activities, such as the Baghdad railway 
project. It also developed a number of joint ventures with some of Germany's regional 
banks, thereby gaining access to all major industrial regions. Slowly it expanded its 
number of branches, opening in Frankfurt am Main in 1886, Munich in 1892 and 
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Dresden and Leipzig in 1901. Continuing its careful domestic expansion and prudent 
foreign investment, Deutsche Bank was one of the more successful German banks, if 
not world banks, on the eve of World War One. 
The impact of World War One was strongly felt by Deutsche Bank: it lost nearly all its 
foreign based assets and domestically had to cope with rapid inflation and many 
-- commercial bankruptcies. Two commercial high points during the inter-war period 
figured however, with its involvement in the creation of the film company Ufa and the 
merger of Daimler and Benz. It was also during this period in 1929, when Deutsche 
Bank merged with Disconto-Gesel\schaft (operating under a joint hanner until 1937). 
This merger with its strongest competitor reduced operating costs and aimed to 
consolidate its position in the German banking market; a market which was 
increasingly undergoing concentration. More significantly however it enabled 
Deutsche bank to survive the world depression ofthe 1930s. 
During the Nazi era, Deutsche Bank, like all German banks of the time, were caught in 
the position of having to defend itself against interference of the State in its operations 
and collaboration. In many cases, it played the "supportive role" called for by the Nazi 
party. 
In 1947 and 1948, Deutsche Bank was broken up into ten banks, with those in the 
Soviet zone of occupied Germany being nationalised and those in the other Allied 
zones operating under their old trading names, prior to ellflier consolidation. Banking 
under the Deutsche Bank name was forbidden. After the formation of the Federal 
Republic however, Deutsche Bank was pennitted to reform in two stages in 1952 and 
1957. 
The 1960's saw a concentration of Deutsche Bank's activities around retail banking, 
however the international business slowly grew in importance when Germany changed 
from being a debtor country to a creditor country. 
By 1970, its international business had become more significant, with Deutsche Bank 
beginning to take a more global shape opening branches abroad and carrying out more 
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internationally focused operations. This international perspective was perhaps most 
notably epitomised by its recent acquisition of the investment bank Morgan Grenfell in 
1995. 
Control 
It was noted that structure is inter-twinned with planning and strategic management. 
The Deutsche Bank regional structure prior to 1990, where each Board (Vorstand) 
Member was given a geographic area of responsibility throughout the world, was said 
to have had the effect of making strategic management of a lesser importance than 
under today's divisional structure. This divisional structure (1990 onward) shifted 
responsibilities away from the Board to the divisional centre. Deutsche Bank Group 
headquarters became "the place where strategies are brought together" in order to 
"co-ordinate and trigger". 
"Deutsche Bank Group has four major divisions: the investment bank, which 
is called Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, the commercial bank, retail banking, 
which is also called private banking, and then the support services which 
actually support all three of those. " 
The Group Executive Committee comprises the Group Board Members (Managing 
Directors) and the Divisional Board Members (see organisational structure in Figure 
19 below). It meets four times per year. 
In terms of control over strategy clear unambiguous responses are given from the top: 
" ... normally they can say yes or no but they can't say Yes but! So normally it 
[the strategic plan] gives them a package and this is the package. Either you 
buy it or you let it go ... something like a Yes or No decision. Very, very 
seldom do they come and say, you have to find out this first, and let's do that, 
it's a question of preparation ... " 
On the one hand it was stressed that: 
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Figure 19: Structure oCDeutsche Bank AG 
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Source: Deutsche Bank AG Annual Report for 1997 
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Note 1: Only those staff divisions that participate in the Group Executive Committee are 
shown. Additional staff divisions are: Auditing, Communications, Compliance, 
Economics and Taxes. 
Note 2: Responsibility for nOrHlverseas regions is shared amongst the Board of Managing 
Directors. 
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" ... we all share a corporate identity, I guess the Deutsche Bank is very, very 
strong: you should always remind yourself we are talking about something 
which is 126 years old" 
On the other, it was noted that the divisional structure and divisional rivalry has a 
direct impact on the management of the Group, where, for example, the financial 
.. implications of a division having a weaker Board Member representative to fight its 
corner in Group Board meetings was noted: 
"If there's a Board member who is not that strong, you are going to face some 
problems with fund raising and ideas ... " 
In addition the impact of the new resource based strategy system was also felt in the 
Board in terms of contribution that the individual Divisions made to Group resources: 
"Shareholder value research shows that returns on equity can amount to an 
mo/ul lot of money in retail banking, without too much equity [i.e. capital] 
being involved. So, your position, of course, becomes more and more 
important and at the end of the day when we bring back an important share of 
the money [Le. more than other Group Divisions] we have something like a 
strategic bargaining [position]." 
Strategy 
"Strategic management in Deutsche Bank is a five year plan that rolls over 
annually. The new model is based upon the Harvard Resource Base Review 
Model, which is about exploiting strategic assets. " 
Group Strategy (referred to internally also as AFK): 
"normally prescribe some forms: this time it was resource based analysis and 
resource based strategic planning -Professor Col/i/, from Harvard, he 
designed this process ... we try to bring the strategic planning process of the 
I For an introduction to the resource based view of strategy see: Collis and Montgmery (1995) 
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entire business unit in one folder, in one form so everything is quite similar to 
one another. " 
"They normally develop an overall framework or guideline as to how to 
structure the presentation of the strategic plan and in some cases they would 
suggest the development of the strategic plan, but clearly in terms of 
presentation it is advantageous to have all four divisions presenting something 
to the Vorstand where there is some similarity between them. Again, this will 
allow for the similarities to be looked at between those groups and so on. 
They also provide some people to help, if we wish, in the process, so there is 
very good co-ordination. But again, they have properly understood that they 
should not be doing the strategic plan for the ... [division}, they think they 
should be assisting and providing guidance and guidelines, but not actually 
producing it... They recognise that there would not be the buy in or the 
quality of product if they tried to do it themselves. " 
The first time the "Harvard-Deutsche Bank framework:' was followed by the banks' 
divisions was in October 1995: 
"This was a two months process, which set out to identify resources for the 
next 5 years. It looked at: competitors, from Sainsbury's to Microsoft to other 
banking competitors; it covered tangibles and intangibles; and it studied 
capabilities, weaknesses and possibilities." 
This strategic process follows on immediately after the yearly operational and financial 
reviews, which take place during September through December. These reviews 
involve nearly all staff and were contrasted to the narrower involvement of only Board 
and Staff Members for the strategic review. Indeed, at the divisional level the numbers 
of those involved in the strategic review are quite constrained: 
"it's something like a task force, which is our Senior Vice-Presidents [i.e. the 
Bereichvorstander or Divisional Board Members l... and they have got some 
people involved doing the paper work and all this number crunching ... " 
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" ... so what we had was a basic team with basic ideas and we simply walked 
~~~~-~~~~~-~~~~~.~ 
have these figures and do you think that's right? So it's not that you have 
people coming from Italy and Spain, our major markets, flying over to 
Germany to discuss for some three or four hours, but we have something like 
questionnaires we give them, and then we have some discussions, but more or 
less we used modern media and not so much time consuming visiting and 
walking around." 
The strategic review was also said to be: 
"a more qualitative process, with more words and with few quantitative 
guidelines. Only a few key ratios are used: 25% return on equity before tax 
(currently 17%); 0.75% return on assets before tax; 60-65% Commercial and 
70-75% Investment Bank cost income ratio; 60% tier 1 and 70% tier 1&2 
Capital Adequacy Ratios . .. 
"Of course we have got some figures which are on equity and so on, which we 
have to achieve, but the quality of the divisions is what counts." 
A certain pragmatism to the limits of the strategic review and the strategic planning 
process is born in mind: 
"I guess the process allowed us to bring into words our strategy. It's not that 
you run around and say well let's wait for the strategy department to come 
and then define our strategic aims and targets, and then OK we try to fulfil 
them. I guess you have something like an ongoing process: you take a look at 
retail banking especially in Germany and you will find something which is 
evolving incredibly fast actually, so if you would wait for certain pOints in 
time to start to do strategic planning you would be totally lost. So what we are 
doing actually is describing options and telling people why we are not 
following these options and why we are doing this, and why we are not doing 
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that. So I guess strategic planning today is more or less something like the 
point in time where you state where you actually stand, because ... you already 
walk while you are planning where you go. " 
This pragmatism is shown again in Deutsche Bank's attitude to facing environmental 
change: 
" ... we have got too many outlets; they are very expensive. Germany is over 
banked in our core market, and so I guess something already went wrong and 
we are trying to fix it and we are in a pretty good way to fix it. So what we are 
talking about is a restructuring project and this restructuring process is 
written down in our strategy, so if something goes wrong all that is going to 
happen will stay like it is and then we are not going to achieve the changes we 
want." 
The strategic review culminates in a short 5 or 6 page "Strategic Planning Framework" 
document, for each of the divisions, covering "the market position and competitive 
environment, and the resource endowment" of each of the division's strategic business 
units (see Appendix 8 for a detailed example). The divisions are responsible for 
completing the framework document, which is issued, with back up support available 
for its completion, by the corporate strategic planning department: 
"we have a framework to fulfil at least, but all the content comes from our 
division, nobody knows better than us. " 
The level of Group Strategy input clearly varies, but was said to be "considerable" by 
one corporate strategic planner. Once completed, the framework document is 
submitted by the division heads to the corporate strategic planning department, who 
summarise and synthesise the various divisions reports into one single Group Strategic 
Planning Framework Document. This is then presented to the Vorstand (Group 
Board) prior to the two day annual strategy meeting. 
At the Group annual strategy meeting, each division is allocated half a day to present 
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and discuss their strategy. The general format, was reported to be a "30 minute 
presentation by the division, followed by a 3 hour discussion. " 
When asked about how ideas are assimilated and assessed about the future, one 
respondent noted: 
"Management thoughts and ideas come up to the Group Strategy Department 
or down from the Board. Group Strategy does the analysis and also does its 
own mega-trend analysis, for example: through environmental analysis; 
through the use of the Research Department's regional development and 
macro development reports, and the Divisions' country analysis reports." 
Another respondent noted: 
"I guess it's not this or that that's going to happen, I guess it's more a 
question of time: when is it going to happen? We know some things are going 
to happen. We've got markets we can follow: if you take a look at the Asian 
market you see Electronic Banking you cannot imagine; on the other side of 
America where everybody thought Direct Banking and Internet Banking is 
going to be the future, it's not thal big a success; so I guess it's nol a question 
of what is going 10 happen, what is very difficult to see is when it's going to 
happen, and are we going to be something like leaders, are we going 10 be 
followers or are we goin", 10 be too late, and of course we don 'I want to be too 
late. " 
Scenario planning was said to be used in order to "look at the options for the future", 
however no explicit examples were obtained. 
The relationship between Group Strategy and the Retail Bank appears constructive: 
"Well I guess its something like a very symbiotic approach. One can 'I do his 
work without the other ... The head office in retail banking is very lean -we are 
talking something like 150-180 people here, centralised, guarding 20,000 
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people -you won't find this ratio anywhere else in the Deutsche Bank. I guess 
we are pretty much dependent on them and normally we would work together 
pretty well. " 
Methods are provided by Group Strategy and the Retail Bank provides the ideas and 
facts: 
"Well of course it happens, somebody has to decide this framework is going to 
be validfor the entire Deutsche Bank Group, and it is not us in Retail Banking 
to do that, it is them of course. So from time to time imposing some issues and 
OK it has to be this and that, but they are not going to tell us you are going to 
buy ABN Amro, etc." 
When asked whether any large differences existed between Deutsche Bank and other 
banks, the following response was received: 
People 
"Well I guess the biggest difference is that Deutsche Bank is not really a fan 
of incremental change, that means one day if we decide we go into this 
direction, we go there - come what may -whatever you like is happening we 
are going to go there, until one day: when we have the common sense to say 
"we will stop there ". So once we make up our minds I think it is very hard to 
stop us, so this is something very specific about Deutsche Bank, I presume." 
"Banking in Germany had no strategic thinking culture until 1973 and the end 
of Bretton Wood;. Also that year coincided with competition becoming 
tougher. Prior to this growth had been high and there was no international 
competition. 1973 was also the year of the oil crisis, making the economy in 
Germany shrink and forcing the banks to rethink. Banks introduced a cost 
calculation system where before only income was considered. 
2 Presumably referring to 1976, when a major revision of the Bretton Woods Agreement was signed 
and gold was removed from the articles of the International Monetary Fund. 
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1965 saw the first real arrival of competition. 1970's was the period of the 
planning process, with extrapolated financial planning and the dominance of 
the Accounts Department. In 1982, Accounts became the Accounting and 
Planning Department. 1992 saw the Accounting and Planning Department 
become Controlling. 1995 saw the first international competition arrive and 
the need for strategic management." 
When asked more specifically about people within Deutsche Bank, the German 
tradition of in-housed development was noted, although it was pointed out that the 
situation is changing with more people being recruited from outside, including from 
non-banking sources. Within the Retail Bank head office, in particular, the people 
were described in the following way: 
"What you have to have is some banking experience either you had it from the 
beginning or you get it here, and we have on all levels people coming down 
from apprenticeships, starting through Deutsche Bank education system. We 
do have direct entrants from universities and we do have entries from 
consultants like McKinsey. We do of course, very seldom, have entries from 
other banks and we do have entries, for example in the Marketing division 
from retail competitors, not retail banks, so somebody from Proctor and 
Gamble, somebody coming from. Aldi -there is a very wide variety of 
possibilities to enter Deutsche Bank." 
" ... What has been very difficult for us was the very hierarchical way of doing 
things, but that changes pretty much, I mean you are talking to somebody who 
is 30 years old and having a lot of fun in his job and seeing a lot of things 
some 10 years ago I wouldn't have even thought about, so this is changing, so 
Deutsche Bank is offering very interesting job opportunities today." 
There was said to be a limited, "but not huge", business school background amongst 
staff. 
"The culture is image driven and not cost driven." 
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Each country was noted as being different, and with the head offices of the various 
divisions being located in different countries it was pointed out that the culture and 
people would be somewhat different for each division. Germany is the home of 
Deutsche Bank's Retail and Corporate Banking operations where image was stressed 
as being fundamental, with Deutsche Bank being perceived as "the biggest bank, the 
number one bank and the prestige bank." The mentality of the bank was said to be 
changing (for the good) "to think profit', but the "process takes time". Retirement 
ages have changed to facilitate this task, and to aIlow for easier adaptation to fit the 
environment, to between 60 and 62. It was pointed out that "the German labour 
market is highly regulated' and so losing staff is highly expensive. 75% of the 
workforce is also unionised. The culture was also noted as being: "not generally 
competitive, trust based and not too cut throat." This said, changes have been made in 
workforce numbers with large numbers of "older Germans being given early 
retirement. " 
"Some 20 years ago or something like this, you signed a contract with 
Deutsche Bank and you were quite sure that when you are going to retire 
having worked for Deutsche Bank. Today, let's talk about retail banking, 
that's what I know, I guess it's more that you enter Deutsche Bank to achieve 
some personal goals. But as I said to you we are mUltinational, we are going 
international, we are having a certain mass to manoeuvre, so all the time you 
have got very interesting jobs and I presume it is more or less a question of 
what you get from your job as to how long you stay today." 
25% of the workforce was said to be on a "fIXed and variable" remuneration scheme, 
with the variable proportion being based upon contributions to shareholders. 
Nationality within the Deutsche Bank Group was said to be predominantly German, 
but the perspective was seen as non-German: 
"It's Deutsche Bank and from the English point of view, you might say, OK 
they are Germans, we are not, I guess Deutsche Bank is something very 
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special ... something like outstanding -the biggest, the richest. We are very 
well educated, international, we are a multinational company no doubt about 
that -even retail banking is going to be more and more international- so what 
you find is something like 'German Bank' as one of the most international 
banks in Germany, which is quite strange." 
~ ~_Within the Vorstand (Group Board), fonnerJy with 12 members, now 10 and possibly-----
7 in the future, there are 1 Swiss and 1 English national. Amongst the Divisional 
Heads there are 11 non Gennans out of 24. Within Group Strategy there is 1 Italian 
out 44 Gennans. 
When asked to explain in further detail about how international the Retail Bank is, Italy 
was used as an example: 
" .. .Italy our biggest market [outside of Germany]. there we do have private 
banking and retail banking [businesses] ... in the year 2000 and whatsoever, 
you will go in there and say OK this is Deutsche Bank I presume our vision is 
the European bank approach, it has to be, the Euro is coming up and all you 
can do is either say OK I am staying national or you go international. Well, a 
bank of our size has no choice and we do have the will to go international... " 
The international system which is used. is perceived as a Deutsche Bank system rather 
than a German banking system: 
"The Board of Directors in Italy is Italian. Of course we have German 
controllers in all this, we do have an exchange, but I guess it is something like, 
there is no imposition of the German bank" 
One final insight into the culture of inter-divisional relations was provided: 
"Everybody says 'well I know better '. This is something very specific about 
retail banking and this is making strategic planning and moving into certain 
directions quite difficult, you always find somebody saying shouldn't we do 
this and that and from his point of view, he is always quite sure that he is 
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right, because retail banking from a point of view of an outsider doesn't give 
you the impression of being very, very difficult. " 
Commentary on strategic control 
"The Corporate Strategy Department monitors implementation: SBUs are 
highlighted and regions are focused on." 
This monitoring is done on a monthly basis. It was noted that there was "nothing yet 
on a qualitative monitoring system" because "the system is still new and the Vorstand 
members are new." This said: "the annual meeting will be the main review of 
qualitative objectives, to check on time frames and performance." 
It was envisaged also that six monthly reporting meetings with division heads were to 
be implemented (currently however they remain annual). The divisions set their own 
targets, including supplementary or personalised divisional targets, which are not 
required by the Vorstand's strategy framework document. Where one respondent 
noted that: 
"Monitoring is on trust and allows for an individual approach." 
The Board - Divisional Board relationship was described as follows: 
" ... Dr Pauluhn ... and the other three, they are head of our business division 
and they are responsible for this business unit, so actually what they do is 
something like telling the head office we are going to do this and that and we 
will ask you for approval. That I guess is a pretty fair wiry to describe it, so 
it's not like a dictation, you have to do this and you have to go around like 
this. It's like a question, something like: why do we have a direct bank and 
why don't we have that and why are we not going to the UK and things like 
that, or, trust me, we always have the right answer ... " 
The Board looks at typically nine "critical projects" each year: 
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"Each of these are monitored specifically and co-ordinated by the Group 
Strategy Department in committees. The projects can be regional, divisional 
or a mix, for example, larger clients are managed globally." 
Interestingly it was stressed that the "client relationship" was managed separately, in' 
addition to the nine critical projects because "it is so important." 
The strategy system used by Deutsche Bank was said to be "tested continuously", with 
"checks on the in-house operationalisation" being made and with information and 
requests going back to Harvard. The Divisional and Group Board Meetings were 
perceived as the primary fora for strategic control review. It was pointed out that: 
"the old system for strategic management used more figures to the point where the 
Divisions became obsessed by figures and didn't think about strategy." The new 
system has been established to rectifY that and appears to have done so whilst leaving 
healthy pragmatism alive: 
"The question is not do you like controlling strategy, the question is, does it 
have to be formalised ... on one hand we need to sit down and say: where are 
we and where do we want to go, on the other ... formulisation of that kind is 
very time consuming and in the end normally we won't find anything we didn't 
know before. So all you are doing is writing down what you already know and 
putting it into some form of structure ... " 
There was also a perceived overlap between operational and strategic reporting, where 
the former blurs into the later. When a divisional level strategic planner in the Retail 
Bank was asked about strategic monitoring and reports, they pointed out that 
Divisional Board Members meet every two weeks, whose members in turn also meet 
with the Group Board Members every month. These meetings and those with Group 
Strategy were perceived as meetings with "partners", partners who needed to be 
"involved and informe(/' with strategic developments. 
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Summary of the Characteristics of Strategic Control Components in 
Deutsche Bank 
Components of 
Strategic Control 
Real life practice in: 
Deutsche Bank 
Premise Control 5 year rolling plan: "a directional map" 
Implementation 
Control 
Strategic 
Surveillance 
Special Alert 
Control 
Operational 
Control 
Environmental 
Scanning 
Scenario 
Planning 
2 day annual strategy meeting by Group Board 
Corporate Strategy monitors implementation each month (quantitative 
analysis only) 
The Group Board looks at nine "critical projects" annually, then co-
ordinated by Corporate Strategy 
The Divisional Boards discuss every 2 weeks and discuss with the 
Group Board every month 
The annual strategy review checks on qualitative objectives (time 
frames and performance) and ensures that financial ratios are met 
Divisional Planning and Strategy Departments monitor on on-going 
basis formally, e.g. milestones, and informally, e.g. periodic 
conversations 
Corporate Strategy uses reports from the Research Department and the 
divisions, regions, critical project teams 
None: said to be aware of problems: "it's a dynamic environment, 
where the planning and management have to be extremely dynamic as 
weir' 
Overseen by Control Department 
Quantitative analysis dominates 
Divisional targets are set for the year 
Divisional, regional, critical project and Research Department reports 
Corporate Strategy formulates and analyses ideas or is directed to do 
so by the Group Board 
Mega trend analysis 
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Summary of Findings within Deutsche Bank 
Control 
• Structure 
Deutsche Bank is Mintzberg's (1995 pp. 350-371) 'diversified' organisation in 
---------
the sense that each Division has significant freedom of operation as long as 
certain standards of performance are mee. 
The centre is the place where strategies are brought together in order to "co-
ordinate and trigger". 
• Systems 
Group Strategy co-ordinates the 'Harvard resource based framework' of 
strategic planning, whilst leaving the divisions to fonnulate strategy. 
The strategy cycle begins immediately after the annual operational and financial 
reviews. These later reviews involve all staff, compared to the strategic review 
which involves the Board members (divisional and group level) and central 
staffers only. Mostly qualitative criteria are reviewed, along with a few key 
quantitative ratios. 
Monitoring of strategy implementation is carried out by Group Strategy on a 
monthly basis, using quantitative criteria only. 
A "symbiotic" relationship is said to exist between Group Strategy and the 
Retail Bank HQ, due to its lean nature, where one can't do its work without 
the other. 
• Style 
A partnership between the centre and the divisions was emphasised by 
respondents: with both showing an appreciation of each other's role. 
Some degree of strategic control awareness appears to be present within 
management at all levels. 
Deutsche Bank is a not "a/an o/incremental change", but rather a 'strategic 
leap' organisation. 
3 Note: 1998 has seen the implementation of a new divisional structure, with the addition of a 
"Corporate Centre" which "will mainly have supradivisional functions, supporting the Board of 
Managing Directors in its management work and ensuring uniform development based on key figures, 
targets and common principles." Source: Deutsche Bank AG Annual Report for 1997. 
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People 
• Staff, skills and style 
"we all share a corporate identity ... you should always remind yourself we are 
talking about something which is 126 years old. " 
There appears to be a positive awareness that the strategic framework plays a 
valuable role, yet is only a summary of the wider reality, which can only be fully 
described through discussion. 
Deutsche Bank staff appears prepared to change with the times: having a wide 
range of experiences and an international perspective. 
People adhere to a Deutsche Bank system, as opposed to a Gennan banking 
system 
Strategy 
• Shared values (super-ordinate goals) 
"the biggest bank, the number one bank and the prestige banTr' 
• Strategy 
"Strategic management in Deutsche Bank is afive year plan that rolls over 
annually. The new model is based upon the Harvard Resource Base Review 
Model, which is about exploiting strategic assets." 
There is an appreciation of the need to keep up with changes, however, a 
realisation that "it's not a question of what is going to happen, what is difficult 
to see is when it's going to happen". 
A strategic planning executive at Deutsche Retail Bank was asked to describe 
its strategy in tenns 0 f the strategic archetypes in the literature review 0 f 
Chapter 2. The response was as follows: entrepreneurial (Mintzberg 1973), 
sales maximising (Utterback & Abernathy 1975), an analyser (Miles & Snow 
1978) and pursuing a cost leadership strategy (Porter 1980). An emphasis on 
brand loyalty and "selling the image" was also highlighted which fits with the 
prestige factor ofDeutsche Bank's shared values. A hybrid Porter archetype 
would therefore be a better reflection of the strategic approach followed, one 
that offered standardised products (cost leadership), yet emphasised the 
personalised Deutsche Bank approach (differentiation). 
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The Dresdner Bank Story 
Introduction 
The Dresdner Bank Group would appear to have no formal strategic management 
systems or frameworks. Certainly, the "few wise men" at the corporate level do not 
appear to produce any guidelines of best practice and leave strategic management to 
those at the business unit and divisional level to devise. Strategic management, one 
supposes, must therefore be informal given that individual business strategies are 
formulated. Indeed, evidence has been seen by the writer that shows strategies to 
have been devised in a relatively comprehensive and rigorous way, albeit that they 
tend to be 'one-oir and 'ad-hoc' in nature. 
Control, one supposes, is also informally organised or when formally approached is 
carried out on a traditional fmancial reporting basis. At no point were any qualitative 
issues shown to have been considered, leaving the writer only to assume that likewise 
some measure of these are taken into account informally. 
Each division would appear to be different, with some being more formal than others 
and with the degree of strategic rigour varying according to the individual makeup 
and expertise 0 f the business unit manager. 
Brief description ofthe bank 
Dresdner Bank is 125 years old, it is a universal bank comprising private, corporate, 
investment and institutional banking businesses. It has a worldwide presence in over 
70 countries covering each continent, with its most notable overseas brand name 
being its Dresdner KIeinwort Benson investment banking (acquired in 1995). Its total 
assets equate to DM677 billion, net income equals DMl. 7 billion and capital reserves 
are DM18 billion. In terms of security it has a: Aal Moody, AA Standard & Poor 
and AA+ IBCA rating. Shareholders number approximately 200,000 (2% of shares 
are held by staft). The number of employees totals 46,000 (7,300 abroad). Some 
1,500 branches are operated by Dresdner Bank Group companies (90 outside of 
Germany) serving some 6 million customers. 1,200 are identifiable as high street 
'Private Customer Business' branches, including 700 locations offering financial 
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advisory services. Distribution of banking services is also via automated teller 
machines and credit card products. New Internet and telephone banking services are 
planned for 1998. Analysis of Dresdner Bank's income in 1996 and 1997 by 
geographical market shows that some 80% is generated in Germany, with 
approximately 10% coming from the rest of Europe and the remainder split between 
North America and Asia 
The private customer business of Dresdner Bank AG was described in the following 
way: 
"Customer orientation and customer commitment are our guidelines in 
serving 6 million individual customers throughout the Group, with customer 
satisfaction being our top priority. Professional quality management 
techniques are being applied to enhance our product range including 
customer and employee surveys and test purchases. Dresdner Bank's 
ombudsman helps us to maintain a high level of quality. On this basis, we are 
convinced that Dresdner Bank is well prepared for the inherent challenges in 
today's market: more demanding customer requirements and increasing 
competition. Our objective is to be the advisory bank in Germany and indeed, 
we have made significant progress towards achieving that objective. " 
Source: Dresdner Bank AG Annual Report 1997 
An intriguing observation, particularly given the strategic alliance between Dresdner 
Bank and the BNP, was made by one respondent about the strengths of German banks 
vis it vis their European competitors: 
"The French situation is worse than it looks! They were only privatised in the 
1980's -they were kept like a Post Ojfice- and now they have the impossible 
task of catching up with everybody else. 
(unrealistically) of being able to catch up! 
France, however, dreams 
The German situation is also difficult, we have the historic task of supporting 
the East German economy, which has a huge impact and is a heavy burden on 
the West." 
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The strategic alliance between Dresdner Bank and BNP removed the need for either 
party to invest in the development of a network in the other's domestic market; 
instead access to one another's services was opened to both banks' clients. The two 
banks also co-operate in a number of areas, including capital market operations, loan 
syndications and staff exchanges. 
A history of Dresdner Bank 
Dresdner Bank was founded in Dresden, Germany in 1872 with some 30 employees. 
Despite some difficult prevailing economic conditions, such as the Vienna stock 
market collapse in 1873, Dresdner Bank managed to keep its finances in the black 
during its initial years. In 1881 it opened a branch in Berlin and soon after in 1884 its 
management relocated to the Berlin office (although leaving Dresden as its registered 
office until 1950). 1892 saw Dresdner Bank open an office in Hamburg, followed by 
a branch in Bremen in 1895 (as a result of the take over of Bremer Bank, founded in 
1856). Also in 1895 its frrst foreign office was opened in London, soon followed by 
offices in France and the USA. 
The First World War and its aftermath of inflation and economic crisis hit Germany 
and the Dresdner Bank hard: every third person within Germany of employable age 
became unemployed and Dresdner Bank faced its share of queues of customers 
waiting to withdraw their deposits (as a result of hyper-inflation the balance sheet at 
the end of the 1923 fmancial year totalled an amazing DM204 trillion). Economic 
crisis was followed swiftly by political crisL, the arrival of the Nazi regime and the 
Second World War. 
At the end of World War Two and the division of Germany, Dresdner Bank had 160 
branches (compared to 322 prior to the war) and faced a more difficult situation than 
many other German banks, as it had also lost 60% of its former business volume in 
the armexed East Germany and 80% of the Bank's buildings in West Germany were 
destroyed. In 1947, the Dresdner Bank was broken up into regional banks, with 
separate operations in each of the 11 German Federal states. In 1952, these eleven 
banks were merged into three and finally were permitted to reform under the Dresdner 
Bank name once again in 1957. Its head office being re-located to Frankfurt am Main 
(where it still is today). 
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The late 50's and 60's saw Dresdner Bank rapidly expand its branch network and join 
in the 'economic miracle' of the German recovery (it was the first German bank to 
introduce electronic data processing). In 1967, Dresdner Bank was the first German 
bank to establish a foreign subsidiary (in Luxembourg) and in 1972 Dresdner Bank 
opened its first two overseas branches in New York and Singapore, followed by 
additional branches in Moscow, London and Tokyo in 1973. 
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Dresdner Bank was finally able to re-open its 
offices in Dresden in January 1990. In recent years it has continued to develop 
domestically throughout the re-unified Germany as well as internationally through the 
expansion of its foreign business activities (it was the frrst European bank to set-up a 
fully operational branch in re-opened Beijing in 1996). 
Table 15: Dresdner Bank's place within its local, European and world markets 
Year Ranking Assets Pre-tax profit Return on Cost/lncome 
(in terms of Tier 1 ca ital $m) Assets Ratio 
Germany Europe World $m $m % % 
1997 2 (10,456) 13 28 372,594 1,830 0.49 69.95 
1996 2 9,325 15 29 355,605 1,777 0.50 NA 
1995 2 9,203 15 31 332,909 1,396 0.42 -
1994 2 8,856 15 35 253,818 1,102 0.43 -
1993 2 7,077 15 37 220,562 1,061 0.48 -
1992 2 6,254 20 40 204,178 1,001 0.49 -
1991 2 6,473 17 32 194,488 867 0.45 -
1990 2 6,424 13 25 189,500 1,022 0.54 -
1989 2 5,405 '!'\\ 26 147,001 796 0.54 -
1988 2 4,284 NA 34 129,733 621 - -
Source: The Banker, July & September 1987-98 
Control 
Dresdner Bank has some 1200 branches for retail customers, currently organised into 
16 regions (with potential plans to reduce this number to 10 regions). 
No official organisational structure was able to be obtained from respondents during 
the period of research, however, an outline sketch of Dresdner Bank Group structure 
is broadly as shown in Figure 20 below. 
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The businesses themselves were said to make and control their own strategy, with the 
centre acting as an advisor. 
"Dresdner Bank has shifted control of certain operations to overseas centres, 
for example, Equity is in London and Asset Management is in San Francisco ... 
These centres have complete control of their operation." 
Figure 20: Dresdner Bank Organisational Structure 
Dresdner Bank 
I 
I I I I l Corporate banking I I Private banking I I Investment banking I I Institutional banking I 
Includes joint venture 
operations with BNP 
Includes Dresdner's retail 
banking businesses and its 
high net worth/private 
customer businesses 
Business operations are 
conducted under the brand 
name Dresdner Kleinwort 
BenSOR 
The organisational structure is designed to fit its markets: 
Comprises Dresdner's 
institutional asset 
management businesses 
"The New Market Approach is a new structure. The bank was created back in 
1872 and all Germa.l banks were very small regional banks. We therefore 
had to be negotiators (brokers) and lenders of capital. Similarly, over time 
more and more conflicts of interest arose as we also became significant 
shareholders. Hence, we became a 'Universal' bank. 
In the 1980 's McKinsey came· into the bank, and all banks in Germany, to 
break up this idea of Universal Banking. The new approach, however, is to 
accept the Universal approach, but to segment the markets clearly (today's 
new Consultant is Boston Consultants). What's interesting, however, is that 
US banks are becoming more German [more Universal] in structure." 
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The reporting process is both oral and written, and although the emphasis is on 
appropriate talking, there are, however, monthly fmancial and operational reports 
made: "first a report and then a discussion." This operational and fmancial reporting 
was seen as the basis for Dresdner Bank's control system. 
"meetings are organised by the headquarters, and we speak to them about 
what they have done in the last period and what they will do in the following 
period, we speak about the aims and new products, etc." 
Lines of responsibility at the retail bank business unit level are blurred: 
"On the highest level it is the man responsible for the private banking in the 
Vorstand and at the other level, there are some people in the headquarters in 
Franlfurt and others in the regions. " 
" ... we make plans and so on, but the people in our regions have responsibility 
for the profits they make in their region. So there is nobody in the 
headquarters, in Services or Personal Banking, saying you must do this or 
that, but rather I think it is a discussion process." 
" ... we have meetings with these people in the regions, responsible for 
personal customers or for retail banking customers, and in every region there 
is a person responsible for their personal customers and a person responsible 
for retail banking customers. " 
" ... they meet with the person who is responsible for private banking as a 
whole [every quarter) and other times they meet with our navigating unit here 
in the headquarters [every trimester). They make appointments in turn to 
discuss their aims. " 
All control(s) was said to be based purely upon operational or financial reporting 
lines. 
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Strategy 
Structure follows strategy: 
"The strategy was set three years ago and from that time all the Dresdner 
Bank branches are working with these two groups of customers or a better 
way to say it would be three groups of customers ... [i.e. retail banking, private 
banking and high net worth customer banking]. Informer times these three 
groups of clients were combined and given advice in every branch, now we 
have made profit centres for each of these customer groups ... " 
There is an annual process of "goal definition": 
"we make a plan for how we want to go next year and what we want to do in 
private banking as a whole, and we make aims for the groups (profit centres}." 
The strategic management system was reported to be defmed and operated by the 
individual business units. 
Ideas about the future are obtained from the personal views of Department heads and 
staff, from literature, market data and Dresdner Bank customers. These views are 
then used for 'scenario planning' purposes, to allow for worst case, best case and 
desired case scenarios to be looked at. . 
Three times a year the seven Department heads of the Private Bank division meet to 
discuss direction, otherwise: 
"two way communications were key to back up the classic monthly financial 
and operational reports. " 
Dresdner Bank's key factor of success was "advising" or its advisory 
capacity/capability. This term originates from the Dredsner Bank Group corporate 
objective: 
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"Our objective is to be the advisory bank in Germany and indeed, we have 
made significant progress towards achieving that objective . .. 
Source: Dresdner BankAG Annual Report 1997 
Operations were defined as day to day tasks and "strategic" tasks were seen as 
"longer term". Little understanding from any respondent was shown as to the need 
for control or monitoring or reviewing other than in the general day to day 
management duties. 
Dresdner Bank does not have any central strategic management department input, 
with in fact no such unit in existence other than "a few wise men who deal with 
acquisitions". It was reported by one respondent that: "all the divisions are doing 
their own thing and that they do not always know what the others are doing?' 
People 
When asked to talk about Dresdner Bank culture, one respondent reported that it was 
one where staff were ''free to thin/C' and yet were conscious of being "cost effective". 
The lack of rigid structure and central strategic management input was defended by 
more than one respondent. A strong sense of self-determination was seen to be 
important at both the personal and bank level. One respondent noted that: 
"the bank should do its own thing and that those who know should make the 
decisions and that no input from others -and certainly no decision making-
should be made. " 
It was said that Dresdner Bank "tries to have a flat structure." Interestingly, in 
cultural management terms, when the interviewer made first contact with Dresdner 
Bank the existing organisational structure was not known and had certainly not been 
made into a chart. One was said to be "currently being worked on" and "not yet 
finalised", leaving some staff having to improvise producing their own "unapproved" 
versions for internal purposes. It was said that: 
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"even producing a chart could be seen as controversial because certain jobs 
might disappear or change as a result." 
The majority of Dresdner Bank employees are Gennan, due to the bank's 
predominantly domestic focus. 
Personnel are trained through "in-house training programmes and apprenticeships", 
the main focus of which are banking examinations. Entrants to the bank were often 
said to have studied Business Administration. 
Staff were reported to stay working in Dresdner Bank for longer periods than they 
would perhaps in other countries, although it was pointed out that this situation is 
slowly changing over time. 
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Summary ofthe Characteristics of Strategic Control Components in 
Dresdner Bank 
Components of 
Strategic Control 
Premise Control 
Implementation 
Control 
Strategic 
Surveillance 
Special Alert 
Control 
Operational 
Control 
Environmental 
Scanning 
Real life practice in: 
Dresdner Bank 
None, other than an annual process of "goal definition" 
The heads of the business units are responsible for making 
and controlling their own strategy, they are 'advised' from the 
centre through "two wcry communications" and dialogue 
The independence and self-determination of each business 
unit is proudly defended 
No formal system exists, but information is obtained by 
managers from literature, market data and talking to 
customers on an ad-hoc basis 
No evidence of this was found 
Operational and financial reporting is the basis ofDresdner 
Bank's control system 
Financial "controlling" is done at a Group level 
Nothing was reported, although one would expect some form 
of environmental information reports to be maintained by a 
business organisation of this size. 
Scenario Planning Little use appears to be made of scenarios, other than 'wNst, 
best and desired case' projections 
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Summary of Findings within Dresdner Bank 
Control 
• Structure 
Dresdner Bank is the epitome ofMintzberg's (1995 pp. 350-371) diversified 
organisation: with each banking sector having its own systems. 
• Systems 
Formal strategic management did not appear to be the Retail Bank's strong 
point: with no evidence ofa formal system or framework being found. 
Divisional independence is strongly guarded: "all the divisions are doing 
their own thing ... they do not always know what the others are doing." 
Planning appears to be limited to a 12 month horizon: "we make a planJor 
how we want to go next year ... " 
Operational and fmancial reporting makes up the entire control system. 
• Style 
People 
"So, there is nobody in the Headquarters, Services or Personal Banking, 
saying you must do this or that, but rather I think it is a discussion process." 
• Staff, skills and style 
Self-determination in decision making was seen as important amongst all 
interviewees. 
Quality management techniques appear to have found their way into the retail 
business. 
The combination of independence and quality is leading staff to take a 
"proJessionaf' approach. 
Of all the banks investigated, Dresdner Bank respondents were the most 
reticent in describing their strategic control practices or views on such a 
system. 
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Strategy 
• Shared values (super-ordinate goals) 
"reliability and being prudent yet bold' (Dresdner Bank Annual Report 1996). 
Dresdner Bank appears to fit Schuster's (1996 pg. 7) conservative banker's 
strategic attitude well. 
• Strategy 
The Retail Bank's objective is to be the number I financial advisor to retail 
customers in Germany. 
Operations were defined as day to day tasks and "strategic" tasks were seen as 
"longer term". 
In attempting to distil some form of strategic position for Dresdner Bank, in 
terms of the strategic archetypes in the literature review of Chapter 2, it could 
be said that it is: adaptive (Mintzberg 1973), performance maximising 
(Utterback & Abernathy 1975), an analyser (Miles & Snow 1978) and pursues 
a differentiation strategy (Porter 1980). 
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The Lloyds TSB Story 
Introduction 
Lloyds TSB is a relatively new organisation, the product of the merger of Lloyds 
Bank and TSB (formerly known as the Trustees Savings Bank) in 1995. Organic 
growth has continued in this organisation with further recent acquisitions. These 
changes are still having repercussions on existing organisational structures and 
systems, and indeed on employees. The information reported here refers to Lloyds 
TSB Group as was at the end of 1997. 
Description of the bank 
Lloyds TSB is a fmancial services group comprising retail banking, mortgage, 
insurance, wholesale market and international banking businesses. Lloyds TSB 
Group total assets amount to £158 billion, net income equals £2.3 billion and capital 
resources equate to some £6 billion. The number of ordinary shareholders totals some 
1 million (50,000 staff). The number of employees totals 82,500 (some 52,000 in 
Retail Banking). Interestingly one respondent noted that the age of "the bulk of the 
people are 45-50." The Lloyds TSB Group's core market is in the UI<, they are also 
active overseas, principally in Latin America, Europe, New Zealand and Offshore 
Banking centres. 
,tetail Financial Services contributes the largest share of total Group profit (65%), 
with its Retail Banking businesses generating almost 25%. The number of customers 
amount to some 15 million. The Retail Banking arm is comprised of Lloyds Bank, 
TSB and Cheltenham & Gloucester and has nearly 2,900 high street branches and 500 
business centres. Distribution of banking services is via the traditional branch 
network, via some 4,300 automated teller machines, via 'PhoneBank' its telephone 
banking operation, the Internet, television and through a wide range of card products 
(e.g. MasterCard and Visa). Its 371 Estate Agency branches, stockbroking activities 
and Hill Samuel Asset Management products are also managed under its retail 
banking umbrella. In terms of security Lloyds Bank was listed as having a: Aal 
Moody and AA IBCA rating; and TSB as having a Aal Moody rating. 
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"The constant challenge of any business is to secure and sustain competitive 
advantage. In a highly competitive environment, the last thing we want to do 
is to spread our resources too thinly and with unnecessary risk over too many 
activities. We continue to believe that tomorrow's most successful banks will 
be built on focus, not diversity. This requires us to concentrate on the things 
we do well and then strive to do them better than anybody else. 
Our aim is to be a leader in our chosen markets and, over recent years, the 
acquisition of Lloyds Abbey Life and Cheltenham & Gloucester and the 
merger between Lloyds Bank and TSB have greatly enhanced our leadership 
positions... Where we are not a leader, or where we cannot aspire reasonably 
to leadership, our course will be to divest and capture the value for 
shareholders. We would rather be a leader in a few markets than a minor 
participant in many ... 
In pursuit of our aim of maximising shareholder value, we use a system of 
value based management as a framework for making business decisions; and 
we choose economic profit as a measurement of peiformance because it 
captures both growth in investment and return. Broadly defined, it represents 
the difference between the earnings on the equity invested in a business and 
the cost of the equity. Everything we do starts with an evaluation of economic 
profit, because it helps us to think long term. We make a multi-year 
assessment, not a single year assessment ... Our aim is to be the best and most 
successful company in the financial services industry ..... 
Source: Lloyds TSB Group PLC Annual Review 1997 
Table 16: Lloyds TSB's place within its local, European and world markets 
. 
Year Ranking Assets Pre-tax profit Return on CostiIncome 
(in terms of Tier 1 ca ital $m) Assets Ratio 
UK Europe World $m Sm % % 
1997 5 (10,408) 14 29 261,462 5,229 2.00 50.4 
1996 4 (8,937) 16 31 250,241 4,254 1.70 56.0 
1995 4 (7,171) 20 42 229,495 2,945 1.28 -
Source: The Banker, July & September 1996-98 
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A history ofLJoyds TSB Group 
Lloyds TSB Group dates its origins back to 1765 with the establishment ofTaylors & 
Lloyds in Birmingham, England. The two families involved in the partnership (the 
former Unitarians and the latter Quakers) continued trading in their one office for 
some 100 years. The association of the Taylors ended in 1852 and in 1865 the 
partnership was transformed into a joint-stock bank: Lloyds Banking Company 
Limited. Expansion immediately followed, through the opening of new branches and 
a series of mergers with smaller banks throughout the Midlands region. In 1884 the 
London bank of Messrs. Barnetts, Hoares & Lloyd (this Lloyd was from the same 
family) was also acquired. 
The trading name was changed to Lloyds Bank Limited during the 1890s and some 
twenty years later its head office was moved to London. During the early 1900's 
acquisitions and mergers continued throughout England, the most notable being the 
merger of Wilts & Dorset Bank in 1914 and Capital & Counties Bank in 1918. 
Following the First World War expansion moved further ahead with the take over of 
Cox & Co in 1923. These domestic developments established Lloyds Bank firmly 
amongst the 'Big Five' UK clearing banks in the forthcoming years. 
Overseas business activities were also developed: in 1911, the Paris based Arrnstrong 
& Co was acquired and renamed Lloyds Bank France (later to become Lloyds Bank 
Foreign and then Lloyds Bank Europe). 1918 saw Lloyds Bank purchase London & 
River Plate Bank, which it merged with London & Brazilian Bank to create Bank of 
London & South America (BOLSA). 
After a failed attempt to purchase Martins Bank in the late 1960s, Lloyds Bank 
reviewed its strategy and decided to reinforce its operations in the UK and to go on 
the offensive abroad. In 1971, it purchased the controlling interest in BOLSA and 
merged it with Lloyds Bank Europe to form Lloyds & BOLSA International Bank, 
renamed three years later Lloyds Bank International. Investments were also made in 
California and New Zealand providing Lloyds Bank with a significant international 
presence. At home meanwhile information technology was introduced to facilitate 
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banking operations (Lloyds Bank was the first major bank to link all of its branches to 
one central computer). 
The 1980's saw Lloyds Bank add the German private banking business of Schroder, 
Miinchmeyer, Hengst & Co to its international portfolio. Toward the end of the 
eighties it also decided to restructure: adding an international aspect to all its business 
activities through the merging of Lloyds Bank International into Lloyds Bank; it 
created Lloyds Merchant Bank; and it regrouped five businesses (life assurance, unit 
trusts, insurance broking, estate agency and finance house services) with Abbey Life 
to create Lloyds Abbey Life. In 1990 its UK retailing bank operation relocated its 
headquarters away from London to Bristol. 
More recently, two major mergers occurred: Cheltenham & Gloucester Building 
Society joined Lloyds Bank Group in August 1995 and in December 1995 the TSB 
Group also merged creating a new powerful UK banking operation under the name 
Lloyds TSB Group. 
A look at TSB history shows that it has somewhat different origins rooted in the 
poverty and the savings bank history of the 19th Century. Many small independent 
savings banks were formed across the British Isles during the 1800s, which 
encouraged the poor not to rely on charity but to help themselves by saving small 
regular amounts of money that could be used in times of need. In 1887, these savings 
banks formed a Trustees Savings Bank Association to: 
"provide the means of affording the help of advice and co-operation in matters 
of a general character in which savings banks or their depositors may be 
interested'. 
This co-operation amongst independent savings banks slowly grew in importance and 
in 1920 the Trustees Savings Bank Association became a registered company. 
Benefiting from the general increase in UK banking volume, as all members of UK 
society became gradually accustomed to saving, a National Savings Movement was 
formed in 1928. This movement was encouraged by the Government of the day to 
open branches across the country and was given equal access to the sale of 
Government stocks, war savings certificates and defence bonds as other banks. By 
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the time of the 1960s, savings banks were increasingly similar to clearing banks 
offering current accounts with chequebooks to depositors, along with life insurance 
policies and unit trusts. In the 1970's a Central Trustee Savings Bank was set up and 
given membership of the London Bankers' Clearing House. This central body re-
organised the 73 independent local saving bank operations into 20 (later 16) regional 
institutions. It was not until 1983 however, that the 16 saving banks gave up their 
___ independence to form TSB England and Wales, TSB Scotland, TSB Northern Ireland 
and TSB Charmel Islands. Soon after in 1986, the TSB was authorised to float its 
shares on the Stock Exchange and became a public limited company under the name 
TSB Group. This enabled it to acquire Hill Samuel Bank and Target Life, develop an 
estate agency business and create UK's first telephone banking system. 
Control 
The overall Group structure was described as follows: 
"Well it's slightly odd, but this is day to day current activity in terms of the 
branches [referring to Figure 21 and the first column under the heading Group 
Director Central Services J, but what is planned for the future in the branches 
is managed by a separate area called Distribution and so they would actually 
manage branch amalgamations, new distribution channels, direct or phone or 
whatever. You have also got in here Phone Bank which is the TSB Phone 
Bank and what was Lloyds Line ... So there are quite a few people in that, I 
couldn't tell you how many off hand, say maybe 3,000 something mC., that. 
You've got IT which clearly is a very substantial area -and merging the two 
systems is a key strategic issue. You've got central operations, which is all the 
purchasing, cheque clearing, all thefactory type stuff. You've got head office 
support (marketing, finance, HR), but the bulk of the numbers clearly are in 
the two branch networks . .. 
Legal frameworks, it appears, are not used in defming a working model of 
organisational structure (see Figure 21 below for an illustration of organisational 
structure): 
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"some of these are ... subsidiary companies, PLCs: C&G is one, UDT is 
another, Bowmaker is another, Abbey Life is another, but essentially they are 
all a part of the Group that is delivering services to UK retail clients. So if 
you like the legal organisation structure isn't allowed to get in the way of the 
market focus. " 
The rationale behind this organisational structure was reported as follows: 
"[ think the reason why we have this particular structure, there's two reasons: 
(1) it is very, very similar to the structure that Peter Ellwood [Group CEO] 
managed under at TSB and it's a structure he is comfortable with, and (2) it is 
manageable from his perspective in that he's only really dealing on an 
Executive Committee with these Executive Directors, each of these are on the 
Board of the bank, of the Group. So you have got six main Board Directors 
that essentially run the business [the titles of these six Directors can be found 
in the bold lined boxes of Figure 21]. 
"And there is a logical split ... between the assets side of the business, which 
has a number of particular challenges, a number of unique requirements, the 
liability side of the business where the market economics are much more 
attractive, and then, if you like, the distribution, now you can use certain 
techniques in distribution to control the flow of business from these two side, 
so you maximise value overall. So, although each of these develops its own 
strategies, there is a very high degree of integration amongst the strategies ... " 
The retail fmancial services business within Lloyds TSB Group is not managed as a 
separate identity, as it had been in Lloyds Bank prior to the merger with TSB, with it 
being generally recognised as "too large an animal to manage as one. " 
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Figure 21: Lloyds TSB Group Organisational Chart 
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Strategy 
The objective of generating maximum shareholder value was underlined by one 
respondent as driving Lloyds TSB Group's strategic thinking and strategic 
management system: 
..... the objective of the organisation is to maximise shareholder value. It's 
very simple, it's very clear cut. We have dejined that further as we want to 
double value for our shareholders over 2 years. So in very crude terms what 
that means is if the value of the company today is £25 billion, I think it's 
slightly more than that, then in three years time it will be £50 billion or 
whatever the equivalent is subject to any dilution by issuing any new shares, 
acquisitions whatever. So we set ourselves very aggressive targets in terms of 
what we want to achieve and those targets are based upon what we have 
achieved in the past: the last IS years Lloyds and Lloyds TSB has grown at a 
compound rate which has been at the equivalent of doubling value every three 
years. We know that there are perhaps half a dozen companies in the world 
that have done this, so that's the basis of the objective. 
So the jirst thing we do is to set ourselves an objective that we can measure 
and that we think is stretching but obtainable -and it really is stretching for 
Lloyds TSB Group. Then we have a process for businesses to develop 
strategies which will achieve that objective, now obviously the strategies vary 
business by business -we have tha: !ort of level of strategic planning, then on 
top of that we have Group Strategic Planning where we look at issues that are 
not necessarily business related directly, because they are things like Group 
funding, so on and so forth, or alternatively perhaps an opportunity presents 
itself or seems to make sense to us to do something that's very major, that 
crosses business boundaries. I mean, the Lloyds TSB acquisition, the Lloyds 
TSB merger rather, was an example of a strategy that probably no business on 
its own would have thought up, but which made sense for a number of 
businesses of the Group collectively, and arose because (a) Lloyds following 
their abortive attempt on Midland were looking around for an organisation 
that they could buy and or merge with, that would begin, if you like, the 
rationalisation of the UKjinancial services. [b] TSB had coincidentally gone 
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through a process of strategy review which had led them to conclude that they 
needed to get larger, but given that their own acquisition attempts had been 
less than wholly successful they were lookingfor a major partner. So that sort 
of Group strategy process also goes on and the department here is looking at 
major Group strategies. " 
Shareholder value is the 'ultimate' strategy driver within Lloyds TSB: 
" ... if that's shareholder value and that's customer service, they are in tune all 
the way up the graph until a certain point and then you start having to do 
things like opening on Sundays or having an extra 50 staff in at lunchtime 
where customer service improves but shareholder value deteriorates because 
its not cost effective. That's the standard Marakon graph. You might ask 
where banks are on this cycle and then I think it would be fair to argue that 
they are somewhere probably down there. We are not actually planning to do 
many things that destroy shareholder value, particularly if you take a long 
term view of shareholder value or longer term, where satisfied loyal customers 
buy more and more products over their life span. " 
Once shareholder value generation criteria are satisfied, the time frame was said to be 
'flexible': 
" ... the time horizonfor strategy isn't set, what is set is the need to have a well 
defined and articulated strategy [i.e. strategic goal] aimed at doubling value 
or aimed at maximising value. So in the future we will be getting strategies 
from these businesses at different times, completely different times and that is 
in part the function of the time horizonfor their current strategy. Because it is 
crazy to say to everybody that you want a three year strategy -that's 
ridiculous. So we say what makes sense for your business, taking all factors 
into account and what you are intending to do. " 
Each business unit is responsible for their own strategy development: 
" ... the important thing to bear in mind is that we are Group Strategy here, 
they are responsible, they are accountable for delivering the strategies, not 
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just purely implementing... So the businesses themselves have there own 
strategic planners who are working on developing value maximising 
strategies. One of the groups we have in Group Strategy is like an internal 
Consultancy, it's called the Strategic Support Group, and in instances where 
businesses feel that do not have the skill set or the capabilities to do strategy 
development work at the standards we require -we have pretty robust and well 
defined standards- then we will then provide them with support to help them 
develop the value maximising strategy. The way it tends to operate is that 
there is about half a dozen full time people working in that team, but what they 
do is they co-opt people from the businesses themselves, so typically you 
would have half a dozen people working on strategy development with a 
business, of which one, either full time or part time, would be from this central 
support function. " 
Ultimately, however, it is the subsidiary Managing Directors and the Group Directors 
who are responsible for strategy: 
"The person accountable for strategy, both for developing and implementing 
it, are these people here [referring to the Managing Directors] and ultimately 
the people responsible for delivering the integrated strategy of their line are 
these people here [the Group Directors]. And there is absolute accountability, 
so given that, if these people have any sense at all, they are not going to allow 
a strategy to be developed for them. But our strategy development process is 
sufficiently robust that one p.'·son can't do it -it's very, very demanding. " 
This "robust" nature of the strategy development process was also said to be 
demanding, because a set number of criteria must be satisfied: 
" ... there is a set process which they are obliged to go through, and essentially 
it involves what we call a position assessment, where they have to review and 
articulate their own particular market economics and position themselves as 
either advantaged or disadvantaged against competition, which means you 
have to know a lot about what the competition is dOing, you have to know an 
awful lot about their market economics and you have to be able to make some 
pretty objective judgements about where you stand. I mean, for example, the 
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definition of an attractive market for us, is clear, it's one where the average 
player can generate economic profit. Economic profit being profit in excess of 
the cost of equity in that market. The definition of advantage or disadvantage 
competitively is also simple, it's do we make a higher return than the average 
player. So you can actually be advantaged in unattractive market and not 
cover the cost of your capital, you can be disadvantaged in an attractive 
market and generate significant economic profit. So the basis of the strategy 
is to understand what you are going to be doing over the next whatever time 
horizon and is to either change the market economics, so you can become 
more attractive, which is very difficult to do, or alter your competitive 
position, so that you become advantaged. It forces people to develop, what we 
call key issues, key strategic issues, which are the things that they have to get 
right in order to develop the strategy. Generally those things would be a 
combination, because we have certain constraints that operate on them, to do 
with, for example, if I want to invest £J 0 million in a new system, how do I free 
up that capital. Obviously there is the issue of actually having access to the 
capital in the first place, which is not a problem for a Group this size, but then 
the point is if it's £J 0 million a year and I am going to depreciate it over say 5 
years, so it's costing me £2 million, how do I reduce other costs by £2 million 
to pay for that? So, there are some very, very hard choices and trade offs that 
are being made. " 
These choices are being clearly pointed out: 
"They are extremely explicit, yes. There is no way somebody could have some 
sort of secret trade off here, it's extremely explicit, it's articulated in terms of 
what the value of the options are, how each option is valued, and the key 
milestones are put in place. There's absolutely no way we would sign a 
strategy off, along the lines: 'we are going to do beller.' It would have to be: 
'we are going to do beller, and beller is defined in these terms, and we are 
going to do better because we are going to do X. Y. Z and they are going to 
have effects A, B, C, and those three added together come to the beller.' It is 
very, very explicit. " 
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The overall management style remains however, results focused. It is a style that the 
CEO likes: 
" ... the Peter Ellwood style ... and I would imagine that the focus will once 
again be very much a one year focus. In the context of long-term things, some 
things like [1] developing Phone Bank is not something which gives you 
immediate returns clearly and quite a few strategic things that TSB did, like 
[2] moving people from very low interest accounts (where there were 
historically large numbers of people in these accounts paying 1 or 2%) into 
modern higher interest accounts, which obviously had a short term impact on 
profitability. The City hated it initially and then two years later praised us for 
our great sense, because of course we were losing customers, when they found 
out they were only getting 1 or 2%, and having converted them into better 
accounts you were then actually selling them more things -and as strategy it 
worked It was quite a high risk because there was quite a dependence on 
those balances on those accounts, so I wouldn't want to give the impression 
that the view was always to take the short term view, but it's fair to say that 
the overriding thinking is hit the budget or it's exceed the budget, but as a 
minimum, hit it. There has been a budget gap so far this year ... the figures 
that were agreed at the start of the year did not match with the requirement 
that the Group Executive had set, so there was a gap, so there is a control 
mechanism there in that everybody puts together their budget and it equals X; 
however the Group Executive wanted it to be smaller than X and work 
continues to bridge that gap. So it isn't just allowed, the requirement is still to 
bridge that gap, although there was not an agreement at the time as how to 
that could be breached, but then you are looking again at head counts and the 
like to try and do that - which is interesting when you are making £2,500 
million profit. " 
The Lloyds TSB strategic management process was produced in conjunction with an 
external consultancy: 
"It is a process we have developed internally along with a company called 
Marakon. Strategy Consultants. It's interesting actually, I mean originally 
when we started down this route and Lloyds has been at it now for 2 or 3 
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years, it was very much a Marakon process. As people have got more and 
more experienced at using this process then it has been modified to suit the 
needs of individual businesses and the Group as a whole, but without 
compromising the integrity of the process . .. 
..... the consultancy (called Marakon) was working in the retail area on 
something like ten strategic themes: the key things that the bank had to get 
right in order to achieve its governing objective for maximising shareholder 
value, and the work they were doing sort of spanned the remainder of the year, 
they were working with Strategic Planning and working with the businesses, 
and into the first part of this year . .. 
Brian Pitrnan, the then Chief Executive, led the development of the new strategic 
management process: 
..... what he said was this: we have been able to double value every three 
years for a number of reasons. The principal reason that it had happened is 
because Lloyds had made some very intelligent decisions, whether by design 
or accident is open to debate, but they made a number of very intelligent 
decisions about which markets they would operate in and they avoided some 
of the major gaffs that other banks made, they also withdrew from a lot 
overseas areas where they were not generating high levels of economic profit, 
they withdrew most noticeably from investment banking, and that enabled 
them to focus on the high grrwth, high margin, retail financial services market 
in the UK and it just so happened, and you can put it down to a number of 
factors, maybe luck was a good part of it, that their focus in these markets 
coincided with a period when these markets were growing well, and not only 
growing in terms of volume, but were offering very, very significant profit. So 
the organisation, if you like, did the right thing. Pitman came to the view, that 
although we could continue to acquire businesses (and we are quite good at 
acquiring businesses) and generate value that way, at a sub-Group level, there 
was a very definite need to improve the strategic performance of the 
businesses, because essentially major portfolio decisions, like withdrawing 
from certain markets and emphasising certain markets was taken at a Group 
level, but there is a limit to which you can do that: once you are in all the 
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right markets, what do you do then? Well, what you have to do then is, if you 
like, drive the process down, so that the individual businesses themselves are 
developing value maximising strategies. He also felt that we needed a process 
of superior strategy design and I guess he looked at a number of people, but 
he knew the American people very well and he talked to them about it and 
together they designed it. And it has now become imbedded in the 
organisation: it is the way we manage. 
In terms of Lloyds ... it has, I would s~, been around 3, perhaps longer, years, 
in one form or another. It's only really recently been integrated across the 
Group, but in terms of technique it is not new at all. I mean the sort of 
concept that you need to generate economic profit and maximise economic 
profit on a business by business basis, and the only w~ you can do that is by 
changing your competitor position or by changing your market, that is not 
new, that has been around for forty years. I think what has changed recently 
and what's available for the Group and other companies that have taken it up, 
Coca Cola for example, is the fact that technology has enabled people to 
handle lots of data and to store data and have access to it easily, [Information 
Technology] is facilitating a radical change in strategic management and we 
are making use of it. But we do believe that ifwe work at this steadily we will 
achieve some form of competitive advantage, and at least will develop better 
strategies . .. 
Milestones for monit«ing performance are used within the system: 
"It depends on what is a realistic milestone. Typically, if somebody came 
along and said they had a 5 years strategy and there are no milestones until 
the end, we would s~ no, that does not work. But if somebody came along 
and said, 5 years strategy, financial results would start to flow at beginning of 
year 3 out till year 5, but for the first 2 years we going to be building a new 
processing system, so in terms of the financial results all you will see is 
expenditure, that is not terribly exciting, that's not terribly helpful, so what we 
would do, we would set milestones in, to do with phases of the project and link 
them with expenditure, so it reflects budget, we would set up review meetings 
every six months or so. And the Managing Directors themselves, would have 
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much more freedom for a new meeting, I mean a major project in Savings and 
Investments to build a new factory, they will probably be on top of it, certainly 
once every couple of weeks, and they would report up to the Chief Executive 
on it once every six months, but in the mean time he will be receiving in the 
management accounts, not only the financial manifestations of the strategy, 
but also the milestones of, I do not know, if we are going to lay a 1000 bricks 
this month to build this factory, every month he would see how many they had 
done. We are not in the business of managing purely on financials. " 
These milestones form one of the criteria for agreement in the authorisation of the 
strategy: 
"Because the strategy is in the nature of a contract ... This guy is saying to 
him: I will deliver you this. So for it to be signed off, not only does it have to 
have the right bottom line number, it has to have certain characteristics, 
which include milestones, and would include brief details of the other options 
considered which have been rejected. " 
There are also a series of strategy review meetings held. The members of staff 
present being those responsible for the strategy at the subsidiary level and those 
responsible for its authorisation at the Group level, with the assistance of those 
overseeing consolidation of the strategic management system: 
" ... there is a review prOL'JS with, if you like, key meetings already in the diary 
for all the strategies coming up... what tends to happen is that they are not 
unilateral. At the Group Executive Committee, which is all of these guys, it 
will get discussed, with Strategic Planning's input, as well as the input of the 
Group Director and the input of the Managing Director. " 
The strategic management system at Lloyds TSB can be seen however, to be rather 
pragmatic, with the realisation that strategy once formulated is not set in stone: 
"There is a process here, within the Strategic Planning department, that will 
monitor each strategy against milestones, and we report to the centre -it's 
always reporting by exception, if they don't hear from us everything is okay. 
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There is one major, major exception to this, and this is we don't necessarily 
believe that if somebody has adopted a 5 year strategy they should stick to it 
slavishly for 5 years. If the world changes in a manner, I mean, virtually all 
strategies get modified during their life, unless they are very short, but if, 
sometimes, modification is extreme, the world may change, and although say a 
business may have a 5 year strategy in place, we expect them to monitor their 
strategies every year, almost continuously -continuously, that's theory, it 
doesn't happen, but people look at their strategies all the time, they are 
constantly receiving additional inputs for them to be able to say it is still what 
we should do, it is still on track or to say, wow, this has really changed how 
things are operating, we really need to think about doing things differently, 
it's time for another strategic review. So if you like a strategic review can be 
triggered by the exploration of the current strategy and the need to do 
something different, or by the fact the world has changed and a current 
strategy is no-longer valid. " 
A respondent from Corporate Planning noted that it was thanks to the system that 
deviations were allowed and seen in a positive light: 
"It's a combination, sometimes it will come up from the business, because they 
themselves perceive things are changing quite radically. They are able to 
understand these things, in a sense it's quite arrogant, but they are able to 
understand these things, because the process they have gone through in the 
first place has equipped them to understand the key drivers of value in their 
business, and therefore they are able very rapidly to put within this framework 
of key value drivers the impact of external or internal events -either market 
driven or from things happening internally... Then we at the centre might also 
take the view that things are happening, and we may see that operating in 
their market or operating in another market that will have knock on effects 
and we will actually alert them to the fact that we think there is an issue, we 
think that something is worth revisiting. " 
The basis of review and its results were described in the following way: 
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" ... we ask a number of questions: what has this done to the competitive 
position within the market economics, have the value drivers changed, is this 
now a different market to what it was originally, if so how are we positioned in 
this new market compared to the old one, do we have the tools to compete and 
be effective here, if so then carry on, whatever, if not let's get them, is the 
strategy we are currently following - is it helpful to the new direction, as it 
may still be perfectly valid, or do we need to do something different? And then 
all the arguments come in about sunk costs, etc. So it is a fairly robust 
process, it does 2 things: number], it contains the tension between the desire 
for some kind of central review and control. You've got responsibility for the 
business, and very much for implementation, because we at the centre do not 
know how to run their businesses, they know much better than us how to run 
their businesses, they have day to day experience. At the same time it is forced 
on to them, this is the second thing, previously] guess you would say that they 
knew an a»:ful lot about how to run their business but very little about what 
the competition was doing and they were sort of reacting to it, whereas now it 
has forced them to develop a sort of database and model of competitive 
behaviour, which is also a sort of reality check that does force them to 
consider not just how they will respond to changes in the market place, but 
also how the competition will respond. " 
Group Corporate Planning was said to have three main functions: 
"Okay, there are thre,'~ strands to Group Strategic Planning. One line of 
business relates to this business Consultancy, working with businesses to 
develop value maximising strategies... -helping them formulate, helping them 
set milestones, helping understand what the deliverables look like, the value of 
those deliverables, helping them understand the key value drivers and how 
they are going to change over time ... it's very detailed, it's very interesting, it's 
extremely time consuming, it's very labour intensive. So that's one side. The 
second strand is to do with monitoring side, which will review and monitor the 
plan and as ] said, reports by exception. They're also involved in, if you like, 
Group competitor analysis -they pool together a lot of the competitor analysis 
that is taking place across the Group, and then if you like provide a Group 
perspective on it. Because sometimes you ... might discover that one of our 
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principal competitors in one area is not regarded as a really serious 
competitor in another area, and that can be for one or two reasons: it can 
either be that they are a [potential] competitor in the other area, but that they 
are just not interested in being one or that they are in the market, but are just 
not very good at it and it is not something they have given an miful lot of 
attention to, so on and so forth. What tends to happen in those circumstances, 
is that in one business they will be regarded as seriously important, in the 
other they will maybe not even appear on the radar, but what we try to do at 
Group is to have an understanding of capabilities. Chances are if Hong Kong 
Bank are good in one area, if it puts its mind to it, it can be good in another. 
So we would alert the business that didn't consider them as competitors, the 
fact that if push came to shove they could be, and we would explain why and 
get them to take it into their thinking . .. 
"If you like, we try to raise the broader focus, because the chances are that 
the businesses themselves have thought about some of the specific business 
related issues. There is an issue, at the moment, about: should we buy a 
retailer, or how should we link with retailers, and there are at least three 
different views through the Group: the technology view, there's a distribution 
view and then a sort of shareholder value view. We are trying to synthesise 
those views into an overall view . .. 
"So they have a mandate across the Group to instruct for those sorts of 
things ... They would start off here probably at Group Executive and say, as 
part of the process this is what we would like and they would probably get it 
approved here, the Director leading this area sits there, so he's signed up to it 
there and then he communicates that to his people . .. 
" ... we are charged here with amongst other things with looking at some major 
strategic questions: like UK acquisitions policies, international strategy, 
divestment, competitive position, we put all of this together and we report to 
the Board. Well, we don't actually report to the Board, we report to 
something we call the Board in Committee, which is even more sinister, 
because it is where the Directors feel they can ask us, very leading questions, 
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and it's a three hour meeting specifically given over to one of these strategic 
issues. " 
The Board in Committee meetings, made up of the Group's Non-Executive Directors 
and chaired by Lloyds TSB's Deputy Chairman, were said to be held once a quarter, 
they were further described in the following way: 
" ... the Board in Committee is aforum in which Directors are able to-consider'----
strategic matters. It's a very free-form session, it's a discussion, it isn't a 
formal proposal. If we are actually going to buy something we have to go to 
the Board and get approval to buy it, that's very formal and there is rigorous 
process. 'Board in Committee, here is what we think about international 
strategy, what do you think?' It's great because they feel much more relaxed 
about, it isn't minuted, we get a very rich debate going." 
Group Corporate Planning attend these meetings in order to: 
" ... talk about things: the presentations we make tend to be pretty short, 
because it is a way of stimulating debate, but we also have a lot of material in 
the background, so if certain questions get asked we can show them ... .. 
In addition to these meetings, there is an annual Chief Executive's Conference 
attended by the Executive, the Chief Executive and the top 50 people within the 
Group. Further detail on ("e Conference was reported as follows: 
" ... [The Conference] takes place in May, where the key strategic issues are 
discussed, and we decide what the top 10 issues are for the following year. 
And they may be the same as the top 1 0 of the year before or they maybe 
different -like this year, international strategy will be on that agenda . 
... what it's doing is it's agreeing that the [key strategic issues] people have 
thought up are the right ones... What will tend to happen is that once the top 
ten issues are agreed, or once the top whatever the number is, generally 
around ten, but once they are agreed, there will be a reality check at the table: 
to say, given that these are now the challenges we face, the things we really 
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want to get right for say the next 3, 4, 5 years, because they are going to 
support the individual strategies, are we con figured correctly to deliver this? 
What actions do we need to change the configuration? ... What does it say 
about our skills mix now, compared to what we need? All those sort of 
issues. " 
"So there was a Group Conference in May for the top 50 Executives in the 
Group and then within the bit that I work in which is Central Services,~which----­
is the whole of the branch network and its the support functions for IT, 
marketing, finance and human resources, there is a Conference in June. And 
that Conference is around communicating the strategy which will be the 
outputs from the work done by Marakon and the constant stream of things that 
is being created through the standard mechanism of papers going to Executive 
Committee and sometimes to Board. So strategy relating to the new brand for 
example, I can't talk clearly in detail about that at this stage, but you know 
that it's being worked on ... " 
A learning environment appears to exist within Lloyds TSB in terms of strategic 
management: 
" .. .it would be wrong for me to pretend that if you visited any of these 
business areas, and you said show me your strategic plan, show me how you 
developed it, the way you will all have used these techniques to the maximum 
and to the best way possible, that just won't happen and it would be crazy for 
me to suggest that t would! Some of the strategies that we get from Group 
businesses are variable in quality, particularly so in the smaller businesses, 
but everybody is moving along the learning curve, and some of the businesses 
are extremely good... Strategies to us are noi statements of intent, they are 
statements upon which actions are based. We are going to do this, here are 
the milestones, this is what we intend to do. " 
Evidence of this learning environment was further highlighted by the value placed 
upon the Lloyds TSB strategic management system: 
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"The more we do under strategy development, the better we get at doing it and 
there is no question that the standard of some of the things we have come up 
with recently is far superior to some of the things we came up with a year ago, 
because people have moved through the process and have got a lot more 
familiar with it. We regard it as one of a half dozen really core things, either 
processes or projects within the Group, that we guard very jealously. " 
Some caution is required when thinking of a 'learning environment', as one 
respondent noted the organisation, perhaps like all organisations of that size, tends to 
collect the latest management thinking into its panoply of 'recipe books': 
"One of the things that is true of the organisation is that you are fine having 
conversations, it would be interesting to compare with another sector, in that 
whatever the latest fad is ... we have it. So we've got total quality, we've got 
the balance scorecard and we've got project management methodologies. If 
you look at all the things that have happened since the 1950's there are 
probably remnants of them throughout the organisation. " 
One respondent made the following distinction between culture types at TSB and 
Lloyds: 
"TSB is incredibly results oriented: set targets, achieve targets, set 
',ilestones, hit them -if you don't let's really work out why and learn from it. 
In a sense, you could argue that there is some sort of stigma to not hitting the 
target, there is a stigma to not hitting the target and not knowing why, but if 
you miss something and you learnfrom it and it won't happen again, then fine. 
So there is quite a healthy process within the organisation. Lloyds actually 
was quite asleep in a lot of its processes -targets were a basis for debate-
where as in TSB they were not. " 
This TSB style, "the can do, let's do sort of approach ", was said by one respondent 
as having infiltrated into the whole Group: 
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"It's extremely healthy, it's a reflection of Peter Ellwood's own style and it's 
incredibly refreshing, it really, really is. It's almost a natural selection 
process, you get people who operate in this world, who are well suited to the 
world. .. " 
One respondent reported that there was an effective mix of cultures following the 
merger of Lloyds and TSB banks: 
" ... there are a number of different cultures and a fair mix. The appointments 
process last year within Central Services saw a fairly even mix of appointees 
in both Lloyds and TSB inter-managerial positions, so there is a fair mix of the 
two cultures. Some of the research that we've done suggests that the cultures 
of the two networks are closer to each other than the cultures, of say, Lloyds 
network and the Lloyds Head Office. TSB network and the Lloyds network are 
closer than the Lloyds network and the Lloyds Head Office. " . 
Cultural differences, strengths and weaknesses were seen by one respondent to be the 
reason why the TSB mindset has dominated over that of Lloyds in top management 
circles: 
HI mean Lloyds couldn't make the changes easily on its own that it needed to 
make in order to keep goingforward, but it has had this injection of a different 
approach represented by the TSB. And the TSB changed radicallyJrom being 
a Savings Bank to where it had got to at the time of the merger, with quite a 
clear vision of where it wanted to go. Lloyds came to the merger in the belief 
that the UK financial services market needed to be rationalised, therefore 
there would be some duplicated capacity that would be taken out in the 
merger, represented by synergies and cost savings, TSB came to the merger 
with a completely different agenda. Well, I say completely different, part of 
the agenda was the fact that there would be physical overlay, there would be 
functions that you could lose, but another part of the equation, was that we 
could apply the TSB operating model to the bigger bank, which would make a 
phenomenal difference in terms of cost base, would make afantastic difference 
in terms of the revenue generation -and so it has proved. And the reason for 
why TSB has been sort of dominant, apart from the fact that clearly they were 
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looking for a successor to Pitman, and it just happened that Ellwood was the 
right man, was that TSB came to the merger with a very, very profound 
understanding of why it needed to be bigger and what it could do with the 
capacity that would be created by the merger, whereas Lloyds came to the 
merger with the feeling we will just take capacity out ... .. 
As can be seen, the common thread between both cultures appears to have been the 
search for shareholder value rnaximisation, the route to attaining it, however, has been ----
somewhat different: 
HI don't think the objective has changed -the question of how you achieve the 
objective is more open now than it has been for a number of years. Lloyds 
tended to be: we will make the major strategic decisions about which markets 
to be in and then essentially we will be fine, because the Economics will take 
care of itself Peter Ellwood is slightly different, his view is that an attractive 
market today can be an unattractive market tomorrow -so what you have to be 
very aware and conscious of are the changes -how things might change, 
particularly how customers requirements change. And you have to modifY 
your offering at all times to reflect where your customers are going to be and 
not where they have been. So, Peter talks a lot about satisfYing customer 
needs. Now he is not doing that out of some kind of altruistic role, he's doing 
it because by satisfYing customer needs you maximise shareholder value. 
Whereas in Lloyds, the research might have demonstrated the market was 
moving in a certain way, they might have waited until it was clearly moving in 
that way and said we won't have first mover advantage here, but we won't take 
the risk that go with it: I mean Lloyds doesn't have a telephone bank yet, if 
you think about that, it is incredible, well they've got the TSB telephone bank 
now, which is fine, but they didn't have until the merger. Whereas the TSB 
approach, tended to say, I think the market is going that way, lets go there: 
it's quite a brave way of doing things. They are both aiming at the same thing, 
maximising shareholder value, but the way of doing it is slightly different, and 
TSB is much more product driven, let's do it, let's set tight deadlines, lets go 
and really make it work. And that culture is starting to take over . .. 
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Shareholder value, as described by some of Marakon's leading Consultants in their 
book 'The Value Imperative', has been influential within Lloyds TSB staff. 
Dilemmas in its implementation, however, can be seen to exist: 
" ... 'The Value Imperative' is seen as a significant book and would have been 
read by the top management cadre excluding the chapter with all the numbers 
in -Chapter 4, something like that, it's really a horrific chapter somewhere in 
the middle! The words 'shareholder value' are known throughout the Lloyds 
community right down to the cleaner probably. What that means in practice is 
really understood or known, it's probably like cost reduction or translated into 
those sorts of things but there is a fair old debate, not least because customers 
were the key thing in TSB, so you have got a dilemma in how you satisfY 
shareholders and customers and maintain staff morale, motivation and 
commitment. It is binding the three stakeholders together. " 
The backgrounds and qualifications of staff appears also to be quite different between 
Lloyds and ISB: 
"One of the things TSB acknowledged sometime ago, and I think that this is 
extremely significant in an organisational sense, they said look: )·obs for life' 
in banking don't exist anymore, so there is going to be a high degree of 
uncertainty, we want our people to be able to operate effectively in an 
uncertain world, how do we do it? There are number of things they can do, 
the most fundamental thing to do is that they said: we will encourage our 
people to get externally recognised qualifications, so that they have market 
value. There are two reasons for that: (1) we will give them a message about, 
we will invest in them -in fact there are three reasons- (2) while they are 
actually working for us, we will have a better qualified worliforce and (3) they 
will deal with uncertainty better because they will know they are marketable. 
The head office of TSB Bank used to be a Victoria House Birmingham and 
there were 1000 staff there: half of them were support staff and pretty junior, 
but quite a lot of those would be taking some form of external qualification, of 
the other half, I would say 80% were either qualified Accountants of one 
description or another or MBA's. There is quite a high sprinkling around TSB 
of Business School Graduates... So qualifications are very different, and it is 
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very noticeable in discussion with the Lloyds people, the extent to which they 
are institutionalised: they have an institutional way of doing things, which 
one has to say over time has been quite effective, but has it been as effective as 
it could be? -probably not. Whereas at TSB it tends to be staffed by people 
with a different approach. .. 
Combined, however, Lloyds TSB Group appears to be developing some form of 
shared culture, with its own new strengths and weaknesses: 
"It's typical in the sense that it's hierarchical to a greater or lesser degree, 
but more hierarchical than Virgin. For example it's essentially male even 
now, although 65% of the work force are women, they are mainly in the 
branch network, often part-time, but the bank is run by men, there are very 
few, even fewer women than there were in TSB and TSB wasn't too bad on 
having senior women, but very, very few in the new organisation. It's 
essentially male, white, in the main although its quite good on racial equality 
and the like, but the culture is essentially male, essentially white, essentially 
Anglo Saxon and really quite similar but also with some differences as well, 
some nuances around in TSB. Lloyds people will characterise TSB people as 
being a bit slap happy, and just get on and do it and then think about it 
afterwards and that was characterised last year 'as ready fire aim '. TSB 
would see Lloyds as a lot of planning, a lot of thinking and reflection and then 
maybe doing something, that was 'plan, plan, plan maybe do '. It's a different 
style in that in TSB there was a. small community of top management who 
would discuss and debate things and then once it was agreed it would be done. 
In Lloyds there was Brian Pitman who was authoritarian and in charge and 
there were quite a few dictates and that led to decisions being questioned 
afterwards, after they had been made and then implemented. That is quite 
alien to the TSB approach where you debate it before and once it is made 
whether you agreed with or didn't agree with it, you had signed up to it at the 
end, if you didn't you would leave, and so the culture was much more about 
proactivity, dOing, and it being very clear that it had been agreed so there was 
no doubt that is was going to be done. One of the problems now that you 
never quite know when something has been agreed because of the debate that 
takes place after a decision and so you are not quite sure whether you have 
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got a mandate to do it or not, and sometimes it comes round again and 
sometimes even again, when you thought it had all been agreed. " 
One unusual aside mentioned when exploring the nationality of Lloyds TSB Bank: 
staff, was the influence of wives: 
"There is an interesting element on the Lloyds side... Lloyds Bank 
International was particularly strong in Latin America and it and a number of 
the other Lloyds operations were closed because they weren't hitting the 
shareholder value targets, like in Portugal and places like that in the late 80 'so 
Lloyds Bank International is important because one of the features of the way 
that Lloyds operated was that it would bring in new blood into senior 
management and some of the new blood of the early 90 's was from Lloyds 
Bank International: ... ex-pats actually coming back from Latin America. 
Then you saw C & G and some new blood... and then the merger with TSB so 
new blood from that. So there is almost like a deliberate attempt to bring in 
new ideas by acquiring or by bringing people in from more distant parts of the 
empire. Some of the senior managers then came from Lloyds Bank 
International, whilst they themselves are British, quite a number of their wives 
interestingly are Latin American, so there might be an injluence, I wouldn't 
rate that as hugely significant but its just something you notice, but essentially 
they are Brits. " 
Finally, an awareness of 'human issues' in Lloyds TSB can be seen to exist in a 
statement in the 1997 Annual Review: 
"Our staff, our customers, our suppliers and our shareholders live and work 
in local communities throughout the UK That makes us an integral part of 
those communities. " 
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Summary of the Characteristics of Strategic Control Components in 
Lloyds TSB 
Components of 
Strategic Control 
Real life practice in: 
Lloyds TSB 
Premise Control ''Aggressive'' or "stretching but obtainable" shareholder value 
targets underline the strategic management system 
Implementation 
Control 
Strategic 
Surveillance 
Special Alert 
Control 
Operational 
Control 
Environmental 
Scanning 
Scenario 
Planning 
Revisits are made to the framework document used to 
identifY and monitor key value drivers 
Milestones are reported upon by Group Corporate Planning to 
the Board -"if they don't hear from us everything is okay." 
Time-tabled strategy review meetings are held within the 
Group Executive Committee 
Close liaison is maintained between Group Corporate 
Planning and business units 
Group Corporate Planning synthesises divergent business 
views which may be tabled for discussion at the Board in 
Committee 
Under "extreme" conditions a "strategic review can be 
triggered' by the business or by Corporate Planning 
Operational reporting is used as an information source for 
strategic plarming purposes 
Each business unit is obliged to prepare a position assessment 
by Group Corporate Planning 
No evidence of this was reported 
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Summary of Findings within Lloyds TSB 
Control 
• Structure 
Lloyds TSB Group's organisational structure moves more toward Mintzberg's 
(1995 pp. 350-371) professional format than many other banks, where the 
expertise of each business unit's staifis nurtured, but is ultimately integrated 
through a divisional structure. At this point in time however, Lloyds Bank and 
TSB still have distinct organisational structures from one another (albeit that 
this is planned to change). 
• Systems 
Stretching, measurable and "explicit" targets are agreed between the centre 
and the businesses following a "set process" of strategy development. 
The strategic management process, which continues to evolve, was developed 
with Consultants, Marakon. 
The Managing Directors are responsible for formulating value maximising 
strategies and delivering the results as per schedule. 
Management accounting systems are used to monitor progress, as are 
qualitative and quantitative milestones en-route to strategy implementation. 
Periodic strategy review meetings are also held, when changes to strategy are 
perceived as perhaps being necessary. 
Group Strategy have three roles: to act a business support consultants, to 
monitor and report on business plan progress, and to synthesise Group 
competitor analysis. 
• Style 
The CEO appears to have moulded the organisation into one he feels 
comfortable with, in terms of manageability and direction. 
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People 
• Staff, skills and style 
Latest management thinking "fads" fmd their way into Lloyds TSB. 
Two distinct cultures merged in 1995: the "ready, fire, aim" culture ofTSB 
and the "plan, plan, maybe do" culture of Lloyds. 
Strategy 
• Shared values (super-ordinate goals) 
Lloyds TSB's over-riding aim is to maximise shareholder value. 
• Strategy 
The Group Board in Committee meets to discuss major strategic questions of 
the moment, supported by Group Strategy. 
The Chief Executive's Conference highlights and discusses the top 10 
strategic issues or challenges for the year. Subsequent divisional conferences 
communicate the strategy more widely. 
In attempting to position Lloyds TSB in terms of the strategic archetypes in 
the literature review of Chapter 2, a split personality can be identified: on the 
one hand it is entrepreneurial (Mintzberg 1973), particularly within TSB, and 
on the other, it is an analyser (Miles & Snow 1978), particularly within 
Lloyds. As a Group it can be seen in terms of the performance maximising 
archetype (Utterback & Abemathy 1975). No clear fit can be distinguished 
however, in terms of Porter (1980). 
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The Royal Bank of Scotland Story 
Introduction 
The Royal Bank of Scotland dates back to 1727. It had serious financial difficulties in 
the early 1990's, but since then it has managed to turn the situation around and now 
has as an enviable reputation of being one of the more innovative fmancial services 
organisations in the UK, thanks to ventures such as Direct Line and its more recent 
jo int venture with Tesco. 
Description of the bank 
"Our principal objective is to deliver a stable and growing earnings stream to 
our shareholders. We believe that the most direct route to creating lasting 
value for our shareholders is through creating enduring customer value. Our 
customers gain through the professionalism and dedication of our staff." 
Source: The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC Annual Review & Summary Financial Statement 1997 
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group comprises three businesses: the UK Bank, Direct 
Line Group and Citizens. The UK Bank offers retail and corporate/institutional 
banking. Direct Line offers direct financial services in UK over the telephone, such 
as insurance, personal loans, mortgages, and savings. Citizens operates in New 
England, USA, with some 300 bank branches. The Royal Bank of Scotland Group's 
total assets amount to £72.6 billion, net income equals £0.457 billion and capital 
resources are some £5 billion. In terms of security it has a: Aa3 Moody, AA-
Standard & Poor and AA mCA rating. The number of ordinary shareholders totals 
some 50,000 (with a share capital distribution of 87% to institutions and 13% to 
individuals). The number of employees totals 30,900 (some 19,000 in the UK Bank). 
The UK Retail Banking Division contributes the largest share of total Group profit. It 
has 660 high street branches. Distribution of banking services is via the traditional 
branch network, access via all of the UK's 22,000 automated teller machines (1,100 
of its own), the Internet and through a wide range of card products (e.g. MasterCard 
and Visa). Various retail banking joint ventures have also been established with the 
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Tesco, Scottish Widows and Virgin Direct. Birmingham Midshires Building Society 
is also to be acquired. 
A history of The Royal Bank of Scotland 
The Royal Bank of Scotland received its Royal Charter in 1727, opening for business 
in Edinburgh, with the authority to "exercise the rights and powers of banking". 
Innovative zeal started from the outset with The Royal Bank of Scotland introducing 
an early form of the commercial overdraft in 1728, followed soon after by the 
payment of interest on deposits. 
Its first branch was not opened until 1783 (in Glasgow), slowly followed by the 
opening of other branches throughout Scotland during the nineteenth century. 1874 
saw the opening of a branch in London. 
From the 1920's onwards The Royal Bank of Scotland bought its way into the English 
and Welsh banking market place. In 1924 it purchased Drummonds Bank 
(established 1717) and soon after in 1930 the Williams Deacon's Bank (established 
1771), with its branch network in the north-west of England. Prior to the outbreak of 
the Second World War it also purchased the private bank Glyn, Mills & Co 
(established 1753), which brought a number of merchant banking services under The 
Royal Bank of Scotland umbrella along with the old established Child & Co dating 
back to the 1580s. Glyn, Mills & Co and Williams Deacon's Bank traded as separate 
banking operations and were commonly known together with The Royal Bank of 
Scotland as The Three Banks Group. 
Throughout the 1950s and 60s further new branches were opened in Scotland and 
London, along with a representative office in New York. Banking innovations were 
also continued, with for example a saving stamp scheme being marketed and branch 
book-keeping being automated. 
In 1969, The Royal Bank of Scotland merged with National Commercial Bank of 
Scotland, which provided it with a joint 40% share of Scotland's banking business. 
The following year the Group's London clearing banks (Glyn, Mills & Co, Williams 
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Deacon's Bank and The National Bank) were combined under the name Williams & 
Glyn's Bank. 
The 1970s were good years for The Royal Bank of Scotland, with it benefiting in 
particular from the economic boon to parts of Scotland that followed the discovery of 
North Sea oil and gas. It also capitalised upon the increased interest in house 
ownership, being the frrst UK clearing bank to offer house purchase loans. 
In 1985, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group produced a new corporate strategy to 
operate all its banking activities under the same corporate name of The Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc, thus signalling the death of the Williams & Glyn's Bank name. A 
telephone based car insurance subsidiary was also established in the same year, soon 
to be known as Direct Line Insurance. 
1988 saw The Royal Bank of Scotland's frrst move into foreign retail banking 
businesses, with the purchase of Citizens Financial Group of Providence based in 
Rhode Island, USA. 
The 1990s have seen the Group sell its merchant banking operations and focus on its 
retail banking businesses. 
Year 
1997 
1996 
1995 
1994 
1993 
1992 
1991 
1990 
1989 
1988 
Table 12: The Royal Bank of Scotland Group's place within its 
local, European and world markets 
Ranking Assets Pre-tax profit Return on CostJIncome 
(in terms of Tier 1 ca ital $m) Assets Ratio 
UK Europe World $rn $m % % 
7 (5,012) 36 76 117,117 1,239 1.06 52.47 
6 3,967 42 91 95,479 1,086 1.14 50.00 
6 3,305 46 106 80,651 951 1.18 -
6 2,934 45 III 71,596 840 1.17 -
6 2,707 42 104 54,833 401 0.73 -
6 3,138 39 85 61,504 37 0.06 -
7 2,833 47 91 56,397 88 0.16 -
7 (2,694) 43 83 56,381 491 0.87 -
7 (2,258) NA 86 45,772 381 0.83 -
7 (2,152) NA 86 36,508 21 
- -
Source: The Banker, July & September 1987-98 
214 
Research Findings 
Control 
An overview of the Group structure was given by respondent as follows: 
"The Royal Bank of Scotland Group is a group of largely autonomous entities, 
there is: Direct Line, Citizens and Royal Bank of Scotland [referred to in 
places as RBS]. There is also a cross shareholding with Banco Santander -we 
----------- ,,- --
[The Royal Bank of Scotland Group] own 4.9% of them and they own 9.9% of 
us- an entity called Tesco Joint Venture and another entity called RES 
Advanta -a joint venture with Advanta (the US credit card), that's a 51% 
holding." 
" ... after much re-organisation and a major change programme managed by 
McKinsey called project Colombus, we now also have a Retail Bank and a 
Corporate and Institutional Bank, based in London. There's a Managing 
Director of each and there's also a thing called Operations Division, which is 
a profit centre ... " 
Figure 22: Overview of The Royal Bank of Scotland Organisational Structure 
Tbe Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
I 
The Royal Bank Direct Line Citizens 
of Scotland 
I I I 
Retail Bank Operations Corporate and 
Division Institutional Bank 
Typical financial and management reports and controls are used in the day to day 
running of the Group. One respondent noted that in fact too many non-useful 
monthly reports are provided: 
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"All sorts of things, by product, by branch, by chief manager, variance 
reports, plethora's of reports -most of which, even to me and I'm responsible 
for products and the branches and so on, are not that useful. / do not care if/ 
open them or not, because / know what's going on and what we are going 
through." 
~-~----~~~~~-
"/ would think that the auditors would be distressed if we did not have them, 
plus now and again you do want to refer to them. But / do not find them 
hugely useful, which is one reason why [a colleague] is doing this piece of 
work on accounting, reporting, MIS and the budgets -that's to say we have 400 
accountants in this business, we should have things that managers find useful -
at the moment we do not have enough. " 
Underneath the CEO is a Strategy Department: 
"Well, off to the side -like a supporting office. The guy who heads it up is ... an 
Actuary ... There are three people under him ... These people tend to look at 
acquisitions and disposals, they do not look at what / call the core strategy of 
the business. They look at the "bells and whistles" ... but they won't be looking 
at the guts of this [RBS Retail]." 
It is left to the MD of RBS Retail to pursue his own strategy and strategic 
management process. 
Strategy 
"On the strategy side, there's the Board of Directors obviously, who review in 
rather a formal way once a year the strategy of the Group -fairly typical for a 
PLC where there's not a lot of real engagement with the data or the concept. 
[The CEO] is quite interested, as sort of a student of strategy he reads the 
Goold and Campbell books, he's quite into the John Kay stuff on architecture 
and so on -he's a bit of an intellectual. He swoops in, in an ad-hoc, way to 
make sure he likes what is going on. Strategy for Direct Line is set within 
Direct Line and is not discussed here [Citizen] or here [RBS], similarly here 
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or here [referring to RBS retail and corporate divisions]. So those three 
basically make up their own story, financial projections and are bilaterally 
reviewed and critiqued by the Chief Executive and the Group Finance 
Director. 
Now, down here there is a more formal thing going on, called the strategy 
development cycle, and this has existed for some time. This is purely in the 
------
RES PLC side [not in Citizen or Direct Line] which is headquartered here in 
Edinburgh at 36 St. Andrews Square. This is a fairly formal thing, which has 
existedfor about 8 years, and the process is that every February each of the 3 
MDs puts together a three year strategy. You are supposed to follow a format, 
the format changes each year, but it is basically: what am I doing, why am I 
doing it, what are the options -like supposing I did not do it or I did something 
different- loosely what sort of financial outcomes (not projections) and risks 
and other issues ... 
[The strategy development cycle] can be fairly elaborate: yesterday was our 
day, for example, this year it was 9.30 to 5.45 and seven of the Directors 
working for ... the MD had to present quite a lot of stuff and it was expected to 
be fact based, reasonably thought through, if possible somewhat conceptual as 
well, tying together small picture and big picture on where the industry is 
going and what am I doing in getting more NPV for every personal loan I sell 
through a branch or branch 'sell-point '. Now this is then followed up quite 
informally after the. big day of steer through by [the GrollP Managing 
Director], [the Group Finance Director] and [the Group Strategy Director] 
with the 3 MDs, who might say basically 'I'm really concerned about what 
was shown there' or say 'it'sfine ' ... " 
This annual strategy development process is linked to the annual budgeting process, 
although the awareness of the link amongst management would appear to be 
somewhat blurred: 
"The next event is the annual budget, which goes on typically in September of 
each year, which is, of course, supposed to reflect ... [the strategy developed] 
and so on -in the past. I think it is typical for any company I know in the 
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world, these would be fairly disjointed, but that's because people do not know 
they are supposed to be related, and it's hard for you to imagine this, but in 
reality you've got all these senior people in the company who think: 'oh, it's 
budget next week' I'll start to write slides about the budget, they do not realise 
that this [the strategy developed] is the route of their financial dynamics." 
The annual budget is prepared by the same individuals that develop strategy: 
" ... the same guys: the other attendees here, and the people who do more of a 
deep drill on it, would be more the finance and accounting staff. At this event 
[annual budget cycle meeting] you'll get the Group Finance Director, the 
Deputy Group Finance Director, the Controller -who is like the chief 
accountant-, several other accountants (we have 400 hundred accountants) 
and the Group Strategy guy -who has a staff of three (all of whom are there -
they do not say a lot, but they are observing)." 
Strategy is both formal as well as informal, as seen in the example given below: 
"Back in the dark days and I suppose the darkest days here were about 1992, 
where we made something like £500,000 profit, the notion was, and the story 
was told to the analysts, that ... we could go out on a limb and say this is how 
we are going to grow the bottom line of the Group: £200 million a year, now 
last year we did £690 million, and the analysts for next year are hovering 
around £700 million, so I guess we are not sayin~ publicly we are not doing 
£800 next year, but I think hints have been given that by 2000 it could be big 
[£1 billion]. So this helped stocks come from £J to £6." 
" ... whenever the Finance Director spoke with these people [strategy 
development cycle meeting members], andfollowed by 3+9 [the name used to 
refer to the 1 SI quarter meeting], 6+6 [2nd quarter meeting], etc. basically he 
was saying are you going to make your part of the £200, £400 or £800· 
million? So it actually became quite real -it came part of the evaluation of 
what we would do. Programmes would be cut or accelerated depending upon 
how they would effect costs or revenues or margins." 
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When there was the need for sudden change, the Royal Bank of Scotland brought in 
outside Consultants to advise them on how to proceed: 
"They called McKinsey, BCG, Booz AlIan, and said we are going to have the 
biggest change programme you have ever seen to turn this retail bank upside 
down. And they did. all the core processes were reengineered. changes of 
staff, HR, we introduced a totally new branch technology to all the outlets, we 
have a sales force that is dedicated to selling products... so it is 
unrecognisable. Not inexpensive, but probably worth doing. So if there is 
future for conventional branch based retail banking, we are in reasonable 
shape to keep it spot on. That was the response: a financial response to go 
and find a shareholder [Banco Santander] and there was an operational 
response to get the change programme started." 
Strategic management is carried out by a select few of the senior management and 
kept at arms reach from operational staff: 
"".because strategy is a dangerous word for them to get too excited about ... 
Strategy is sort of set here [strategy development cycle meeting], although 
only a couple of [the MD RBS Retail's] Directors have a particular interest in 
it... These [referring to those individuals below in the organisational 
structure] are just doing the basics every day, which in my opinion is the right 
way to keep this whole gangfocused. 
In the old days, before this structure, we had a traditional retail bank regional 
structure, so we had all of this [below the 7 Directors ofRBS Retail] building 
into regional baronies. They all had their own little strategies and they were 
all making decisions about closing branches, refurbishing, mortgage outlets -
the stuff which is not material to the business of selling products and 
providing good service. So all of that has been striped out. Being humans 
these people [below the 7 Directors] are fascinated by those things and they 
will continually come to me and my colleagues to say I've got a great idea for 
a new product, I've got a better poster, I want to close some of my branches 
and I want to open ATMs instead. My view is that I listen, but I am not hugely 
interested because I know that I have got better data and have access to sales 
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staff of my own and I just want them to do every day business. It sounds over 
patronising, but that's the way to make money in retail banking: it's a nuts 
and bolts slog in this kind of business, you want every little thing to be right, 
you do not want the guys running the sales force, because there are 12,000 
people down here, to be messing around on distribution strategy on one day 
and advertising the next: it is not their job. " 
"The way that works is that we have [the MD RBS Retail] and seven 
Directors, one of whom is ... Director of Sales effectively and he has got 8 
Regional Retail Directors, 36 Chief Managers and then all the branches, 
there's 660. Basically they have sales goals, which are quarterly targets and 
branches that sell products, have performance points which reflect net present 
values, and the notion is: let's just have these people selling ... " 
"So strategy is fairly tightly circumscribed here, it is actually three RBS Retail 
Directors who tend to do it. " 
The difference between tactics and strategy is not clear or worried about: 
People 
"That would be considered a semantic nuance, I would say. I do not think 
people would worry too much about what is tactics and what is strategy. Of 
course [the CEO] sees strategy as lots of practical ducking and diving and 
pragmatism, very little grand architecture, he is suspicious of that idea -even 
though he reads John Kay's books." 
The culture is not one of control: 
"1 would say the culture and ethos is not one of control. It's of hiring good 
people, expecting them to figure out the right thing to do and periodically 
checking in, to check that they are not giving you nasty surprises. [The CEO] 
himself was a venture capitalist and an academic, and he believes basically in 
pragmatic, people-based management: hire good guys and they will figure out 
what to do, just make sure through periodic financial oversight that the results 
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are good and that you can cajole them into even better results. So it is not an 
AT&T kind of Group at all. There is of course a whole lot of monthly reports, 
but I think that is there for the comfort of the auditors and the internal audit 
group, as much as because the Chief Executive believes that it affects how 
people work" 
Apparently the culture is informal and non-hierarchical: 
"We are surprisingly un-hierarchical. One of the things project Columbus did 
was to eliminate many layers of managers, so that within the retail bank, for 
example, on the sales line side -people who work in branches- we really only 
have four roles and quite a lot of sophisticated thought went into role 
definition. One of the problems with retail banks is that its jobs are quite 
badly defined, they are hierarchical in the sense that as you move up you 
accumulate more responsibility, and if you end up having 10 or 15 
responsibilities, of course, you are no good at any of them, so you have a little 
army of helpers who phone the helpers of people lower down the bank -it's 
amazing how few people you need to run a retail bank once you get it right. 
So we swept away, hundreds upon hundreds of people from the retail bank 
over the last 4 years: mostly people who were happy to take early retirement. 
So it is not that hierarchical, in the centre similarly it is -I mean people get 
paid different amounts -down the corridor, I sit at one big table with 5 other 
people and anybody who is working on things I am involved with just come to 
talk to me, so the style is extremely informal." 
"The reward system was totally revamped, along with the way we recruit and 
retain people, you see in order to slim down, all the jobs were redefined and 
3,000 people had to re-apply for jobs: that was the mechanism for finding out 
the people we did not want to retain. Along with that went a new series of pay 
scales and arrangements for bonus, annual performance bonus, options and 
everything else. So everything is relatively simple and fairly rational, 
particularly as everything has to be agreed with BIFU, the Banking Union, so 
it is not the easiest world to make it simple and easy, because there is a lot of 
imbedded custom and practice in our bank I think what the HR people have 
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managed to do is think reasonably creatively at how to sweep away decades of 
encrustation and have something straightforward. " 
The new reward system is designed to be an impetus for success and a sanction for 
failure: 
"Yes, you do actually feel the pain. If for example, you only perform at the 
satisfactory level, which is a 3, you do not get a bonus and the way the matrix 
works you do not get much of a pay increment either. If I do not make my 
numbers, there is a thing called the Senior Executive Pay Scheme which shows 
how much I have to hit them by or exceed them by to get different percentages 
of reward. I could end up with no bonus, I could end up beingfired -although 
that tends not to happen that much, although Directors have been fired in the 
last year. " 
"Interestingly, in three years, no reportee has survived that length of time [i.e. 
all Directors have been reporting to the MD RBS Retail for less than 3 years]." 
The employees tend to be mostly British nationals: 
"Yes, I am not aware of any senior non-British people here. There are a few 
British people, secondments from the Royal Bank working at Citizens, and we 
actually have exchanges here [Banco Santander], they [Direct Line] actually 
hire who they want themselves. Santander usually hav' a few people working 
in here [within the retail bank] and we actually have a formal exchange 
sending a few people to work there. " 
"It is a real mixture, and it's a real mixture because [the CEO] in the last year 
has brought in a number of people he used to work with, who are essentially 
Scots who used to work in America ... Because of project Columbus, and the 
impact of McKinsey, we've got in the retail bank, say in the top 100 people or 
so, maybe 50 who have come up from the age of 16 as retail bankers and 
another bunch of people, like me, who are either Scottish or English, went to 
business school or not, have done other jobs and joined the Royal Bank at 
perhaps between the ages of 35 and 40. So it's quite a hydrogenous bunch 
222 
Research Findings 
now. Of the Directors, the [Retail Bank] seven, there are 3 Royal Bank lifers 
and 3 Directors who are relatively new. 
The makeup of the staff was described as follows: 
"We are a bit of a mixture now, probably not a bad mixture: we've got classic 
lifers who started in branches at 16 and have made their way up, others who 
have come in through perhaps the Banks Graduate Recruitment Programme In 
the 1970's &1980's and there are also folks who have worked in other 
companies, who have particular skills that were hired by the bank and have 
been through several different jobs -no longer doing what they were hired to 
do. So it's quite a nice hydrogenous mix. In retail banking services right now, 
of the senior 20 people, I would say, probably, 6-7 have been here 3 years or 
less. " 
" ... most people who work in this retail bank did not go to University at all. In 
Retail Bank Services graduates are certainly in the minority. " 
The majority of staff pursue banking examinations as their main form of professional 
training: 
" ... we still do banking exams ... Despite questions of whether they are still 
relevant. " 
Management personality is seen as key in many strategic decision making areas: 
"1 think a lot of it was because of personalities. In fact I think a lot of things in 
this Group is driven by personality. " 
"1 do not think that this is a company that does a lot of deliberating. The only 
question is how are we going to do it -put people on and their job is to make it 
happen. Then periodically we might review it, but the acquisition of Citizens 
and subsequent growth, the early funding of Direct Line ... they were just done 
deals, done quickly." 
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"[The CEO] has people who he thinks they know what they are talking about 
and he trusts their instinct, and if necessary their use of data -but basically 
good ideas will bubble up from good people. If they have a hunch for a good 
thing, it will be a good thing. and they certainly will not have a strategic plan 
lying about. Interestingly, having had McKinsey here for about 4 years has 
totally queered the pitch for any form of formal strategy style of that kind. It 
just got to be too much ... People got fed up with it. It's debilitating for 
managers to have Consultants around the whole time -like they can't do 
anything without checking with the Consultants. " 
"I think it is a bit of a shame because there is a level at which it would work 
well ... At afairly high level ... in identifying key drivers, what sort of makes the 
business go ... Establishing a business plan -perhaps that is too formal a word-
more like saying these are the levers offunds, this is how we are planning it ... 
When we had McKinsey's around, we set up this wonderful process through 
which all projects had to be approved and projects were made to jump 
through hoops and they did not fit, and an enormous amount of time was spent 
trying to force these projects through these things they would never fit. But it 
was the methodology." 
Commentary on strategic control 
The strategy development cycle is a three year rolling proc.>~s. However, it appears 
that the annual review process -to look back at the progress that has been made since 
the previous year- is not carried out: 
" ... in fact, the criticism you would make of our approach .. .is that it tends not 
to be sufficiently backward looking in that people can come and say I've got 
brilliant new slides, look at this new idea, look at that initiative, and people 
tend not to say, but wait a minute you told me two years ago, you were going 
to do this and that, and it has not materialised. So it is stuff like that, that does 
not happen. " 
"I think at root that the theology is people find it hard to articulate a basic 
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story and then stick to it. And why is that? That's a reflection of a very 
fundamental observation about strategy that very few people can say: look, 
here is my vision of the world and here are the three elements, building blocks, 
call them what you will, of how we will compete goingforward, that are right, 
and they will be my touch stone and frame of reference, that I will come back 
to for as long as I am in this job. People do not think like that, people think 
about three month projects and one year projects and so on, but they do not 
have an enduring framework in their minds that they keep going back to. So 
this document [strategy development report], a year from yesterday will look 
totally different from last, and there is almost a virtue of that, to say that this is 
new, sexy and exciting rather than here we are on year three of what we said 
we would set out to do, look at the progress -it is more like: look how different 
we could be in thefuturer' 
Strategic implementation control is poor: 
" .. .for example, there was an objective set out in about 1992 to be 'the best 
retail banking group by 1997'. So it was a rallying call as much as anything, 
but that was held to be an objective that everyone could understand and work 
towards. Now that we are in 1997, the question is, are we that or not? The 
answer is given to be, well we think so -but it was deliberately never made 
tangible, so that it did not have real benchmarks, like cost-income ratio, 
customer satisfaction, growth of assets." 
Financial targets and controls do exist, however: 
"There is a very seriously taken ROE expectation, which is communicated to 
analysts outside and internally -we have a Group hurdle rate of 21% and it's 
expected that the retail bank makes significantly more than that, as you can 
see from the results coming out from other banks. You can be making 30% 
ROE in a bank today -it is not impossible to do. There is an ROE thing -these 
tend to be enduring -the other one is, maybe the profit outlook, maybe the 
Group will do £J billion by the year 2000 -for us that is not inconceivable. " 
The existence of milestones is unclear, with one respondent noting: 
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"Milestones tend to be keyed off this [annual budget cycle] actually. Coming 
out of here, there's a '3+9' [i.e. a 1st quarter meeting] 3 months into it, then we 
do a '6+6' [2nd quarter meeting], then a '9+3' [3,d quarter meeting], which is 
homing in on how are we doing for the P&L for this year, if you are 
particularly astray, you might even do a '4+8' -it is not unknown. So the P&L 
is tracked that way. " 
The above respondent later realised, after consultation with other staff, that milestones 
no-longer existed: 
"Yes ... there used to be milestones, so you could not forget it, nowadays it's 
slacker, so that plan will be somewhat shelved until maybe the 6+6, when [the 
Group Financial Director] might say, let's just think about strategy ... 
Another respondent, unaware that they no-longer existed, noted with regret: 
"They did when I designed the process! It used to be that they formed the 
basis of the monthly meetings between [the CEO] and the MD ... There was an 
Access Database with them all on. .. That's a shame, then if they have gone. " 
There is an acceptance that strategic implementation control is not essential: 
"The central flaw with this, and again it is the same for any company I am 
aware of, is that people will think 'oh the budget is not coming in as planned, 
we better cut costs or sell a whole lot more stuff' -people do not take a 
particularly measured view of it by saying 'what happened?' or 'why did it 
happen?' and I think that that is partly because it's a bank -banks are very 
complex, organic things, where everything effects everything else, and it is 
very difficult for anyone to say, I know unambiguously why personal loans 
came off target last month and I know what levers to pull to get them back on. 
Now if you are in a manufacturing company, you can trace back the root 
cause of your problem a bit more readily than in a bank. So it is opaque and 
despite the fact that we have some very smart people in the bank, it remains 
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opaque, and the era of transparent 'lever based' or fact based diagnosis as to 
why we are off track and how to get back on, that's not there. " 
Similarly an awareness as to why strategies are chosen or not chosen is not known 
amongst management, meaning that premise control must be absent: 
" ... it tends not to be that sort of style, it's actually more pragmatic, more 
reactive ... it is more that kind of thing, rather than 'how do we see the basis of 
competition evolving in car insurance?' -that question would not be asked, it 
might be talked about in camera by these people [MDs of Direct Line, Citizen, 
RBS] and [the CEO] and [Group Finance Director], but it is not played out in 
public particularly, and in our case, in retail banks, it's a bit vague." 
Strategic implementation control is more informal than formal: 
" ... it's informal, like the Strategy Director, and CEO will meet with the MD 
RBS Retail to say how did you think it went yesterday, that was impressive, 
that was really totally useless, you've got a problem here with the way you are 
unbalancing your P&L. So it is the immediate reaction ... immediately starting 
to hone in -so its pungent, rather than formal feedback. " 
"the Group approach has become more informal. It always used to be that the 
CEO would have exercised some form of control, whereas he has definitely 
moved away from that now. " 
"I think it was more mechanistic when the bank had to be turned around. 
When did we not make any money? 1991. As we have stepped up the reported 
profits, possibly people have got a little slacker. Although we still have a good 
size apparatus, as I said, we have 400 accountants: but at the big picture 
level, it does sound that we have moved off the milestones. " 
"There is a fair bit of chat: there is no question that [the Group Finance 
Director] is on the phone to people a lot, but yes, it is at the level of a serious 
chat, it is not formalised in anyway. " 
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"Yes, also, we haven't got things like activity based costing in place, so the 
monitoring systems are not as good as they could be for homing in on the tree 
diagrams, where you are actually identifYing what the key drivers are and 
homing in on them when they start to go awry, but also how we are 
performing in the process and where in the process more attention needs to be 
given and where the strategy needs to be reviewed. " 
Informality is appreciated or accepted with certain modifications: 
"Personally I am not unhappy with it, proof of the pudding is that results are 
not bad ... I think the area where it could be improved would be the use of the 
[annual] budget as a thing to educate more managers on how the economics 
work: how your actions drives this financial outcome... We seem to have a lot 
of people who trudge through spread sheets, to come up with things that do not 
support decisions." 
" ... and they are fairly inflexible, like if an assumption changes they are away 
for another 2 months working on their spreadsheet. It's kind of daft f' 
"I do not think it is that bad, but it's a million miles from what your course 
would say it should be... You see compared to a chemical firm or a car 
company ... even the conceptualisation of some of these things in the bank is 
difficult. For example, what does it mean to do a budget in a bank? It's not 
obvious to everybody -are they just talking about how r:lUch money I'm going 
to spend this year, are they talking about ratios, like spend-in, revenue-out or 
what? It was apparent to me having gone to the Annual Budget meeting in 
September -there was a complete lack of framework in the room, people really 
did not know what the meeting was about. In fact, there is a saying I 
heard ... 'the only time I can decide whether this is a strategy meeting or a 
budget meeting is when the Vice President of Strategy is in the room!' Now, 
we are not that bad, not enough people though understand the purpose of the 
budget in this cycle ... " 
The lack of consultation in previous years' strategic plans and lack of update in 
existing strategic plans was admitted by the respondents: 
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"Yes, it's a new sheet. There is not any referral back to what we said we 
would do, it's always blazingly new stufJ! It's a three year document, but it has 
a one year shelf lifer' 
"To be honest again, I think it is a case of personality -for strategy nobody is 
actually accountable. Strategy tends to be what people want to hear, or they 
put forward what people want to hear ... But because it's never referred back 
to, people put forward something that is not too stretching in year 1, a bit 
more stretching in year 2, and by year 3 we're the best bank in Britain! 
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Summary ofthe Characteristics of Strategic Control Components in 
The Royal Bank of Scotland 
Components of 
Strategic Control 
Real life practice in: 
The Royal Bank of Scotland 
Premise Control No formal premise control exists, although a 3 year strategy is 
outlined as a result of the annual "strategy development cycle" 
A pragmatic and some what sceptical approach to strategic 
management is admitted to: it is personality driven 
Implementation Strategy tends to be reviewed once a year by the Board 
Control 
The CEO and Group Finance Director critique business 
strategy in an informal ad-hoc way 
Implementation can be deliberately fudged 
Strategic 
Surveillance 
A small group of individuals at divisional level are involved in 
strategic management issues 
Special Alert 
Control 
Operational 
Control 
No evidence of this was found other than fmancial 'risk 
control' measures as defmed in the Annual Report 
A plethora of reports are produced, some of which are used 
The annual budget "is supposed to reflect" the strategy 
developed 
Environmental No evidence ofa formal system was found, presumably 
Scanning however, ad-hoc informal environmeiltal scanning does occur 
Scenario No use of scenario planning is made 
Planning 
230 
Research Findings 
Summary of Findings within The Royal Bank of Scotland 
Control 
• Structure 
Mintzberg's (1995 pp. 350-371) diversified structure forms the basis upon 
which the largely autonomous Group divisions operate. 
"We are surprisingly un-hierarchicaf' -a result of the improvements made 
since the trough of performance in 1992. 
• Systems 
A plethora of fmancial management reports and controls are produced each 
month, in order to satisfY the auditors: "most of which ... are not that useful. " 
A small supporting Group Strategy office exists to look at acquisitions and 
disposals. 
A performance related pay scheme is set in place to encourage compliance 
with short term targets. 
• Style 
People 
The strategic management system is becoming less forma~ with, for example, 
milestones no-longer being used, because ''people find it hard to articulate a 
basic story and then stick to it." There is evidence of "a fair bit of chat" to 
compensate. 
• Staff, skills and style 
"/ would say the culture and ethos is not one of control." The CEO is seen as 
a pragmatist: "-hire good guys and they will figure out what to do, just make 
sure through periodic financial oversight that the results are good and that 
you can cajole them into even better results. " 
The majority of employees are British, pursuing banking exams, although 
senior management appears to have a broad range of professional experience. 
As a counter reaction to 4 years of Consultancy 'inspection', the Group 
appears to be rejecting formal systems and no longer deliberating decisions to 
any great extent. 
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Strategy 
• Shared values (super-ordinate goals) 
"Our principal objective is to deliver a stable and growing earnings stream to 
our shareholders." 
An 'inventor' approach (Schuster 1996 p. 7) fits the Group's strategic attitude. 
• Strategy 
The Board reviews Group strategy once a year, but it is left to the divisions to 
pursue their own strategy development and strategic management process. 
In the RBS division, the three Managing Directors oversee an annual strategy 
development cycle, with a forward looking three year horizon. It is a top 
down process involving a handful of staff. The subsequent annual budget is 
supposed to reflect the strategy developed. 
A lack of continuity in the annual strategy development cycles was admitted 
due to a lack of accountability and understanding within management. 
A key executive within the Retail Bank was asked to position RBS in terms of 
the strategic archetypes in the literature review of Chapter 2. This respondent 
noted that RBS was entrepreneurial (Mintzberg 1973), sales maximising 
(Utterback & Abernathy 1975), a prospector (Miles & Snow 1978) and 
pursued a strategy of differentiation (Porter 1980). 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
6.0 Introduction 
The conclusions will be partitioned into two main sections. The first section will 
identify those conclusions drawn directly from the research fmdings of Chapter 5 and 
the broader issues discovered whilst investigating the retail banking environment. 
The later section will assemble the wider context observations as concluding remarks 
on the subject of strategic control and as a discussion of 'best' practice. 
Finally, a note is made of the limitations of this research and the identification of 
areas for further investigation. 
6.1 Section 1: Analysis of the Findings and Conclusions 
The fIrst conclusion to be drawn from the research concerns the validity of the generic 
research model. This model is described in Chapter 3 and is reproduced below in 
Figure 23. 
Figure 23: Generic Research Model 
S.L.E.P.T. (S.W.O.T.) 
STRATEGY 
shared vslues 
stnltegy 
~ 
CULTURE 
~ theory of nationality 
NATIONALITY 
COrJ1)aratlve management 
theory 
PEOPLE 
.... 
Ildlls 
(style) 
CONTROL 
stn.lctul1l 
systems 
,style, 
Box 1: The Strategic Control Organisation 
Box 2: The Business Environment 
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This model has been a valuable construct in assuring a comprehensive approach to the 
study of strategic control practices in European retail banks. It has enabled the focus 
of attention to remain on the key elements of strategic management and strategic 
control. In conducting the research interviews it was particularly valuable as an aide-
memo ire, in effect assuring the division of the interview into four parts: namely 
questions dealing with strategy, control, people and environmental concerns. Some 
difficulty, however, has remained in that the broad nature of the model requires 
careful management in its application, so that significant data can be collected from 
all areas of investigation. Careful consideration, for example, needed to be given by 
the interviewer in the allocation of interview time to the various parts of the model. 
In looking at the investigation of nationality as the chosen aspect of the business 
environment for investigation, it is clear from the findings that nationality is not a key 
'determinant factor' in the practice of strategic control. Prior to the commencement 
of any primary research, it was expected that national differences in strategic control 
practice would be identifiable, with for example, German retail banks being more 
technocratic in their approach to strategic control compared to their more bureaucratic 
French counterparts. Whilst evidence of these general national stereotypes have been 
shown to exist in the broader organisational context (see Chapter 3 pages 57-65), the 
findings of Chapter 5 indicate that the impact of nationality does not appear to be a 
major influence to strategic control practices. This does not mean that nationality 
does not have any influence, but is rather a statement about the degree of influence. 
The fmdings show, for example, that Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank, the two 
German banks studied, are less similar in their strategic c()OJ.trol practices than 
Deutsche Bank and Lloyds TSB. So the short answer to the research question: do 
British, French and German retail banks employ distinct strategic control methods 
that differ significantly from one another? is 'not to any marked degree', because 
national differences in strategic control practice amongst the retail banks are 
overshadowed by the individual differences distinguishing one bank from another 
regardless of nationality. 
In analysing this fmding, one is compelled to re-think the impact of all the 
enviromnental factors (i.e. social, legal, economic, political and technological or 
S.L.E.P.T. factors) upon the practice of strategic control. Given that comparative 
management writers have shown that national differences exist, then why is it that 
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these differences are not significant in the determination of strategic control practice? 
This question needs further investigation, however a tentative answer would appear to 
lie in the fact that strategy is a generic management concept. Strategy writing in 
general terms has been developed from a common United States based capitalistic 
perspective. Strategic archetypes, such as those identified by Porter (1990), Miles & 
Snow (1978) and Mintzberg (1973), amongst others, are generic theoretical constructs 
--based upon the fundamental pursuit of profit generation for a company's shareholders. 
Given this fact, 'how' an organisation pursues its capitalistic goal is of more 
significance than the nationality ofthe people within the organisation. Furthermore, 
in looking at how an organisation pursues its capitalistic goals, if all the other 
environmental influences are the same or similar (i.e. common social values, legal 
framework, economic conditions, politics and technology), which could be argued to 
be the case within British, French and German retail banks, then none of them will be 
a determinant factor upon strategic control practice. This means that the determinant 
factors can only be identified from looking within the strategic control organisation 
itself. 
In answering the research question: how is strategy controlled by British, French and 
German retail banks? certain patterns can be seen to exist. 
The fmdings of Chapter 5 show that in terms ofpeop/e (one of the three elements of 
the strategic control organisation shown above), all of the retail banks have a long and 
'proud' history. Retail banks are after all a 'pillar' of confidence within their local 
community, having existed fu many years, lOO's of years in the case of The Royal 
Bank of Scotland, serving the fmancial needs of their customers. Interviewees from 
all countries have reflected this 'stature'. It appears also that employees are mostly 
nationals with a tradition of in-house career development, albeit showing signs that 
this is gently evolving over time with increased international exposure and greater 
levels of staff turnover. 
Similarly, patterns can also be seen in terms of strategy, with retail banks preparing 
their strategy to face similar strategic threats, for example, the arrival of the Euro, the 
increase in employee mobility and the ever present need to reduce overheads and to 
keep pace with the changing needs 0 f customers. It appears that European retail 
banking products and services may be becoming more alike, with changes in one 
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country soon to arrive in another, for example telephone banking is now common to 
retail banks across Europe. The advent of the Euro must surely make the arrival of 
these changes swifter. Indeed, Kay's (1995) "distinctive capabilities" are the same 
for all retail banks, in that the maintenance of reputation and capital (strategic) assets 
are key to success, with the need to innovate and maintain existing architecture a 
more distant second priority. The pursuit and maintenance of shareholder value 
generation levels is also (perhaps unsurprisingly for a bank) a common strategy. 
Control patterns also exist in that operational control, in particular short-term 
fmancial control, generally dominates all other forms within the retail banks. The 
need for control over the short term is perceived as necessary and indeed valuable, 
whilst some of the banks had varying degrees of difficulty in perceiving the need for 
strategic control. Patterns in organisational structure can also be distinguished, with 
most banks having an 'entrepreneurial' or 'diversified' structure or some mix of the 
two (Mintzberg 1995 pp. 350-371). 
In looking more closely at the strategic control organisation, an analysis of Table 18 
helps in the identification of further strategic control patterns. A discussion of each of 
these observed patterns of strategic control now follows, allowing for answers to be 
formulated to the remaining three research questions. 
Premise control 
The strategy plan is based on premises, arrived at as a rI::sult of the 
strategy formulation process, and as such contains the 'standard' upon 
which premise control is based. The rationale for this is that any 
attempt by the organisation to outline and plan for the future over a 
stated period, requires that certain underlying assumptions are 
identified, which become as a consequence 'revisitable' at some point 
in the future. This does not necessarily mean that premise control 'is' 
exercised, but it does mean that premise control 'can' be exercised. 
Any review, because of its nature, i.e. because the fundamental 
assumptions within the strategy plans are being reassessed, tends to 
involve senior management, often involving members of the Group 
Board. 
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Clearly premise control will be easier to carry out if premises are 
explicitly and unambiguously identified at the strategy formulation 
phase. The research findings describe a general lack 0 f understanding 
or acceptance in the value of premise control -some managers don't 
understand the importance of identifYing planning premises as the 
foundation for their strategic planning or they don't want to. In the 
either case, the entire validity of the organisation's strategic 
management is as a result put into question. Little evidence of premise 
control was found, instead Table 18 identifies a number of planning 
methods which 'should' be based upon some explicit underlying 
assumptions and which 'should' be revisited on a periodic basis. 
Implementation control 
This is the most obvious aspect of strategic control and all banks were 
found to exercise some form of strategic implementation control. 
Milestones or short-term strategic targets are a feature in many of the 
banks and form the basis of strategic implementation control. 
Otherwise more informal strategic control is mostly used, with 
evidence that frequent strategic conversations are employed as a means 
of monitoring strategy implementation. Implementation control 
systems vary fr:;n bank to bank, with each bank using different 
timetables and methods. Paradoxically it is in the implementation 
stage that controls are the most numerous, but at the same time 
'strategic' implementation control is the weakest. It appears that short-
term fmancial control dominates over strategic control at this stage 
unless the strategy is 'protected' by senior management's commitment 
to it. 
Unsurprisingly, implementation control makes use of the many and 
varied operational controls within the organisation. The art of 
implementation control being the distillation and interpretation of the 
main strategic messages from the operational detail. 
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Table 18: Summary of the Characteristics of Strategic Control Components in European Retail Banks 
Components of 
Strategic 
Control 
Premise 
Control 
Abbey Nadonal 
3 year plan 
Annual "strategic framework 
document" and on-going 
papers 
Implementadon "Value creation targets" are 
Control outlined, monitored and 
challenged at the annual 
"target review meeting" 
"Performance contracts" are 
signed between the CEO and 
business heads, business 
heads and their subordinates, 
and 8re reported upon 
monthly 
Informal updates, based upon 
"trust, expertise and 
personal credibility", are 
used to check on progress 
BNP Credit Agr/cole 
Profitable development is the 3 year "budgetary working 
fundamental mantra at SNP: drawing" 
"all choices are made with 
this objective in mine!' A 'dialectic' culture exists 
and numerous committees 
pervade alt areas ofactivity 
within the Group 
Each Director reviews their 
own area's strategic progress 
every 18 months 
Operational heads are 
responsible for their business 
plans' and their successful 
accomplishment 
Dialogue is the only thing 
done in a systematic way 
Scorecards are used 
Management controls are 
reviewed every 2 weeks by 
the Regional Banks' 
management team 
New strategies are reviewed 
every quarter by 
management teams 
Control Department checks 
compliance of internal and 
external regulations 
throughout the Group 
Monthly meeting ofalt 
Regional Banks with the 
National Bank in committee 
Deutsche Bank 
S year rolling plan: "a 
directional map'" 
2 day annual strategy 
meeting by Group Board 
Corporate Strategy monitors 
implementation each month 
(quantitative analysis only) 
The Group Board looks at 
nine "critical projects" 
annually. then co-ordinated 
by Corporate Strategy 
The Divisional Boards 
discuss every 2 weeks and 
discuss with the Group 
Board every month 
The annual strategy review 
checks on qualitative 
objectives (time frames and 
performance) and ensures 
that financial ratios are met 
Divisional Planning and 
Strategy Departments 
monitor on on-going basis 
formally, e.g. milestones, and 
informally. e.g. periodiC 
conversations 
Dresdner Bank 
None, other than an annual 
process or"goal definition'" 
The heads of the business 
units are responsible for 
making and controlling their 
own strategy, they are 
'advised' from the centre 
through "two way 
communications'" and 
dialogue 
The independence and self-
determination of each 
business unit is proudly 
defended 
UoydsTSB 
"Aggressive" or "stretching 
but obtainable'" shareholder 
value targets underline the 
strategic management system 
Revisits are made to the 
framework document used to 
identify key value drivers 
Milestones are reported upon 
by Grou p Corporate Planning 
to the Board -"if they don', 
hear from us everything is 
okay" 
Time-tabled strategy review 
meetings are held within the 
Group Executive Committee 
Close liaison is maintained 
between Group Corporate 
Planning and business units 
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The Royal Bank of Scotland 
No formal premise control 
exists, although a 3 year 
strategy is outlined as a result 
of the annual "strategy 
development cycle" 
A pragmatic and some what 
sceptical approach to 
strategic management is 
admitted to: it is personality 
driven 
Strategy tends to be reviewed 
once a year by the Board 
The CEO and Group Finance 
Director critique business 
strategy in an informal ad-
hoc way 
Implementation can be 
deliberately fudged 
Continued over leaf 
,-
Conclusions 
Components of 
Strategic 
Qmtrol 
Strategic 
Surveillance 
Special Alert 
Control 
Operational 
Control 
Environmental 
Scanning 
Scenario 
Planning 
Abbey Nadonal 
4 strategy conferences are 
held each year attended by 
the Executive 
No evidence of this was 
discovered 
Monthly reporting data is fed 
into the monitoring and 
control of strategy 
Information is supplied to the 
strategy conferences upon 
request 
Economic scenarios are used 
for sensitivity testing, but 
there is little ofa strategic 
nature 
BNP 
Observation Centres are the 
focus for market competition 
and product surveillance, 
with the publication oh 
monthly"competitlon 
monitor" 
Tile headquarters strategy 
unit attempts to highlight the 
best strategic direction to be 
followed 
None, other than crises are 
prepared for by BNP's 
commitment to a strong 
profit base 
Annual budgetary review is 
carried out by the CEO for 
all operational functions 
A budgetary scorecard is 
produced monthly 
Observation Centres monitor 
the economy, markets and 
product changes 
BNP uses "a range of 
scenarios" to estimate the 
impact of changing events on 
strategy (Le. a form of 
sensitivity analysis) 
Credit Agr/cole 
"Ideas can sprout from 
everywhere" 
Aware of fundamental lack 
of inertia in strategic choices 
Traditional operational 
controls (with heavy focus 
on financial control) 
Dialogue and committee 
meetings are relied upon to 
disseminate report findings 
Evidence of some limited use 
of scenarios was found, 
however they are generally 
not used for strategic 
planning purposes 
Deutsche Bank 
Corporate Strategy uses 
reports from the Research 
Department and the 
divisions, regions, critical 
project teams 
None: said to be aware of 
problems: "it's a dynamiC 
environment, where the 
planning and management 
have to be extremely 
dynamic as weIr' 
Overseen by Control 
Department 
Quantitative analysis 
dominates 
Divisional targets are set for 
the year 
Divisional, regional, critical 
project and Research 
Department reports 
Corporate Strategy 
formulates and analyses 
ideas or is directed to do so 
by the Group Board 
Mega trend analysis 
Dresdner Bank 
No formal system exists, but 
information is obtained by 
managers from literature, 
market data and talking to 
customers on an ad~hoc basis 
No evidence ofthis was 
found 
Operational and financial 
reporting is the basis of 
Dresdner Bank's control 
system 
Financial "controlling" is 
done at a Group level 
Nothing was reported, 
although one would expect 
some form of environmental 
information reports to be 
maintained by a business 
organisation of this size 
Little use appears to be made 
of scenarios, other than 
'worst, best and desired case' 
projections 
IJoyds TSB 
Group Corporate Planning 
synthesises divergent 
business views which may be 
tabled for discussion at the 
Board in Committee 
Under "extreme" conditions 
a "strategic review can be 
triggereti' by the business or 
by Corporate Planning 
Operational reporting is used 
as an information source for 
strategic planning purposes 
Each business unit is obliged 
to prepare a position 
assessment by Group 
Corporate Planning 
No evidence of this was 
. reported 
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The Royal Bank of Scotland 
A small group of individuals 
at divisional level are 
involved in strategic 
management issues 
No evidence of this was 
found other than financial 
'risk control' measures as 
defined in the Annual Report 
A plethora of reports are 
produced, some of which are 
used 
The annual budget "is 
supposed 10 reflect' the 
strategy developed 
No evidence ofa formal 
system was found. 
presumably however, ad-hoc 
informal environmental 
scanning does occur 
No use of scenario planning 
is made 
Conclusions 
Strategic surveillance 
Strategic surveillance is the early detection of internal and external 
changes affecting strategic activities and makes use of information 
from non-directed environmental scanning activities and that of 
directed environmental research activities. The fmdings demonstrate 
that 'strategic planners' at the Group centre usually assimilate strategic 
surveillance information, whilst environmental scanning is typically 
carried out by the individual business units or by 'research groups', as 
they perceive as necessary. None of the banks make use ofIT systems 
for the wider dissemination of information (as yet), but some have 
extensive documentation centres and libraries. In organisations 
making use ofa 'balanced scorecard' (some limited form of which is in 
use, for example, in Lloyds TSB and BNP), it is here that the 'orange 
lights' should be monitored, with appropriate actions being taken to 
avoid them turning to 'red lights' instead turning them back to a safe 
'green' ones. 
Special alert control 
No evidence of any formal special alert control has been found in any 
of the retail banks: the banks presumably hope to weather any crises 
by having sizeable reserves which give them time to manoeuvre or 
avoid crises by effectively 'controlling' their envirsnment. Reaction to 
the question of "how does the retail bank try to prepare for sudden 
unexpected changes?" was usually one of surprise and 
incomprehension. On further exploration of this question area, it 
appeared that the retail banks have never (or virtually never) had to 
deal with any major unexpected changes, with change always coming 
about over a manageable period. In times of particular difficulty, for 
example during a crisis of the economy, common action with other 
banks, Central Bank and Government support all provide 'safety 
valves' for the banks. Because of these observations, one can not help 
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but note that confidence in the status quo reigns supreme amongst the 
retail bank respondents. 
Operational control 
Operational controls are clearly used in all of the banks, they are after 
all sizeable organisations, indeed, leading organisations in their 
respective countries, and have all the operational controls that would 
be expected in organisations of their size and calibre. Financial 
controls are, unsurprisingly again, the cornerstone of all the banks 
operational control systems. Qualitative controls are used, however, 
albeit less extensively. 
Environmental scanning 
Numerous 'environmental information' reports are produced 
throughout the -many organisational units within the bank, i.e. its 
departments, functions, business units, special project teams, etc. 
External information sources are also monitored and information is 
acquired from a wide range of external sources. 
Scenario planning 
~ InkS do apparently use scenarios for planning purposes, however 
they are used to a far lesser extent and to a lesser degree of rigour as in 
some other organisations, such as in the much publicised Shell. In 
reality, sensitivity testing is being carried out in the banks under the 
guise of scenario planning. The fact that if scenarios are to be used 
effectively a significant amount of review should take place (in the 
form of discussions and reports) appears to have escaped from the 
minds of 'strategic thinkers' within all the banks or at least no evidence 
of this was found. 
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It is also important to point out that no bank was found to have a system called a 
'strategic control system'. Indeed, in some cases respondents found the whole 
concept of strategic control somewhat alien. This was not unexpected however' and 
the research framework was created in order to discover evidence of systems in use in 
the retail banks that were in fact strategic control systems albeit unknown as such by 
the respondents. 
The fmdings make it clear that no one system of strategic control is in use' amongst 
the retail banks, and instead various forms exist. Furthermore, the fmdings show that 
levels of rigour in strategic control practice (its comprehensive nature and 
effectiveness) appear to vary from bank to bank. It appears that many retail banks 
have 'incomplete' strategic control systems, as is described below. BNP, for 
example, has a form of premise control, some implementation control and one of the 
more comprehensive strategic surveillance systems identified. Evidence indicates, 
according to the respondents, that where gaps in the formal strategic control system 
are found, they are apparently supplemented by the use of informal strategic control 
systems, such as conversations, meetings and ad-hoc working groups. The best 
example of this is seen in the omnipresent dialogue of Credit Agricole. A summary of 
the characteristics of strategic control components is provided in a tabular format at 
the end of each of the retail bank stories in Chapter 5, which are brought together for 
ease of comparison in Table 18. A commentary to which is found below under points 
'i', allowing for the advantages and disadvantages of the strategic control practices to 
be developed under points 'ii'. 
Abbey National 
i. Abbey National has a fairly prescriptive system of formal strategic 
control, based around its strategic framework document (produced 
each year with a three year perspective), and an influential informal 
strategic control system. The annual review meeting and plan 
challenge meeting that follows the production of the strategic 
J Indications ofthe discrepancy between real li fe practice and the theoretical recommended practice had been 
found following initial background area interviews at the start of this study (see Chapter 4 for further details) 
and opinions on this 'paradox' had been sought in subsequent discussions with strategic control 
commentators. 
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framework document provides the basis for premise control, 
implementation control and the annual fmancial (operational) targets. 
Strategic surveillance information and environmental scanning 
information is also fed into these meetings in an ad-hoc way depending 
upon the direction and agenda of the review. Likewise, the results 
from the Group Risk Department's scenario exercise are input as 
required "akin to stress testing". Once the plan has been agreed a 
whole range of operational (including human) targets are cascaded 
down throughout the Group businesses. 
ii. The formal strategic management system at Abbey National has clear 
advantages in terms of strategic control as a result of its unambiguous 
and rigorous structure. Thanks to this structure, a relatively 
comprehensive and effective system of strategic control is identified 
compared to some of the other banks within the sample. Strategic 
control gaps do exist, however, with for example no evidence of 
special alert control being found and a weak usage of scenario 
planning being identified. There is evidence also that the informal 
system of strategic management is substantial and in the hands of a 
small senior management clique, generating feelings of a "top down, 
bureaucratic, command and control culture" amongst some. The 'think 
new' philosophy also highlights a weakness for accepting short-term 
targets to the detriment oflonger term strategy. 
BNP 
i. BNP's strategic management and strategic control systems are 
underpinned by its mantra of 'profitable development'. This clear 
objective, and the subsequent key ratios that are expected by the 
Board, is in effect a form of premise control -a mindset that has been 
readily grasped by employees perhaps because of BNP's only recent 
privatisation in 1993. In order to go beyond the narrow view of 
budgetary control systems, BNP uses strategic surveillance and 
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environmental scanning reports "opening up horizons, seeing strong 
tendencies". 
ii. This system Qf strategic control is pragmatic and minimalistic. Thanks 
to an easily grasped and remembered corporate objective, an awareness 
of strategic direction is permanently present in the day to. day activities 
for all BNP emplQyees. As such no explicit strategic management 
system exists, instead infQrmatiQn from operational activities is tapped 
to provide some dual strategic value. Likewise no formal system Qf 
strategic control truly exists, but instead an ad-hoc informal one is 
conjured-up. Whilst these aspects can be perceived as a strength 
because of their 'light' nature, they are also a weaknesses in that 
strategic management and strategic control are left to the vagaries of 
the moment. In so doing, this shows a worrying lack of understanding 
as to the strategic direction ofBNP (or at least the articulation of which 
is lacking). Beyond wanting to be profitable and to grow, does it know 
where it wants to. go or indeed, what it 'does' as an organisation? 
Credit Agricole 
i. Credit Agricole has a strong sense of origin and purpQse; unlike the 
other profit driven banks in the sample, Credit Agricole is a mutual and 
co-operative bank. Discourse is fundamental to. the organisatiQn and 
much of the strategic control within it is based upon this infQrmal 
dialogue. The formal system of strategic control revolves arQund 
annual operational contrQls and a plethora of 'nQrmal' business 
information reports (with a three year perspective). 
ii. If a mark were to be given to. Credit Agricole's fQrmal system Qf 
strategic contrQI, it would be weak to adequate. What makes it wQrk, 
hQwever, is its infQrmal system Qf strategic cQntrol. The strength Qf 
Credit AgricQle's strategic management and strategic cQntrol practices 
lies in its internal communications and dialQgue. These make it a 
thinking and learning QrganisatiQn. Whilst this 'mutualist and CQ-
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operative brain' is Credit Agricole's strength it is also clearly its 
weakness, building inertia into the organisation which must deal with a 
rapidly changing commercial environment. 
Deutsche Bank 
i. Deustche Bank has the most comprehensive system of strategic control 
amongst the banks within the research sample. A structured strategic 
plan, the framework of which is provided by Group Strategy, forms the 
foundation of the strategic control system: forcing premises to be 
identified, the specification of short term targets for implementation 
and the utilisation of strategic surveiJIance and environmental scanning 
information. Divisional progress is checked formally with an annual 
review by the Board, but responsibility for results remains firmly in the 
hands of the divisional management teams. 
u. The strength of the Deutsche Bank strategic control system is in its 
clear and relatively comprehensive structure. Its requirements are 
explicit and unambiguous and as a result there is an awareness of the 
need to accomplish the strategic objectives. The weakness in the 
system is that those items and tools not required in the completion of 
the strategic plan are marginalised (and potentially ignored), for 
example scenario planning and special alert control or qualitative 
('woolly' and difficult to describe) issues. Greater use of informal 
strategic control could also be made, with for example not just the 
Group Board discussing "critical projects" but with wider 
participation. 
Dresdner Bank 
I. Dresdner Bank was found to have no specified Group strategic 
management system, instead individual businesses pursue their own 
course. In the case of the retail bank this means that operational and 
financial reporting forms the basis of strategic control. Informal 
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strategic control's "two way communications" were said to fill any 
strategic control information gaps, however, no evidence of how this 
was carried out was made available. 
11. The current system of strategic management in Dresdner Bank appears 
to forgo any value derived by the businesses from the centre. The 
centre was said to advise the businesses; however, no formal evidence 
of this was found or indeed, of what this advice might be. Conversely, 
the Board appears not to require any form of long term strategic 
information from its retail bank (beyond informal sources), apparently 
satisfied with short term fmancial and operational data. In short 
strategic control appears to be ignored within Dresdner Bank, leaving 
one to assume that unlike all the other retail banks in the sample, it is 
firmly placed within the 'financial control' stereotype as defined by 
Goold and Campbell (I 990b). 
Lloyds TSB 
I. Lloyds TSB has a comprehensive system of strategic control built upon 
the concept of maximising shareholder value. This concept (and the 
subsequent ratios and thresholds that are required to be met as a result) 
is integrated into the strategic management and strategic control 
systems, with implementation control being a key aspect. 
Responsibility for strategic management and strategy delivery remains 
with the bllSinesses, although support in strategy formulation is 
available from the Gro11p Strategic Planning Department. Group 
Strategic Planning also acts as the monitoring body of business 
performance, reporting anomalies to the Group Board and preparing 
documentation for a periodic formal review process. It also acts as a 
centre of synthesis, accumulating strategic surveillance and 
environmental scanning reports and tabling these for discussion in 
conjunction with the Group Board. 
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ii. The strength of this system of strategic management is that it identifies 
responsibilities. It allows for business-led strategy formulation (by 
those people in touch with the markets), but imposes a rigorous 
strategic framework upon it (designed by strategy experts) which tests 
its viability. It allocates the management of the strategic control 
system to Group Strategic Planning who monitor strategy 
implementation whilst maintaining a surveillance of the continuously 
changing business environment. It leaves the authorisation of strategic 
decisions (and where necessary the sanctioning of personnel for 
unrealised strategies) in the hands of the Group Board. In so doing it 
allows for a flexible mix of formal and informal strategic control. The 
down side of this system of strategic management and strategic control 
is that they risk becoming routine, with emergent strategies potentially 
being overlooked and the value of some strategic control components 
being diminished (for example, scenario planning or special alert 
control). 
The Royal Bank of Scotland 
i. The Royal Bank of Scotland retail bank has its annual strategy 
development cycle (with a three year perspective) as the basis of its 
strategic management and budgetary systems. Strategic control 
revolves around this cycle too -making use of operational milestones, 
review meetings and mvironmental reports for strategic control 
purposes. The culture is not one of control, however, being more 
about "hiring good people, expecting them to figure out the right thing 
to do and periodically checking in, to check that they are not giving 
you nasty surprises." 
ii. The strategic control system relies on the fact that only a few senior 
managers are involved in The Royal Bank of Scotland's strategic 
management. As such they are able to maintain some form of grasp on 
strategy through the limited formal strategic controls that exist, 
supplemented by frequent informal communications. The lack of 
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strategic thinking, strategic planning and strategic management in 
general however, means that strategic control is weak, replaced instead 
with a reliance upon short term operational (fmancial) controls. 
The above analysis begins to answer the following research question: what are the 
advantages and disadvantages of these strategic control methods? In answering this 
question fully, however, one needs to compare actual practice to theoretical 'best' 
practice, in so doing answering at the same time the final research question: how does 
current strategic control practice' amongst the retail bank sample compare to 
commentators' theoretical models of strategic control? 
In looking at the above strategic control components it is clear that their utilisation 
and their quality of utilisation is affected by certain environmental influences peculiar 
to retail banking. Most notably, the findings show that premise control, special alert 
control and scenario planning utilisation is generally weak within the sample. In 
attempting to analyse this observation, one tentative rationale for this is that the 
relative stability of the retail banking sector in the past, protected retail banks from 
much of the impact of environmental changes and so reduced their need to utilise 
strategic control components fully. In exploring this further and drawing upon the 
same sources as used in Chapter I (Anderton 1995, Palmer and Lucas in McGoldrick 
and Greenland 1994, Howcroft and Lavis 1986), it is logical to note that: if 
deregulation is occurring today then in the past the retail bank industry was regulated 
and protected by legislation; similarly if globalisation is happening today then in the 
past markets were more parochial; and likewise continuing the argument. if 
technology is more open to change today then it was more stable yesterday and if 
management tasks are more complex today then in the past they were more 'simple'. 
If one accepts this then, it is possible to argue that strategic planning assumptions or 
premises were less likely to change and so control over those premises was less 
necessary. Similarly, if fewer surprises occurred to that foreseen when plans were 
made, then the need for crisis management or any form of special alert control was 
reduced. Likewise, the need to use scenario planning was greatly reduced if the future 
was perceived as relatively stable and well determined. It can be argued therefore that 
retail banking stability in the past has contributed to the current state of strategic 
control practice today. 
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In looking at the strategic control literature as identified in Section 3 of Chapter 2, the 
above analysis of retail bank practice shows that the Schreyogg and Steinman model 
(1987) is satisfied to a limited degree and that the utilisation of the full range of 
strategic control components as described in Table 2 and used in Table 18 is satisfied 
to an even lesser degree. The findings confirm that the Schreyogg and Steinman 
model is a fundamental description of strategic control, in that it can be interpreted to 
include special alert control, operational control, environmental scanning and scenario 
planning even though they are not all explicitly specified in its content. As a 
theoretical construct therefore, it is a powerful generic model, whereby all the retail 
banks investigated would to a limited degree satisfy its criteria. On closer 
investigation, however, it is clear that strategic control practice as discussed above is 
not the same amongst all the retail banks. A glance at Table 18 shows clearly that 
gaps in the utilisation of strategic control components exist, and on closer 
examination that those components that are used have a variable quality of utilisation 
amongst the retail banks. More precisely, whilst the fmdings from most of the retail 
bank sample have shown that premise control, implementation control, strategic 
surveillance, operational controls and environmental scanning are an integral part of 
their strategic control systems, they have also shown that special alert control and 
scenario planning components have not been understood to be as important or as 
necessary, as shown by their absence in most of the sample's strategic control 
systems. Strategy literature writers however, such as Preble and Van der Heijden, 
would argue for their inclusion. 
The use of the generic research model has highlighted the fact that many strategic 
control components (as identified in the literature review in Section 3 of Chapter 2) 
already exist in basic form in European retail banks. It can be argued furthermore, 
that an effective strategic control system needs to draw upon all of these basic 
components, adding missing components or improving the quality of existing 
components and integrating them into a comprehensive structure. Instead, it is all too 
easy for practitioners to believe from reading the literature that a strategic control 
system is a new, complex and expensive system to introduce. This research has 
shown, however, that the building blocks of a strategic control system already exist in 
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the retail banks, but may require some modification and supplementary components in 
order to become a 'best' practice system. 
In answering the above research questions therefore, the answer demands a balanced 
response. Strategic control practices amongst the sample of retail banks do satisfy 
some of the strategic control writers' models of strategic control, but this does not 
mean that they satisfy all aspects of the strategic control writers' models or that they 
can not improve their strategic control practices. If blame for the state of strategic 
control practice amongst the retail banks was to be apportioned, blame should be 
partly placed on the shoulders of strategic control commentators for not clearly 
specifying an easily implemented strategic control system which concerned 
organisations could use in order to give them a comprehensive and effective system of 
strategic control. A word of warning to retail bankers is also needed however, in that 
the retail banking environment has changed and strategic control systems need to keep 
apace with the impact of this change. In the past, the retail banking sector has been 
relatively stable, a stability protected by, amongst other things, regulation and access 
to capital. In today's increasingly deregulated market however, competition is more 
intense and non-banking sources of capital are now available to competitors (as in the 
case of the UK's new supermarket banks for example). As a result, maintaining a 
strategic view and taking strategic decisions is increasingly important to banks rather 
than a purely short term view and short term decision making. If strategic decisions 
are indeed to be made, then this thesis argues that a comprehensive and effective form 
of control over strategy is needed. No longer can it be appropriate for retail banks to 
rely on short term operational control and inadequate strategic control in their . 
decision making: a more rigorous system of strategic control is now required. 
6.2 Section 2: Implications of the Findings on Strategic Control Practice 
This section provides a summary of the implications of the findings for retail banks 
(and potentially other organisations) and puts forward a set of strategic control tools 
as instruments for attaining a rigorous and appropriate system of strategic control. In 
so doing, this section brings together the observations made during the investigation 
as a set of concluding remarks on the subject of strategic control. 
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A rigorous system of strategic control conjures up images of a rigid, bureaucratic 
planning organisation, which sounds far from being adaptable to change. This is not 
what strategic control is about however, and it clearly needs to be avoided. As 
discussed in this section, a rigorous strategic control system needs to allow for the fact 
that: (1) as information requirements change, so should the strategic control system to 
provide that new information; (2) the degree of rigidity of the strategic control system 
needs to be balanced in order to keep apace of changing environmental realities; and-
fmally (3) it needs to be born in mind that although the purpose of strategic control is 
to equip decision-makers with early warning information with a view to preparing for 
the future, the future will always remain unknown. A comprehensive and effective 
strategic control system (i.e. one that is rigorous) needs to ensure that these three 
'fundamentals' are integrated into its design. 
A logical conclusion from the observation that as information requirements change, so 
should the strategic control system to provide that new information, is that effective 
strategic control practice requires a certain level of understanding within management 
about strategy and the willingness amongst all bank employees to learn and improve. 
In order to be able to make the best strategic decisions the people making those 
decisions need to be equipped with sufficient information, which in turn requires that 
a range of information gathering activities have been carried out. Strategic control 
provides the necessary system for identifying that information. Caution is needed 
however, in order to ensure that the strategic control information is appropriate to the 
needs of the organisation. This means that a strategic r:~ntrol system can not be left 
rigid, but instead needs to evolve to meet the changing information requirements of 
the organisation. The 'controllers' need to remember, therefore, to control the 
strategic control system in order to ensure that the dynamic of organisational learning 
continues and that valued strategic information is the result. 
In order to acquire this 'learning information', it is clear that information gathering 
opportunities, both internal and external to the organisation, need to be maximised. 
Once collected, the information also needs to be distributed widely within the 
organisation and in particular made available to those who may need it. This is easier 
said than done! The introduction of computerised information systems, however, 
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does facilitate this task. Information technology needs to be used to integrate day to 
day operational information into its longer-tenn strategic context. 
The degree of formality in the strategic control exercised over a strategy should2 
indicate the level of importance the organisation places upon the strategy. This leads 
us to ask the question about which is better: a formal or informal strategic control 
system? The answer must be a practical one: if the strategy is perceived as being of 
fundamental importance for the organisation, it will require a comprehensive system 
of strategic control, which if it is to be completely effective will need also to be 
formalised into a structured system The rationale behind this statement is that an 
informal system of strategic control is highly time consuming if it is to be 
comprehensive and effective. The research fmdings show that Credit Agricole has the 
most rigorous system of informal strategic control amongst the sample of retail banks 
and one respondent noted that its senior management (some 200 people) spend "one 
fifth of their time" in meetings (4 complete days every month) "trying to fmd what 
brings us together and not that which pulls us apart". Clearly not only is this type of 
informal system time consuming, but also it requires a culture that fits with it. The 
reality of the commercial situation however is that most retail banks will be unlikely 
to be in a position to introduce a fully comprehensive and effective informal system of 
strategic control. 
The above discussion would tend to suggest that an organisation with a we3k strategic 
control system is likely to have a poor understanding of the concept of strategy itself 
or at least does not place a high regard on the importance of attaining the strategy. In 
other words, if a strategy is of critical importance to the organisation, then it will 
allocate the maximum resources possible to ensure that the strategy is accomplished 
and, in which case, in terms of strategic control, the management of the organisation 
will maintain the keenest of interests in the strategy and will want to be informed of 
any developments as and when they occur. This does not mean that informal strategic 
control will not be used, but it does mean that it will be organised into a formal 
strategic control system, whereby opportunities for informal strategic control reports 
and discussions are an integral part of a more formal system. Informal strategic 
2 The conditional tense, "should'" is used, because a definitive statement would assume that all management 
were aware ofthe importance of strategic control and understood what it was, which unfortunately is not the 
case. 
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control's major value is indeed its flexible nature, allowing organisations flexibility to 
manage the impact of a changing environment. 
In thinking about the degree of formality or informality in strategic control and the 
need for organisations to learn, the compromise made could be likened to parenting 
(Goold, Campbell and Alexander 1998). Parental control over offspring is an inexact 
science, with differences between parental practices existing, likewise is the practice 
of strategic control. The aim of more formal, rigid control practices that parents 
impose upon their children when young is to ensure their safety and discipline, until 
such time they are equipped with their own personal understanding of right and wrong 
and are able to make their own 'best' decisions. Similarly the management of an 
organisation will need to exercise strict strategic control on organisational activities 
until a strategic control ethos has been generated throughout the organisation, 
whereby strategic information is routinely circulated in order to maximise 
organisational learning. 
Much of the underlying philosophy of strategic control is an attitude or understanding 
to check, monitor and evaluate. The problems faced in gaining this attitude, can be 
likened to the similar mind-shift that was required to move away from the backward 
looking, legalistic form of accountancy systems, to the introduction of forward 
looking, fmancial management systems. This mind-shift takes time to introduce, but 
those organisations that do not have this attitude need to make efforts to acquire it and 
those that do have this attitude need to fme tune it and make it more rigorous. Indeed, 
if management thought '-and the control system?' at every stage of strategic 
management, it would facilitate the management of strategic thinking, learning and 
implementation and would provide clarity and direction to their strategic management 
system and strategy. At British Telecom3, for example, one respondent called this 
mental state of the organisation, the point when management become "active 
reflectors". 
l A research interview on the subject of strategic control was carried out with a key strategy manager at 
British Telecom during the course of this investigation, further details however have not been included in 
this thesis as it is not a retail bank and is not therefore directly relevant. Prior to this investigation, related 
research interviews were also carried out on the subject of strategic control with a number of leading 
European petrochemical companies and these too have not been included for the purpose of this thesis for 
the same reason. 
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The 'ownership' of strategic control can be shown to need top management, Board 
level and CEO level commitment, whilst at the same time relying upon devolved 
decision making. On the one hand, senior management need to maintain strategic 
control over business operations as well as providing businesses with 'valuable' 
senior management input in their pursuit of strategy, and on the other business 
management needs to be free to develop their own strategic control system specific to 
the strategic management 0 f their business. 
The research findings have shown that strategic control is still at an early stage of 
development in European retail banking. It shows further that those business 
organisations buying in consulting expertise, mostly from the USA (i.e. Deutsche 
Bank and Lloyds TSB), appear from the fmdings to be the 'best' equipped amongst 
the research sample to deal with the increasingly rapid changing environment. 
A 'best practice' strategic control system will allow for opportunities for early 
warning to be raised, and thereby allow for prompt strategic decisions to be made. 
Strategic control, it must be noted, is not simply a return to the strategic planning 
methodology of the 1970's and early 1980's. It is not merely a method for planning, 
but rather it creates a framework for the evaluation of strategy, reminding 
management not just to remember the feedback loops of the control system, but also 
to feedforward information and to be pro active in the monitoring and surveillance of 
strategy. Strategic control thus allows for strategic progress as put forward by 
Mintzberg (1996 pp. 13-21), whereby on the one hand, an early warning of strategic 
progress moving away from that intended is given (e.g. highlighting the likelihood of 
deliberate strategy becoming unrealised strategy), and on the other, providing an early 
warning 0 f the appearance 0 f new emergent strategy, so that this new strategy can 
introduced as soon as possible into the organisations strategic management system. 
In the literature review of Chapter 2, it is argued that the more rigorous the strategic 
control system employed (in terms of its comprehensive nature and effectiveness), the 
more focused the organisation will be upon the complete strategy process -from 
formulation to strategy implementation. It is clear also, from the above discussion, 
that the more rigorous the system of strategic control, the earlier the warning of any 
derailment or likely derailment or new direction of strategy away from that foreseen. 
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A direct consequence of this early warning is that a more rigorous system of strategic 
control requires an organisation that is open to learning and willing to adapt to 
change. There is no point after al~ in an organisation introducing a system of 
strategic control to provide early warning of the need to introduce change, if the 
organisation is not willing to change. 
The recommendations for a 'best practice' strategic control system have been 
developed from the above discussions, around two twin requirements, namely the 
need for organisations to develop a rigorous strategic control system which also has 
built in adaptability to allow for environmental change and organisationally specific 
preferences. The use of a range of strategic control 'tools' is therefore proposed; the 
details of each tool are described below. 
Premises 
Key underlying assumptions or premises should be identified for all 
businesses within an organisation. These assumptions should form the 
bedrock of the organisation's strategic management system and as such 
should be the same for all businesses. A knowledge of the key 
assumptions provides clarity of strategic direction and facilitates strategic 
decision making. 
Scenarios 
Different potential scenarios should be used to test strategies prior to their 
implementation. Furthermore, once a strategy has begun to be 
implemented their continued testing against scenarios should be 
maintained, in order to check that the strategy is still 'best' in the light of 
up-dated scenario parameters. The use of scenarios allows for a valuable 
periodic review of strategy and above all encourages learning. Senior 
management should participate in and encourage businesses to carry out 
scenario planning, ensuring that reports of findings are circulated where 
appropriate throughout the organisation. 
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Critical projects' discussions 
The utilisation of critical projects' discussions should be encouraged. 
These discussions might take the form of a strategy conference, as in the 
case of Lloyds TSB for example. The aim should be to encourage an 
awareness of critical strategic issues, to generate strategic thinking and to 
distribute information on strategic decisions. Senior management should 
participate in these discussions and should encourage the widest 
appropriate participation from employees. 
Environmental information reports 
The environment, both the operating environment and the remote 
environment, should be scanned regularly in order to identity change. 
This information gathering activity should be wide ranging, focusing on 
changes rather than their current relevance to business operations. Senior 
management should ensure reports of these environmental changes are 
circulated widely. 
Balanced scorecards 
The use of a balanced scorecard will ensure that a balanced perspective of 
operational control is maintained (contributing to balanced strategic 
control perspective). providing financial, customer, internal business, 
innovation and learning perspectives (as discussed in Chapter 2). The 
aim of which "is like the dials in an air plane cockpit: it gives managers 
complex information at a glance" (Kaplan and Norton 1992). Senior 
management should ensure that all businesses produce and use a balanced 
scorecard for strategic management purposes and report upon it. 
Milestones 
The introduction of milestones for all businesses will ensure short-term 
implementation contro~ allowing for 'stop-go' judgements to be made 
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upon strategic progress. Senior management should require that 
appropriate milestones are used and are reported upon, but should leave 
the responsibility of the selection of the appropriate milestone in the 
hands ofthe business units' management. 
Risk management 
-
Awareness should be maintained of the risks an organisation faces and 
some form of preparation should be carried out to deal with that risk 
occurring. It is senior management's responsibility to ensure that its 
businesses prepare for all risks, particularly strategic ones (thereby 
assuring special alert control). 
Fundamental to the above list of tools is a strategic management framework, upon 
which these tools are hung in order to provide a complete and effective strategic 
control system. This framework whilst enabling the development of strategy and 
opportunities for leaning, needs to also ensure a rigorous control over strategy, 
allowing for both informal as well as formal strategic control. The advantages of a 
formal system of strategic control, such as the removal of ambiguity and the use of a 
timetable, need to be weighed against its disadvantages, for example increased 
bureaucracy and rigidity. The formal-informal equation will need to be 
organisationally specific, allowing for a strategic framework that is appropriate to the 
management of the strategic control organisation elements as identified in Figure 23, 
namely strategy, control and people. 
6.3 Limitations and Avenues for Further Research 
This research has been ambitious in its scope, attempting to capture a picture of 
strategic control practice within a sample of European retail banks and compare this 
practice to theoretical best practice in order to provide some useful recommendations 
for practitioners. In so doing various difficulties were faced and various choices were 
made. As a such the research will contain a number of inherent limitations. 
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Finally, further research is needed to detennine the impact of introducing a more 
rigorous system of strategic control within European retail banks. Analysis of the 
'before, during and after' introduction of a rigorous strategic control system would 
provide many valuable learning opportunities for retail banks and other organisations 
embarked upon improving their strategic control practices. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
In order to investigate the PhD research questions and satisfY the research objectives, 
the following 'accessible' interview questions have been produced. These interview 
questions were designed to provide findings that would allow for examples of actual 
---strategic control practice in leading European banking organisations to be ascertained._ 
Along side each interview question in Table 19 below is the theoretical basis or 
practical rationale upon which each question is founded. This theoretical basis refers 
the reader to the key source for each question, as outlined in further detail within the 
literature review provided in the main body of the thesis. 
Not all of the questions outlined below were always asked of the respondents 
interviewed. The reason for this is predominantly one of time, whereby the 
interviewee quite simply over ran on the quantity of information provided on some 
questions, leaving no time for a response to be given on others. Occasionally, 
however, as in the case of one interview at Dresdner Bank for example, some of the 
questions were not relevant due to the responses provided to earlier questions. This 
said, through having at least two respondents from each banking organisation 
providing the research data, any gaps that remained following from one interview were 
generally filled from another. The use of at least two respondents also allowed for 
opportunities to confirm or reject (validate or falsifY) the data provided in earlier 
interviews. Finally, the use of the telephone or letter 'follow-up' with respondents 
provided further precision from the previously collected interview data. 
It must be noted also, that the wording of the interview questions was not strictly 
adhered to during the interviews. The questions below represent a guide or proforma 
of questions that was covered within each banking organisation investigated. The 
reason for this, was the need for flexibility, whereby each interview was pursued in a 
format and structure that was the most appropriate to the situation. One clear example 
of this, was an interview carried out with Credit Agricole, where a direct translation of 
each question was not used because of the need to make allowances for methods of 
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French expression. This said, equivalent or similar questions were asked in order to 
provide answers to the PhD research questions in line with the theoretical basis for 
each question as shown below. 
Table 19: Interview Questions 
nterview question 
~ould you please briefly describe the 
[bank's strategic management system? 
Does your bank monitor its strategy? 
Does your bank review formulated 
strategy to see ifit's still valid? Ifso, how 
egularly? 
Theoretical basis/practical rationale for 
the interview question __ . ____ ~ __________ _ 
An introductory coverall question that 
allows for subsequent probing. 
A further introductory coverall to provide 
a preliminary check on the rigour and use 
of strategic control. 
To check on awareness ofunrealized and 
deliberate strategy, premise control and 
implementation (stop/go) control. 
Are the underlying assumptions established General coverall to capture all Schreyogg 
during strategy formulation checked? and Preble controls, as well as the 
existence of intended strategy. 
s strategy implementation reviewed? If 
so, how regularly? 
iHow and when is feedback of strategic 
progress given? Are milestones used? 
s the control system itself reviewed? If 
~o, how regularly? 
How are the views ofthe future captured 
and used? Is scenario planning used? 
How does your bank make provision for 
sudden change? 
How do other domestic banks control of 
strategy differ to yours? And foreign 
banks? 
To check on implementation control and 
deliberate/realizedlunrealized strategy. 
To check on the implementation reporting 
process, operational controls (financial and 
departmental reports), deliberate strategy 
and the use of milestones. 
To check on strategic control system 
rigour. 
To understand the nature of the company's 
strategic surveillance/environmental 
scanning system and on how they decide 
upon intended strategy (if they indeed do). 
To verifY the existence 0 f a special alert 
control system. 
To explore and confirm comparative 
management theory and culture theory. 
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at do you think are the influences on 
rategic control internal and external to 
he organisation? 
oes nationality have an impact on 
trategic control? 
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Theoretical basis/practical rationale for 
the interview question 
To verilY the respondents view upon own 
model. 
To confirm comparative management 
theory, culture theory and own model. 
e all influences of the same importance? To verifY the respondents views on the 
. ch are the most important? model and on areas not covered by it. 
t do you think of this model? Which To explore and perfect the model. 
spects are right, which are wrong? 
o retail banks exist as such these days or To check on banking theory and practices. 
e banks becoming more universal or is 
etail financial services a better term? 
ow do you see the future of European 
'retail' banking? 
ow does your bank distinguish between 
hat is strategic and what is technical? 
at do you think are the benefits of 
eeping control over strategy? What are 
he disadvantages/drawbacks? 
To compare reported sources accounts of 
banking future with practitioners 
perspectives. 
To compare the respondents 
interpretation/understanding of strategic 
theory with actual practice. 
To understand the respondents view of 
strategic contro~ financial and operational 
control. 
What makes a strategy worth controlling? To discover the respondents views on the 
worth of strategic control. 
ould you describe the people for me in 
he bank -what is their 
tionalitylbackground? 
To assess the type of people within the 
bank. 
ould you describe the culture of the bank To assess the type of culture within the 
formal/informa~ top downlbottom up? bank. 
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Appendix 2: Excerpts of an Interview with a UK Academic 
Introduction 
This interview took place in the summer of 1995. The interviewee is David Asch, 
Dean ofthe Open University Business School, who, of particular interest to this thesis, 
published the following paper on strategic control: 
"Strategic Control: A problem Looking for a Solution" in Long Range_. 
Planning 1992, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 105-110 
Commentary 
To start the ball rolling I was going to ask you whether you in your experience have 
come across companies having difficulties distinguishing between strategic and 
tactical? 
I don't think actually most companies make a distinction to be quite honest ... One of 
the things I refer to in that article is that - and I don't see the evidence myself since 
writing it that it has changed - most companies have fairly extensive financial reporting 
on monthly, weekly, annual, whatever the basis is, that tends to be fairly 
comprehensive, if you take for example, companies like GEC, the notion of a three 
page report that captures everything you need to know, is primarily - not solely 
because the front pages are a commentary - but it primarily financially driven. Now 
what that tells us it seems to be that if it's financially driven ergo it's historically 
[driven], because that's where the numbers have come from, these are the sales from 
last month or whatever the view it is now. So that is if you like standard control 
information that Boards of Directors, Senior Managers, Managers all the way down 
the line receive. It seems to me that what isn't so widely disseminated is whatever 
work organisations do in a much looser way, such as, for example measuring market 
share. Now marketing departments often measure the market share of product and so 
on and so forth, but it does seem to me that that's not so widely disseminated as the 
financial inf6rmation, and a number of possible reasons for that are: one would be that 
of course most of the time, 99% of the time, market share data is very unreliable. A 
company I did a lot of research in, Rank Xerox, for example, who are actually 
'whizzos' at measuring market share, so they can quote it to you how they compare 
against key competitors like Cannon, Kodak, Toshiba and so on, all the major 
competitors, but you actually look at how that data is prepared, it's sample data, fairly 
small samples, and there are a number of ways of doing it, you can measure it for 
example on how many let us say medium sized photocopiers were installed in the last 
month? Those are new photocopiers, nobody counts the used or reconditioned ones, 
so: a) it cuts out a big chunk of the market, or possibly a big chunk of the market, 
nobody actually knows, but everybody knows that reconditioned machines are in that 
particular market. The second thing is if Rank Xerox discover as they would on say a 
mid range machines that they are number two to Cannon, perhaps ahead ofToshiba or 
some of the others who are away down, they then do another little sum which 
measures the number of photocopiers that are made in a month, again its sample data, 
in using that measure Xerox comes out at number 1, well what a surprise! I think the 
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key point is that that data is subject to significance variation, its much less certain, as 
certainty goes than say historic financial infonnation. 
With that in mind, do you see that information or do they see that information as 
more of a tactical instrument or a strategic instrument? 
I think its quite blurred you see, because companies like Xerox that I know quite well 
in the UK and internationally tend to measure that as a matter of course, now I don't 
think they necessarily see it as tactical or strategic, they see it as infonnation and they 
establish targets then, that are argued as strategic targets that say we want to be 
number 1 or best in class or whatever in this range of products and-semces, soCdon'C· 
think they ever explicitly state the difference, implicitly I think they are both, because 
what they then do is they track there perfonnance over time, but we have to recognise 
is that, that sort of data is very uncertain and if the company doesn't like the message, 
and of course I am talking from say a UK perspective here in terms of say Rank Xerox, 
right, when they might need to tell Headquarters in the States that they are actually 
doing better than they are, so there are also political things that come into those as 
~ well. 
I was wondering if you could describe what you think is the most common method of 
strategic planning actually made use oj? 
Strategic Planning, well that interesting, I mean in companies like the GEC Group, 
Rank Xerox, there is a bank that I know, a small bank... Planning seems to be not as 
necessarily we would teach it, you know, whether you follow the Argenti or Andrews 
approach, those two, so you do a proper assessment of this that and the other, 
objectives, looking at your strengths and weaknesses, etc. There are a whole series of 
models like that, that say this is how one should plan and so on. None of them actually 
seem to do that in my experience, what they tend to do it seems to me, I'm just trying 
to think if there are any exceptions in those countries that I mentioned I don't think 
there are substantial exceptions actually. What they tend to do is to take where they 
are today, which is as good a start as any because a company can't change its history, 
and say what do we expect we will do next year in the light of assumptions that we are 
going to make about how the markets are going to develop wherever it is they are 
going to go? Now thq then role forward on the basis of those assumptions what they 
think the sales revenues and hence costs, profits etc. are going to be, and they role 
forward things like what they anticipate market share to be and so on. What it seems 
to me, is it's very interesting that they are not so good as they say. I can think of a PC 
company currently that's launching a new product, a new PC, I thought as a non-
expert as quite deliberate: they say we are going to do this, we are going to spend this 
much on advertising and promotion and we've got the distribution channels worked 
out, etc. What they haven't done though is to say or to think through what are 
competitors going to do? So this company competes with outfits like say Compacq, 
IBM, Hewlett Packard and so on and so forth, but this new product, it's a home based 
PC, would actually also lead to competition with the manufacturers of say TV's and 
stereo systems. So they needed to in addition think through (which they hadn't) what 
would Compacq do when they see us launch this new product, what would people like 
Sony or JVC or whatever do? So in a planning context that is really quite restricted I 
would say. I don't think its quite as bad as firefighting, but I think what is quite 
surprising in 1995 is that it's still so crude! I would have expected I think, because 
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these are all pretty large companies, I would have expected perhaps a larger element of 
sophistication and perhaps more of a demonstration of understanding the subtleties in 
the market place. I will give you two examples if you like, in the case of the PC 
Compacq world, what's quite clear from all the data that they have, that we've looked 
at, is that the PC world is changing from the professional as they call it, i.e. office 
based PC to a homebased PC market. What they are saying is office PCs are now a 
replacement market largely, most companies that are going to have them have already 
got them, and they are just talking about upgrades, replacements and so on. The big 
untapped market, and if you think back to TV ads in the Autumn coming up to the run 
up of Christmas ofIast year we had TV ads for Intel, IBM and Apple and so on. Now 
what they are all saying is the consumer market is the big one to go fo~r~wlliinliey 
haven't yet cracked, it seems to me in the UK anyway, what the implications of that 
are for distribution networks and so on, nor have they cracked yet issues around 
customer perceptions of PCs. I mean in terms of customers being non professional 
buyers, as an industry that gives them opportunities in the sense of the home buyer is 
nowhere near as sophisticated as the corporate buyer man, but nevertheless they are 
probably much more price sensitive in some ways. So there are a whole heap of issues 
and about competitor responses in particular - that I know haven't yet really been 
thought through. The other example I would give would be I think in terms of the 
reprographic marketplace which has shifted, I mean that's been a replacement 
marketplace for some time. But the major players at the top end of reprographics, like 
Rank Xerox, like Kodak and so on, I don't think have yet fully thought through - well 
partly - what they are doing, and what the positioning of themselves in their products 
should be ... 
With that in mind do companies monitor their strategies to see what they are doing, 
and whether they are achieving the results they want? 
I think they monitor them but only in the sense that their conventional reports talk 
about fmancial performance against budgets, for example. So the assumption then is 
that the project reflects the strategy, which of course it mayor may not. The 
difficulties seems to me for companies is to understand why or why not they might be 
on target. The assumption then is if they are on target, i.e. they are hitting the budget 
or perhaps exceeding the budget lets say in sales revenues, there on course, now the 
fact..; of course that they may be on course for completely different strategic reasoris 
than those reasons that they originally thought about: they may have said well 
customers really like this particular feature of the product or service that we are offer, 
but in fact they like something else much better, if you don't pick that up it might have 
interesting implications for future product or service development. 
Now if we go through the strategy process. They formulate a strategy these 
companies presumably, they want to be number 1 in a particular sector, but do they 
review that this strategy's still valid depending on perhaps what their competitors are 
doing or what other criteria is going on? 
It depends. If it's successful, let us say they are hitting the revenues hard and I'm 
using that as short hand for hitting everything else· as well, of course that may not 
always be the case. Let us assume they are successful, the odds are that they won't be 
asking the questions, if they are successful they don't need to! If they are not hitting it, 
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if there is a revenue shortfall, because perhaps the products are not being as successful 
as they might me, then they start to look as why this might be the case. 
So it's a negative action? 
Then again it maybe too late, a lot here depends on the nature of the industry, if you 
are in, let's choose two extremes, if you are in the PC industry for example and you are 
flogging a PC for about £1,000, it's a very small item, you might not these days have 
sufficient advance warning that your product for whatever reason is not so acceptable 
compared to competitors. So general knowledge is fairly wide across that particular 
group, but nevertheless you may not pick it up in the same way as perhaps say in the 
top end of re pro graphics, the Xerox's, the Kodak's and the Canon's of this world, they 
would know what the forward orders are because they are selling bits of kit for 
£150,000-£200,000, so selling them is quite different. So in other words Xerox could 
have a view about the acceptability of its products, perhaps more in advance than say a 
PC manufacturer might have, and that's largely to do with a sort of different selling 
and distribution processes. 
There is another over or underpinning dimension which I think is actually neglected to 
some extent, and that's the political context in which these decisions and reviews take 
place, in as much as, if, and 1 can think of a case in a company where a new product 
was coming up and an assessment had been done on volumes, prices, revenues and 
profits that these products were going to generate, now 1 was at a Board Meeting 
when the Marketing Manager who as it were was the product champion for this 
particular product, made a presentation, said these are what we expect, and someone 
asked the question: "1 don't really believe these volumes!" They were predicting 
volumes of 500,000 units with a fairly small retail price of 50p, so you know half a 
million sounds a lot, but in that context it's not a lot. The question was asked we 
don't really believe these volumes, because they say you've got 600, 500 and 400,000 
units estimated, you know sort of good, average and poor, or whatever it was. Now 
the Marketing Managers response to this was these are the absolute minimum's that 
they could expect, and anyway there were cut-off points for TV advertising and so on, 
so if they didn't hit those volumes they could pull the advertising out. Now what 
actually happened to the product - again it's interesting because what they hadn't 
anticipated was that in t:idt particular industry, there was a gravy sauce or a soup mix 
or something, a fairly simple product actually, but there was a new one, a new product, 
was that competitors could actually replicate that product in about a month, because 
they would pick one off the shelf, analyse what they have done with it, and then do the 
same things themselves, different packaging, price and so on. The other interesting 
things in the case that went to the Board, they'd say they had done some Market 
Research which said what's the propensity to buy at 20p, 50p or whatever the price 
was 1 can't remember, and they said OK the propensity to buy is a certain percentage 
at say 40p, but the actual launch price for the customer discounted for retail was set 
above that -so in a way that undercut, if anybody had bothered to look, the 
assumptions that were made about volumes. Now in the event the product bombed, so 
if they said they were going to sell half a million units, that actually sold about 200,000 
-it was still a profitable project/product, but nevertheless it was nowhere as near as 
successful as had been anticipated. Now this was quietly forgotten, and the Marketing 
Manger is now Chief Executive of the company, now it seems to me to be an 
interesting legal tale for what its worth in the terms of that it was not in the Marketing 
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Manager's or the then Chief Executive's interest, because the Marketing Manger was 
his protege, as it were, to explore in too much detail, nor to have a detailed inquest as 
to what had happened! So in many organisations I really believe now, that we can 
look at the rational process, say have we done the research, have we done this, have 
we done that, are the costs right and so on, but it seems to me now that the reality is 
we can do all that, but if someone has the ear of the Chief Exec., or whoever it is that 
is making the decisions, those sort of political issues that are really crucial. 
There is not a sort of a rigorous planning system at all? 
It might be rigorous at one level. 
It can be bent and got around? 
Exactly, got around yes. It can be subverted. 
How about once a strategy is on course, I suppose it's your gravy packet again, 
they're still not chasing it up depending on these political factors? 
Yes. This is of course actually where organisations are fascinating in a sense, that you 
look at the successes and whoever is responsible for the success would of course 
trumpet it on the basis on getting promotion to the Board or getting a bonus or 
whatever it is. Whereas if it is not a success indeed if it's a failure, you might say: Ah! 
this is because, you know competitors have introduced you know a better product, 
quicker and cheaper than we could or whatever the reasons for that are, and so the 
whole issue then is about shifting responsibility for that, and of course you do that, or 
managers seem to do that, actually on quite different reference points, so if it a success 
its because we're really good and if it's a failure its because we are still good but the 
competitors did something else or the customers are stupid or something, they don't 
understand the benefits that we offer! Talking to another PC company for example, 
they were saying, our computers, our PCs are ten times better than Compacq's, and 
you say: who cares? What's the point? If the market is happy with a Compacq PC, 
you know at £ 1,000 or whatever it is, why would they want to buy your's which might 
have more bells and whistles on it or whatever for £1,200, because you haven't told 
them th:.i yours is ten times better than theirs for a start, you just assuming that they 
know, so there are big issues around here in perceptions in organisations as well as the 
politics of it. 
Do you think that there is this sort of monitoring and if there is any monitoring is it 
done on a regular basis, or on a sort of normal company planning timetables, or? 
I think it varies enormously, if we think first of a fairly standard product line that a 
company has then it tends to be regular because it is built into the system for example, 
and probably no one has as it were the political stake in what is going on. 
So they would be using the sort of typical tactical reporting? 
Yes, typical standard, weekly, monthly whatever. Now on the other hand if we've got 
and I think it was Ansoff who suggested that the strategic projects ought to have a 
different method of looking at them, I think some companies do that, if they have a 
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really major project, that's viewed quite differently, the reporting lines, and the 
reporting methods, and the issues that are reported on, are quite different and that's 
because it might actually have really important consequences for the future of the 
organisation, and those consequences might be not just to do with the success of that 
particular product, but the fact that if that product is successful it can have a cascade, a 
halo effect, on all other products, but they don't change just because we have said, this 
is a really good thing here, and we're really an excellent organisation to have done 
that, that can have knock on effects to everything else that we do. The best example 
of that in the UK at the moment is as I understand is the Volvo 850 T5 whatever it's 
called which is not going to sell in any great numbers, they might sell a couple of 
hundred cars, but this is the super fast estate, faster than a Ferrari in 4th gear - you 
read the ad it's quite interesting! They'll sell maybe 200 so that's nothing in terms of 
UK market, but the halo effect on that, on sales and other parts of the Volvo range, 
and in shifting customer perceptions on what Volvo now means, have, as I understand 
it, been quite significant. So if you were managing Volvo in other words you'd been 
watching that like a hawk, because that would be shifting customer perceptions to 
enable you to sell more cars. 
How closely is watching like a hawk would you say? Would they do it every month or? 
Oh, probably, if not - I mean what some companies do, I don't know if Volvo does, 
what some companies do, is they would monitor that - for example they know when 
they have a campaign to say the press or TV or whatever it is for a product like a car, 
so they would be doing things like a gallop type poll of the general population so you 
know here in Milton Keynes they might have a couple of people out in the streets 
saying, did you see the latest ad for Volvo or much more subtlety what's your opinion 
of Volvo cars, and then what they might do, ultimately they will track that to see, 
because you might say after the advertising campaign, let us say recognition ofVolvo 
or whoever it is, is say, 9 out of 10 people have heard of them, and then you would 
unscramble what that actually means. So that might be a week after, you might do it 
again a month after to see how knowledge of the product or the company decays over 
time, so what some companies do, not all of them, but some of them do, say here is the 
promotional point, say the 1 st August and track then how understanding builds and 
decays over time, because that then would enable them to say well, when we had this 
high recognition did we have sufficient bits in the warehouse to meet us or whatever? 
If we go to the end pOint of the strategy process once things have been accomplished 
and they are all sitting in place, do they monitor that to see if the strategy was 
successful, looking back? 
No. There is a little known ditti - a little poem that I reflect on in strategy which is: 
"Two ships set sail in the selfsame breezes blow, but it is the set of the sail and not the 
gale that bids them where they go." That's the first verse, so they've been buffeted all 
the time and a voyage/a journey is actually quite a good analogy in some sense for 
strategy, in other words we might say today in '95, this is where we want to be in '97, 
so you go from point "a" roughly [to point "b"] and companies sort of have those sort 
of fairly simple statements of intent, now what do they do when they have done that? 
And of course, the difficult part is say in the case of Canon, we can all as an 
organisation coalesce behind a fairly simple objective: "beat Xerox because they were 
number 1 and when we have done that we'll be number 1 ", and then of course it gets 
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really hard because we have to sustain that position, and when you are number 1 there 
is only really one place to go which is to number 2, unless you can retain [the position]. 
So in sense I don't think they stop and look back and say we have achieved that, but I 
think they do stop or pause rather on individual projects, products or services or 
whatever and they say this was what was really successful, do we understand why that 
was the case, are we able to repeat this? But I don't think in an organisational sense, 
we have a look at the organisation and say: "hay, that's really good", because in that 
sense it is just like a way station on a much longer journey. 
What about the small control system, do they actually look back and say well why 
don't we have a better control system and sort of review the actual control system we---
have had? 
That's very interesting. I suspect they do, but I don't know, I think it tends to 
manifest itself more in terms of this is the information we need to know, but for some 
reason we can't get it, we don't have it or something, so in that sense there is a review, 
because of one of the things again that happens is they often will set up new projects, 
new products, whatever it might be and they are just as it were bolted into the existing 
control system that mayor may not be appropriate, so that information can become 
distorted. Well, not distorted but it doesn't necessarily tell us what we need to know, 
whether or not we are being successful and so whether problems are there. 
If there was a better control system in place or a control system in place at all these 
stages would that improve the awareness of what's going on in the company? 
Well, I think, if we take that to mean that the control system allows for the 
dissemination of information arising from it, then yes, but if it is just a system that - let 
me give you another example from a completely different context, if you think of say, 
what passengers require in an aircraft, so they require it to depart on time and so on, 
they also require it to be clean, lavatories clean, reasonable services, on board services 
and so on. Now what comes back to a point I made earlier, that we know about the 
financial performance of a flight because we can measure the number of passengers on 
board the plane, what we don't necessarily know is customers perceptions of the 
quality of that flight, now often what happens or some of the airlines I have been 
talking to,· often what happens is they do measure what customers think of on board 
services, but that never gets fed back to those that can make a difference, like say, the 
cleaners, so the cleaners may believe they are doing a very good job, but if the 
passengers are saying but, there was insufficient soap in the lavatories or they weren't 
cleaning up or whatever the complaint is, if the cleaners don't know about it they can't 
change it. So in some senses its not just about collecting the information, which we 
often do reasonably well even the more difficult and less certain external information, 
we don't necessarily disseminate it to the right people to change things. 
Who do you think keeps this information? 
Well in an instance like that, it would very often be the Marketing Department because 
they are if you like responsible for say measuring customer satisfaction or whatever it's 
called, so they would get that, and then its up the them to disseminate that information 
to in the case of the Airline say the cleaners. I can think of a case with Rank Xerox 
when they were looking at a customer satisfaction survey run by the Marketing Dept. 
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and it just took them quite a while to realise that on one of the machines the problem 
was with a paper tray, it didn't fit properly, and this was causing customers a problem, 
now that information should have been fed back by fax the next day to the factory, to 
the designers or whoever, so that they could understand that the tray doesn't fit 
properly and presumably bring out some slightly revised version so that it wasn't a 
source of dissatisfaction any more. In that particular instance information did 
eventually go back but it took them about a month as opposed to next day, and you 
just ask the question then, it's not really good enough, in the sense that this could be a 
very serious issue and it might be quite an easy fix for the designers or the engineers or 
whatever to deal with. 
Do you think information is fed more readily up the scale as opposed to down the 
scale? 
Well yes, I would of course warn about information gatekeepers and so on, that's part 
of the role of middle management isn't it, it's to filter the information that travels up 
and that's why in a sense it comes back to politics within the organisation? If it makes 
me look good, I'll forward it up, if doesn't look so good I may say no or I might just 
feed it into the financial year end, by then it's too late to doing anything about it, and 
then we start with the new budget the next year. So I don't think one can escape the 
political context, the other point about information about coming down, well that can 
obviously if it's the Chief Executive can also be quite powerful. Often, because of 
course you receive much more aggregated information at the Board level, drawing 
definitive conclusions from that can make it quite risky, because there may not be a full 
understanding at the top of the organisation, as to what's caused X & Y with people 
lower down ... often it may be slightly over simplified and maybe misleading. 
{interviewee is shown a balanced scorecardfor discussion purposes] 
Do you think those areas, those perspectives, cover all the possible areas which might 
be controlled? 
The comment I would make: let's deal with them in turn: in the financial perspective, 
and this is where I suspect it's more difficult for the UK and American companies, is 
actually this focus now on shareholder value, because if you talk to senior people in 
quoted UK organisations and indeed American organisations, they are very much 
driven by the need to satisfY the next quarter or six months reporting requirement on 
the stock exchange. 
It has to be an improvement? 
It has to be an improvement, and they have to at least hit the target that they have 
effectively negotiated with the analysts, bankers and so on. 
And you think that's different to other countries? 
oh, very much different, they don't have to worry about that sort of stuff to the same 
extent in Germany, France, Japan and that has very interesting consequences in terms 
of what it is you measure, because if you are concerned about the future of your 
company, and this is where the Director's personal interests come into it of course, 
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then you need to ensure that presumably the share price stays up, and so on and so 
forth. This means, or can mean, it doesn't have to be, but it can mean, that the 
perspective you take has to be a much shorter term because you can't commit 
resources for the long-term because ofthe impact that will have on the share price and 
profitability and so on, and I think therefore there is some truth in the notion that was 
banded about over the last 10-20 years, that the Japanese in that sense are much more 
interested in, for instance, building market share and so on, the long-term growth, 
rather than necessarily focusing solely on profitability . 
... There is a very interesting article about a month or so ago in one of the Sunday 
papers, which looked at the history of GEC and compared it to Siemens, the German· 
company, and it took them to where they started from, to where they are today. 
Although GEC is more profitable, Siemens' turnover has grown in leaps and bounds. 
The argument would then be that that mass of Siemens' turnover could, and of course 
it's not a certainty, but could give it of course significant more market power than 
GEC, and you have to ask the question as to the reasons that Siemens' has been able to 
do that and GEC hasn't, and what the other pressures on them are, so that's my worry 
in a sense about the way that we are reporting. You talk to German managers for 
example and they are amazed that the financial focus in the UK. So that's the only 
comment I would make on the financial perspective. 
On the internal business, costs, and allocated and apportioned costs are always a 
problem in organisations, you talk to any manger and say well I've got a budget of 
£100,000 or whatever, but by the way, a very large percentage of that is just charged 
into the department by Head Office or the Centre or something. Cycle times are 
crucial. Quality, only if its related to customers. R & D - I would personally relate R 
& D to cycle time, and core competencies and capabilities. I mean again, actually 
measuring those is quite difficult if you think about - I mean some of the latest thinking 
- from Hamrnal & Prahalad and Grant and so on about this area of core confidences 
and capabilities is I think quite interesting in tenns of the lack of ability to get any 
where near measuring things, because a lot of it is built on a series of complex 
interactions within the organisation that can give you an advantage that you 
competitors can't see. I think it is impossible to measure. Innovative and learning 
perspective, again I mean it would be nice, the key - again it comes back to a future 
perspe;"tive it seems to me, we can measure the number of innovations that we have 
had, and we can perhaps understand the processes by which those innovations have 
occurred, but does that mean necessarily that that's going to happen in the future, and 
that's a difficult one? And it's the same with launching new products and so on. Then 
the customer perspective, there is the cycle time and quality issues. All of those I 
guess should be in there, I would tend to think that, and again it depends on one - you 
see if it were a UK company you would have to start with the financial perspective, 
that would have to be number I. If you were a Japanese company or a German 
company you might [have to start with the technical aspects 1 
You see ... if you read things like the Honda Case by Pascall, the Sony Case, etc. Okay, 
they are not complete stories, of course they're not, but one of the reasons it seems to 
me that have been able to do that is firstly because they are able to take the longer term 
view and not worry about the next three or six months report to the stock exchange, I 
think that's quite important in tenns of establishing the nature, the type, the culture of 
the organisation, so there is that point. The second point is I think they see from what 
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one reads, and I think that you have to acknowledge that may not always be the whole 
truth, but they do seem to be able to learn from their mistakes. Cars are a classic, 
motorbikes are a classic: if you think back about what Toyota's were like 20 odd 
years ago, they were crap! Now you have got a Lexus which is as good as a Mercedes 
or a BMW. It's interesting to see how they moved from producing crap cars in 
organisational terms a fairly short time ago 20-30 years about, to producing a really 
class automobile today, and they have done that by learning, they have done it by 
innovating in production processes. Toyota for example is reputably the lowest cost 
car produced. Ford couldn't do a Lexus, Ford had to buy Jaguar, so I mean there are 
interesting ways about how one approaches it, and that's about an organisations ability 
to learn, and possibly ones ability to learn is coloured by the reward systems that exist 
for management. The classic case again in this area is a GE case from the States "The 
winner who lost". We talked about a manager who is appointed to a GE subsidiary in 
America, appointed as Chief Executive of a subsidiary, and there the subsidiary was in 
trouble, he had two courses of action, one he could completely redesign, re-engineer 
the product, that would take a couple of years, they would loose a lot of money, the 
second one was to do like a "sticking plaster" job which might take a year but in longer 
term the company wouldn't be such a good show. He opted for the first course of 
action the rout of brand re-appraisal, the product and so on, the company lost money 
in year 1 and year 2, and he was sacked. The successor comes in at the beginning of 
year 3 and is quite outstanding! Now, who is actually responsible for those profits, it 
is of course the poor guy who put through the changes that were necessary to ensure 
that the product met the market requirements, but he was out of a job and his 
successor was reaping the rewards, that happens in organisations, and for me you see 
the lesson of that is not just about the short-sighted nature, but the fact is the 
organisation now has lost that ability to learn. 
Sudden changes which effect the environment or the company, how do you control 
those or monitor or cope with those? 
Firstly I think they're industry specific. If you think of major changes that have 
happened in industry, they're fairly rare: telephone selling of insurance and banking is a 
good one. These things don't happen very often, but it changed the nature of 
competition in those industries significantly, and I think Norwich Union were on 
record as saying, they didn't think that telephone insurance would work because 
customers wanted to talk to a bloke or an adviser face to face! What First Direct and 
Direct Line have proved is that's a fallacy for some customers, not for every customer, 
but the large raft of customers. Now Norwich knew about that, so in sense they 
weren't stupid, people running companies like Norwich Union and other insurance 
companies are not fools, but it comes back to really questioning what it is the customer 
is looking for, for your product or service, and then when you know what that is how 
are you best going to deliver it for distribution? Now is seems to me that the Norwich 
Union presumably had the right sort of products in terms of policies that customers 
would want, but had made assumptions, and because those assumptions had been built 
up over time this was not an overnight thing, that customers actually wanted to come 
into an office and sign. I would guess, but it is only a guess on my part, that if they 
had actually bothered to analyse how people interface with them a lot of it would have 
been on the phone. But that message didn't really sink in, so when they heard about 
Direct Line they didn't really believe it would work, but this is if course as we know a 
resounding success and Norwich along with other insurance companies are having to 
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have now a telephone service. This comes back to Directors, Managers, ability to 
perceive these changes as and when they are happening and that can be very, very 
difficult, because we have in this company a traditional way of doing things, and by the 
way we have been very successful in last 5, 10 how every many years we have been 
successful. We've got to be right, haven't we? And who does this bloke think he is 
selling insurance down the phone or whatever it is? So I think there is an issue around 
managers ability to perceive those sort of things, even if we have the information. And 
of course that leads into the other point is that often that information is quite uncertain. 
So you wouldn't place straight reliability on it. 
If you know for a fact, for example your aeroplane has crashed or whatever it is, and 
you are an aeroplane company, you are British Airways or whatever, and you have a 
crisis, do you have a crisis management team, or should you have one? 
The task force type approach? I don't think there is any sense in having one standing 
by, because you don't know what the crisis is going to be, but I think if you do 
recognise that there is a problem -and you see the airline crash is a good example, let 
us assume that a British Airways 737, any 737, crashes which raises question marks 
about presumably the safety of that particular plane. Now if you are BA, I think your 
response could be quite different if you are a smaller regional airline: Virgin let us say. 
Virgin might have a dozen planes, if one of those Virgin planes or another you know 
767 or whatever they use, crashes, then for Virgin this is a major issue and how they 
deal with that and how they deal with the plane makers to cope with the possible 
questions about reliability -by the way why don't you blame the pilot- is different to 
how British Airways would respond, because British Airways is so big and would be 
able to say to Boeing: you have just got to fix this! So their relationship is quite 
different. Now I think you would have some sort of - you might call it a crisis or a 
project team or whatever to look at it - so for example in the case of the Norwich 
Union, if I were running the Norwich Union and I saw the success of Direct Line 
Banking, I would set up a project team to establish something to counter that as 
quickly as possible. That is probably how you would do things, if it were to take you 
outside the normal run of events. You see the difficulty we have is what we didn't 
know when Direct Line started -it's easy in hindsight to say this is how customers 
behave isn't it, but at the time these sort of discontinuities that happen outside are 
actually very difficult to spot, yet alone even when we have spotted it, it's our ability to 
internalise that and come up with a response to it. So in a rationale world the 
information might be there, but it comes down to managers' ability to then respond to 
that. 
What makes a strategy worth controlling? 
Well I think the company has to adopt a pro-active stance, it's no good just been 
buffeted, some of that can happen, I mean using the insurance example so that 
Norwich Union and the other insurance's might well feel quite buffeted by things like 
Direct Line. In the banking. industry the deregulation of the Building Societies in 1988 
is something that effected them all, so to some extent they're buffeted, and you might 
say therefore that any strategy they might have had before it, was pretty worthless if 
they hadn't predicted that sort of thing happening. But as I say those events are 
actually pretty unusual, so it seems to me that if our strategy is to be or to become, 
whatever it is, the number 1 player by doing a whole series ofthings, then we ought to 
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be at best monitoring how well we are achieving against those targets, those objectives 
that we set ourselves. Now the question is: what do we do to actually make that 
happen? And if we find that we had non acceptable stuff or very acceptable or 
whatever it is, we need to then unscramble that through that process to say OK, if we 
want to be number 1 in pes, then we have got to go down this route rather than that 
route. We can't make those decisions until we have gathered enough information or 
sufficient information to enable us to make a reasonably important judgement, and the 
difficulty seems to me, when it comes down to it, is ... the [organisation's] ability to 
pull information together that will enable us to then formulate some sort of response ... 
Doesn't it come down to some sort oJ key competitive advantage criteria, because you 
already know those presumably? 
Presumably you do, but they may change, it comes back to the fact that we have been 
successful for the last 10 years or whatever it is, 20 years, 50 years or something by 
doing that. Is that necessarily what customers are looking for in the future? I mean 
the determinants of strategy arguably would be to support your sources of advantage 
and that would be a very logical, rationale thing to do, but the question is, are those 
the sources of advantage that are going to sustain you for the next 5 to 10 years or 
whatever the relevant time scale is. That's where you can have real issues around 
people's ability to understand. 
Presumably as well they will be controlling those financially sensitive strategies? 
Well, one of the things you would look at would be the key variables so in somewhere 
like in the Airline industry that would be like load factors, you would monitor on a 
flight by flight basis by routes - what's the load factor here and what is the yield, the 
mix of passengers on the plane. 
And do you think that's a strategic element? 
Oh, absolutely, because that would determine things like pricing policies, management 
policies and so on and so forth! If your load factor has gone down, and because it's so 
important, because once a plane takes off with an empty seat it's not like not selling 
your tin of beans today you might sell it tomorrow, the seat has gone forever, so for 
them that's crucial and the yield you get on the overall flight is crucial. 
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Appendix 3: Excerpts of an Interview with a Leading Strategic Thinker 
Introduction 
The aim of this interview was to gain a viewpoint on strategic control practices from 
an independent strategic thinker. 
Commentary 
Do you think there is a pre-disposition that people have towards certain needs for 
control? 
Again it varies from business as to the actual philosophy that they have, why I say 
philosophy, is that at the end of the day in terms of banks, the key thing is risk. Banks 
are about managing risks and depending on the organisation, the operation there is 
different attitudes towards the risk and nobody wants a loss as it were, but if your 
managing a credit card operation or portfolio you would expect there would be a 
portfolio loss, so you are managing it in a totally way from if you're lending to XYZ 
multinational. 
But that would be the same criteria for any bank anywhere in the world, wouldn't it ... 
to manage risks, that's what banks do and that's culture-less in a way? 
Yes, but they are different - no it isn't because the evolution of thinking about it, there 
has been quite a large development or change in the way people think about risks. 
Explain to me the cultural implications of risk management? 
Well, in very simple terms, if you went back to the 1960's, then you were looking at 
single balance sheet management, the people just managed their balance sheet - so I'm 
the Branch Manager, in one country, you get the books, you get the branch, here is 
your balance sheet, here's you assets, your liabilities, you manage it, you understand it. 
One of the changes of occurred in the 70's was the split between asset and liability 
management, so from a strategy/culture standpoint, you manage the two parts of the 
business totally separately, so you said: 'Ah! here's Treasury now' and it's no-longer 
just a utility, they are there, they are managing the liability side of the balance sheet, 
and 'here is the Corporate Bank', and they are no-longer just a sort of an origination 
force, they are actually managing the corporate asset side ofbaIance sheet. 
Surely this happens across the world, again? 
What I am saying is yes that happened in a sort of delayed effect across the world, so 
certain parts of the world caught up in the 80's probably, but in the same way you are 
getting new thinking and a new approach coming in every area of risk, which changes 
the overall strategy of the bank towards risk, and the business that it will do, and the 
control process procedures that it needs to put in place to address that. 
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What are the drivers behind that? 
Sorry, to give you an example of the present: the area that's growing, is the whole area 
of credit derivatives, which I touched on earlier on, where people can try and change 
the nature of their balance sheet, but that means the strategy towards doing certain 
businesses, the ability to control that risk -so when the development of the futures 
market came in and the arrival of the swap market transformed the way people thought 
about the business and managed it. 
What are the of drivers then on the individual, obviously they have got various new 
methods, new products coming up which will require different management of risk, 
but more fundamental to that there's got to be various drivers which allow those new 
products/new developments to come along, would then one of the key drivers be 
legislation allowingfor that to happen, or customer needfor those sort of products? 
I think that... the emphasis in terms of strategy and control is in drawing the 
boundaries rather than being explicit. The individual businesses basically decide on 
what they are doing within those boundaries or going to do within those boundaries, 
rather than having an overall deliberate plan. So this comes back to the shareholder 
value aspect, if you went along and talked to the sort of top level in the banks, they 
may have an idea of what businesses they should be in, but the one thing that most 
people have brained into them now is the return criteria they are looking for, so return 
on "economic capital" is X. Now in terms of the businesses we are in, our portfolio, 
where do our portfolio businesses fit within that framework? The control process is 
very much on the macro level at drawing these parameters of the business, whereas 
going back in time, in terms of what you were eluding to originally, we actually 
determined our strategy, and throughout the organisation there was the plan. The plan 
calls for us to do 1,2,3,4,5. We do 1,2,3,4,5. Where there is now more - this is the 
shape we want to be - now its up to the people in the box to figure out how we do it, 
and to put in control mechanisms where they're in control of what's going on. 
The people in the 'box' are in control of what's going on? 
Yes. Now the type of thing you'll see coming in there, is more emphasis on self 
assessment, ~cause the best people who control the risk are the people who do it, 
rather than people who are coming in to look over their shoulder, or by having very 
detailed procedural manuals. 
You're saying that the controls these days tend to be more of a self-discipline or a self 
imposed structure of control lower down the organisation than one which is imposed 
upon them from on high, which is the old fashioned planning mechanism? 
It is really that once the strategy is determined (within the framework of these 
parameters, which are set in terms of their customers, capital etc.), within each 
business there is a - generally speaking - a fairly documented process that actually 
looks at what they are trying to do from a business and delivery standpoint. So it's 
saying this is the business we want to do, it's the credit card business or it's lending to 
the shoe industry or something. There is a proposal that is put down or a programme 
is put in place, which says what we are going to do in terms of credit cards, this is our 
view of the credit card businesses, we are going to achieve this -and so it's like a plan. 
284 
Appendix 3 
The plans that the planning functions did historically were far more - look at the 
environment and come up with the objectives or bottoms up budgeting... Today my 
sense is that there is more emphasis on implementation in terms of how we are going 
to do it, and the related control process along the way - we are going into this 
business, we are going into the credit derivative business, this is the objectives, this 
what we are earning, what are the systems implications, what are the accounting 
implications, what are the legal implications, or the regulatory implications, and the 
control processes associated with those? 
That whole discussion is going on in the actual business unit for example, who is 
thinking about it, it's not happening at the top at the Board of Directors level? 
No. 
What do they do at the top - this Board of Directors sitting in their 'ivory towers '? 
Well not sitting in the ivory tower of the Board of Directors: it's difficult for me to 
judge! No, the role of the Board of Directors is that it is in turn a control mechanism, 
so they are basically responsible for looking at the direction of the organisations, they 
have a fiduciary responsibility for the things that are on track from that standpoint. .. If 
you look who's on the Board of Directors they should be bringing outside views as to 
the direction and behaviour of the organisation, hopefully by bringing in knowledge 
from other industries. 
If I can just sort of paraphrase all this, you are saying then it's basically these days 
[interrupted] 
It is a form of strategic control - at a high level. 
[continues]a bottom up process these days then, whereas in the past it was top down, 
can Ijust paraphrase it in those two simple terms? 
No. The top down process is in looking at ... a high level, so determining the overall 
direction of the business to get the return on shareholder capital, to make sure there is 
an alignment between what all the various stakeholders wants. If you want to move in 
a particular direction either you change the stakeholders view of the organisation, or 
you change the organisation. There has to be an alignment between the two ... 
Is this view that you are putting across what is actually happening in banks today in 
the high streets, or is it an ideal view of what they should be doing but they are not 
necessarily doing? 
I think that it's in different stages with different players. There is a continuum from ... 
deliberate planning to basically empowered [planning at the business level] ... 
Do you know what sort of stages different banks are in? 
Sorry, I have already made a note about the economic cycle, - the other aspect is 
regulation or the regulatory environment, because banks have historically been a very 
controlled environment, they've been in a very planned environment. One of the 
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changes that has occurred is basically de-regulation and increasing competitiveness, 
that has required a different approach, because you have to be able to respond to what 
is going on out there. So if someone launches a particular type of account or on the 
retail side they are offering a special type of mortgage or whatever it might be, you 
have to be able to respond to it. So organisational flexibility is an issue here. 
Where are these banks in the UK at the moment? Do you know where they are in the 
terms of the system you have talked about, are they all using that, or are they about to 
use it, or are they using bits of it, but not using other bits, or are they still the old 
fashioned planned mechanisms, how do you see banks operating in the UK? 
It's a bit of both, really there is a sort of spectrum of banks, I think what is happening, 
what you see is there is more businesses operating within businesses ... 
So where historically you had the bank, you now have the rise of product management: 
Mr Current Accounts, runs IS million current accounts, he is the product manager and 
determines what happens to current accounts, and there is Mr X who is, etc. Which 
comes back to my thing of running these things as businesses and looking at all the 
implications of the product and what you are doing with it. So I think you'll find that 
as you go round [the banks], the rise of product management and the management of 
the different aspects of businesses as separate businesses within this overall framework 
is something which is fairly prevalent. Where people are in terms of budget process or 
planning cycle processes is going to vary a lot from business to business. I don't know 
specifically within each bank the differences between them - but if you look at the 
merchant banking arms and the bank itself, you would expect a totally different 
approach to strategy and control within those businesses. 
Within the actual organised Group organisation as a whole? 
Yes. Depending on the business, but in a high level I would expect there to be a core 
set of parameters laid down, which you will find if you read the annual reports in terms 
of portfolio returns, etc. 
There must have been at some stage a relinquishing of control basically by the top 
management of the high street banks, so that the various divisions, businesses have 
the flexibility to run their operations the way they see they ought to be run? 
I can't generalise, and I don't know whether it's that simple, because a lot of the new 
organisations have been set up outside of the organisation, look at Barclays and 
BarcIaycard and then if we looked at First Direct? Lloyds and Abbey Life? I think 
there probably is a pattern for major banks for setting up operations that are perhaps 
outside of your main control and then bringing them in, or changing the main stream 
organisation. Remember that most change occurs from... the uncertainty in growth, 
so people respond to threats. The threat being generally the external environment. 
So the Directors of the banks have accepted that they had to change because the 
environment had changed? 
Yes, or because business pressure is such that they need to change. 
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We have talked briefly about culture, but we haven't talked too much about the people 
in British banks, what is their background, is there such a thing as a typical British 
banking person, are banks made up of 'Brits' or are there a lot of Americans in there 
or Europeans all mixed up together, what sort of people operate in these banks, and 
what sort of backgrounds do they have? 
I don't know if I could hold myself out as being an authoritative source on that! I 
think you would find both in terms ofthe culture and in terms of the changes that came 
through, that you would find that there has been a strong US influence on the market, I 
mean on banking. Now that influences through direct recruits ... There is a lot of 
American influence through the recruitment of staff, who have worked for American 
banks, and there are historically the British banks - British banks are quite 
international. So I think you'd find there are a lot of the senior people who have had 
international experience, and that is an important factor in their thinking and culture ... 
somebody who has run Lloyds Bank California or has run HSBC Canada or Barclays 
Singapore... quite often people when they go abroad get the opportunity to run 
countries at an early age, running total businesses... [and they bring this experience 
with them when they return home]. 
The other trend really I think has been the rise of specialists in most organisations, in 
technology for example. Historically the Branch Manager from Little Snoddington, or 
something could go and become head of Personnel, or Head of Technology or 
whatever, and then you go back to being Branch Manger of somewhere else. I think 
the old career paths have changed. 
Are people still staying in one bank doing their sort of entire career life span as 
traditionally they probably were: Lloyds men through and through so to speak? 
I don't think there is an expectation of that now. There are people who have been 
through and through. 
But it's more mixed 
Yes. 
The bargain that's struck is not a life time bargain. I think there is quite a lot of 
material that you can draw out in terms of the way things have changed and the 
influences of change, how both strategies and the related control mechanisms will 
merge ... 
Basically two thirds of companies didn't have or couldn't look beyond two years, they 
were very short tenn, basically responding to the environment. 
And would you say that's typical, a 1-2 year look? 
Well historically it's a reflection of the reaction to the economic environment and 
changes they are going through in deciding. So if you looked at cost cutting, for 
example, clearly we have got beyond the re-engineering stuff now and we are now into 
the revenue prioritised phase. One way to look at it is to just go through the [annual] 
reports, which you are probably doing, looking at Chairman's statements, the Chief 
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Executives statements, and analysing them. Clearly the drivers which effect the banks 
are very susceptible to the environment for a number of reasons. 
So do you think they are controlling the strategy as a general principle? 
I don't know whether you do control strategy, there is an assumption there which I 
don't necessarily agree with. I think that there is basically ... coming back to the 
founding purpose of most organisations, there is a sort of strategy imbedded in the 
organisation which in many organisations still comes through today in one form or 
another. So if! go back to looking at the flotation of Halifax, they will say well the 
Halifax, since its foundation in 1850 something or other, when two or three people met 
together in a pub or something in Halifax, has been doing this. So I think you would 
find that - its management that's been there that's not badly exactly - but there still is a 
background culture in most organisations. 
If you take the view that maybe strategy is a way of thinking about the future and a set 
of goals to achieve, in a shorter period rather than the fundamental mission perhaps, 
but something which is actually achievable within a certain time frame, then in which 
case then there is a possibility of controls, is there not? 
I think - well there are two separate issues: firstly strategy is very much a question of a 
mixture of past, present and future and the past and present have a very strong role on 
the future, because the ability to generate future strategy, must really be built upon an 
organisations capabilities. So coming back to control, rather than control mechanisms, 
is really the alignment of what one is trying to achieve with the organisation'S 
capabilities. Ifthere isn't an alignment [pause in recording] 
We were talking about why you can't control the strategy I believe? 
Its not that you can't control it, but that it is very much a question of alignment with 
the organisational capabilities and basically if you are coming up with something that 
you want to do that's totally different you have to change the organisation before you 
can actually implement the strategy; so in other words if you need particular 
capabilities in terms of human resources or typical skills you need to develop, then you 
Wllilt to be quite sure you have them in place before you start embarking on it. .. 
Okay, so do banks control their strategy? 
The short answer is there are control mechanisms. Obviously, you have to have 
control mechanisms in one form or another, if nothing else they have a minimum 
scorecard, which is that they produce the numbers every month or every day. It varies 
a lot between the types of banks you are talking to, what control position, what control 
mechanisms are in place, because the retail banking side is a very controlled 
environment whereas the corporate wholesale banking side is controlled from a risks 
stand point of control, but is not as controlled an environment, because the difference 
is with the retail side you have basically a fairly standard product or you have a 
product which you have to standardise because you are selling it to 2 million or 15 
million customers, whereas on the wholesale side you are basically tailoring each deal 
to the customer, that says that on the wholesale side you are less descriptive. If you 
look at businesses in terms of being product dominated or customer dominated in 
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tenns of focus... there is a difference of emphasis between businesses which are 
basically: - ''we're in the mortgage business and we're serving our customers", as 
opposed to ''we have these customers and we will serve them in whatever way they 
want to be served". To a certain extent you can say that in the consumer 
banking/wholesale banking split, because the wholesale banking is more customer 
orientated than the retail banking which is more product orientated. 
Coming back to the strategic control clearly there are totally different control 
mechanisms required if for instance you've said that tomorrow you are a bank, and 
tomorrow you want to get into the ABC market and trade, well what do you need for 
that? Well, you will you need to have some ability to analyse the credits, and you need 
to have a couple of transactors, but I mean having got the strategy it's fairly easy to 
implement and [likewise] the control mechanisms you need around, are fairly easy to 
implement. If you are looking at launching a new credit card where you are going to 
send it to 10 million potential customers, if that's for us, then the control mechanisms 
it had better be pretty tight. 
Do you think there are definite distinctions, in which case, between the wholesale and 
the retail as you called them, there are definitely different ways of controlling 
strategy? 
It's this rigour really. 
[Retail banking] is a very controlled environment, it has to be, because if you think that 
something like Barclay Card has something like 8 million customers for example, if you 
decide that you need to do one thing that requires sending out an extra letter, just the 
postage at 2Sp time 8 million you know quite an expensive 
It's more deliberate strategy as opposed to a emergent strategy. 
Is one of the influences on whether something is controlled the complexity of the 
actual business operations? 
Complexity - no, its not really complexity it's - at a high level, one of the problems in 
tenns of your question is that it depends on what level we actually look at strategy 
because when you are looking at the various banks you are looking at a portfolio of 
businesses... If we go back to, if we take any of the major banks there is an overall 
strategy for the bank in tenns what they believe, what the past present and future is, 
etc., but within that there is a whole series of businesses each with different degrees. 
But going back to what you are looking for in tenns of this control versus strategy 
balance, there are different degrees depending upon the business of controls over the 
strategy, and in some, there is a very deliberate long term strategy, because there is ... 
the infrastructure to put down, lay down, etc. - and certain high volume product 
businesses, I mean if you are in cash management or securities or trade services, they 
are long term businesses - so you just don't go and join CHAPS for the next 6 months! 
The cost of entry into those businesses [makes these unfeasible]. 
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Lets talk about culture, what sort of culture do British banks have, is there such a 
thing as a British bank culture, or is it a Barclays culture, a NatWest culture? 
I would hesitate to say; this is a very complex situation these days because most 
organisations tend to be a bit of a "melting pot". I think that one of the observations 
from your standpoint, is that there are increasingly different people coming into and 
out of the organisation, people come with different cultural values so it makes it more 
difficult from a strategic control standpoint. You have to find ways to indoctrinate and 
control the organisation that's been changing because you are getting these new people 
coming in. Whereas when you have a fairly static organisation its fairly easy to 
indoctrinate people and to maintain a balance. Now in terms of the culture there is -
change within banking. Then there are obviously individual country characteristics and 
then there are individual bank characteristics. 
In that order? 
Yes. If you look at a lot of ideas, a lot of thinking, you could look at the concept of 
shareholder value or something, now there may be some earlier adopters, adapters, like 
Lloyds Bank, Barclays, essentially there is a lot of change that as happened in the US, 
that has come over to the UK and then probably moves into Scandinavia, then filters 
southwards, but the same thing could be said for looking at privatisation or something 
and, I don't know whether it is true in terms of banking cycles, in terms of actual 
economies, looking at bad debts maybe, but a lot of the thinking in terms the way 
people think about business - going back to strategy a lot of the new things in terms of 
- that we went back to look at these Chief Executives reports and said: what's in the 
reports today, and what's going to be in the reports tomorrow and you can see this 
sort of creeping across a doctrine of a sort of new thinking. 
Do you think banks are reviewingformulated strategy to see ifit still valuable? 
Yes. There is a question about the degree of formulation so -going back to the mission 
statement, missions in general are very general I want to be whatever, and it's in the 
business definition that there is a constant review going on, with [many questions being 
asked, such as] which customer, which products, what is viable, what isn't viable, what 
is appropriate or not? 
Are they reviewing the implementation of strategy to say whether it should be stopped, 
continued? 
In terms ofliability there is the review of business interests. From time to time there 
are sort of macro reviews that take place or events that occur, for example something 
like Lloyds TSB merger, it obviously causes a significant rethink of the business. 
What about the actual feedback of strategic progress, is it being reported back, are 
people ticking boxes oJJmilestone charts? 
Yes. The biggest issues in banking at present are: EMU, the Year 2000. Now if you 
are running the Year 2000 project, you have got to be in control in terms of what's 
going on. Now what I am saying is most of the larger projects are structured so there 
is feedback. .. Again it depends on whether we are talking deliberate projects, short 
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tenn projects that in terms of the businesses necessitate major changes, major systems 
changes, etc ... There are feedback loops, but the feedback loops will vary. 
Are they checking to see whether the feedback they've got is appropriate, or the 
control systems they have are appropriate? 
At the end of the day what distinguishes different organisations is their ability to think, 
and there ability to actually implement a clear mandate, so your question, I don't think 
is a question of some are some aren't, it's a question of the degree to which they can. 
Some organisations basically are innovators: things are fonned, they write the control 
process the procedures and the things that go with it and they do it. Now other·-
organisations are more followers, basically they are getting hold of ideas: they hire 
consultants who come along and basically tell them what other people are doing -that's 
being very harsh but all I am saying is that there are different people at different stages 
here. Going back to the control processes the basic control processes are fairly similar 
and in the regulated industry remember there is the overall Bank of England 
supervision which covers the general strategy of banks, controls, etc., so there are 
various outside pressures as well which impact upon what's being thought out. 
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Appendix 4: Excerpts of an Interview with a French Academic 
Introduction 
The interviewee is based at a leading French Business School and has written various 
influential publications on the subject of strategic control. 
Commentary 
I think this notion that you probably have a national subsidiary level and then the 
branch or a sub unit level within each of the subsidiaries probably allows for a more 
interesting research design and then you can really look at this question of what is 
localised versus what isn't. In my mind if you want to put this on a slightly more 
learning orientation if you wish, I think the critical challenge for most of the financial 
companies in trying to address that question is, how do you create the mechanism, or 
which process do they use to decide which global rules or which of my own rules I 
follow or I break and similarly which of the local rules I identify and then I decide to 
follow or to break, and I think that is the interesting dilemma. In other words if you 
are going to go back and kind of take, you know "when in Rome do it like the 
Romans", you basically lose some of the advantages of the integrated multinational 
operation. At the same time I guess if you try to manage the branches in Southern 
Portugal in exactly the same way as you do in Britain, or Northern England, its not 
quite clear that it will work. I think part of what I see in multinational control for that 
kind of corporation, is to push together a little learning of the applicability ofthe global 
rules and the learning of the reality of the local ones as well. When I say rules I am 
kind of fusing this in the broader sense of the rules of behaviour and not just banking 
rules, although those rules have their role. 
What do think, back at the actual national office -do you think that they are really 
pursuing strategic controls within their actual domestic markets, let alone other 
markets? 
I am not sure, you need to help me, and I know you raised the question but I'm not 
sure could answer, it depends on your definition of strategic control. 
What did you think of this idea which I put forward, that you have implementation 
control, premise control, strategic surveillance, and then sort of evaluation at the end 
and feeding back, so you have a feed forward system and a feed back system coming 
in, would you agree with that? 
That makes sense. 
What do you think strategic control is? 
What I like right now, but that's probably because I have just read it recently, there is a 
book by the guy Robert Simons at Harvard called Levers of Control which I think is 
probably about, so far to me, the best. It's the best treatise there is. So far it's the best 
description of analysis of strategic control that I have seen. 
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... now you see it deals with something which is perhaps more fluid than in retail 
banking ... but still even if you look at retail banking and how you position yourself in 
a given country, whether you go for multiple positioning, whether you can actually go 
into mass markets verses private, I mean there are many definitions about what retail 
banking is all about, you know, where does retail stop and where does corporate start 
and also if you are in a retail or in corporations then how do you connect that with 
other services indeed like foreign exchange and other things which are perhaps primary 
or secondary. So I think there is enough richness there. 
Another way to think about it is almost, but it is highly consistent with the Simons 
approach, is to take the kind of view to widen a bit the notion of strategic control then 
you go back and look at Bergerman Bower or Bergerman kind framework and you say 
really you have people in heads of units, you have people who play kind of integrators 
roles ... or you have integration functions and then you have some kind of detecting 
functions for the working of the corporation. You can think again about ... the various 
types of behaviour versus outcome, versus normative, versus instrumenta~ both. What 
are the modes of control and what are the tools and what are the assumptions built into 
those tools, in terms of how they - what kind of premises or what kind of presumptions 
they have around the nature of the behaviour, the room for freedom and 
entrepreneurship locally and also the nature of the dialogue ... It's also partly, I think, 
an issue of saying where do you want them, how do you want the dialogue to take 
place between the people who are at the induction or whatever, who represent the 
corporation if you wish and the people who represent the local entrepreneurship and 
part of the control function is to try to put the dialogue in as useful a way as possible. 
I think Bob Simon makes the point in various places by saying: there is a piece of the 
. control which is kind of functiona~ which is saying you need a certain kind of control 
system for numbers and so on, that's interesting in its own right, but it's not quite so 
interesting as thinking about what are the pieces that favour dialogue, and I always get 
for instance, into an argument with different companies when you talk to sub unit 
managers - and their gut feel reaction for instance is to say: "WeR if I don't get high 
spending discretion or high investment discretion, then it means that I'm sitting with a 
bunch of petty controllers ... " and sometimes I say wait a minute, you may be right, but 
lets first try to understand a bit about how you communicate with and so on, and 
sometin.c:s there are absolutely right, and sometimes they are really kind of victims of 
mixed messages, and that they are much more controlled than you would believe, on 
the other side you can look at people and sometimes the way it really works is that 
people don't really control them ... 
So I would tend to say when you look at strategic contro~ the quality of the dialogue 
is probably more important than the mechanics of the management process and what 
numbers are correct and so on and so on. Now you are pretty careful with banks, 
because my sense there is there is a lot of control which really has to do with probably 
just the behaviour oflocal [banks] ... 
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What do you think about the idea of the story -as portrayed by Goold and Campbell, 
where they have three ways of generally controlling businesses: financial planning, 
strategic planning and strategic control? 
It's seductive, but 1 don't know what to use it for, it may well be that 1 don't 
understand it well, 1 think that the categories are intuitively appealing and you say yes, 
people want financial control and people want strategic control, and then there is, what 
ever they call it, strategic intervention -but what do you do with it, it is not totally 
clear? 
Now there might also be a market segmentation issue in banking which 1 am not sure 1 
understand. What you may want to kind ofthink through is what is the consistency, or 
what consistency is there or is there not between the kind of market segments that the 
bank wants to serve, and the type of mode or, if you want, where to play with Goold 
and Campbell categories, the kind of mode of control it uses. 1 don't know well 
enough, it's hard to say, because if I'm tempted, 1 was under the impression, for 
instance I did some work some time back, a little bit of work for essentially an aIIiance 
of farmers co-operative banks, and what they were telling me is across Europe at least 
the behaviours of farmers, is not all that different, so you could probably run a bank 
targeted at farmers with a fair amount of centralised uniformity- well at least you could 
achieve some level of uniformity centrally. 1 do not know if you take high net worth 
individuals, which is another segment that international banks have targeted, whether 
those people actually behave very similarly across countries or whether they are - and 
in some sense are very cosmopolitan- or on the contrary, you could argue are probably 
part of very highly differentiated local elite and local network, and if you don't 
understand the way in which those networks operate, you will never become an insider 
in those countries, you may serve a fringe clientele of a kind of international jet-set 
types, but 1 mean they are not -I am thinking aloud here -there is an interesting kind of 
question there. 
Almost going back to the kind of work 1 was doing 20 years ago, back to the kind of 
global integration, local responsiveness, segmentation of customers and then trying to 
think about their forward kind of control... - there would be an interesting question of, 
therefore, is there a uniform way of managing control or implementing control across 
various segments of!i given country, or do we want to differentiate across those 
segments, and there may also be a position, for example if I'm Barclays in Portugal 1 
may play to a different kind of customer and we may try get a different kind of 
customers than the local Portuguese banks would typically go after, but 1 don't know. 
What do think sets the tone for the strategic control, do you think it's the MD or the 
Chief Executive of the company which sets the tone ... 
To go back to my example offarmers co-operative banks and so on, I think one of the 
things that probably made those banks, I mean Credit Agricole in France, and so on, is 
that they were kind of built up from regional entities in their home base, so they started 
with, I think, with a greater amount of delegated or decentralised strategic control than 
something which starts as a very highly national bank and just opens branches 
internationally one at a time. So I guess when Credit Agricole mergers or buys or 
expands internationally, I would expect it to take the relevant approach, so I would 
probably say the development path are mostly historical. I would speculate that there 
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is a heritage dimension where you come from does matter and there is also a past 
tendency... 1 would say that's probably more important than the CEO's or individuals 
approach ... 
(Change of tape) 
There may also be some defining moments or defining crisis... 1 think one parameter 
might also be to say, are there failures of control or crises of control? [With the people 
then trying to] re-assert or re-centralise or even shift from one type of behaviour vis it 
vis strategic control to another. There is also another question or facet ... it's also part 
of whether you are in the learning mode or whether you have the right or the winning 
recipe? So in other words, what is the balance between actually learning and finding 
out the applicability of what you believe you know or the applicability of what you 
know how to do, versus kind of believing that you have it right. And what is the veto 
which you exercise ... it's also a question of what is the mechanism by which you 
integrate corporate or central values and identity, etc. It's back to the question of 
what are the uniform variants versus what is it that is delegated, elected, to be 
differentiated, versus what is it that the dialogue between the centre and the 
periphery ... 
To come back to your complication of the fact that a retail bank is within a larger 
framework: with the investment bank, corporate bank, capital markets all included, 
what do you think, do they influence strategic control? 
Probably. That 1 don't know. 
Well what about in other industries, do you just pick one of the business units within ... 
{interrupted] 
If you are an oil company, if look at strategic control within the oil industry: you are 
not going to run exploration and production in the same way as you run retail. 1 would 
argue, if you take my responsiveness integration or my global versus local business, 
again 1 would assume that in banking Some segments are going to be more local than 
others. 1 don't know how they are organised. Part of the problem there is the front 
office v"rsus back office, kind of problem in banks, the fact that there may be people 
selling, and the fact that there may be relational problems. You also have the fact that 
some banks are relation oriented and others are product oriented. That is something 
to be explored, 1 just don't know, you are asking the right questions: you would 
expect products to be cross national and then they have to be modified, taking into 
account legal and fiscal considerations, etc., at the same time the relational -I don't 
know, two retail banks are going to have a very different balance between being 
product oriented or being relationship oriented, they will also have some very different 
data infrastructure or information structure to support them. 
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In looking at strategic planning, it would appear that some organisations think about 
the strategy and writing strategic documents [and] they enjoy the exercise of writing 
the document but they don't necessarily follow the document? 
But that's the problem, because sometimes the value is in the process - you have to be 
careful, generating a strategic plan may have more value than the plan itself. .. I would 
be very careful to try to get into the discussion of what - forget about the tight 
definition of strategic control for a minute- but what is the nature of the dialogue, 
between the local sub unit manager and whoever he or she reports to. 
You may have the trappings of strategic control and some other people may not have 
the trappings, but they have some of it? 
And do you see dialogue as being the informal control mechanism? 
Yes. 
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Appendix 5: Excerpts of an Interview with a Leading Practitioner 
Introduction 
The interviewee is a Partner at Global Consulting PLC, as it will be called here for 
reasons of confidentiality. His particular area of work is serving their large 
multinational clients in the private sector, specialising in offering business management 
advance techniques in management accounting in the retail and fast moving consumer 
goods sector. 
The aim of this interview was to gain a flavour of a management consultant's or expert 
practitioner's viewpoint with regard to strategic control practices. 
Commentary 
J am looking at how companies control strategy. One of the key issues I'm looking at 
is when you go into your customers do they distinguish clearly between what is 
strategic and what is tactical? 
Well, let me say first of all that when we speak to our clients they often claim to have 
clearly developed strategies, but when you actually ask them to show some of them to 
you they are often not able to produce them, so I suppose a lot of people talk about 
things that they don't always have. Now obviously a very large corporation will 
always have a very high level strategy, but in our experience there is not always a good 
connection between a high level strategy and the way they operate their business. 
Very often the high level strategy is specified in terms that are not even closely 
measured at an operational leve~ for example they might set up a standard of 
excellence, saying one of our key objectives in the last two years was to grow our 
market share of 6.8% to 7.3%, but they won't have any recording systems to measure 
market share or indeed what's happened to the share of competitors. So very often 
their reporting systems are based around what is affecting the statutory accounting 
procedure., but their strategy is for quite understandable reasons often based around 
more qualitative things. In strategy mission statements people write even more 
difficult to measure things like - we will be the leading firm and what does being the 
leading firm mean? We will be highly effective and efficient, what does that mean? 
How can you know that you are, if you don't know what characteristics demonstrate 
that, even if you are vigilant in your progress towards it? 
What sort of process -if there is a process, would you say they use for strategic 
planning? 
Yes it is, in most large corporations they have pretty well developed strategic planning 
processes and they vary somewhat and some may use consultants for the process or as 
part of the process. 
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If you were asked to come in and introduce a strategic planning process, what sort of 
basis would you use, do you have a particular model that Global Consulting uses? 
We can do these things a variety of ways, most corporations Will have elements of their 
way of doing things and elements of where their information is or the organisation is 
structured in such a way that to a certain extent it seems to dictate the approach 
needing to be taken. But if I try to answer your question more specifically I would say 
that the approach that we would generally advocate to large corporations who have a 
diverse portfolio of businesses is one based on the creation of shareholder value and 
we do have a well developed product to help people set their strategy around 
increasing shareholder value, because I think most of the research suggests that in the 
long run it is this approach that is most likely to develop success. 
With shareholder value does that mean that it is predominantly based around 
financial criteria? 
Clearly shareholder value has to be measured to look at that, but I wouldn't like you to 
think that it was something that was an accountants numbers game, it isn't, its about 
evaluating the portfolio businesses you have and looking at their propensity to create 
shareholder value, their ability to realise shareholder value and how you should 
develop and invest in those businesses, how you should add other businesses to or take 
them away from that portfolio of businesses, so it is very much at the portfolio 
management level... 
What sort of mechanisms do companies use that you deal with or what sort of 
mechanisms do you recommend that companies use for monitoring their strategies? 
What we would recommend is that they should not see the strategy as a single event. 
What we would strongly recommend is that they see strategy as a process. It's like a 
wheel: identify the strategy, identify the strategy measures, review the strategy. Our 
philosophy would be that strategy is a continuous process. We try to get our clients to 
be very purposeful, to decide what they want to accomplish and measure what they are 
actually achieving. 
Would you be advocating that they come up with key performance indicators or 
particular milestones to achieve? 
You will find I think that most consultancies, or certainly as far as we are concerned, 
are very hot on getting our clients to be very purposeful and to be able to see what 
they planned to do and what they are actually achieving, because if you don't take that 
line, don't take that approach, then you end With what I think was something like the 
case in the 1970's where there were some big corporate planning departments set up, 
which were somewhat divorced form the mainstream business and they produced a 
great volume of strategic corporate plans which weren't able to be checked. 
With that in mind, do companies once they have formulated a strategy, do they review 
it to see it is still valid? 
Well, typically most corporations will review strategy annually. 
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You reckon it's an annual review? 
Yes, it's usually the precursor to the budgetary planning phase. Because from that 
process they will set out the groundwork for the strategy. 
What about the implementation process, they have got their big goal and they've got 
their mile posts for example, do they review their implementation process towards 
those mile posts? 
Well, as I say this is where I think sometimes things are not followed through as well 
as they might be. What we would recommend to our clients is that they should do 
that. Within the corporate pIan there are maybe two sets of things. Things which you 
achieve as part ofthe mainstream activity of your business, things which are to do with 
projects -like we will open a new factory, or we will develop our own distribution 
centre, as against we will increase our margins to 32% or our market share to 8%. 
Now those are two differences and one is a sort of a finite project and they should 
formulate a project plan for that and they should have milestones along the way against 
which they can measure their progress. The other ones are more as I say sort of 
ongoing methods and those we would expect to identifY key points in the reporting 
system, which cascade down through the business, so that if the objective of the 
corporation is to increase their profits or reduce their investments, then each of the 
managers in the business understands his or her part in what they need to do. As I say 
that is not always the case, sometimes there is a disjunction ... 
How and when is the feedback of strategic progress given to people, and who would it 
be given to? 
Well typically a major project would have a report back to the Board, through a sub-
committee. On the routine measures -we are going to increase margins or we are 
going to shorten the cycle time, something like that, then that would come through the 
routine reporting and maybe there is a possibility that sometimes people might lose 
focus on that, and may only be looked at again perhaps when the next corporate plan 
process comes around. It rather depends upon how seriously and how motivated the 
Board is to drive through these plans. Now some of the organisations which achieve 
the greatest ftteasure of success and transformation are those where the Chief 
Executive is very personal about these things and so keeps absolutely at the forefront 
of his agenda all his key criteria, asking why progression or accomplishment is not 
there. So I think it does to some extent depend upon the money: you can build it into 
the pointers, but unless somebody is focusing on it, unless somebody is saying 'hey 
wait a minute you said we were going to increase our market, we are only at one 
percent, what happened to that target?' 
You are painting me a very formal picture here ... do you not like an informal process 
at all, one which is slightly less set in stone? 
I think you might be overstating it somewhat, I did say to you earlier that you need 
feedback and you need to constantly adjust to what your competitors are doing, and 
what the environment is doing. If after 2 months the bank rate changes or something, 
the dollar-pound exchange rate changes, then clearly that is going to shift a lot of goal 
posts so you can't be rigid. That's why the right word is uniform -you have to have 
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some flexible processes and those processes would typically be I think reviewed 
processes where you would review your progress as you went along, that is what I 
personally see as good practice to have some regular review and adjust the strategy as 
we go along in the light of changing circumstances. Providing you don't allow the 
watering down of objectives, providing you don't sort of emasculate the objectives by 
continuously saying 'Oh well, something has changed, we will have to change things 
again' and then nobody knows what they are focusing on. Clearly though if there is 
some major event or somebody shuts down -take an example, Rumbalows went out of 
business, immediately after Rumbalows went out of business there was a whole raft of 
purchases on the High Street of electrical goods which then went out into all the other 
electrical goods suppliers, so it changed immediately their environment and their 
potential market share, so they would be fooling themselves if they if they immediately 
said 'Oh, right we achieved our strategy this year because our market share went up 
2%' maybe because somebody went out of the market that was a gift, so they haven't 
really made any progress, maybe they have lost ground, maybe their competitors have 
picked up more business in the market place than they did. 
With this sort of sudden change how would you recommend companies make 
provision for that? In a strategic sense, should they have a team on standby to deal 
with sudden change? 
I think the first step is to recognise it, I certainly don't think they should plan, I don't 
believe in planning for an enormous range of continuous events, because I think that is 
just a waste oftime. I wouldn't play God and have a whole range of plans for what we 
would do if the dollar rate does this, or what we would do if the interest rates soar, 
what we do if our competitors do that, etc. Obviously you look at scenarios but I 
think producing thousands of instances is a waste of time and equally if you every time 
something changed in the environment, which is a pretty regular thing, dash out and do 
a complete rehash of all the plans, then again that is a waste of time and I don't think 
of much great value. What you need I think is -number 1 in the process, you need to 
identifY change, not miss it, because it could be pretty important to you if suddenly 
someone/one of your competitors changed their situation significantly - a change of 
ownership, change offunding base, perhaps having the resources to open new factories 
or drop their prices or whatever it may be - if you miss that, obviously in terms of your 
competitive response it coul.:! impact upon your position in the market place. Whether 
you actually need to set up some team to do something rather depends upon the 
circumstance I think. I don't think you have a team on stand-by, again that is rather 
expensive I think what you do is you respond to the situation and either you use some 
of your senior management who by definition of people who have time to apply to a 
variety of things or in some circumstances you might call in externals organisations, so 
we might get called in, where someone might say there has been some big change, a 
sudden shift in the market place or consumers and we need some help to evaluate this 
and decide on what we should do about it. 
Does the control system itself. does that get reviewed? 
You mean the reporting systems are working OK? 
The reporting systems, the reporting indicators... the entire control system that you 
have introduced to monitor strategy. 
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We often review those systems when we are called in because nonnally people will 
start reviewing those systems only when something's not' working very well or 
something's not going well or something is going wrong. 
So you think it is a reactive event? 
Well I think it's two parts: one it is reactive, because people are used to saying if its 
not broken don't fix it -now the new thinking is break it before it gets broken or it 
might be too late to fix it! But yes, one part is reactive the other part I think is just 
part of the review process, that as part of the review process when you are looking at 
your progress against your strategy, you can ask yourself the questions like, are the 
things you are measuring and looking at giving a good guide and feedback or not or is 
their a gap ... 
All these various controls and measures which are introduced, does that in itself 
improve awareness of the companies strategy? 
Communication in corporations is perhaps one ofthe major issues that we have to deal 
with. I think most corporations realise -although some are taking it more seriously 
than others - that communication of strategies and what part every individual in the 
organisation is to play should not be left to just chance... We have all heard the stories 
of the Japanese car manufacturers and perhaps they show the way forward ... 
Let me show you a model of the balanced scorecard -I was wondering if you think this 
represents all the possible areas within an organisation which you would wanting to 
be controlled or monitored at some point? 
It's fairly comprehensive in the way you have approached it, it perhaps doesn't capture 
some of the more qualitative things used ... 
Customer satisfaction? 
You've got customer satisfaction. 
Well, perhaps its not meant to really, but it doesn't speak much about how your 
corporation seeks to add value -it's slightly mechanistic in its views, although a lot of 
things lay behind these issues. 
So, you would identify the key competitive advantages or something like that? 
Well, a strategy has a certain amount of vision doesn't it? 
(Change of tape -starts in the middle of the on-going discussion) 
Some of these things are slightly overlapping ... but no if someone was saying I want 
to have a scorecard to look at how my organisation was performing I think you have 
got a lot of things incorporated here. 
301 
Appendix 5 
You said that part of your role here is to work with multinationals, have you come 
across different organisations that because of their nationality view strategy and 
strategic planning differently? 
Yes, there is a probably true to say that different countries do approach it differently. I 
would say the Americans are high on analysis. 
Would that be a more financial analysis or analysis across the board? 
Analysis across the board, operational analysis - very tend to use vast quantities of 
data. I think UK based corporations tend to be a little bit more intuitive. These are 
grand generalisations, but I think Americans tend to be rather analytical. .. I think that 
you can't really talk about continental Europe, because you would have to talk about 
each individual country. But I think the culture and style indicates the way things are 
done. The French are very didactic and logical. So yes it does vary a bit, it is as much 
to do with their national culture. I think the management concepts of strategic 
planning are the same across the world, it's just how they are approached that differs. 
Do you go into Germany, as well? 
Yes we do. 
How do you view them and their thinking? 
When I said the Americans were analytical, the Germans make the Americans pale into 
insignificance in their analytical way of doing things ... So whereas if you consult to a 
UK or American organisation you say 'so and so, it makes common sense' with the 
Germans they will say 'Why, why do you say that, where is your evidence?' 
What about ownership of companies does that effect the strategy, planning process as 
well? 
Yes it does. You could spot the Japanese companies in the UK or the American 
companies in the UK. 
The classic textbook cases? We are more financially led and driven than the 
Japanese and Germans for example? 
Well maybe, but what I was more meaning was that the ultimate holding company will 
normally colour quite a strong style in the management processes, so if it was part of 
an American corporation the style of the corporate planning would be quite American 
based, even though its in the UK. So I think you do get some measure of the 
mediation of it, but a lot of it is enforced by the templates, the various forms, the 
approach, the requirements of meetings and the need to report back to corporate 
headquarters and so on. 
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What would you say makes a strategy worth controlling? Is it one which is perhaps 
based on competitive advantage or is it one based on whether it is an investment 
decision or whether their is political backing behind it or not? 
I'm not quite sure I understand the question. 
You would go along the line that all the strategies would need to be controlled or 
would you say there is a particular strategy which need to be controlled more closely? 
Well, you are speaking as ifthere were a whole set of strategies. 
You would say there was only one strategy? 
Wel~ it depends on what level you are operating I suppose. I mean there should only 
be one Group strategy but then maybe strategies of various degrees within the Group, 
but there should be a -strictly speaking if everything is done properly -there-should be a 
hierarchy of strategy. But there is no point in having a strategy is there if does not 
provide a worthwhile gain. It would seem to me that a strategy which was hardly 
worth controlling is hardly worth having. 
What I am driving at, is the measure the Board -who are trying to choose various 
strategies to go for and plumping for the best option of the company for various 
reasons- what sort of thing are they probably going to choose as the most important 
thing to look out for? 
Obviously if someone is under severe threat, its the survival strategy of some sort. But 
I mean really you want to create a strategy that is going to generate sufficient value for 
the business. So people are highly motivated to play their part in fulfilling that strategy 
and the best form of control is people who are highly motivated to fulfil it rather than 
having people that are going round like policeman checking up on whether they have, 
because the policeman may only find that nobody is doing anything about it. What you 
really want is for people to behave in a certain way as a consequence of the strategy-
change their behaviour and direct/focus their efforts towards a strategic ends of the 
business. 
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Appendix 6: Excerpts of an Interview with a Management Guru 
Introduction 
This interview was carried out in March 1998. The interviewee is Micahael Goold, a 
Founding Director of Ashridge Management Centre. He has written various 
publications on the subject of strategic control, these include most notably: 
Goold, M., Campbell, A. and Luchs, K. Strategies and Styles Revisited: 
Strategic Planning and Financial Control Long Rang Planning 1993(a), Vo!. 
26,~0.5,pp.49-60 
Goold, M., Camp bell, A. and Luchs, K. Strategies and Styles Revisited: 
'Strategic Control' is it Tenable? Long Range Planning 1993(b), Vo!. 26, ~o. 
6, pp. 54-61 
Goold, M. and Quinn, J. J. The Paradox of Strategic Controls Strategic 
Management Journal 1990, Vo!. 11, pp. 43-57 
Commentary 
Back in 1990 you wrote a paper in the Strategic Management Journal where you 
talked about the paradox of strategic control, do you still think there is a paradox 
today in industry at large? 
I think there is. I think the basic phenomenon to which I was referring to there is still 
relevant, i.e. companies on the whole do a much less thorough job of monitoring 
strategy implementation and budgeting. So I think there is still that paradox there. 
Do you know why or what drives this paradox, where there is a lack of rigour in what 
they do? 
Well, I think the most difficult aspect, which is what most people who have thought 
about it have observed, is what it is exactly that you need to monitor and what the 
nature of the strategic control process is. It needs to be able to pick up the things 
which are important but which still needs to be a manageable process -which isn't 
easy thing to do. I think also that it hasn't been built in so much into the management 
process and so it is something which has gone by default. 
So you see there is potentially some form of discrepancy between the management 
teaching and learning which hasn't necessarily been brought into the systems? 
Focus on it has increased over the last ten years since I started working on this and as 
it were at that time I knew that we were at an early stage. Since then the Balance 
Scorecard has been started, Schreyogg's work was done, although it was not so 
influential at a business level, Simons work was done and Eccles too. There has been 
some attention placed on it and I think that it is something now that it is higher up the 
management agenda than it used to be. But it is still not easy. 
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So how do you perceive the developments made by organisations toward creating 
strategic control systems? Are they moving towards your strategic planning type of 
philosophy or are they moving towards the financial control type of philosophy? 
I think the world has moved on since we did the original management styles work and 
I think that the viability of the fmancial control style a la Hanson that we were 
describing there, there are now not many companies that are adopting that style. 
What I think that has replaced that is the whole leveraged buy out type phenomenon 
and high powered incentives that is much the same kind of philosophy, which is 
trying to create corporate structures where managers have direct incentives. So there 
is that end of the spectrum, leveraged management buyouts, etc., has been quite active 
in the last couple of years. 
That's linked to the reward systems, the payment packages which are being paid to 
senior management? 
Yes, giving people lots of personal equity and making them get on with it. Those are 
the more strategic ends of the spectrum. But I think we have still got the same sort of 
issues which I wrote about in the book on the subject with the formal and less formal 
approaches to this, but I do think there has been some progress in terms of things like 
the use of strategic milestones, balanced scorecards and I think people do give more 
attention to those things now. On the other hand, there is still an argument to be made 
that you will never be able to capture in a few key variables all the things that really 
matter in the implementation of the strategy, particularly given the change in the 
environment you are operating in and given that a much less formal process of 
interaction is what you will need to pick up the things that emerge as being important 
as you go along. That remains an iffiportant issue. 
If I can perhaps pick up on some of the formal issues: do organisations use some 
form of validity checks to monitor the underlying strategic assumptions they made at 
the first stages of strategy formulation? 
I am not sure if I observed that as being particularly different now as to what it has 
been ever or for a long period of time. Obviously it is part of any strategic planning, 
exercise to try and think again about the assumptions upon which strategy is based. 
So you would say it is not a new event? 
Yes. 
What sort of methods do you perceive organisations to be using for these validity 
checks? 
Different things for different companies. I am not sure that I am going to be able to 
give you any tremendously (useful information) -we are getting to the level of 
anecdote now- it is not something which I am currently researching on or have any 
good research data on, but I am sure that anybody researching companies will have 
their own particular anecdotes. 
How do you perceive organisations evaluating strategic direction in the light of past 
events? 
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Same answer. 
In order to detect changes in the environment they will use various methods, but do 
you perceive any particular preferences in which methods they are using? 
I think the two which we have mentioned already which I think have got used wider 
in the last ten years. That's to say the concept of strategic milestones and trying to 
convert some time at the back end of the strategic planning process to identifying 
some strategic milestones. Although I think it has to be said that people do not fmd it 
that easy and that it is often a bit of a struggle. Secondly the Balanced Scorecard 
concept and variants of it, where people try to develop a wider range of performance 
measures. Possibly benchmarking of course as well, which is related and which is 
another tool that has become more popular. 
A lot of those of course have a balance between qualitative and quantitative; do you 
see that that balance is critical? 
Well yes, I think I covered that earlier in my remark about formal and informal. 
Some organisations prepare for times of crisis in terms of strategy and I was 
wondering how you perceive that as a fundamental part of strategic control or a bolt 
on extra? 
It's depending on the organisation, partly on the size of the organisation and the 
nature of the operation they are in. If you are a Shell then it probably does make 
sense to have contingency plans for crises, but if you are a small Midland metal 
basher then it probably doesn't. 
Should there be different strategic controls for difftrent business units in larger 
organisations? 
Certainly. 
And you would recommend this? 
Yes. 
How do you think these potentially different strategic control systems might be 
brought together so that there is some form of all encompassing strategic control 
system at the corporate level? 
We are talking about the review process really, aren't we? What I thought you were 
saying was that different businesses would say have different strategic milestones as a 
reflection of what was important in their particular strategy. At a higher level, the 
idea of meeting periodically to review the strategy against progress and against the 
milestones, that I think can be more common across the businesses. It's what you are 
looking at that needs to be different. 
So the system might be the same, but the content of the system is actually going to be 
different? 
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Yes. 
Do you see the informal to a certain degree taking over from the formal types of 
strategic control? 
You mean becoming more popular over time? No, I think again the reverse. 
So there is a drive toward more formal strategic control? 
Yes, to the extent that people are trying to layout a Balanced Scorecard criteria - . 
which is formalising what was recently more informal. 
And the types of informal control, how do you see that interacting with formal 
control? 
How do you mean? 
Well, if you have a move toward more explicit formal controls, with balanced 
scorecards, strategic milestones, etc., I am assuming that there would still be some 
iriformal control around that and I was wondering if there would be a need for some 
form of balance between the two? How do you suggest organisations achieve the 
appropriate balance? 
Well, I don't think I have anything to add other than to say that you would need some 
form of talk around the measures you have got. 
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Appendix 7: Excerpts of an Interview with a Leading Market Analyst 
Introduction 
The interviewee is a market analyst for a leading City of London equity trading fIrm, 
called here for reasons of confidentiality, Global Traders. His position is Director of 
Global Traders' European Financial Team, providing advice on the value of banks, 
amongst other fmancial companies, to their market traders and investors. 
-
The aim of this interview was to provide a flavour of how market traders and 
investors attempt to analyse a bank in making their investment decisions. In 
particular, the interviewer set out to explore whether the stock market demanded 
short-term fmancial growth or was interested in longer-term strategic growth. 
Commentary 
What criteria do you look at when analysing banks? 
We start by looking at the stock price today, at that particular minute in time and ask 
ourselves the question as to whether its price reflects its value. In looking at whether 
its price reflects its value, I can give a 3-5 year view or can give a 3 minute view of its 
worth, of the value of the stock. We look at various sources of information to help us 
in that: stock market information, company news, media news, information circulated 
and comment of the central banks, competitors reports and we talk to the organisation. 
We go to its market conferences, we attend the publication of fmal results and half-
year results, and we also generally network with members of the organisations on an 
ad-hoc basis. 
You have to remember that our aim is to make money, we are those 'capitalist pigs' 
you read about! We aim to make commission on buying and selling stocks and 
facilitating mergers. That's what our business is about. 
What do you look/or? 
We look at the stock, in other words the shareholder returns. We also look at the state 
of the company's strategic goals and whether they achieve those goals consistently. 
This varies from analyst to analyst. Let me give you an example of an example of the 
breadth of the views: there are two different companies BZW and Credit Lyonnais 
Laing. BZW's position is generally long-term and at the other extreme is Credit 
Lyonnais Laing, which has more of a short-term viewpoint driven by PIE [price 
earnings ratio]. The agenda is set by the institutional investors and not by the markets 
and their analysts. You need to remember that the long-term movements of a stock 
vary because of the buyers and sellers of the stocks, not necessarily because of the 
comment. 
Do banks 'sacrifice' other goals in order to meet the analyst's criteria? 
Some do -although they shouldn't! If they do it's misguided, it is only a short-term 
fix and the market will eventually find them out and react. 
308 
Appendix 7 
Why do they? 
A short-term fix at the end of the day never fools anyone. It might in the short-term 
solve some problems, but they will come through in the end anyway. It's bad 
management, driven by management's, senior management's, equity options. There 
is a view amongst some management that they are only there for a few years and then 
are going to move on, so they feel they will not be found out if they use some short-
term fixes. Hanson was the classic example. We wouldn't welcome their strategy, 
Global Traders doesn't look at purely the financial aspects, we look at the wider 
picture: we look for the economic value added. - -----~ ----
From your perspective do you notice that management styles are different amongst 
the banks? 
Management quality varies for sure. The analyst's job primarily is to assess the value 
of the stock price, but culture can be influential in determining that stock price. You 
can tell the good banks by walking in, it's self-evident even to the untrained. Any 
analysis of management style at the end of the day is a judgement call, done by feel. 
You can't really quantify it or rely on it too heavily. I look for a degree of insider 
ownership, to see whether the management is committed to the objectives of the 
company. 
A look at where the banks advertise can in itself be quite informative: HSBC 
advertise at Formula 1, because they are international, Lloyds TSB adverts are at 
cricket matches, because they have a national perspective. What does this tell you 
about their strategy? 
What is a bank? 
The concept of "what is a bank?" is a key question at the moment. Global Traders is 
trying to sell its view to its customers right now. So I'm not going to tell you, because 
we can make some money out of selling our view at the moment. I will tell you in a 
few months! I can give you a few hints though: you need to go back to the Bank of 
England defmition of a bank as an "authorised deposit taker" and you need to position 
it somewhere in between that and what ihe former head of Barclays said about 
banking: "it is a confidence trick". 
The best banks know what their business is. If you look at Brian Pitman of Lloyds 
TSB, he realised five years before everybody else that domestic banking was the 
future and not corporate banking. The other banks have been slow to catch-up. He 
had this idea, pushed it through, implemented it and sat down to build up a rationale 
for it afterwards. He was visionary, but he provided for long-term improvement in the 
share price by focusing on simple things. 
From your perspective, how powerful do you think the CEO is? 
They can change the culture of an organisation, but ultimately they are responsible to 
the stockholder. Don't forget that he is their representative. His job is to focus on 
running the company and to create value for the company and therefore the 
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stockholders. He is employed to have vision and do the job, otherwise he wouldn't be 
employed. The stockholders though are together the boss! 
Do you as an analyst prefer sudden or incremental evolutionary change? 
The answer depends upon where you start from. You don't want your investments to 
be too volatile, ideally you want the stock to perform by a few percentage points 
above the norm and to do this every year without fail. Evolution is therefore best. 
Traders though, I suppose, want explosive changes, because it gives them lots of 
opportunities to make money, their commission, on the fluctuations. -
Do you think your view of what you have told me so far is a typical one or is it just 
your own personal viewpoint or the viewpoint of Global Traders? 
No. Different analysts will have different views. When you speak to other firms you 
will quickly see this. In particular you will see that they are more or less long-term in 
their viewpoint than us. 
One last question, how do you see the future of banking in Europe? 
The European bank market is over banked. Market consolidation will happen, but it's 
not going to be easy. There are many different cultures, many different laws and 
regulations and on the whole I think it will take time. When it does happen though, I 
think it will follow the path of the car industry. In other words, Barclays' name will 
still be there, but it will be owned by Deutsche Bank, for example. 
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Appendix 8: Deutsche Bank Group Strategic Planning Framework 1997 
Introduction 
The strategic framework reproduced below follows that of the proforma sent to the 
management of Deutsche Bank's divisions by Group Strategy. It was supplied (in 
1997) to divisional management as a guide with the purpose of highlighting areas of 
'strategic thinking' that require some specific elaboration and analysis, and which 
together provide a succinct overview of the divisions' and SBUs' strategy that is 
looked at by the Group Board in their authorisation of each division's strategy. 
1. Market Position and Competitive Environment 
1.1 Market Position ofthe Strategic Business Unit 
(Identify the current Strategic Business Units of the Group Division and evaluate their 
competitive position in the relevant regional markets. Consider market share, growth, 
products/services and profitability.) 
1.2 External Influences on the Competitive Position of the snus 
(Describe the significant market trends which will influence the competitive position 
of the SBUs within the next few years. Particular reference is to be made to current 
and future trends in the economic environment, in technology, in the 
market/competitive structure, in regulation and EMU). 
Macro-Economic Trends 
(e.g. compare with brochure "Medium-term view 1997-2001" ofDeutsche Bank 
research) 
Technological Trends 
(e.g. distribution channels, production processes, information systems) 
Market and Competitive Trends 
(e.g. consumer habits, mergers, market entrants/exitors, non-bank competitors) 
Regulatory Trends 
(e.g. nationallsupranational regulation, taxation) 
EMU 
(e.g. chances, risks, costs, earnings) 
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2. Resource Based Analysis of the Group Division 
2.1 Resource Endowment of the SBUs 
(IdentifY the important resources of the individual SBUs of the Group division on a 
disaggregated level of analysis. Distinction is to be made between tangible and 
intangible resources, and capabilities. Characterise the resources in tenus of the 
categories indicated in the table. Resources that do not qualifY in regard to the five 
tests may be liabilities for the SBU. They are to be notified accordingly.) 
Tangible resources 
Intangible resources 
Capabilities 
Liabilities . 
Resources Demand Scarcity Appropriabilitv 
Does the Is the resource Is the resource Is the resource Can Deutsche 
resource create competitively hard to copy? hard to Bank capture the 
value to the superior? substitute? value created by 
customer? the resource? 
"Competitive "Non-
"Utility" Superiority" "Inim itability" Substitutability 
" 
Resource I 
Resource 2 
... ... ... ... ... . .. 
2.2 Valuation ofSBU Resources 
(Valuate the identified resources relative to those of the key competitors or other 
benchmark firms. Indicate to what extent the resources are and will be (,0mpetitively 
critical for the SBUs. Include also those resources which the SBUs has yet to 
develop.) 
I = not critical 
I = substantiallv weaker: 5"" substantiallv stronJZ;er S = absolutelv critical 
Which are the key How does the resource Is the resource 
resource competitors? rate vis a vis the peers? competitively critical for 
tbe SBU? 
(benchmark firms) 
SBUA (Name) (Score) 1997 2001 
Resource 1 
Resource 2 
... . .. ... ... . .. 
SBUB 
Resource 1 
... ... ... . .. . .. 
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2.3 Confirmation of Strategically Critical Resources 
(Name the resources which criticality for prospective competitive advantages of the 
SBUs. Differentiate between SBU-specific resources and those with relevance on 
Group Division level. Substantiate your choice.) 
3. Resource Based Strategic Objectives and Measures 
3.1 Qualitative Objectives 
3.1.1 Group Division Objectives 
(IdentifY and qualifY a maximum of five strategic objectives for the Group Division 
and the implications for the resource endowment associated with the objectives. 
Defme and describe your future Core-SBU-Portfolio with reference to the regional 
scope. Reconsider your future Core-SBU-Portfolio on the premise of a cost-cutting 
target of 10% within 2 years (base year 1996) on Group Division level. Give reasons 
for your modifications.) 
Strategic Group Division objectives 
Implications for the resource endowment 
Strategic Core-SBU-Portfolio 
Core-SBU Regional Scope Specification of Core-SBU 
Core-SBU I ... . .. 
Core-SBU2 ... . .. 
... ... . .. 
Potential modifications of the strategic Core-BA-Portfolio respecting a 10% cost-
cutting target 
3.1.2 SBU Objectives 
(IdentifY and describe a maximum of three distinctive strategic objectives for your 
Core and Non-Core SBUs) 
Objectives for Core SBUs 
Objectives for Non-Core SBUs 
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3.2 Strategic Measures 
(SpecifY the measures you want to indicate or already have indicated in order to 
reconcile the resource endowment of the Group Division with the strategic objectives. 
Potential acquisitions, co-operations, divestments, spin-offs, structural and procedural 
measures are to be disclosed. QualifY these measures particularly with respect to the 
following categories: continuous investment in resources; upgrading of resources; 
leveraging of resources. Assess them regarding their relative contribution to the 
realisation of the strategic objectives and give details about expected costs, inherent 
risks and the time frame involved.) 
3.3 Quantitative Outcome 
(QuantifY the prospective outcomes of the strategic measures as per 200 I provided 
they will be implemented according to plan. Use the ratios as indicated in the table. 
The 1996 figures will have to be extrapolated from the latest available data.) 
1996 2001 estimate 
- Gross Perfonnance 
- Risk Provisions 
- Cost/Income-Ratio 
- Return on Equity 
- Return on Assets 
4. Divisional Mission Statement 
i¥Ma 
(Formulate a divisional mission statement - half a page maximum) 
Source: Deutsche Bank Corporate Planning Department Information, Summer 1997 
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